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Abstract 
Abstract 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to examine the validity of the claim that low productivity 
led to a decline in Thailand’s competitiveness, and hence, to the 1997 economic crisis. For a 
decade from 1985 to 1995, Thailand was one of the world’s fastest-growing economies with 
an average real annual GDP growth of 8.4 percent. However, such growth was criticized as 
being simply the result of large inward investment and rapid accumulation of capital, 
leading to very little productivity growth, and therefore, being unsustainable in the long run. 
Worse still, the later surges of capital inflows came in mainly as speculative stashes, instead 
of as foreign direct investments in production and businesses. Hence, as predicted, the 
boom finally came to a sudden end in 1997. The economic growth statistics recorded severe 
contraction, financial market collapsed, the currency was battered, domestic demand 
slumped, severe excess capacity was experienced, employment deteriorated, personal and 
corporate income diminished, inflation and the cost of living mounted, and finally, poverty 
surged.  
 This thesis utilizes a stochastic production frontier approach to verify the claim that 
low productivity lessened Thailand’s competitiveness. This approach, unlike the standard 
econometric approach, allows the existence of technical inefficiency in the production 
process. It also, unlike other non-parametric approaches, recognizes that such inefficiency 
can sometimes occur as a result of external factors that are out of the firms’ direct control, 
such as statistical errors and random shocks. The period covered in this thesis is from 1990 
to 2002. This is divided into 2 sub-periods, i.e. the pre-crisis period (1990 – 1996) and the 
post-crisis period (1997 – 2002). The estimation results indicate a structural shift in the Thai 
manufacturing sector, from being labour intensive in the pre-crisis period to being capital 
intensive in the post-crisis period. The productivity level also improved post-crisis, as 
compared to the pre-crisis level, and is shown to follow an increasing trend. The low 
productive investment level in the pre-crisis period is identified as having led to the decline 
in the manufacturing sector’s efficiency. The thesis concludes that this low productivity level 
did indeed lead to the decline in Thailand’s competitiveness, and hence, to the decline of 
export growth, which was at that time the main source of Thailand’s economic growth; in 
turn, playing an important role in precipitating the 1997 economic crisis.  
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Introduction 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims of the Thesis 
  
The principal aim of this thesis is to examine the validity of the claim (Chainuvati et al. 
(1999), Laplamwanit (1999), Krugman (2001) and Kraipornsak (2002)) that low productivity 
has led to a decline in Thailand’s competitiveness, and hence, to economic crisis in 1997. 
Figure 1.1 (overleaf) is a simple sketch of a time-line of this 1997 crisis. It gives a broad 
diagnosis of the genesis of the crisis, which started with the establishment of the Bangkok 
International Banking Facility (BIBF) in 1993 that allowed private financial institutions to 
engage freely in capital account transactions. Stimulated by the outsourcing of 
manufacturing activity to Thailand from Japan and the Asian Tigers (i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Singapore) in the mid 1990s, massive capital inflows started to flood the 
country. Unfortunately, the later surges of capital inflow were largely speculative1, and local 
investors too were engaging in speculative investment2, rather than investment in the more 
productive areas of manufacturing. Therefore, Thailand’s productivity was seen to plummet 
(Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996 and 1998)), leading to sharp decline in its 
competitiveness. By 1997, the economic situation had clearly deteriorated, and the currency 
was heavily attacked by the currency speculators. Eventually, Thailand had to abandon its 
fixed exchange rate regime on July 2nd 1997, which triggered the worst financial and 
economic crisis the country had ever experienced. As a result of this crisis, 58 financial 
institutions and 4 commercial banks were suspended, leading to an economy-wide collapse 
of businesses. (A more detailed account of the crisis will be examined in later chapters.) 
   
  
                                                          
1 Phongpaichit and Baker, (1998) 
2 Vines and Warr, (2003) 
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Figure 1.1: Time line of the 1997 Economic Crisis (1) 
 
  
 Many analyses (World Bank Report (1993), Marti (1996), Tinakorn and Sussangkarn 
(1996 and 1998), Collins and Bosworth (1997), Sarel (1997), and Dollar et al. (1998)) have 
been carried out to estimate the pre-crisis productivity growth of Thailand. However, the 
results of these studies have been lacking in consistency. The empirical studies on the 
sources of growth of Thailand have created conflicting opinions about the two sources of 
growth, viz. factor accumulation and productivity growth. While some studies (Marti (1996), 
Collins and Bosworth (1997), Sarel (1997), and Dollar et al. (1998)) have argued that high 
productivity growth was partly caused by the openness of the Thai economy, many 
(Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996 and 1998), Krugman (2001)) have counter-argued that it 
was capital accumulation that was the main driving force for such growth. Tinakorn and 
Sussangkarn (1998) found that after adjusting for the quality of labour, in the period from 
1980 to 1995, only 16 percent of the economic growth of Thailand came from the growth in 
total factor productivity, while the remaining 84 percent came from increases in the factor 
inputs used. This resulted in conflict with the findings of Sarel (1997), who claimed that 39 
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percent of the total economic growth in the period from 1978 to 1996 was the result of total 
factor productivity growth. One of the explanations for such differences could have been the 
result of the different methodologies used in these analyses. 
 Most of the studies concerned with the measurement of Thai productivity employed 
the growth accounting approach (Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996, 1998), Sarel (1997)), or 
in some few cases, the econometric approach (Marti (1996), Sarel (1997). However, both 
approaches are subjected to some critical drawbacks. The growth accounting approach is 
usually based on the strong assumptions of constant return to scales and perfectly 
competitive market, which are often considered too strong for the case of developing 
countries like Thailand. Likewise, the traditional econometric approach, although it is able to 
relax these assumptions, is also subject to the limitation of not being able to allow for 
technical inefficiency in its estimation. This, therefore, implies that the only source of 
deviation from the estimated production function is caused by statistical noise. Such an 
assumption might, again, be considered as too strong for the case of Thailand, in particular 
during the pre-crisis period, in which technical inefficiency was thought to be high and 
persistent. 
 Hence, the use of an alternative approach to productivity measurement, which has 
not been used before in the case of Thailand, is proposed in this thesis. A parametric 
distance function based approach is proposed, namely the techniques of stochastic frontier 
estimation (Pitt and Lee (1981), Battese, Coelli, and Colby (1989), Battese and Coelli (1992). 
The stochastic production frontier is superior to the growth accounting approach in that it 
allows for greater flexibility in specifying the production technology. It permits the 
investigation of technical change other than that implied by the Hicks-neutral formulation, 
on which most growth accounting is based. Also, non-competitive pricing behaviour, non-
constant returns, and factor-augmenting technical change can all be incorporated into this 
parametric distance function approach. This approach is also superior to the traditional 
econometric approach, in that it allows the technical inefficiency components to be included 
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in the model. Hence, analyses following this approach are no longer subjected by the 
common, but scarcely tenable assumptions of the econometric approach, in which 
producers are always operating on the boundary of their production functions, and technical 
inefficiencies in their production processes never exists. In brief, the level of inefficiency can 
be the focus of attention under this new ‘frontier’ approach.  
 Another equally, or even more, important objective of this thesis is to measure the 
actual productivity level in the post-crisis period. Then the comparison between the pre- and 
post-crisis productivity could suggest the nature and magnitude of adjustments made by the 
manufacturing sector after the event of the crisis. It can also reveal evidence on whether or 
not the surviving manufacturers had learnt from the crisis, and had made efforts to improve 
their efficiency. It could also provide an indication of whether or not the country’s authority 
had worked out the problems taking place in the Thai manufacturing sector and had, as a 
result, taken appropriate action to remedy such problems. Moreover, in this case it is 
possible to examine whether a low and slowly improving productivity level was indeed the 
root problem faced by the manufacturing sector in the mid-1990s. We could then justify 
those claims mentioned previously that the rapid growth of Thailand was simply a result of 
factor accumulation, not productivity growth, and therefore could not be sustained in the 
long run. Hence, a possible preventative measure for avoiding such crisis in the future 
would be to focus the policy of economic development not just on the nominal growth rate, 
but on the improvement of the productivity level.  
 One important concern when making comparisons between the results obtained 
from two separated sets of productivity measurements is that productivity measurement 
can be easily influenced by many underlying factors (such as the source of data, and the 
methodology used in the measurement). Therefore, although there have been a number of 
productivity measurements made of the Thai economy (both pre- and post-crisis), none 
could be considered suitable for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the final aim of this 
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thesis is, then, to provide new measurements of productivity/efficiency3 levels that are more 
suitable for making objective pre- and post-crisis comparisons. This is to be done by, firstly, 
the employment of the data from the same source for both periods so as to minimize bias 
arising from any discrepancy in method of data collection. Then, these two sets of data will 
pass through the same process and criteria of model selection. Such steps are aimed to help 
minimize the biases that might occur from the measurement sensitivity, so that the 
comparison results are more robust.   
 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
The measurement of the pre-crisis productivity level of Thai manufacturing sector is, 
therefore, an important means of assessing the claim (Chainuvati et al. (1999), Laplamwanit 
(1999), Krugman (2001) and Kraipornsak (2002)) that low productivity was the main reason 
behind the decline in Thailand’s competitiveness, and hence, caused the 1997 crisis. 
Furthermore, the measurement of the post crisis productivity level is, as well, essential. The 
comparison between the pre- and post-crisis productivity level could imply improvements 
that the sector might have achieved since the event of the crisis. It might also be able to 
reveal some evidences on whether or not the surviving manufacturers had learnt from the 
crisis and improved their efficiency, as well as, whether or not the country’s authority had 
teased out the problems endemic to Thai manufacturing and had provided them with 
appropriated policy action.  
                                                          
3Efficiency is a closely related concept to productivity. They are differed in that the term productivity 
refers the ratio that evaluates relationship between inputs and outputs. It is a measurement of the level 
of production in an absolute term (e.g. how many units of outputs can be produced by a certain set of 
inputs). On the other hand, the term efficiency is a relative concept. It evaluates the degree of 
acheivement of the maximum productivity at a certain input level. In the case of this thesis, efficiency 
refers to an index that evaluates the level of productivity attainable to a maximum compared 
production level defined by a frontier production function. Nevertheless, as productivity and 
efficiency always move in the same direction, they are often a good proxy for each other.  
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 Unfortunately, although there have been numerous studies on the productivity of 
Thailand, (i.e. World Bank Report (1993), Marti (1996), Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996 
and 1998), Collins and Bosworth (1997), Sarel (1997), and Dollar et al. (1998), more details 
on these studies will be discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3), most of them only cover the 
pre-crisis period. And although the Thailand Productivity Institute has been publishing a 
monthly productivity index since 1995, these indexes are calculated using the growth 
accounting approach which although it is generally reliable, is still subject to the heavily 
criticized assumptions of constant returns to scale and a perfectly competitive environment 
(this will also be discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3). In addition, the measurement of 
productivity can be easily influenced by variations in the approaches of calculation, purposes 
of study, and sources of data 4 . Hence, results of two separate forms of measurement 
should not be used for comparison purposes.  
 Therefore, the objective of this thesis (as mentioned in the last section) is to 
provide measures of both pre- and post-crisis productivity/efficiency levels that are suitable 
for statistical comparison. This is to be done, firstly, by the employment of data that come 
from the same sources (i.e. the Annual Manufacturing Industrial Survey published by the 
National Statistical Office) for both periods of studies. Then, these two sets of data will pass 
through the same processing and evaluation criteria of model selection (details in Chapter 
8). Such steps are aimed to help minimize the biases that might occur from the sensitivity of 
the method measurement to data sources and evaluation criteria, so that the resulting 
comparisons are more robust. In doing so, an attempt will be made to answer three sets of 
main research questions. These are: 
1. What was the productivity/efficiency level of the pre-crisis manufacturing sector? 
Is it true that the sector had low efficiency, and its productivity level had not 
been improved throughout the period, despite the growing competition from 
the newly industrialized countries such as China and Vietnam?  
                                                          
4 Dhanani and Scholtrs, (2002), 
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2. What was the productivity/efficiency level of the manufacturing sector in the 
post-crisis period? Did it improve, or did it deteriorate during the 5-year period 
of study? 
3. What are the possible explanations for the difference in pre- and post-crisis 
productivity level? Did capital investment play a significant role in accounting for 
such difference? 
 
 In addition, in order to facilitate the pursuit of answers to these research questions, 
several sets of hypotheses (  and their alternatives )0H ( )aH are set up including (in 
narrative, rather than statistical, form): 
• Ho:  The productivity/efficiency level in the pre-crisis period was reasonably high, as 
the level of capital investment during that period was also high. Therefore, the 
deterioration of competitiveness, and hence the 1997 economic crisis, were not 
caused by low productivity productivity/efficiency levels. 
Ha: The productivity/efficiency level in the pre-crisis period was low, as investment 
made during that period were concentrated mainly in the unproductive areas. 
Therefore, the deterioration of competitiveness, and hence the 1997 economic 
crisis, were indeed caused by low productivity/efficiency level. 
 
• Ho: The productivity/efficiency level in the post-crisis period was lower, when 
compared to the pre-crisis period. 
 Ha: The productivity/efficiency level in the post-crisis period was higher, when 
compared to the pre-crisis period. 
 
• Ho: The deterioration in the post-crisis productivity/efficiency level was a result of 
the reduction in the amount of capital investment, due to the problem of the 
domestic credit crunch during 1997 and 1998. 
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 Ha: The improvement in the post-crisis productivity/efficiency level was partly a 
result of the increase in the amount of productive capital investment, despite 
the decline in the total amount of capital investment. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis Claims 
 
This thesis has aimed to push forward to a significant extent the research area concerning 
the productivity of Thailand, as well as research on the effects of the 1997 economic crisis. 
It claims to provide several new contributions to research in these fields. Firstly, this thesis 
is the first empirical study that provides rigorous measurement of both the pre- and post-
crisis productivity/efficiency level, estimated from the same source of data, and through use 
of the same process of model selection. Therefore, the pre- and post-crisis findings can be 
used confidently for comparison across periods, knowing that precautions have been taken 
to limit measurement problems.  
 Secondly, it opens up a new area of empirical research for Thai productivity 
measurement, by introducing the use of the parametric distance function based approach. 
This had never been employed before on Thai data. Most of the existing works on 
productivity measurements based on the data of Thailand have employed the growth 
accounting approach (Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996, 1998), Sarel (1997)), or in some 
few cases, the econometric approach (Marti (1996), Sarel (1997). However, as the growth 
accounting approach has suffered from the strong assumptions of constant return to scales 
and perfectly competitive markets, productivity level, measured by such approach, might 
not reveal an accurate empirical representation of the productivity level for Thai economy. 
Likewise, the traditional econometric approach, although it is able to relax these 
assumptions, is also subject to a severe problem of not being able to include the technical 
inefficiency components in the standard models used for such analysis.  Therefore, this 
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motivated the use of the stochastic production frontier approach in this thesis for such 
estimation. This approach is expected to fulfill the main objective of this thesis, by providing 
reliable and unbiased measurements of productivity level for the comparison between the 
pre- and post-crisis periods. 
 Additionally, the fitting of the stochastic frontier production function to the pre- and 
post- crisis data will not merely provide satisfactory productivity/efficiency measurements, 
but will also allow other parameters of the production technology to be explored. 
Embellishments like the cost-of-adjustment parameters can also be incorporated into the 
analysis to help explain the residual. In addition, the underlying structure of the sector 
(including the output elasticities of capital and labour) can also be revealed. 
 Consequently, the comparison between the pre- and post-crisis production frontier 
have enabled the examination of the effects this crisis had on the Thai manufacturing sector, 
i.e. whether or not the crisis had any effect on the elasticities of the capital and labour 
inputs. Also, by comparing the efficiency estimates of the two periods, it discloses the 
adjustments that have occurred in the post crisis period, which could be related to the 
manufacturers’ responses toward the economic downturn, the government’s economic 
stimulus packages, the IMF’s recovering measures, as well as the economy’s self-
adjustment process (such as the shakeout). 
 Finally, if the hypothesis stated previously about the problem of low productivity 
level and lack of improvement in the productivity is true, one important underlying problem 
of the economic growth process of the early 1990s (specifically, the issue of over-
investment in the unproductive sectors) can then be explored. By employing the technical 
efficiency effects model (Battese and Coelli (1995)) in Chapter 9, it is shown how to validate 
the claim that the pre-crisis manufacturing sector of Thailand was hurt by the lack of 
investment in productive sectors, thus leading to decline in the sector’s efficiency level. This 
therefore implies that the best possible preventative measure for avoiding a future crisis 
should be carried out by focusing on economic development; not just on the growth rate, 
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but also on the improvement of the productivity level. Continuity of economic growth that 
relies solely on the growth of input factors, without the improvement in the level of 
productivity, is impossible to sustain in the long-run: either the input resources would 
eventually run out; or the economy would ultimately run into diminishing returns5. Hence, 
in order to generate future sustainable growth, it is important that the relevant authorities 
focus on economic development, not only on the nominal growth rate, but also on the 
quality of the growth, i.e. the improvement of the productivity, technical progress, as well 
as, the efficiency level. Therefore, policy recommendations should be based on this 
argument.  
 
 
1.4 Research Findings  
 
The results from the analyses in this thesis reveal that the pre-crisis manufacturing sector 
exhibited a relatively low productivity/efficiency level. Also, the sector experienced very low, 
and, in the worst case, no improvement in technical progress at all, during this 7-year 
period from 1990 to 1996. These results were based on the fact that during the early 1990s, 
Thailand underwent a period of over-investment in the unproductive sectors (such as the 
real estate and the stock market), and that therefore the manufacturing sector was 
suffering from a lack of productive expansion. However, the efficiency level in the post-crisis 
period improved. Several explanations can be used to justify this finding. Firstly, 
immediately post-crisis, the manufacturing sector had to go through the shakeout process, 
in the face of wage rigidity. With the substantial reduction in demand, downward pressures 
were placed greatly on product price levels; therefore, firms were forced to compete with 
each  other  by lowering prices6.  Firms  that  had  higher  production  costs,  i.e.  were less 
                                                          
5 Krugman, (1994) 
6 Utterback and Suárez, (1993) 
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 efficient, would be pushed out of the business. This shakeout process continued until all 
the less productive firms were forced to exit the industry7, thus leaving the sector with an 
improved level of productivity.  
 Secondly, the reformation of the financial market structure imposed by the IMF, as 
one of the conditions for receiving the rescue package, had also benefited the Thai 
economy (in particular the manufacturing sector) greatly. Prior to the crisis, financial 
institutions had the tendency to make decision on loans based on the collateral (such as 
lands) provided by borrowers 8 . However, in the post-crisis period, real estate prices 
declined immensely, and therefore, banks turned to investment projects as an alternative 
criterion for their decision makings 9 . As a result, loans were made only to those most 
productive investments, viz. those that expected the highest rate of returns. This raised the 
chances of good manufacturers getting access to loans, as compared to the pre-crisis period.  
 Finally, after the crisis, the Thai government had implemented several industrial 
measures which concentrated on solving the structural problems, as well as enhancing 
productivity, in the manufacturing sector. These measures included the establishment of a 
number of industrial development institutes, and the introduction of two sizeable economic 
stimulus packages, one in March 1999 and another in February 2000. They were aimed at 
one key goal, which was to enhance the long-term competitiveness and efficiency of the 
domestic industries 10 , especially among the small and medium size enterprises, which 
accounted for 90 percent of the total number of establishments in the country. Such 
measures were considered to be very important, as the small and medium size firms in 
Thailand were generally facing common problems of the lack of sufficient funds and of the 
ability to carry out useful research and development. Soft loans, as well as taxes and tariffs 
reduction measures, were implemented in order to create incentives for private investment 
                                                          
7 Jovanovic and MacDonald, (1994) 
8 Warr and Nidhiprabha, (1996) 
9 Vines and Warr, (2003) 
10 Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich, (2000) 
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in some selective areas. Although not all measures were successful, as a whole, these 
policies should have, nevertheless, contributed to the improvement in efficiency in the post-
crisis Thai manufacturing sector.  
 Moreover, the results also show that there was a switch of the relative importance 
of the roles of capital and labour between the pre- and post-crisis periods. In the pre-crisis 
period, the Thai manufacturing sector was very labour intensive. However, the analysis of 
the post-crisis data indicated that there was a structural shift, away from being labour 
intensive, towards being capital intensive. Two additional arguments can be used to explain 
this finding. The first is the effect of real wage rigidity in the Thai labour market. Given the 
severity of the crisis, the post-crisis real wage level had not declined as much as one would 
have expected11 . Adjustment in the labour market had been largely channelled through 
quantity, rather than price adjustment. Thus the number of working hours in the 
manufacturing sector declined rather considerably (including the effect of more prevalent 
part time working). Hence, the relative dominance of the capital inputs became more 
evident, and resulted in the structural shift towards higher capital intensity. 
 In addition, this structural shift could also be explained by the sharp decline in the 
post-crisis interest rates. After the easing of the monetary measures in August 1998, 
domestic interest rates declined radically. Combined with rigid real wages, the relative price 
between capital and labour changed considerably, and thus, labour was substituted by the 
higher use of capital in many production processes. Unsurprisingly, the manufacturing 
sector demonstrated the trend toward developing into a capital intensive sector. 
 
  
1.5 Guides to Contents 
 
This thesis explores the productivity trend between the pre- and post 1997 economic crisis 
                                                          
11 Behrman, Deolalikar, and Tinakorn, (2001) 
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 in Thai manufacturing sector in its empirical aspect. Chapter 2 will explore the background 
to the research. It raises the issue of the decline in productivity as being the main factor 
leading to the crisis. This chapter also reviews some important empirical works on 
productivity and growth of the Thai economy. Chapter 3 will provide general background 
knowledge of the Thai economy. It starts from the period of laying foundation in the 1950s, 
and ends at the period of economic bubble in the 1990s. This chapter is included in this 
thesis as it is believed that in order to be able to develop a good understanding of the 1997 
economic crisis, it is important not to only comprehend the immediate genesis of the crisis, 
but also the more fundamental question as to what had gone wrong with the growth 
process leading to the crisis. The detailed accounts of adjustments in economic policies and 
political environments in the last five decades will be broken up into three sub-periods, 
including the period of foundation laying (1950 – 1973), the period of macroeconomic 
uncertainty, hardship, and turbulence (1974 – 1985), and the decade of extraordinarily high 
growth, speculation, and bubble (1986 – 1996).  
 Chapter 4 is devoted to creating a better understanding of the anatomy of the 1997 
economic crisis. It discusses the five main causes of the crisis including the slowdown of 
export growth, mistakes in financial policies, asymmetric information and over-investment, 
attacks on the currency, and responses to the currency devaluation. The time line indicating 
the important events taking place during the periods before and after crisis is also 
presented in this chapter. Then, the impacts of the crisis are examined. They are classified 
into two areas of consideration: economic growth, and employment. Due to the structure of 
the Thai economy, the analysis of the employment factor is not only conducted through 
consideration of the employment and unemployment rate, but also through the 
underemployment rate in which the definition of the underemployed person is the person 
who is able to work, and is willing to work, but is working less than 20 hours per week 
during the week of the survey.  
 - 13 -
Introduction 
 Chapter 5 provides an overview of the conceptual and methodological issues in the 
topic of productivity. Attention is given to the concept of productivity, its different types, 
and its approaches in measurement. Productivity will be defined here, at the simplest level, 
as the ratio of a certain output of goods and services produced to a given a set of inputs. 
The measurement of productivity is classified in several forms – the single and multi/total 
factor productivity, as well as the gross output and the value-added productivity, with each 
of them having their own strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the chapter will also 
indicate that there are several approaches in the measurement of productivity, both 
parametric and non-parametric. They are summarized by four main lines of approach 
including the growth accounting, the index number, the econometric, and the distance 
function based approaches. Unsurprisingly, each of them also has its advantages and 
drawbacks, with one approach being more suitable for some particular objectives. The 
chapter concludes by noting that the choices between types of measurement, as well as 
between different measurement approaches, are always dependent on the purpose of the 
studies, and in many cases, on the availability of the data.   
 Chapter 6 employs an Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) approach to examining the 
underlying structure of the Thai manufacturing sector. The EDA approach was first 
introduced by John Tukey in 1977. It is an approach for data analysis that is concerned with 
reviewing, communicating, and using data in which there is a low level of knowledge about 
its caused system. Following the EDA technique, it is important that before any in-depth 
analysis on the productivity and efficiency of the Thai manufacturing sector is conducted, a 
preliminary analysis aiming at the revelation of the underlying structure of this data set is 
first carried out. According to EDA, it is important to allow the data itself to reveal its 
underlying structure without making too many assumptions, so that the results would not 
be contaminated by these assumptions, and hence, could avoid criticisms regarding the 
neutrality of the findings in the more refined analyses to be conducted later on. This 
chapter also provides details on the data set that will be used through out the thesis.  
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 Chapter 7 and 8 examine the stochastic frontier production function method in 
detail. Their concerns are to provide answers to the main research questions posted by the 
thesis. Chapter 7 starts by examining the further technical development of the production 
frontier following the more general literature review presented in Chapter 5. This is to begin 
with the theoretical development of the early literature concerning the frontier estimation 
proposed by Farrell (1957), which has subsequently been developed into the deterministic 
frontier, then further extended into the stochastic frontier, where statistical ‘noise’ is also 
included in the model construction. The extension from the cross sectional stochastic 
frontier to the panel data frontier, as well as the extension to the time-invariant panel data 
frontier to the time varying panel data frontier, are also examined. Then, chapter 8 carries 
out the empirical analysis of the productivity of Thai manufacturing sector in the pre- and 
post-crisis periods. Some possible stochastic frontier models are selected and then tested 
with the Thai data in order to select the most appropriate models for representing the data 
set of these two time periods. At the same time, the computer software which is used to 
carry out the frontier estimations are reviewed, and compared. The software being chosen 
for the estimation in this thesis is called FRONTIER 4.1 developed by Tim Coelli, University 
of New England, in 1994.  
 Chapter 9 is concerned with an important issue carried over from Chapter 8, viz. 
that the post-crisis efficiency level in Thai manufacturing sector improved significantly, when 
compared to the pre-crisis level; and part of this might have resulted from the higher post-
crisis investment in productive capital. Chapter 8 indicates that there exist pre- and post-
crisis structural shifts in the manufacturing sector, as well as the significant improvements in 
the post-crisis efficiency. This suggests that there are some specific causes which affect 
such variations. Chapter 9 examines the relationship between capital investments and 
technical efficiency in the Thai manufacturing sector, based on the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model, in which technical inefficiency is linked with the variables that could explain the 
existence of such inefficiency. The post-crisis data on three categories of capital 
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investments (namely, the increase of investment in land, machinery, and office appliance) 
are used as explanatory variables. A negative relationship between the increase in a 
particular type of capital investment and the inefficiency level would imply that the 
improvement in the post-crisis efficiency level is made possible by the increase in that 
category of capital investment. It is shown in this chapter that the increase in productive 
capital investment, such as in machinery and office appliances, has indeed had a negative 
effect on the inefficiency term, thus verifying the claim made in Chapter 8 that the 
improvement in the efficiency level was partly a result of the increase in investment in more 
productive capital. 
 Chapter 10 elaborates the main findings and implications of the thesis. Furthermore, 
a summary of contributions, policy recommendations, as well as future research suggestions 
are also included.  
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Chapter 2 – Background to Research 
 
“Unsustainable situations usually go on longer than most economists think possible. But 
they always end, and when they do, it's often painful.” 
 
Paul Krugman 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is aimed at explaining the background to this research, and therefore providing 
rationale for arguments, as well as analyses, which will be discussed later on in the thesis. 
Although the relationship between the production function and productivity has been 
analysed since as early as the 1950s (e.g. with the work of Solow (1957)), in Asia, it was 
not until the 1990s that the link between production and productivity growth has started to 
receive greater attention from economists and policy makers. This is partly due to the work 
of Alwyn Young (1992, 1994) and Paul Krugman (1994), who alleged that the so-called 
‘miracle’ economic growth in Asia was driven merely by the accumulation of the inputs in 
the production process, rather than by increases in productivity. In other word, they (and, 
in particular, Krugman) believed that the newly industrialized countries of Asia have 
achieved rapid growth in large part through a remarkable mobilization of resources. The 
Asian economic miracle was largely attributable to an increase in the quantity, but not the 
quality, of the factors of production. Therefore, once one accounted for the role of rapidly 
growing inputs in these countries’ growth, one found very little left to explain.     
 For a decade from 1985 to 1995, according to the World Development Report 
(1997), Thailand was the world’s fastest-growing economy with the average real annual 
GDP growth of 8.4 percent. However, Thailand had also been criticized (Krugman (2001)) 
that such growth was simply the result of large inward investments and rapid accumulation 
of capital, with very little productivity growth. The underlying reason for this rapid growth 
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had its foundation in the Japanese economy, which in the effort to overcome the adverse 
effects of the second oil shock, had held down its exchange rate, and concentrated on the 
export market, in order to balance out the domestic economic downturn. In doing so, Japan 
managed to build up large trade surpluses against its trading partners, in particular the U.S.  
Unfortunately, such success had instigated the 1985 Plaza Accords, in which major 
currencies were realigned, and Japan was pressurized into revaluating (i.e. appreciating) its 
currency. Consequently, in 4 years after the Accords, the yen was strengthened by 89 
percent against the US dollar, resulting in the sharp rise of manufacturing costs, and hence 
affecting its export greatly.  
 The Japanese manufacturers, however, found their way out of the trouble by the 
outsourcing of manufacturing activity away from the country. In 1985 a famous slogan for 
Japanese firms was ‘escape the value of the yen!’ Many firms moved their manufacturing 
directly to the US and European countries, where they marketed the majority of their 
products. Others searched around for low-cost site in the Southeast Asia (i.e. Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia), where the supply of labour, as well as natural resources, were still 
abundant. Massive rush of manufacturing industries relocation started from then, which was 
made possible by two other factors: the liberalization of the Japanese financial markets and 
the government assistance in relocation for enhanced markets and lower production costs.  
 Later in the late 1980s, the early Asian industrialized countries (i.e. Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, and Singapore) have also followed the pattern leaded by Japan, as they 
also faced rapid expansion of their export-oriented economies. Similar to Japan, their 
current accounts have also exhibited large amount of surpluses, which have led to the 
appreciation of their currencies. Furthermore, the rapid growth of the economy had put 
much pressure on their labour supply, and hence led to the labour shortage situation as well 
as the rising production costs. Pressures were put on them to reduce these growing costs; 
therefore, they followed the Japanese in outsourcing their productions to the Southeast 
Asian countries. Consequently, the Thai economy benefited from such relocation, and the 
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process of developing into the light and medium, labour-intensive industrial economy kicked 
off. The products Thailand specialized at, during that time, were the production of garment, 
footwear, consumer electrics, and automotive.  
 While the increase in foreign investment was impressive, the upsurge in local 
investment was far greater. Foreign investment accounted for only one-eighth of the 
increased in the total investment between 1985 and 1990 (Phongpaichit and Baker (1998)). 
Thai export products were no longer limited to textiles and electronics, which were the 
principal migrants’ products from Japan and the Asian Tigers (i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Singapore), but also included jewellery, leather goods, wood products, 
processed foods, computer components, and auto parts. In a decade from 1985 to 1995, 
manufactured exports multiplied twelve times and drove up total exports by seven times1. 
Such growth in export was so impressive that in 1993, the World Bank highlighted Thailand 
as a case which ‘shows how openness towards foreign investment, combined with export 
orientation, can contribute to a dynamic export-push strategy’2.  However, unlike in the 
period from 1986 to 1992, the later surges of capital inflows were no longer directed as 
foreign direct investments in productions and businesses. Most of them, instead, came as 
portfolio funds, merchant banking loans, and speculative stashes – forms of capital which 
could move in and out at the speed of an electronic transfer. It was simply for the reason 
that Thailand, at that time, seemed particularly attractive for such speculative investments. 
The interest rates were high. The currency was tightly pegged with other major currencies 
and, therefore, removed any currency risk. Moreover, the economy was growing at one of 
the most favourable speeds ever seen in history (with the average GDP growth of 9.52 
percent per annum). As a result, a bright future was predicted for the country. In early 
1995, The Economist projected that Thailand would become the world’s eighth largest 
economy by 2020. And even on the eve of the economic downturn in 1997, the IMF was 
                                                          
1 World Development Report, (1997) 
2 World Bank Report, (1993) 
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still praising Thailand as having ‘remarkable economic performance’ and ‘consistent record 
of sound macroeconomic performance’. 
 
Figure 2.1: Time line of the 1997 Economic Crisis (2) 
 
 
2.2 Genesis to the Crisis 
 
Against the above background, the local financial industry, as well as local firms, gorged on 
the inflows, as they could not resist the temptation to leverage with loans that appeared so 
cheap. The situation was worsened when the government at that time failed to control the 
amount of inflows, and worst of all, failed to direct them towards productive uses. As shown 
in Figure 2.1, these surges of capital inflow were facilitated by the establishment of the 
Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) in 1993, with its role to facilitate the flow of 
foreign currency current account transaction. Foreign capital inflow no longer needed 
approval from the Bank of Thailand (BOT). Financial institutes with the BIBF license were 
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allowed to carry out foreign currency account transactions freely. With a large number of 
private financial institution directly involved in the capital account transactions, it had 
become much more difficult for the BOT to monitor and regulate such activities.  
 Moreover, this relaxation of the foreign exchange control combined with the 
country’s fixed exchange rate regime had resulted in a massive wave of foreign capital 
inflow into the country, following the virtually risk-free currency environment3 . Financial 
institutions saw the profit opportunities of borrowing at a much cheaper rate offshore, and 
then lending them at higher domestic rates. The average discrepancy between the deposit 
and the lending rate was as high as 4 percentage points (4 times bigger than the spread of 
less than 1 percent in the banking system of many developed economies). The period from 
1993 to 1996 had become the prime years for Thai banking sectors; Thai banks were 
ranked among the world’s most profitable banks. As a result, more than 50 banks and non-
bank financial institutions were established during that period. In order to compete with 
each other, financial institutions lowered their requirements for loans, and started to engage 
in very risky lending behaviours. 
 With easy loans, local entrepreneurs plunged into over-ambitious investment 
schemes, such as gigantic real estate projects. As Pongpaichit and Baker (1998) put it, ‘too 
much was squandered on condos for housing mosquitoes.’ Such massive inflows threw the 
Thai economy off balance, making investors (both domestic and foreign) overlook the fact 
that Thailand must grow through trade, not through money games and concrete fantasies4.  
 Therefore, it was no surprise that the boom finally came to an end in 1996/1997. 
Only few were mesmerized into believing that Thailand would escape the business cycle, 
although unfortunately, those few seemed to include quite a large number of Thai 
entrepreneurs. Many had predicted that Thailand’s engine of export growth would falter, 
because of rising wages, increased competition, and strains on infrastructure and human 
                                                          
3 Doner and Ramsay, (1999) 
4 Pongpaichit and Baker (1998) 
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resources. Hence, the downturn was very much expected. However, it was the severity of it 
that was astounding. Figure 2.1 shows that in 1996, export growth slumped from over 20 
percent to ‘zero’ percent, as well as the stock market had lost two-thirds of its value. By 
1997, the economic growth had recorded contraction with the growth rate falling lower than 
in any year since the country’s reasonable statistics have been compiled. The currency was 
battered by speculators into a sharp depreciation; and finally on July 2nd, the fixed exchange 
rate regime had to be abandoned. The currency was severely devalued, from around 25 
Baht per US dollar to its lowest value of 48.80 Baht per dollar in December 1997. Fifty-eight 
financial institutions and four commercial banks were suspended. This large scale failure of 
financial institutions had led to a very tight liquidity condition, and combined with the 
decrease in domestic demand, these had caused widespread collapse and insolvency of 
domestic businesses. Many industries found themselves in severe excess capacity and 
attempted to shake out employees, which led to an immense increase in the number of 
unemployment and underemployment5. The substantial decrease in income resulted in the 
reduction of personal consumption, which again reduced the market demand even further. 
Also, the reduction in personal and corporate income had lessened government revenue and, 
therefore, government spending, which in turn reduced the total output of the economy. 
Furthermore, the drastic currency depreciation along with the liquidity crunch brought about 
inflation and increased cost of living. Finally, by August 1997, the IMF had to be called in to 
arrange its second-largest-ever bailout in its history.   
 
 
2.3 The Crisis and Productivity  
 
Among many elements which led to this crisis, the decline in the productivity of Thai 
economy was most often blamed. Productivity was commonly seen as the cornerstone of 
                                                          
5 Paitoonpong, (2002) 
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the economic growth. Economic growth could come from both an increase in factor 
accumulation and an increase in productivity level. However, Krugman (1994) argued that 
as countries become more developed and move closer to their limits of factor accumulation, 
in order to sustain the economic growth, they had to rely more and more on increasing 
productivity. Failing to do so would eventually lead to a stagnant growth rate as the 
increase in inputs would inevitably run into diminishing returns.  
 In the case of Thailand, unfortunately, by the mid 1990s, the economy had seemed 
to reach its limit of factor accumulation (Sussangkarn (1998), Phongpaichit and Baker 
(1998)). The country’s saving fell short of financing the massive surge of investments, and 
hence, driven up the interest rates. Also, the rapid growth of the economy had put strain on 
the labour supply. Consequently, the growing demand for labour had led to a significant 
increase in real wage, a phenomenon seen before in Japan and the Asian tiger economies 
(i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore). A natural way around this problem 
would be to upgrade the production technology in order to increase labour productivity6. As 
mentioned in a recent World Bank cross-country study of determinants of productivity 
growth by Ahmed and Miller (2002), they found that investment with additional effects 
resulting from technological change was the most important determinant of productivity 
growth for low- and middle-income economies.  
 Unfortunately for Thailand, during the mid 1990s, the improvement in the 
productivity was, however, prevented by the immense level of unproductive and speculative 
investments in the private sector (Phongpaichit and Baker (1998)). Therefore, with neither 
improvement in productivity nor advancement in the technology, the Thai manufacturing 
sector lacked the ability to develop into the more technological oriented segments, and thus, 
was left competing in the labour-intensive sector. With higher cost of labour compared to 
the newly industrialized economies (i.e. China and Vietnam), the competitiveness of Thai 
                                                          
6 Paitoonpong (2002) 
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manufacturing sector inevitably declined. As suggested in the Nukul’s Commission report7, 
the weakening in export growth of 1996 had sent a clear signal to the international currency 
speculators that the Thai economy was facing deep-rooted fundamental problems, and the 
rapid growth of the economy would soon come to a halt. Seizing such opportunity, currency 
speculators launched severe attacks on the Baht, as it was expected that the Thai 
authorities would soon adjust the exchange rate, in order to deal with the economic 
difficulties. On July 2nd 1997, the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned and the 
country plunged into the deepest economic recession in its history.  
 
 
2.4 Total Factor Productivity Measurements in Thailand 
 
As mentioned earlier in section 1.1, many analyses had been carried out in order to examine 
the productivity growth of Thailand in the pre-crisis period. However, the results of these 
analyses were far from unison. This section is devoted to the review of these works, and 
also, to suggest possible explanations for the divergent in these findings.    
 The empirical studies on the sources of growth during the period from 1985 to 1995 
have created a conflicting view between factor accumulation and productivity growth. While 
some studies (i.e. Sarel (1997) and Dollar et al. (1998)) recognized high productivity growth 
associated with openness as part of the explanations for Thailand’s rapid growth, others 
(including Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996, 1998)) argued that it was the capital 
accumulation that played the significant role. Table 2.1 shows some results from the 
previous studies. Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996) found that after adjusting for the quality 
of labour, during the period from 1978 to 1990, only 16 percent of the economic growth 
came from the growth in total factor productivity, while the remaining 84 percent came  
                                                                                                                                                                   
7 Nukul’s Commission Tasked with Making Recommendations to Improve the Efficiency and 
Management of Thailand’s Financial System, (1998) 
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Table 2.1: Total Factor Productivity Growth in Thailand 
Whole Economy Manufacturing Source Time 
Period TFP Contribution to 
Growth 
TFP Contribution to 
Growth 
Methodology and 
Type of Data 
Remarks 
World Bank (1993) 1960-1990 2.5 N/A N/A N/A Parametric,  
Time Series 
Full Sample 
 1960-1990 0.5 N/A N/A N/A Parametric,  
Time Series 
High-Income 
Marti (1996) 1970-1990 1.6 42.5 N/A N/A Parametric,  
Panel Data 
 
Tinakorn & 
Sussangkarn (1996) 
1978-1990 2.7 36 0.4 4.4 Growth Accounting, 
Time Series 
1972 Prices 
  (1.2) (16) (-0.4) (-4.1)  Adjusted* 
 1981-1990 3.1 39 1.2 13.1 Growth Accounting, 
Time Series 
1972 Prices 
  (2.5) (32) (0.9) (9.1)  Adjusted* 
 1981-1990 2.8 37 1.9 19.0 Growth Accounting, 
Time Series 
1988 Prices 
  (2.2) (29) (1.6) (15)  Adjusted* 
Collins and 
Bosworth (1997) 
1960-1994 1.8 36.0 N/A N/A Parametric,  
Panel Data 
 
Tinakorn & 
Sussangkarn (1998) 
1981-1995 2.1 26 1.1 10.5  Unadjusted 
  (1.3) (16) (-0.1) (-1.2)  Adjusted* 
 1986-1990 N/A N/A 3.8 N/A  Unadjusted 
    (4.0)   Adjusted* 
 1991-1995 N/A N/A -0.6 N/A  Unadjusted 
    (-3.1)   Adjusted* 
Sarel (1997) 1978-1996 2.0 39 N/A N/A Econometric/ 
Growth Accounting, 
Panel Data 
 
 1991-1996 2.3 35 N/A N/A Econometric/ 
Growth Accounting, 
Panel Data 
 
Source: Tinakorn and Sussankarn (1998) and SME Technical Working Paper Series, No. 8 
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from the increase in factor inputs used. Repeating this exercise with the revised data for the 
period from 1980 to 1995, Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1998) found that the unadjusted 
total factor productivity growth contributed around 20 percent to the overall GDP growth, 
and declined to just 10 percent in the manufacturing sector.  When adjusted for the 
increase in labour quality, this figure turned into a negative value for the manufacturing 
sector, indicating the worsening of productivity. In contrast, Sarel (1997) indicated a much 
more respectable productivity growth for the period from 1978 to 1996.   He estimated that 
productivity was growing at the rate of 2 percent per annum, and accounted for 39 percent 
of the aggregate economic GDP growth. Re-estimating for the period from 1991 to 1996, 
the productivity growth rose to 2.3 percent, and explained 35 percent of the total economic 
growth. Another study by Dollar et al. (1998) found that the total factor productivity among 
the manufacturing establishments grew by 25 percent between 1994 and 1996.  
 There are several reasons that could explain such divergent findings of the pre-
crisis productivity level, including approaches in the estimation, sources of data, periods of 
study, and assumptions assumed. The first problem to be mentioned is concerning the 
methodology of the estimation. For total factor productivity, unlike in the case of GDP and 
GNP calculations, there is not yet an international standard, guideline, or methodology in 
which researchers can follow. Therefore, depending on the specification adopted, TFP often 
measures different things in different cases7. For example, the TFP calculated from gross 
output data could give an entirely different set of results from the one calculated using 
value added data. Details regarding this issue will be mentioned in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3.   
 Second, in most cases, the TFP computation demand a rather rich set of time series 
data on capital stock (preferably by sector) which are often lacking in developing countries, 
including Thailand 8 . Therefore, these studies on Thai productivity growth employed 
different sets of data from difference sources, and hence, leading to divergent outcomes. As 
                                                          
7 Dhanani and Scholtrs, (2002) 
8 Dhanani and Scholtrs, (2002) 
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a result, the comparability between these studies suffers greatly from the problem 
generated by data sensitivity. Moreover, the TFP estimates are also very sensitive to the 
time periods of study. As seen from Table 2.1, these studies all estimated TFP for different 
time periods, and therefore, diverging results are not unexpected.  
 Finally, many TFP specifications assume constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition, two neoclassical assumptions that do not apply in many developing countries. 
Dhanani and Scholtes (2002) alleged that, in fact, economies of scale occurred in the 
modern and large-scale production facilities were a major source of productivity growth. In 
addition, market power has also been found to be a fairly important determinant of the 
productivity estimations, as Kee (2002) suggested that when adjusted for the factor 
concerning the market power, the estimates of the average productivity growth in 
Singapore was doubled. These problems could, nevertheless, be solved by the use of the 
econometric approach in productivity measurement, in which the assumptions of constant 
return to scales and perfect competition are not necessary.  
 Even with the assumptions of constant return to scales and perfect competition 
being relaxed, this still cannot guarantee an unbiased measurement of productivity. The 
traditional econometric approach is, nonetheless, subjected to a limitation of not being able 
to include the technical inefficiency components in the model used for estimations. The 
conventional estimation techniques associated with the traditional econometric approach (i.e. 
ordinary least square, generalized least square) usually assumed ‘zero’ mean error 
component9. Therefore, this implies that the only source of deviation from the estimated 
production function is due to the statistical noises10. However, when considering the case of 
Thailand, in particular in the pre-crisis period in which the technical inefficiency is expected 
to be high and persistence, this assumption might be considered too strong. Hence, an 
alternate approach, namely a stochastic production frontier approach (Pitt and Lee (1981), 
                                                          
9 Green, (1993b) 
10 Hulten, (2000) 
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Battese, Coelli, and Colby (1989), Battese and Coelli (1992), is proposed for the estimations 
in this thesis (details for such approach can be found in Chapter 7).  
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Chapter 3 – Background in the Thai Economy and Polity 
 
“Policy can influence growth, either for good or ill, in many ways. The task is thus to try to 
exploit as many as possible of these avenues for good.” 
 
Arnold C. Harberger 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide detailed accounts of the development of the Thai 
economic policies as well as the political environments for the past five decades, from the 
rapid development of the 1950s to the bubble economy in the 1990s.  The economic crisis 
that broke off in Thailand in 1997 was the result of a complex set of deep-rooted problems. 
Therefore, in order to develop a good understanding of it, it is very important not only to 
comprehend the immediate genesis of such crisis, but also the more fundamental question 
as to what had gone wrong with the growth process leading to the crisis. Among many 
different explanations, some (Siamwalla (1996), Chainuvati, Nakavachara, and Kunjara Na 
Ayudhya (1999)) claimed that it was the result of the subtle imbalance in macroeconomic 
management, while some (Chalamwong (1995), Krugman (2001)) blamed it on the 
inadequate technological advancements in the right direction. Many others (Phongpaichit 
and Baker (1998), Laplamwanit (1999), Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich (2000)) also 
suspected that there were flaws in the design and operation of the political and social 
institutions, which thereby resulted in the overall economic system becoming vulnerable to 
major economic shocks.  The final answer to this question is difficult to obtain and agree 
upon; however, a better understanding of the historical development of the Thai economy 
should be the first step in pursuing such an answer.  
 The economic history of Thailand has been surprisingly global. Thailand has joined 
the openness of the world economy since it signed the Bowring Treaty in 1855. This treaty 
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had greatly limited the fiscal autonomy of Thailand by limiting its import duty on general 
merchandise to only 2 percent ad valorem.  Siamwalla (1997) alleged that it was precisely 
this inability to protect its industry which had delayed the Thai economy from industrializing 
until as late as the 1960s, despite it being involved in the ‘globalization’ of the world 
economy so early on. On the political side, throughout most of its modern history, Thailand 
had endured heavy military involvement in its political affairs. The political history since 
World War II has been punctuated by a succession of military coups and attempted coups, 
sometimes followed by relatively democratic periods, sometimes not 1 . However, in the 
1970s, the role of the military in civilian matters had become increasingly contentious as a 
result of the country’s growing urban, educated middle class, who began to demand 
democratic reform and reduced role of the military in the country’s affairs, both 
economically and politically. 
 Despite the political instability, the general conditions of living for the populace 
were rather unaffected.  This internal stability results largely from three main reasons2.  
First, Thais are united by a popular monarchy, who although has no direct involvement in 
politics, has always been able to stop, or at least calm down, any potential turmoil. Second, 
the majority of Thais share the same religious belief (i.e. Buddhism), which therefore 
reduced the possibility of any dispute to develop into religious conflict. And third, unlike 
some neighboring countries, throughout its history, Thailand has experienced very little 
racial conflicts. Ethnic Chinese constitutes a large minority group heavily concentrated in 
Bangkok, and despite some early discrimination, they are treated as Thais, and the country 
has immensely benefited from their entrepreneurial abilities.  
 Despite the political instability, the economic policy formation of the country was 
the opposite. Despite many military coups, Thai policymakers have been following the same 
economic philosophy of committing to economic growth. They all share equal belief that 
                                                          
1 Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) 
2 Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) 
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market forces combined with prudent public sector infrastructure investment should be the 
principle means for achieving the ultimate goal of economic growth. Therefore, although 
Thai economic policies have been far from laissez-faire, the prevailing view in Thai political 
circles has always been that the government should play only a limited role in the economy3. 
Hence, Thai bureaucracies have been maintaining the continuity of the country’s economic 
policies along these values. 
 Until the early 1990s, Thailand had followed relatively conservative macroeconomic 
policies shaped by a strong aversion to inflation. The inflation rate of Thailand had remained 
below 5 percent since after World War II, except for two brief surges associated with the oil 
shocks of the 1970s. Even then, inflation was quickly brought under control by stringent 
monetary contractions. It was common knowledge among the Thai financial circles that the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT) would contract the monetary policy whenever the inflation rate rose 
above 6 percent and would persist with this policy until the rate fell below that threshold. 
Such stringent monetary discipline is only made possible by the independent status of the 
Bank of Thailand.  The Thai constitution has made clear that the status of the Bank of 
Thailand has to remain as an independent agency, where decisions on the monetary policy 
could not be intervened with by political pressures of any kind. As a result, Thailand’s 
monetary policy had always remained creditable, and the record of monetary management 
was exceedingly impressive. Another central policy objective of the Bank of Thailand was to 
maintain a stable exchange rate.  The Baht was maintained at fixed parity with the U.S. 
dollar (although in some periods, with currency baskets comprising of other major 
currencies such as Pound Sterling, Deutsche mark, and Japanese Yen).  
 By and large, up until the early 1990s, the monetary policies of Thailand had been 
countercyclical and stabilizing. The amount of capital flows and the level of interest rates 
were very much controlled within the targets of the Bank of Thailand. However, the capital 
market reformation of the early 1990s (which was originally thought would help to enhance 
                                                          
3 Phongpaichit and Baker, (1998) 
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the country’s capital mobility, and hence, facilitate the rapid growth of the economy) had 
reduced the Bank of Thailand’s ability to exercise its stabilizing role 4 . Regrettably, this 
mistake has put an end to the country’s long history of monetary stability.   
 On the fiscal policy side, the bureaucrats of Thailand had always placed as a high 
priority the building of necessary infrastructures (such as road, ports, telecommunications, 
and electricity and water supplies), as they believed that only with good basic infrastructure 
could the rapid economic growth be assured. Besides, although the country’s authorities 
had been believed in market economy, some manufacturing protection policies had also 
been imposed in order to protect young and weak industries. The protection, for the past 
four decades since the 1960s, has been biased against the agro-based industries, and 
toward the industrial manufacturing goods5. Import substitution policy was used since the 
late 1950s and remained until the early 1970s, before it shifted away toward export 
promotion policy with the imposing of the new Investment Promotion Act of 1977. Although 
it could not be claimed that Thailand had been practicing unmitigated free trade, its 
protection levels were reasonably moderate and stable.  
 As stated at the beginning of the chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to provide 
the detailed accounts of the development of Thai economic policies and political 
environments for the past five decades, as the understanding of such developments is 
potentially crucial in developing the understanding on the genesis of the 1997 economic 
crisis. For this purpose, in this chapter, the economic and political history will be divided into 
three important sub-periods: 
1. The period of laying foundations: 1950 - 1973 
2. The period of macroeconomic uncertainty, hardship, and turbulence: 1974 - 1985 
3. The decade of extraordinary high growth, speculation, and bubble: 1986 - 1996  
                                                          
4 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
5 Jitsuchon, (2002) 
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Each sub-period would be examined in details. Section 3.2 examines the period from 1950 – 
1973, when some important economic foundations were laid that had later resulting in rapid 
economic growth. Section 3.3 considers the period of hardship which was triggered mainly 
by the two oil price shocks in the 1970s, and the policies response by the Thai authorities. 
Finally, section 3.4 considers the ten-year period of speculation and bubble, which had 
directly led to the economic crisis of the 1997. However, section 3.4 only provides an 
overview of the situation during that period, further discussion on the sources of the crisis 
and the mistakes in the economic management will be provided in Chapter 4.  
 
 
3.2 The Period of Laying Foundation: 1950 – 1973   
 
This period should probably best be described as the period of laying many important 
foundations, which had later brought about the high and stable economic growth for the 
country in the later periods. Throughout the 1950s, the Thai economy found itself in the 
state of recovering from the damages left over by the Second World War. The economic 
management during the most part of the 1950s could be described as eccentrically diverse, 
in which it was trying to serve many goals that did not seem to add up6. It was not until the 
late 1950s before the high economic growth of the post-war years really began, when Field 
Marshall Sarit Thanarat took complete control of the power through a coup d’etat in 1958.  
  
3.2.1 Economic Stability and Capital Formulation 
 
Sarit brought with his premiership a vision to run the country according to the international 
standard7. One of his first and foremost policies was to establish economic stability, which 
                                                          
6 Jitsuchon, (2002) 
7 Wyatt, (1984) 
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at that time was influenced by the arrival of the World Bank advisory mission in 1957, as 
well as the World Bank report on Thai economy sent to the Thai authority in 1959. The 
World Bank report found very receptive audiences in the government of the time, 
particularly in Sarit himself, and since then, many significant changes in the economic policy 
followed. This report had influenced Thai economic policies in two important ways8. First, it 
recommended that Thailand was in need of a fundamental shift in the nature of how the 
public sector involved in the economy. More specifically, it advised that government 
interventions should be shifted away from direct production (i.e. the extensive and highly 
inefficient public enterprises) toward investments in the public infrastructures necessitated 
for the economic development, such as investments in roads, ports, telecommunications, 
and electricity supply. Second, the report also recommended that the government should 
change its method in promoting private investments; it should rely less on the direct price 
control, and focus more on the provisions of the taxes and tariffs incentives, as well as on 
the introduction of investment promotion schemes.  
 In response to these recommendations, Sarit presided over a period of rapid 
institutionalization of various public units that was thought to be vital for the economic 
development. Two new units were established, namely, the Budget Bureau in 1959 and the 
Fiscal Policy Office in 1961. Also, two existing institutions, the National Economic 
Development Board (NEDB), later called the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB), and the Board of Investment (BOI), were revamped. The Budget Bureau, 
the Fiscal Policy Office, the NESDB, and the Bank of Thailand were assigned to jointly 
determine the country’s annual budget.  This is done for the reason of preventing 
imprudent behaviour that might occur in one particular authority. Such vision had later been 
proved to be a very important factor ensuring the country’s stable economic policy, in spite 
of the following political unstabilizing periods.  The government budgets at that time were 
                                                          
8 Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) 
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drawn up with the highest priority being given to development projects, primarily in 
infrastructure constructions.  
 However, economic stability by itself, while necessary, was insufficient to generate 
such high growth experienced in Sarit’s era. Siamwalla (1996) alleged that economic 
stability after the Sarit reformation was, however, allied with another process, the process 
of capital formation.  It was with the extensive capital formation coinciding with the lengthy 
period of political stability that such rapid growth could have taken place. The key to these 
changes, he claimed, was the incorporation of the Chinese entrepreneurs as a class into the 
Thai society after the closing off of mainland China in 1949. Prior to that, because of the 
more aggressive Chinese-Thai nationalism regime, the process of assimilation was 
somewhat more difficult. The nationalism arose because of the fear that the communism 
regime from China would spread into the country, and therefore, the military government of 
Thailand at that time put forward the anti-Chinese policies, limiting the Chinese 
entrepreneurs from engaging in various key businesses. The Chinese commercial 
communities, hence, adapted to the situation by forming business alliances with military top 
men (and it is these alliances that have laid foundations for business-bureaucrat relationship 
that exists throughout Thailand’s economic development history). It was this repression 
against Chinese businesses that had resulted in the outflows of a large proportion of the 
accumulated wealth from the Chinese immigrants to China. Fortunately for Thailand, the 
closing off of mainland China after 1949 and the modus vivendi achieved with the Thai 
political leadership had set the stage for Chinese entrepreneurs to redirect their energy back 
to the Thai economy.  In such process, they set up commercial banks which have greatly 
help facilitate the process of capital accumulations, certainly for themselves, and as a by-
product, for the national economy.  
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3.2.2 National Development Plan  
 
With the combined effects of capital accumulation and economic stability, private 
investments began to surge. The newly formed National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB), in response to this increased investment, began to formulate the regular 
five-year development plans, started in 1961. These development plans could be best 
described in relation to the economic conditions existing at the time they were formulated. 
The underlying philosophy of this economic planning is a commitment to the market 
economy, and therefore, the planning had been directed mainly toward securing a smooth 
functioning of markets with minimal direct government interventions and controls. 
 The goal and means of economic development engineered by Sarit’s government 
were officially declared in the country’s first National Economic and Social Development Plan. 
This First National Development Plan (1961 – 1966) had the main objective in encouraging 
economic growth in the private sector through the provision of basic infrastructure. The 
principle thrust of government involvement was therefore concentrated on expanding 
infrastructure facilities in transport, communications, power, social and public services, and 
agriculture. Attempts were also carried out in reducing the role of military founded 
monopolies, which were low in efficiency.  The results from this plan were exceedingly 
remarkable9. The economic growth resulting from the First Plan period was both rapid and 
broadly based, with the average annual growth rate of 8.1 percent. A new surge of public 
investment in infrastructure had taken place. Private investments also multiplied as a result 
of the Board of Investment’s used of a combination of various investment promotion 
schemes, tariff policies, tax regimes, and trade as well as price controls. And although most 
of the public enterprises then in existence still remained in place, their role became much 
less significant as the private sector economic activity in manufacturing grew.  
                                                          
9 Warr and Nidhiprabha, (1996) 
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  The Second Plan (1967 – 1971), similar to the first, was still largely concentrated 
on the public expenditure program. It continued the First Plan’s task in building 
infrastructure, particularly in those areas considered conducive to development. However, 
the pattern of public expenditure under this plan revealed the government’s increased 
emphasis on the slower growth areas, especially the rural sector. And although it 
incorporated manpower planning, it still made no attempt to direct resource allocation 
among sectors. The growth rate of GDP during this Second Plan was less impressive than it 
had been during the First, with an average rate of growth at 7.5 percent per annum. Output 
continued to expand rapidly in infrastructure and services, but less in industrial.  
 The Third Plan (1972 – 1976) reflected a moderate shift of emphasis in 
development thinking among the Thai bureaucrats. This shift clearly reflected a growing 
awareness among the NESDB planners on the increasing problem of regional disparity and 
poverty in the rural areas. It was clear to the authority by the time of planning this plan that 
the benefits of industrial expansion were not reaching the majority of the populace. 
Furthermore, it was also recognized that the impressive aggregate growth since the First 
Plan had been achieved at the expense of a rapid deterioration in Thailand’s land, forest, 
water, and marine resources. Therefore, although still aiming for higher growth, the Third 
Plan set specific priorities for reducing the growing disparities between urban and rural 
areas, and also between sectors. The emphasis of the plan was no longer simply on 
improving public infrastructure and maintaining economic stability, but also on achieving a 
more equitable distribution of income and social services.  
 
3.2.3 Agriculture Led Growth    
 
Resulting from the government’s heavy investment in infrastructure, the growth in the 
1960s was dominated by the expansion of road networks, irrigation, power supplies, and 
telecommunication systems. The expansion of the road network in the 1960s was tacitly 
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linked to an American-supported counterinsurgency program. It had a considerable impact 
on agricultural development, as well as on the overall economic growth. By providing 
farmers with direct access to external markets, it had rid the need for middlemen, and thus, 
had significantly increased the farmgate price for cash crops. However, more importantly, 
the expansion of the road network had also provided an access to a vast amount of 
previously uncultivated land further away from rivers and railway lines. Combined with the 
government’s policy in the clearing of forest lands in order to expand the agricultural land 
frontier, this had become instrumental for the agricultural growth of the 1960s.  
 Furthermore, and equally important, the building of a large-scale irrigation system 
had facilitated the dry season cultivation of rice, most notable in the central region. Prior to 
this, the cultivation of rice could only be made once per year during the rainy season. 
However, after the irrigation system was built, it had become possible for the second 
cultivation season, and therefore, doubled the production of rice. This rapid growth in the 
agricultural sector had become an important instrument in supporting industrial sector 
growth. The foreign revenue derived from the accelerated export of agricultural products, 
combined with the increase in government revenue from the increased agricultural 
production, had provided the necessary resources for early industrialization in the 1960s.  
 During the 1960s and 1970s, strong import substitution policy was imposed in order 
to create a favorable market condition for early industrialization. Import tariffs were raised 
significantly to protect local industries, with the strongest incentives directed at the 
production of final products based on imported intermediate and capital goods. However, 
despite the very favourable atmosphere, the commercial sector and investment demand 
were never the major contributors to the high economic expansion, which recorded at 7.2 
percent per annum between 1958 and 1973 (Jitcushon (2002)). Thailand was still very 
much an agricultural country, with the agriculture sector being the primary engine of growth.  
 Jitsuchon (2002) claimed that the dynamics of agricultural production in this period 
is a good example of how economic growth in Thailand has been driven by increasing uses 
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of inputs instead of advancing technology. Siamwalla (1996) supported this argument by 
alleging that when corrected for land expansion and irrigation provision, he found no real 
gain in production yields from the period of 1958 to 1973 at all. 
 In summary, the key to the success of Thailand’s early modern economic 
development is owed very much to the combination of capital accumulation, increase in 
production inputs, as well as the vision of the country’s leader in promoting economic 
growth through sound macroeconomic management, promoting a favorable business 
environment, and institutional strengthening. Without any single one of these factors, such 
remarkable growth would have never been made possible.   
 
 
3.3 Political Uncertainty and Economic Turbulence: 1974 - 1985 
 
The period from 1974 to 1985 had been dominated by both the domestic political 
uncertainty and the world economic turbulence. Quite coincidentally, the economic and 
political stability of Thailand ended on the very same week in October 1973, when 
domestically, the military Thanom Kittikajorn government resigned amidst the massive 
protestation from the general public, and internationally, the six-day war broke out in the 
Middle East and marked the beginning of the first oil price shock. Economic hardship was 
felt most in the latter part of this sub-period, when as a result of the two oil price shocks, 
the windfalls from the world commodity price boom in the 1970s was finally over. This 
period can, however, be considered as a period of transition, both on the political and 
economic ground.  
 On the political side, this period was marked by the transition from the absolute 
military regime toward the western democratic system. The military influence, which had 
dominated Thai politics for over half a century, was replaced by a new force from the urban 
society, specifically, an urban middle class. While on the economic aspect, this period 
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witnessed a major structural change from the agricultural-led-growth economy toward the 
industrialization of the domestic sectoral production. Although the overall economic 
performance in the sub-period was rather disappointing, it should nevertheless be fair to 
allege that it was these adjustments from this period that had later laid the foundation for 
the new economic structure as well as the rapid growth of the economy of the next sub-
period.  
 
3.3.1 Political and Economic Uncertainty 
 
As mentioned, the economic hardship that occurred in this period was the result of two 
main incidents happening separately, with one occurring domestically and one 
internationally. Domestically, the outburst of political freedom, long suppressed under the 
military power regrettably coincided with the triumph of communists in the Indo-Chinese 
neighbors. During the 1950s and 1960s, Thai politics was very much suppressed under the 
military ruling. However, since the early 1970s, many Thai students returned to the country 
from their education in the democratic western world. They brought back with them the 
belief in the freedom and equality of the democratic system, and therefore, started the 
democratic movements10. Unfortunately, the triumph of the communist party in Vietnam 
generated fear among the military rulers that Thailand would soon follow the pattern of 
Vietnam and be taken over by the communist movement. Therefore, political freedom 
among civilians was strictly limited. However, such suppression had created an even greater 
urge among the new thinkers in overthrowing the military authority. Consequently, the 
period from 1974 to 1976 was marked as the period of the most vigorous confrontations 
between the lefts and the rights in the country’s history 11 . The confrontation ended 
                                                          
10 Siamwalla, (1996) 
11 Jitsuchon, (2002) 
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tragically in October 1976, when the right-wing military once again took over the power, 
forcing many educated, young left-wingers to flee the country. 
 Internationally, the Arab-Israeli conflict had triggered the first oil price hike in 
October 1973. And later in 1979, the Iranian revolution set off the second, and worse, oil 
crisis.  Thailand, although, was fortunate enough not to be affected much by the first oil 
price shock (helped by the commodity prices boom during 1972) was not so providential 
this time, when the second oil crisis hit. The government of the time was already facing the 
problem of a soaring budget deficit arising from the increased government expenditure on 
the country’s rapid infrastructure investment. Coinciding with the need for the government 
to counter the economic slumps that followed the two sharp oil price hikes, as well as the 
world recession of early 1980s, the problem of budget deficit and public debt mounted. By 
the first half of the 1980s, such budget deficits had eventually led to one of the most 
serious public debt problems of the Thai history. 
 To make matters worse, the Thai economy at that time was also greatly affected by 
the rapid movements in some of the world major currencies, an experience the country had 
not been prepared to deal with before. After the collapse of the Bretton Wood system in 
1971, Thailand chose to continue pegging its currency with the U.S. dollar. This decision 
had later proved to be very costly to the country, when the U.S. dollar appreciated against 
other major currencies between 1978 and 198512. As a result, the Thai Baht was de facto 
appreciated, which drastically lessened the country’s competitiveness. The Thai government 
was therefore forced to devalue the currency by 15 percent in 1981, and went on to 
abandon the single-currency fixed exchange rate for the basket system in 1984, which 
amounted to an effective devaluation against the U.S. dollar by another 15 percent.  
 As seen before in many countries, the economic hardship was always the major 
cause of changes in politics, and Thailand was no exception. Finally in 1980, General Prem 
Tinnasulanon took the office of Thailand’s premiership. Although General Prem himself had 
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risen to the post by the promotion from the headship of the army, he had been running the 
country in a very democratic manner. After the end of his 4-year term, a country-wide 
general election was conducted, in which his party and its coalitions won the majority vote 
and General Prem himself was backed for the premiership. His 8-year term could be 
considered one of the most stable political periods in the Thai history.  On economic 
achievements, his government managed to restore fiscal discipline between 1982 and 1985, 
which was very remarkable considering the rapidly changing economic conditions during 
that period. On the political achievement, his government marked the new era for Thai 
politics. For the past forty-seven years, Thailand had been ruled by the military powers; 
however, his political vision was focused mainly on the development of Thailand’s 
democracy, i.e. constitutional reform and administrative decentralization.  
  
3.3.2 Economic and Social Development Plan 
 
With the economic hardship Thailand was facing during the 1970s, the Fourth Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1977 – 1981) focused its immediate objective at revitalizing the 
domestic economy from the effects of world recession13.  The role and the influence of the 
public sector - particularly of the core agencies controlling macroeconomic policy – had 
been increased.  Although the private sector remained the central source of economic 
dynamism, the government had become more active in economic affairs. Large public 
expenditures had been invested in an attempt to maintain the economic growth momentum. 
Furthermore, the Fourth Plan also set its core objective at implementing the social structural 
adjustments. The Plan was intended to address the growing disparity between urban and 
rural areas, as well as the rapid deterioration of the nation’s natural resources left from the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
12 Pongpaichit and Baker, (1998) 
13 Warr and Nidhiprabha, (1996) 
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rapid growth in the previous sub-period.  At the heart of this plan, there was an attempt to 
switch from a growth orientation economy toward greater social awareness.  
 The performance of the economy during the Fourth Plan period, despite being 
affected by the unfavorable external conditions (e.g. the rising oil prices, high international 
interest rates, declining demand and prices of Thai export commodity), was still satisfactory. 
Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) claimed that this achievement was partly a result of the 
government’s attempts to maintain the growth momentum by expanding public investment 
despite a drastic deterioration in domestic savings. 
 The Fifth Plan (1982 – 1986), continued from the Fourth Plan, had the main 
concern in economic restructuring so as to reduce the disparity between the urban and the 
rural. This was meant to be achieved by placing more emphasis on the quality of growth 
rather than the rate of growth. In this process, a reform of the public development 
administrative system was required in order to better facilitate rapid economic development. 
The main force driving the economic growth was planned to rely upon industrial 
development, which share of output was projected to reach the share of agricultural by the 
end of the planning period. The implementation of this objective was carried out through 
two main policies: the dispersion of manufacturing from urban to rural areas, and the shift 
in public investment from infrastructure to development projects.  
 In response to this Plan, by the 1980s, the national public provision had changed 
significantly. The emphasis of public investment had shifted away from infrastructure 
toward development projects. The reason for such a shift came from the economic hardship 
arising from the external shocks Thailand faced in the 1970s. Therefore, strategic industries 
were planned to be developed in order to help strengthen the economy’s ability to absorb 
external shocks, as well as to provide a foundation for resource-based industrialization. 
Many new development projects such as the fertilizer project, the steel project, and the 
Eastern Seaboard project were created following this Plan.  
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 Moreover, the economic and investment policy had also been focused on 
decentralizing the industrial development to areas outside of the heavily concentrated 
Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA). Incentives such as income tax and import tariff 
exemptions were given to those manufacturers located outside BMA. However, despite 
these efforts to direct industries to provincial areas and to encourage economic growth in 
regional cities, the BMA continues to be the dominant economic, social, and administrative 
center of the country. One of the primary problems preventing this decentralizing growth is 
the fact that infrastructure facilities in targeted regions were very severely lacking. Although 
investments in infrastructure had always been the main objective of the previous 
Development Plans, the Thai economy had been growing very rapidly during the past 
decade, and the country’s infrastructure growth failed to adequately catch up with the 
speed of industrial expansion.  
  
3.3.3 Export Promotion Policy 
 
This sub-period had also witnessed a major structural change in sectoral production14. The 
agricultural sector, which expanded rapidly in the 1960s and into the early 1970s, had been 
faced with two major obstacles to further growth. First, the price of the agricultural 
products in the world market, which was at that time Thailand’s main source of income from 
abroad, had been declining since 1980. And second, the forest areas which were suitable 
for agricultural production had been dwindling rapidly. By about the same time that the 
rapid growth in agriculture could no longer be counted upon as reliably as in the past, the 
idea of shifting the country’s industrial policy from import-substitution to export-promotion 
began to gain momentum15. The hallmark of this policy shift was the announcement of the 
1977 Investment Promotion Act.  
                                                          
14 Siamwalla, (1996) 
15 Martin and Warr, (1990) 
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 With the passage of the Investment Promotion Act of 1977, the emphasis of 
industrial policy then supposedly shifted away from import-substitution toward export-
realization. Export-promotion had since become the central theme of efforts in promoting 
private investment in industries. Particularly, with the economic recession caused by the 
internal political turbulence faced in the 1970s, Thai authorities had become more focused 
on the promotion of export-oriented industries in the attempt to maintain economic and 
financial stability. The Board of Investment, the Ministries of Industry, Commerce, and 
Finance, as well as the Bank of Thailand, jointly formulated and administered policies that 
directly affect industrial development, with these policies being ostensibly aimed at export 
promotion16. Like many other developing countries, Thailand had favoured supporting infant 
industries that were expected to be capable of becoming successful export industries after a 
short period of protection.  
 However, the success of the new industrial policy was, nevertheless, obstructed by 
three important factors. First, the unfavourable world economy at the time had resulted in 
the decline in demand for Thai exports, therefore, discouraging further investment in the 
private sector.  Moreover, the Baht was over-valued during 1981 to 1984 as a result of the 
artificially strong US dollar. Hence, Thai exports became much more expensive compared to 
those of other developing countries. And finally, the tight fiscal policy the government 
imposed since 1982 to restrain the public debt had resulted in domestic economic recession, 
and hence, limited the private sector’s ability as well as incentive to invest.   
 
 
3.4 Economic Boom, Speculation, and Bubble: 1986 - 1996 
 
In contrast with the previous period, the period from 1986 to 1996 could be considered as 
the most prosperous time in the history of the Thai economy; however, only if attention was 
                                                          
16 Industrial Management Corporation, (1984) 
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paid simply to the aggregate growth figures. The average GDP growth in this period was as 
high as 9.58 percent per annum, with the highest growth being at 13.29 percent in 1988. 
This good time, however, was argued to be triggered by external events, and not from the 
development in the domestic economy17. On the political ground, this period was marked by 
moderate political stability. Although the period involved one failed coup as well as one 
successful one, five Prime Ministers, and many more major re-organizations of the cabinet, 
the transitions had been largely smooth and peaceful, with only one strong demonstration.  
 
3.4.1 Factors behind the Economic Growth 
 
The first external event that was claimed to be the main driving force for the rapid 
economic growth of this period came with the 1985 Plaza accords that effectively realigned 
major currencies in which the Japanese yen as well as the US dollar were devalued. The 
Thai Baht, with the US dollar representing almost 90 percent of the share weighted, 
depreciated likewise.  Therefore, the country’s labour-intensive manufacturing products, as 
well as the agricultural products, became much more competitive in the world market.  The 
second external factor was the sharp decrease in petroleum products since 1986, which had 
revived the world economy from great recession in the earlier period. Both accounts on the 
external front had greatly benefited Thai exports, especially the manufactured ones. 
Therefore, Thai export growth expanded immensely. Between 1988 and 1995, Thailand had 
experienced a substantial exports growth rate as high as over 20 percent per annum.   
 Another important by-product of the exchange rate realignment was the relocation 
of industrial productions from other industrialized countries, i.e. Japan, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong.  The Japanese manufacturers started to lose their competitiveness as a result of the 
yen appreciation. Combined with the rising wage rate in these countries, they recognized 
                                                          
17 Jitsuchon (2001) 
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the need for a more cost-effective relocation. Consequently, investment capital in the form 
of foreign direct investment flooded into Thailand at an unprecedented magnitude.  
 The stable political atmosphere in this period had also been another important 
factor inducing high economic growth. The relatively stable political scene during the eight-
year period of the Prem government was followed by a smooth transition to the Chatchai 
government in 1988. Although the Chatchai government was overthrown in the 1990 coup, 
the transition to the new government led by Anand Panyarachun was also peaceful. The 
Anand government did not have a problem getting acceptance from the public. In fact, 
most of the public supported this 1990 coup, citing the highly corrupt ministers and 
scandals in the Chatchai government as the justifiable pretext. However, such approval was 
short-lived. In 1992, the military top men had attempted a direct control over the 
government at that time, which had led to another strong opposition and board 
demonstration among urbanites. When the demonstration finally ended with the defeat of 
the military power, Thailand entered the era of real democracy. An amendment of the 
constitution had been made, which compelled that all governments from then onward have 
to gain their power through parliamentary process. Therefore, all governments of Thailand 
since 1992 have gained their power through public elections. The Prime Ministers and key 
ministers were either coming from civilian bureaucracy or business background. And 
although each government had not remain in office for very long, the transitions had always 
been smooth. Hence, it could be reasonably concluded that between 1992 and 1997, 
Thailand experienced a period of moderate political stability. 
 As a result, the manufacturing productions surged in response to the growing 
export and investment demand, as well as the favorable political climate. This was further 
helped by the sluggish agricultural production in 1986 and 1987, which had led to the 
release of a large number of cheap and unskilled labours suitable for working in the light 
and medium industries.  Consequently, the transition from the agrarian economy to the 
industrial economy was, thus, completed.   
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3.4.2 Speculation and Bubble 
 
During this sub-period, Thailand was fortunate enough that despite the tendency among 
politicians and military rulers to engage in big-scale corruption, the fiscal discipline had 
remained largely intact. Jitsuchun (2002) provided three possible reasons for such 
achievement. First, the memory of the hardship associated with tight fiscal policy in the first 
half of 1980s (which was the result of lax fiscal policy during the 1970s) was still very fresh. 
Second, fiscal budget balance and surplus was regarded as a political achievement by the 
government at the time. Third, the foundation of the budgetary process put in place since 
the early 1960s by the Sarit government had successfully prevented systemic imprudent 
fiscal spending by the government.  
 However, while financial prudence in the public sector was evident, it was 
regrettably missing in the private sector. Speculation in real estate was taking place at an 
alarming rate. The same phenomenon was also observed in the stock market, where both 
domestic and foreign investors rushed in without involving a proper risk analysis. Therefore, 
the bubble in the real estate and stock market was lucid.  
 Another interesting point worth noting in this period is the shift in infrastructure 
build-up policy. Unlike in the 1960s, when the governments were entirely responsible for 
providing basic infrastructure (i.e. road and irrigation, to the economy), the policy in the 
1980s and the 1990s was to give private companies concessions to build, and sometimes to 
operate, these infrastructures. The telecommunications and expressways stood as good 
examples. In principle, the positive side of this policy is the reduced burden on public 
spending, increased efficiency, and more timely constructions. However, in reality, not all of 
them were realized. As described by Jitsuchon (2002), ‘the negotiations between public 
personals and private companies often resulted in the marriage between the worst of both 
worlds, namely, the inefficiency and delays of the public sector and the greed of the private 
sector’.  
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 In sum, although this sub-period experienced a remarkable growth rate, this growth 
mainly resulted from the accumulation of factor inputs, not the so-called ‘efficiency-lead 
sustainable growth’. Therefore, it is not surprising that from the supply side growth 
accounting, Jitsuchon (2002) found that the major source of growth during this period was 
clearly coming from the accumulation of capital stocks, increasing at an average of 10.3 
percent per annum during 1986-1996, which accounted for almost 80 percent of the 
contribution to growth during 1991 – 1995. While the TFP growth, adjusted for changes in 
human capital, was merely 0.4 percent during the same period, reduced from 31.3 percent 
during 1981 – 1986. These figures clearly reflected the fact that the capital accumulations 
of this period had been used very inefficiently as a result of the speculative behavior.  
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Chapter 4 – The Economic Crisis of 1997 
 
“When everyone feels that risks are at their minimum, over-confidence can take over and 
elementary precautions start to get watered down.” 
 
Ian Macfarlane
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to create a better understanding of the anatomy of the 1997 
economic crisis. Before the financial and economic crisis hit Thailand in July 1997, the Thai 
economy had long enjoyed immense economic growth. For a decade preceding 1995, the 
Thai economy had been growing at the very impressive rates; its total GDP growth per 
annum was ranging from 8 to 13 percent of (Table 4.1). The country’s development regime 
was regarded internationally (by the IMF, the World Bank, as well as the Economist1) as a 
success case and was often used as a model for the less developed countries to follow. The 
growth of the Thai economy could be traced back to the 1970’s, when the Board of 
Investment (BOI) began offering a range of export incentives, such as cheap credits for 
export producers and income tax exemption for qualified exporters. Combining with the 
shifting of comparative advantage from Japan and many other industrial countries, Thai 
export sectors soon took the major share of the country’s GDP.  
 To many economists, the crisis in 1997 had taken place by surprise. Paul Krugman 
expressed his opinion on this issue as the following:    
 “It seems safe to say that nobody anticipated anything like the current crisis in Asia. 
True, there were some Asia sceptics – including myself- who regarded the claims of 
an Asian economic miracle as overstated, and argued that Asia was bound to run into 
diminishing returns eventually. ….. But even pessimists expected something along the 
                                                 
1 Details in this was previously referred in Chapter 2, Section 2.1 
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lines of a conventional currency crisis followed by at most a modest downturn, and 
we expected the longer-term slowdown in growth to emerge only gradually. What we 
have actually seen is something both more complex and more drastic: collapses in 
domestic asset markets, widespread bank failures, bankruptcies on the part of many 
firms, and what looks likely to be a much more severe real downturn than ever the 
most negative-minded anticipated.” 2
 
Table 4.1: GDP Growth Rate  
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
GDP Growth (%) 9.519 13.288 12.191 11.167 8.558 8.083 8.251 8.987 9.238 5.901 
 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GDP Growth (%) -1.371 -10.510 4.431 4.637 1.798 5.426 7.218 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 
Table 4.2: Inflation Rate 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Inflation (%) 5.7 4.07 3.36 5.19 5.69 5.85 5.61 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 
Table 4.3: International Reserves 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997q2 
Int’l Reserves 
(million US $) 
16,478 21,265 24,245 31,664 37,009 46,504 45,833 41,074 
Int’l Reserves 
(months of 
Import) 
5.22 5.82 6.32 6.75 6.79 6.30 6.55 5.77 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
 
 Prior to the crisis, Thailand had been one of the Asia’s most outstanding economies. 
The fundamentals of the economy were very sound. The GDP growth rate was high, 
inflation rate was low for the standard of emerging markets, ranging from 3.36 to 5.85 
percent (Table 4.2).  Domestic savings accounted for as much as 34 percent of GDP, 
                                                 
2 Krugman, (2001) 
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unemployment rate had been low, the government had run fiscal surpluses in nine out of 
the last ten years, and the international reserves were a healthy 5 to 7 months of imports 
(Table 4.3). These indicators contrast sharply to those of Mexico prior to the peso collapse 
in December 1994, where domestic savings were low, GDP growth was sluggish, and the 
country was still experiencing the residual effects of the triple digit inflation rate in the late 
1980s. Therefore, the interesting question posted by many economists was ‘what could 
possibly go wrong with the Thai economy that has brought about a sudden overturned of its 
fate in such a short period of time?’ 
 As stated earlier, this chapter is devoted to create a better understanding of the 
anatomy of this 1997 economic crisis. Therefore, in doing so, the chapter starts, in section 
4.2, with the analysis of the five main causes leading to the crisis. Then section 4.3 focuses 
on the consequences. Section 4.3.1 examines the effects of the crisis on economic growth; 
section 4.3.2 considers the effects on the employment issues, including the employment, 
unemployment, underemployment, and real wage. Finally, a brief conclusion is presented in 
section 4.4.  
 
 
4.2 The Causes of the Crisis 
 
The answer to the question on the causes of the crisis is not a simple one, and surely there 
is not one single explanation or cause, but a complex set of problems that precipitated the 
crisis of such intensity. Many studies (Moreno (1997), Nukul’s Commission Report (1998), 
Phongpaichit and Baker (1998), Sussangkarn (1998), Chainuvati, Nakavachara, and Kunjara 
Na Ayudhya (1999), Doner and Ramsay (1999), Laplamwanit (1999), Sussangkarn (1999), 
Acharya (2000), Na Ranong (2000), Krugman (2001), Diao, Rattsø and Stokke (2005)) have 
provided numerous explanations. However, they could be classified into five main categories: 
(1) the slowdown of export growth; (2) the mistakes in financial policies; (3) asymmetric 
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information and over-investment; (4) attacks on currency; and (5) responses to the 
currency devaluation. 
 
4.2.1 Export Growth Slowdown 
 
Between 1988 and 1995, Thailand had experienced a substantial exports growth rate of 
over 20 percent per annum. At that time, Thailand possessed strong comparative 
advantages in labour intensive manufactured goods such as textiles, electronic products, 
and semi-conductors, but was weak in the areas involve higher value-added products. The 
strong export growth was mainly driven by the two most important assets the Thai 
economy owned, namely the cheap labours and the extensive natural resources. 
Unfortunately, by 1996, these two assets seemed to reach their limits.3  Between 1982 and 
1994, Thai real wages raised immensely with an approximate 70 percent increase between 
these 13 years. To worsen the situation, from mid 1990s onward, Thai export sector 
experienced increased competition from other developing Asian countries such as China and 
Vietnam, who had recently opened up their economies (with abundant resources and much 
cheaper labours) for foreign direct investment. In normal circumstance, a natural way to 
solve the problem of declining competitiveness would be to upgrade the economy toward 
the more capital and technology intensive industrial sectors. However, this was not an easy 
option for Thailand at the time.  During the early 1990s, because the Thai economy was 
growing so favourably, local and foreign investors flooded the country with massive and 
countless investments. Consequently, the country’s national savings failed short of financing 
these projects, driving the domestic interest rate to very high levels (with fixed saving rate 
reaching more than 14 per cent per annum). As a result, the majority of investments made 
during that period were concentrated in the speculative sectors such as real estate and 
stock market, which were simply the only sectors that could possibly generate sufficient rate 
                                                 
3 Jitsuchon, (2002) 
 - 53 -
The Economic Crisis of 1997 
of return.4 As a result, the manufacturing sector was struggling to acquire sufficient funds 
for the necessary upgrades.  
 Furthermore, another important factor which had led to the downfall of Thai export 
involved the exchange rate. At the time, the Thai Baht was pegged to a basket of currencies 
in which the US dollar was weighted at 80 percent of the total basket. With the sharp rise of 
dollar against other currencies in the mid 1990s5, the Baht became over-valued, and hence, 
led to export difficulties for Thai producers. To add severity to the problem, the time prior to 
the 1997 crisis was the period of worldwide export downturn in which demand for Asian 
exports dropped considerably. In addition, the Japanese market, one of the Thai major 
export destinations, was facing yet another economic recession; as a result, this led to the 
further decline in demand for Thai products.  
 Therefore, by the second half of 1996, Thailand’s export growth rate had dropped 
from over 20 percent per annum in the previous year to zero percent. The exports of labour 
intensive manufactured products (the major source of export growth from the mid 1980s to 
early 1990s) declined by approximately 14.6 percent through the first 11 months of 1996.6 
With the main driving force of the economy facing such a sluggish condition, the Thai 
economy was inevitably turning into the recession. 
 
4.2.2 Mistakes in Financial Policies 
 
Three financial policy errors could largely be held responsible for the financial meltdown in 
mid-1997: (1) the premature liberalization of financial institutions; (2) the financial 
liberalization with a fixed exchange rate; and (3) the failure to prudently supervise the 
financial institutions.   
                                                 
4 Kittiprapas, (2000) 
5 The US dollar strengthened by about 38% against the Japanese Yen and about 27% against the 
Deutsche Mark between April 1995 and June 1997. 
6 Laplamwanit, (1999) 
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 Prior to 1990, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) had a strong plan to propel Thailand into 
the regional financial hub. The Nukul’s Commission Report (1998) described the reasons 
underlining this plan as; first, it would help facilitate and support investment funding, and 
therefore, enhanced the competitiveness of the country. Secondly, it would help stabilize 
the country’s monetary and economic systems, and hence, created a better environment to 
facilitate economic growth. However, it was recognised at that time that Thailand was still 
lacking some concrete fundamental elements to support this plan, and therefore, some 
measures are needed to be implemented. In the BOT letter No. 545/2533 dated March 30, 
1990, endorsed by former Central Bank Governor Chavalit Thanachanan, it was proposed 
that the highly regulated foreign exchange controls at the time should be relaxed so as to 
facilitate foreign capital flows and to boost foreign investor confidence. It also suggested 
the government to accept the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) agreement No. 8, which 
stated that the Thai government would not limit any payment or money transfer overseas. 
This announcement would officially signify to the world that Thailand had abandoned all 
foreign exchange controls. In order to implement this plan, the Bangkok International 
Banking Facility (BIBF) was initiated in 1993 with its role to facilitate the flow of foreign 
currency current account transactions. Such a scheme was implemented with the 
anticipation that the large amount of investment funds flowing into the country would make 
available the resources for upgrading a firm’s export capacities, improving congested 
infrastructure, as well as, training and educating the labour force.7 As a result, 42 BIBF 
licenses were granted to commercial banks and non-bank financial intermediaries allowing 
them to engage freely in a number of foreign exchange activities.  
 However, this liberalization of the foreign exchange and capital flow came with 
costs. With a large number of private financial institutions directly involved in capital inflow 
and outflow, it had become much more difficult for the BOT to monitor and regulate such 
activities. The freeing of foreign exchange controls should have been accompanied by the 
                                                 
7 Nukul’s Commission Report. (1998) 
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strengthening of financial institutions in order to develop confidence among the foreign 
investors, as well as, to prevent the problem associated with bad lending behaviours. 
Statutes of practice must be set, at least to meet the international standards, particularly in 
the area of capital base adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, and data base 
development. Unfortunately, measures to achieve these goals were never accomplished. In 
fact, the BOT relaxed, rather than tightened, measures which would have led to the 
strengthening of local financial institutions.8 First, the BOT permitted financial institutions to 
maintain the capital adequacy ratios below the requirements of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). At the time, these requirements were thought to be too strict, and would 
obstruct the economic growth. Second, the BOT allowed the existing below-international-
standard non-performing loan’s definition to persist. And finally, the Financial Institution 
Regulation and Supervision department of the BOT failed to impose strong guidelines for 
the BIBF’s operations, and permitted the boundless lending and borrowing behaviours to 
continue.  
 The relaxation of the foreign exchange control and the BIBF’s establishment 
combined with the country’s fixed exchange rate regime (which fluctuated very narrowly 
between 24.91 – 25.59 Baht per US Dollar) had resulted in a massive wave of foreign 
capital inflows into the country, following the virtually risk-free currency environment.9 Local 
investors sought foreign funding sources as the national savings failed to finance the fast 
growing investment expansion. Financial institutes saw the profit opportunities of borrowing 
at the much cheaper rate offshore and lending them at the higher local rates. By 1995, the 
number of BIBF borrowers increased to a much higher level than the BOT had expected. In 
1995 alone, Thailand had a net capital inflow of 14.239 billion US Dollar, accounted for 14 
percent of the total GDP, and increased by more than one hundred percent from its net 
                                                 
8 Nukul’s Commission Report. (1998) 
9 Doner and Ramsay, (1999) 
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capital inflow in 1992 before the liberalization of capital account and the establishment of 
BIBFs.   
 However, although foreign capital inflows were high, foreign direct investment was 
minimal. Capitals flowing into the country were primarily for credit extensions, not 
investment. This, therefore, led to rapid growth of the country’s external debt. The total 
outstanding external debt rose from 43.11 billion US Dollar in 1992 (accounted for 38.58 
percent of GDP) to 83.38 billion US Dollar in 1995 (accounted for 49.38 percent of GDP) 
(Table 4.4). There are two important points that needs to be mentioned here; first, almost 
all of the increase in debts during that period were generated by the private, not the public, 
sector.10 During the first half of the 1990s, the Thai government was always running budget 
surpluses; therefore there was no pressure for the government to borrow offshore. Second, 
more than half of the country’s outstanding credits were short-term in nature, with maturity 
of one year or less.11 This would later prove itself to be an important factor in accelerating 
the tempo of the crisis in 1997. 
 
Table 4.4: Foreign Debt 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997q2 
Long-term 
(% to GDP) 
18,594 
(21.77) 
22,147 
(22.52) 
23,976 
(21.46) 
26,948 
(21.43) 
32,236 
(22.28) 
37,029 
(21.93) 
50,609 
(27.32) 
53,124 
NA 
Short-term 
(% to GDP) 
10,239 
(11.99) 
15,307 
(15.57) 
19,134 
(17.12) 
23,410 
(18.62) 
33,319 
(23.03) 
46,354 
(27.45) 
43,737 
(23.61) 
40,567 
NA 
Total 
(% to GDP) 
28,833 
(33.75) 
37,454 
(38.09) 
43,110 
(38.58) 
50,358 
(40.06) 
65,555 
(45.30) 
83,383 
(49.38) 
94,346 
(50.94) 
93,691 
NA 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 
 Nevertheless, this severe financial melt down could have been lessened, if not 
avoided, if at least one of the three policy mistakes was well taken care of. Without the 
premature liberalization of the financial institutions, they would have time to develop more 
expertise in the area and would be able to avoid making these serious mistakes. And even if 
                                                 
10 Krugman, (2001) 
11 Laplamwanit, (1999) 
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the premature liberalization of the financial market could not be avoided, the problem could 
still be contained if it was not because of the fixed exchange rate regime Thailand adopted 
at that time. Huge amount of capital inflow resulting from the capital market liberalization 
would have driven the currency to appreciate, and hence, hurting the export sector as well 
as the balance of trade.  Therefore, the incentive for capital inflow would eventually decline. 
But with the fixed exchange rate regime, this automatic stabilizer of the economy was 
overwritten, making the Thai financial market a virtually risk free market for profit earning. 
Finally, even with the premature liberalization of the financial institution in the market with 
fixed exchange rate regime, the severity of this problem could still be limited if the authority 
involved had managed to provide prudent supervision of the financial institutions. The 
problems of overlending, non-performing loans, and risky investment behaviours could have 
all been avoided.  
 
4.2.3 Asymmetric Information and Over-Investment 
 
In the past, the Thai public sector had a rather effective control system for the size and the 
maturity structure of its foreign debts by using the combination of foreign debt ceiling, 
currency mix, and the management of the repayment schedules. However, in mid-1990s 
when most of the foreign debts were private, the Thai authority made a major mistake by 
failing to impose sufficient disciplines for controlling debt creations. Along with the problems 
of asymmetric information, the deep-rooted financial trouble originated.  
 In economics, information asymmetry occurs when one party to a transaction has 
more or better information than the other party. George Akerlof used the term asymmetric 
information in his 1970 seminal work, “The Market for Lemon.” On the most abstract level, 
asymmetric information refers to a market process in which bad results occur due to 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, i.e. the ‘bad’ products or customers 
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are more likely to be selected.12 There are generally 2 problems that could occur as a result 
of asymmetric information13: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard is a concern 
generally arising in the post-contract (e.g. an insurance policy, a debt guarantee) context. It 
refers to the increase risk emerges from problematical behaviours a participant may be 
engaged in, if that participant does not suffer the full, or any, consequences of his/her 
action. 14  In the case relating to debts, rescue operations carried out by governments, 
central banks, or consortiums of financial institutions can often encourage risky lending, if 
creditors realize that they will not have to take losses in case some serious problems 
occur.15 Adverse selection, in contrast, concerns the pre-contract context of signalling and 
screening.16 In a financial market where there is non-perfect information (i.e. loan making), 
it is often that the borrowers have better information about their risks and the financial 
institutions are pressed to make loans based on the information provided by the borrowers. 
In such cases, borrowers with high risk tend to be better off, as they will be able to put 
forward a business plan with higher rate of returns, and thus, increase their chance of 
securing the loan.17 As a result, the market ends up with investors with high risk, causing 
the financial market to become very sensitive to economic shocks.  
 For the case of Thailand in 1997, the problem of moral hazard in the banking sector 
could be viewed from two different perspectives18: the creditors and the lenders. From the 
bankers’ point of view, because they believed that the BOT would always bail them out if 
things went wrong; they became less careful about lending to risky and speculative projects. 
While from the depositors’ viewpoint, as they were aware of the BOT’s implicit guarantee of 
their deposits, they realized less need in observing the behaviour of their banks. Hence, 
                                                 
12 Economic A-Z, Economist.com 
13 Frexias and Rochet, (1997) 
14 Lipsey. (2004) 
15 Fisher, (2001) 
16 Economic A-Z, Economist.com 
17 Laplamwanit, (1999) 
18 Williams and Nguyen, (2005) 
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moral hazard in the banking sector resulted in an even more severe problem of over-
investment in the unproductive and speculative sector of the economy.19
 Nukul’s Commission Report (1998) alleged that the BOT had, historically, always 
taken the role of the lender of last resort for failed financial institutes, especially between 
1983 and 1986, when many commercial banks ran into trouble as a result of the second oil 
crisis. Several banks including Asia Trust, Siam City Bank, and First Bangkok City Bank, as 
well as several finance companies, faced serious financial trouble and needed government 
assistance under the April 4th 1984 lifeboat scheme. Subsequently, in 1985 and 1986, the 
government also assisted another two commercial banks, i.e. Bank of Asia, and Krung Thai 
Bank.  
 However, a more recent case of Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC) had been the 
case that greatly enhanced the public belief on this role of the BOT. The problem of the BBC 
was first discovered in a bank examination ran by the BOT on April 30th 1991, which 
revealed the non-performing loans as high as 18.2 billion Baht, accounting for 26.73 percent 
of its total assets; 3.6 times above the industry average. However, no strong action was 
imposed.  Although the BOT was empowered to order the BBC to write off bad assets or 
reserve against those assets, the BOT merely ordered the BBC to draw up a strict plan to 
increase its capital. By March 1993, the situation of the BBC had worsened. The non-
performing loans had risen to 38.5 billion Baht (39.57 percent of its total assets). Further 
examinations showed that many of these non-performing loans were the results of 
fraudulent behaviours, for example the approval of overdraft loans to BBC senior executives 
without any contracts or collaterals, or the approval of loans valued higher than the 
authorised level. Reacting to these problems, the BOT drew up a capital increasing plan for 
the BBC so that it had to increase capital by 3 billion Baht by June 1995, and another 3.7 
billion by the end of 1996. However, the capital increase was slow, while the non-
performing loan problem rose even further. On August 5th 1996, the BOT had to order the 
                                                 
19 Frexias and Rochet, (1997) 
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BBC to increase its capital by another 22.5 billion Baht, but still without requiring prior 
capital write-down, and ordered the Financial Institutions Development Fund to buy all the 
new shares in the interim.  
 The BOT rationalised its actions by explaining that, at the time, the BBC was the 
only bank facing problems, and the economy was still in good condition.  Therefore, the 
BOT would be better off employing a soft solution with the attempt to recover debts and 
dealing with the management of the bank quietly in order to prevent public from fears and 
panic. However, when the news spread, these actions further confirmed the public belief 
that the BOT would always bail out any financial institute, and hence, depositors’ money 
would be safe.20 On From the commercial bank point of view, although the creditors of 
these financial institutes did not receive explicit guarantees from the government, they did 
believe that they would be protected from the risk, an impression reinforced by the strong 
political connections between the owners of such institutions and the politicians.21
 To most economists (whom Paul Krugman was among one of them), the combined 
conditions of the public belief that the BOT would bail out financial institutions in trouble 
and the premature liberalization of the financial market would undoubtedly pose a serious 
problem of moral hazard. The case of Thailand was not an exception. It was not long before 
Thai financial institutes began to engage in risky lending behaviour. Banks and financial 
companies competed with each other in extending loans and one of the ways of doing so 
was by lowering the requirements for loan applications.22 As a result, the credit to deposit 
ratio for commercial banks had risen from the level well below 1 in 1990 to 1.35 in 
September 1996.23 The period from 1993 to 1996 became the prime years for Thai banking 
sectors. More than 50 banks and non-bank financial institutions were established. Most of 
them were doing so well that Thai banks were ranked among the world’s most profitable 
                                                 
20 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
21 Laplamwanit, (1999) 
22 Laplamwanit, (1999) 
23 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
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banks as they could charge up to 4 percentage points difference in interest rate for loans 
and deposits, a discrepancy which was 4 times bigger than the spread of less than 1 
percent in the banking system of many developed economies. Thailand reached the lending 
boom phase; the average debt/equity ratio among the listed non-financial companies rose 
from 1.58 to 1.98 between 1994 and 1996.   
 The BIBF operations and the skyrocketing loan extensions initially caused local 
interest rates to fall from 1992 to 1994. The interbank rate fell from above 10 percent to 
only around 7 percent. This interest rate cut helped ease domestic liquidity, thus, 
encouraged further investment. However, with the problem of adverse selection in the 
banking sector (in which investors have better information on their investment projects, and 
therefore are able to deceive financial institutes to make loans to risky projects that can 
offer higher rates of returns), a large proportion of those BIBF capital inflows went into 
speculative and non-productive investments (such as in the real estates and stock market), 
therefore, sending asset prices, including land and stocks, to abnormally high levels. Only a 
small fraction of the total capital inflows at that time could be categorized as foreign direct 
investment, the main objective of the financial liberalization in the first place. Consequently, 
the share of foreign direct investment declined over time, from 33.57 percent of the total 
current account financing in 1990 to 15.90 percent in 1996.24
  This euphoria of bad investments and risky lending behaviours became more 
severe as time went by. Financial institutes preferred lending to firms that use real estate as 
collateral, since land prices were rising so rapidly it was almost a guarantee that the 
increase in prices of those assets would catch up with the accumulation of interests. By 
1995, the Bangkok office vacancy rate was around 20% and yet real estate developers 
continued to borrow and build. It was planned that another 32,087,730 square meters of 
office unit would be entering the market before the end of 1997.25 By this time, concerns 
                                                 
24 Bank of Thailand 
25 Dollar and Hallward-Driemeie, (2000) 
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had been raised to the Bank of Thailand stating that no matter how fast Thailand’s growth 
was, it would be very difficult for those additional spaces to be filled. This plethora of bad 
investment projects provided a clear warning sign that the economy was overheating, and 
the bubble in the economy was developing.   
 To amplify the problem, the prolonged economic boom, the bubble in real estate 
and stock market, and the large inflows of foreign funds had all contributed to the raising of 
the domestic inflation, and the price level. Therefore, in the viewpoint of producers, it 
became more attractive to produce products for domestic consumption, rather than to 
produce for exports that would require competing in the more competitive world market. 
Hence, much of those non-speculative investments went into domestic protected sectors 
and non-tradable sectors (such as steel and petrochemicals), instead of the tradable sectors. 
Therefore, the country’s competitiveness decline, the national volume of exports reduced, 
and consequently, Thailand’s balance of trade deteriorated.  
 
4.2.4 Currency Attacks 
 
It was not until 1995 before the Bank of Thailand started to realize the problem of 
overheating economy, especially in the real estate sector. Attempts to slowdown the 
economy were carried out by the tightening of the monetary policy through increasing 
interest rates. However, as the interest rates increased, the spread between the local and 
foreign interest rates became even higher, giving greater incentive for foreign investors to 
bring more funds into the country. As a result, this measure not only failed to decelerate the 
economy, but instead, caused foreign borrowing to increase even more rapidly.26    
 After the second half of 1996, concerns about the sluggish export growth, the 
bubble economy, and the over-valued currency had become widespread. Currency 
speculators started some sporadic attacks on the Baht, as they expected Thai authorities 
                                                 
26 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
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would soon adjust the exchange rate in order to deal with the economic difficulties. 
However, the Bank of Thailand sought to resist these depreciation pressures, albeit it was 
clear that cheaper Baht would increase the Thai export competitiveness. In the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter of November 1997, it was mentioned that 
this decision of resisting depreciation by the BOT was done due to several reasons. First, 
the long-term stability of the Baht had led many Thai borrowers to believe that there was 
no currency risk associated, and thus, they borrowed offshore without hedging their foreign 
currency exposure. The depreciation of the Baht would increase their debt burdens.  
Concerning the huge amount of foreign debt outstanding at the time, such an action would 
put too much pressure on the economy as a whole, and therefore, currency depreciation 
was not a feasible option both economically and politically. Second, a sharp depreciation of 
the Baht could lower the risk assessing of the country, and therefore, could have an effect 
on the cost of foreign borrowing in the future as foreign lenders would demand a higher risk 
premium for Baht volatility. Finally, a weaker Baht would tend to increase domestic inflation, 
hence, reducing the domestic purchasing power; an effect the Bank of Thailand did not wish 
to see at that time.  
 Confronted with these dilemmas, the Bank of Thailand chose to resist the 
depreciation pressures in a number of ways. 27  First, the BOT defended the Baht using 
international reserves and swap contracts. Second, the BOT also raised domestic interest 
rates in order to attract more capital inflow as well as making the Baht more expensive to 
borrow for the speculators. Finally, the BOT imposed measures that would restrict 
foreigners’ access to Baht, so as to limit the amount of Baht they could dump into the 
market. However, these defences proved to become very costly to the economy later on. 
Under the fixed exchange rate system, the BOT needed international reserves to maintain 
the exchange rate at the desired level. These reserves could be classified into three 
accounts: foreign exchange reserve, exchange equalization fund reserve (EEF), and general 
                                                 
27 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
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reserve. In Thailand, foreign exchange reserves are governed under the Foreign Exchange 
Act 1958 which required the BOT to have reserves in order to print currency notes. These 
reserves can be comprised of gold, foreign currency, foreign securities, or local promissory 
notes. Nevertheless, the domestic promissory notes must not exceed 20 per cent of the 
total amount. The Foreign Exchange Act 1958 also stated that these foreign exchange 
reserves must be separated from other assets of the BOT and could not be used for any 
other purposes except issuing notes. The second part of the international reserves, the EEF 
reserves, has the objective to maintain the stability of the foreign exchange rate to 
accommodate the economic and financial situation of the country. Broadly speaking, the 
BOT only uses the EEF as a “window” for trading in foreign currencies on a day-to-day basis. 
The EEF would be used to match the demand and supply of foreign exchange, and buy and 
sell the surplus or deficit in order to maintain the currency rate according to the basket 
weight. Finally, the third element of the international reserves, the general reserves, was 
the reserves that the BOT could use for direct intervention in the currency markets in case 
of currency attacks. On February 13th, 1997, the general reserve level was at 16.64 billion 
US dollar, accounted for 43.05 percent of the total reserve value of 38.65 billion US dollar.  
  However, during the period of defending the Baht (from July 1996 to July 1997), 
the general reserve was not the main instrument used by the BOT. Instead, the BOT 
preferred buy-sell swap contracts, where the BOT would initially buy US dollars and pay for 
them with Thai Baht, and after the agreed maturities, buy back the Baht with US dollar. 
Immediately after the speculation attacks, the BOT would use US dollar it acquired from the 
swap agreements to buy up the Baht that had been dumped into the market. In the BOT 
point of view, the swap contracts were a better instrument compared to the spot market as 
they wouldn’t affect the amount of Baht in the circulation. Also, the swap system could 
conceal the impact on the foreign exchange reserves, and thus, prevent the public from 
awareness of the declining reserves. Unfortunately, this measure proved fruitless, as the 
swap commitments were abnormally large in size so that it was very noticeable to the public.  
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 To make matters worse, the swap contract was not only unable to conceal the 
public from the fact that Thai Baht was being attacked, it also cancelled out the effect of the 
other Baht defending measures the BOT employed at the time. In normal circumstance, 
with any free market system, the market itself would be built with an automatic stabilizer 
that will ease out the effects of economic shocks. This same rationale also applies to the 
currency markets. Under the spot market system, if the BOT bought all the Baht dumped by 
speculators, the amount of Baht in the circulation would reduce, causing a tight money 
situation, and therefore, would result in the increase of interest rates. Combine with the 
BOT’s measure of raising domestic interest rates, eventually, the interest rates would shoot 
up so high that the profits made from speculating Baht would no longer cover the 
opportunity costs losing from the interest rate forgone. However, swap contracts enabled 
the BOT to prop up the Thai Baht without reducing the Baht in circulation in the current 
period, as the Baht would be injected back into the system in the first leg of the swap 
activity. Thus, this overruled the market’s automatic stabilizing process, as well as, the 
effect of the high interest rate policy imposed by the BOT itself. Furthermore, the swap 
analysis also overwrote the BOT’s measure in restricting foreigners’ access to Baht. Again, 
under the spot market system, the BOT’s attempts in buying up Baht would suck Baht out 
of the system. In order for the speculators to attack Baht, they needed Baht on hand in 
order to dump it in the market, and thus, creating pressure for the Baht to depreciate. 
However, with less and less Baht in the market, the speculators would find it more difficult, 
as well as expensive, to acquire Baht, and would eventually have to abandon the attack. 
Unfortunately, with BOT releasing Baht in the first leg of the swap, Baht become available 
again in the offshore currency market. As a result, the swap neutralized any of the BOT’s 
intervention attempts.28    
 Nevertheless, the worst consequence of using swap contracts was the fact that they 
are a forward commitment, and did not have an immediate affect on the figures of the 
                                                 
28 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
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foreign exchange reserves account. Swap contracts allowed the BOT to borrow foreign 
currency to defend the Baht, and thus allowed the BOT to use more reserves than the sum 
of EEF and the general reserves, without violating the Foreign Exchange Act 1958. As a 
result, the BOT built up swap obligation valued almost as much as the total foreign reserves 
in its attempts to defend the Baht. The Nukul’s Commision Report (1998) showed that by 
early June 1997, the total foreign reserves fell to 30.9 billion US Dollars, with 23.4 billion 
Dollars obligated to be delivered in the forward market over a 12-month period, leaving the 
net official foreign reserves to a mere 7 billion US dollar. The situation got worse during 
June and, by June 30th, the country’s net official foreign reserves collapsed to only 2.9 
billion US dollar. While the country had about 36.5 billion US dollar short-term foreign debt, 
and the current account deficit was running at about one billion US dollar per month. 
Moreover, the rising interest rates started to cause adverse effects on the economy as it 
dampened the economic activities, as well as, increased the cost of funds for existing 
borrowers. By the time Thailand abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime on July 2nd 
1997, interest rates had risen to an exorbitant level. The steep increase in interest rates 
caused many firms with outstanding loans to fail to service their loans. Consequently, 
financial institutes suddenly faced with the problem of massive amounts of outstanding non-
performing loans, as well as, the sharp decline in the demand, hence, prices of their 
collaterals. Therefore, the financial market suddenly plunged into great chaos.   
 
4.2.5 Responses to the Currency Devaluation 
 
Within the first 48 hours after the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system on July 
2nd 1997, the Thai Baht was devalued by 17 percent, from around 25 Baht per US dollar to 
28.80 Baht per dollar. It then continuously went down since then until it reached its bottom 
at 48.80 Baht per dollar in December of the same year. With net official foreign reserves 
falling to only 2.9 billion US dollar and the short-term foreign debt figure a massive 36.5 
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billion US dollar, Thailand was, in principle, bankrupted. Given its foreign currency obligation, 
Thailand simply could not participate economically in the international community without 
sufficient foreign reserves. Therefore, seeking assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) became unavoidable.  
 In order to facilitate the economic recovery, tackling the problem of the almost 
complete depletion of foreign reserves had to be put as the main priority.29 The IMF put 
together a lending package of 17.2 billion US dollar, with 4 billion coming from the IMF’s 
own funds, and the rest being contributions from other sources, including countries from 
Asia Pacific Region, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. However, the IMF 
package was meant only to be a relatively short-term liquidity support, with repayment for 
each drawing due in three years. Thus, IMF had imposed a stringent reform package aimed 
at turning around the foreign reserve position of the country in a short period of time. With 
the belief that a strong and stable financial sector is a pre-requisite for economic recovery, 
the IMF imposed many measures to restructure and reform the financial sector, including 
the passing of new laws on bankruptcy procedure and foreclosure, as well as, upgrading the 
prudential regulations (in particular on definitions and classifications of NPL, provisioning 
requirements, and capital adequacy ratios). As a result, between November 1997 and 
August 1998, fifty-eight troubled non-bank financial institutes were suspended and, in 
addition, 4 failing commercial banks were also forced through the acquisition procedures. 
These measures created a panic across depositors and creditors. 30  Eventually, the 
government had to impose a full deposit insurance system in order to contain tranquillity in 
the financial market.31 However, because of the cash flow situation of the time, depositors 
of those failed institution would only receive their money back through a 5-year repayment 
schedule. Therefore, the problem of tight liquidity was still unavoidable.  
                                                 
29 Lane et al., (1999) 
30 Stiglitz, (2001) 
31 Laplamwanit, (1999) 
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 Apart from the closure of financial institutes, the IMF also imposed austere 
monetary and fiscal policies. Such policies would later be heavily criticized as having shoved 
the economy even deeper into recession. IMF had successfully recovered the crises in Latin 
America in 1980s (when bloated public deficits and loose monetary policies had led the 
countries to runaway inflation) by employing the same package of fiscal austerity and rigid 
monetary policies. However, given the totally different fundamental problem in Thailand, 
where the mistakes were not created by the imprudent government, but rather the 
imprudent private sector, as well as, where the government had already been running 
budget surpluses, monetary policy had already been so tight that the deposit saving rate 
was as high as 12 percent per annum, and inflation was at the respectable rate of 5 percent, 
the IMF’s remedy package was inevitably been criticized as a “one medicine cure all” 
approach. Joseph E. Stiglitz pressed his concern in his article “What I Learned at the World 
Economic Crisis”32:  
 “Under such circumstances, I feared, austerity measures would not revive the 
economies of East Asia--it would plunge them into recession or even depression. 
High interest rates might devastate highly indebted East Asian firms, causing more 
bankruptcies and defaults. Reduced government expenditures would only shrink the 
economy further.” 
As a result, by September 1997, short-term interest rates increased by almost three folds 
from the pre-crisis levels, and stayed at a high level until the third quarter of 1998 (Table 
4.5, overleaf). Also, the tight fiscal policies led to the significantly worsening of the socio-
economic condition, especially in the social safety net programs, education, and 
infrastructure, which are the essentials for the economic growth.  Unemployment shot up 
from 497.6 thousands person before the crisis to 1,423.3 thousand in 1998, whilst the 
underemployment also increased from 580.7 thousands to 938.4 thousands in 1998. Tight 
monetary and fiscal policies combined with the closure of financial institutions created 
                                                 
32 Stiglitz, (2001) 
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severe credit crunches in the financial market. Many surviving firms (lucky enough not to be 
affected by the debt problems) saw the new opportunities created by the improvement in 
competitiveness due to cheaper Baht, but nevertheless, had to face this new set of credit 
problems which prevented them from further investments. As a result, the economy failed 
to benefit from the improvement in competitiveness as it should have. Thailand GDP growth 
declined from 5.9% in 1996 to -1.8% in 1997, and slumped down to -10.4% in 1998.  
   
Table 4.5: Interest Rates (per cent per annum) 
  Repurchase Rate Inter-Bank Rate Prime Rate 
1997 April 9.06 8.75 12.75 - 13.0 
 May 11.37 12.13 12.75 
 June 12.75 15.10 12.75 
 July 17.26 18.66 13.75 
 August 14.89 15.43 13.75 
 September 23.28 23.87 14.25 
 October 14.74 18.72 14.75 
 November 17.99 19.99 14.75 
 December 22.36 21.73 14.63 
1998 January 22.94 21.51 15.75 
 February 20.81 19.83 15.75 
 March 21.00 20.57 15.75 
 April 18.81 19.11 15.75 
 May 16.38 16.40 15.75 
 June 17.43 18.58 15.75 
 July 14.18 11.72 15.75 
 August 10.35 9.81 15.25 
 September 7.09 7.02 15.00 
 October 5.37 5.35 14.25 
 November 4.62 3.55 12.25 
 December 3.75 2.63 11.5 – 12.0 
1999 January 3.37 2.73 11.0 – 11.5 
 February 3.18 3.09 10.0 -10.5 
 March 2.15 2.25 9.5 – 10.0 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
  
 Finally, by late 1998, the IMF admitted that it had badly misjudged the severity of 
the economic downturn of Thailand.33 The first Letter of Intent that the Thai government 
signed with the IMF in August 1997 expected a positive real GDP growth of 3.5 percent, a 
current account deficit of 5.3 billion US dollar, and a capital account surplus of 1.8 billion US 
dollar for 1998. Unfortunately, these numbers turned out to be completely opposite to the 
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actual figures, with the real GDP growth of - 8.4 percent, a current account surplus of 14.3 
percent, and a capital account deficit of 9.6 percent. It was clear by this time that the IMF 
had too much faith in the market confidence that would result from its program. It expected 
the economy to run current account deficit as it did not expect the depreciation of the Baht 
to continue and worsen. Also, it expected surpluses in the capital account as it had seriously 
overestimated the rollover of the country’s short-term external debt. With such expectation 
on the current account deficit, the IMF believed that the ways Thailand would recover its 
foreign reserves were through 1) the employment of stringent fiscal and monetary policies 
in order to control the current account, 2) the generation of a high rollover rate of short-
term foreign debt, and 3) the attraction of new medium- and long-term investments 
through foreign buyouts of domestic enterprises and privatization of state enterprises. 
 If the IMF had predicted the economic scenario closer to what subsequently 
happened, it would have chosen much easer fiscal policies (particularly for the social safety 
net programs) so the reduction in the GDP, the increase in unemployment, and the 
underemployment would not have been so severe.34 In addition, the monetary policy would 
have been tight in order to control inflation (so that the potential benefits of a weaker Baht 
would not be wiped out), but not so much that it would harm the investment environments, 
which actually happened during that period. The current account surplus would have been 
higher as firms became more competitive from the Baht devaluation. On the other hand, a 
looser monetary policy, and hence, a small reduction in the interest rate, would not affect 
much net capital outflow, as the high interest rates were hardly sufficient to create 
incentives for the markets to keep their money in a country where the net foreign reserves 
have almost been depleted.  
 Unfortunately, by the time the IMF admitted its mistakes and adjusted its policies, 
the Thai economic crisis had already worsened. Given the substantial time lags for both 
                                                 
34 Stiglitz, (2001) 
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fiscal and monetary instruments, it meant that the Thai economy had to suffer an 
unnecessary severer and lengthier effect of the crisis than what it should have been.  
 
 
4.3 Impacts of the Economic Crisis 
 
The economic impact of the 1997 crisis affected Thailand very broadly and deeply, though 
the impacts have been uneven between different sectors. The Thai economy experienced 
severe adjustments in many ways; the more obvious examples are the exchange rate 
regime and the restructuring in the financial sector. The economic growth had recorded 
contractions, which was the condition that the Thai economy had not experienced for the 
past 15 years. This was partly the result of the declining domestic demand, both on the 
consumption and investment side. The failure of financial institutions had also led to the 
tight liquidity condition, combined with the decrease in demand; this had resulted in the 
widespread collapse and insolvency of domestic businesses. Many industries found 
themselves in severe excess capacity and attempted to shake off employees, which had led 
to an immense increase in the number of unemployed and underemployed. The substantial 
decrease in income had brought about the reduction in personal consumption, then again, 
reduced the market demand even further. Also, the reduction in personal and corporate 
income lessened government revenue, and therefore government spending, which 
sequentially reduced the total output of the economy. Finally, the drastic currency 
depreciation, along with liquidity crunch, brought about inflation and increase cost of living. 
 Figure 4.1 sketches the detailed time line of the 1997 economic crisis. Using July 2nd 
1997 (when the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned) as a divider, the incidents on 
the left hand side were explained previously in Section 4.2, as the genesis of the crisis. Also, 
the incidents between July 2nd 1997 and August 1998 were explained in Section 4.2.5 as the 
mistakes in authorities’ response to the currency devaluation  that had shoved the economic 
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Figure 4.1: Time Line of the 1997 economic crisis (3) 
 
 
 
recession into the economic crisis. Nevertheless, this crisis had generated some positive 
factors for which they alleviated the adverse effects on the economic condition. First, the 
export expansion, resulting from Baht depreciation, had prevented the economy from 
contracting even further. In addition, the currency depreciation had made import goods 
became relatively more expensive, thus reduced demand for imports, and therefore 
improved the balance of trade. The improved balance of trade, combined with the low 
domestic demand, helped restraining the inflation rate from rising too much. Combined with 
the assistance from the two economic stimulus packages the Thai government imposed on 
March 1999 and February 2000, Thai economy started to recover. However, such recovery 
was punctuated briefly by the September 11th terrorist attack in the United States 
(Thailand’s biggest trading partner), which resulted in another round of world economic 
recession.  
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 The following sections will examine the impacts of the crisis on two important issues: 
economic growth, and employment. 
 
4.3.1 Economic Growth 
 
The overall GDP growth (Table 4.1) declined significantly from 5.9 percent in 1996 to -1.37 
percent in 1997, and further to -10.51 percent in 1998. The non-agricultural sectors had 
experienced much larger negative impacts than the agricultural sector. Among the non-
agricultural sectors, the construction sector experienced the largest negative impact in the 
period following the crisis. The manufacturing sector had also been heavily hit, though the 
impacts were uneven within the sector.  
 
4.3.1.1 Agricultural sector 
 
The agricultural sector had registered slight negative growth from the third quarter of 1997 
until the second quarter of 1998 compared to the same quarter in the previous year (Figure 
4.2), but has continued to grow after that, despite some periods of weather disturbance (i.e. 
drought, flood). It  had  experienced  less  turbulence  from  the  crisis  due  to  the  
beneficial of  Baht devaluation, resulting in the increase in export volume from 160,312 and 
167,131 millions Baht in 1995 and 1996, respectively, to 183,962 and 211,092 millions Baht 
in 1997 and 1998, respectively. However, by 1999 the affect of the devaluation faded away, 
and the export volume fell to 184,947 millions Baht. In order to promote the recovery of the 
economy beyond the benefits of Baht devaluation, on February 1999, the Ministry of 
Agriculture had implemented a recovery package involved measures to enhance production 
efficiency, export competitiveness, and management system35.  
 
                                                 
35 Details can be found in the Bank of Thailand’s Annual Economic Report 1998, p. 12-14 
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Figure 4.2: Quarterly Gross Domestic Product at 1988 Price 
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4.3.1.2 Construction sector 
 
This was the sector that experienced the most severe negative impact from the economic 
crisis. Since the late 1980s up until before the crisis in 1997, the construction sector had 
experienced dramatic growth, as a result of growth in real estate sector. However, by early 
1996, the supply in this sector had become much higher than the real, non-speculative 
demand. The office vacancy rate was more than 20 percent in Bangkok municipal area, 
while other types of construction were also facing with similar problems. By the time of 
crisis in July 1997, it had become clear to the public that there exist a large gap between 
the demand and supply of this sector. With the huge amount of excess capacity, the 
vanishing speculative demand, the contraction in real demand (as a result of high domestic 
interest rate), and the liquidity shortage (faced by consumers seeking mortgages), the 
bubble in the real estate sector had finally busted. Many building projects were discontinued 
because of the liquidity shortage, as well as because there was not enough demand to keep 
them continued. Many unfortunate companies were forced to declare bankruptcy as they 
could not service their higher external debts resulting from the devaluation of the Baht. Thai 
construction sector experienced the first decline in its GDP share for more than a decade. 
The construction sector contracted considerably by 21 percent in 1997, and then by 35.9 
percent in 1998. 
 However, the sign of recovery in the construction sector came in 1999. Although 
the growth rate of the sector was still in the negative region, the devastated effect of the 
economic crisis has started to fade out. The GDP of the sector contracted by around 8 to 9 
percent in both 1999 and 2000, much lower compared to the reduction of more than 35 
percent in 1998. The main reason for this improvement came from the improvement in the 
overall liquidity since the second half of 1998, which allowed interest rates to lower. 
However, financial institutes were still very cautious about extending credits. Also, problem 
of non-performing loans was still persisted. By 2001, the growth rate of the GDP had finally 
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bounced back to the positive region. The liquidity in the financial system remained high in 
2001, interest rates had lowered further, the problem of non-performing loans had also 
been solved, and financial institutions began to compete in the extension of housing credits.  
 
Figure 4.4: Annual Gross Domestic Product at Current Price 
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 From the market supply side, the successful progressed in debt restructuring since 
1999, combined with the improvement in the overall liquidity since late 1998 had enable the 
revival of many companies, which had once ceased operation due to debt problems. 
However, the recovery was not yet come in full until 2001, when household incomes started 
to experience full recovery in tandem with the overall economic recovery. Therefore, home-
owning become much more affordable from the consumers’ point of view. 
 
4.3.1.3 Manufacturing Sector 
 
In 1998, the Thai manufacturing sector experienced a negative impact from the 1997 
economic crisis. The overall manufacturing production fell by 10.8 percent, a sharp contrast 
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to an increase of 7.8 in 1996, and an increase of 0.2 percent in 1997. Such a negative 
growth could be observed across most production segments, except for textiles which 
continued to expand. Major factors contributing to this downturn were36: 1) the contraction 
in domestic demand, both on consumption and investment due to the crisis; 2) the liquidity 
shortage faced by producers and exporters; and 3) the ongoing financial crisis in the East 
Asian region. The effects of this crisis also spred across the rest of the world, creating 
recessions in many other economies, which causing only marginal improvement in 
Thailand’s export performance, despite substantial depreciation of the Baht. 
 
Domestic Oriented industries  
 
Sectors that experienced the most severe downturn were the domestic oriented sectors 
(export less than 30% of the total production), such as construction materials, vehicles and 
transport equipments, and iron and steel products (figure 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7). The production 
of construction materials exhibited a slight decline of 3.25 percent in 1997; followed by a 
great contraction of 38.2 percent in 1998, in accordance with the sluggish construction 
sector.  Factor contributing to this decline were 1) the excess supply in the real estates, 2) 
decline in government construction projects following the moderation of budgetary 
disbursement since the end of 1997, and 3) the liquidity shortage that caused some 
producers in this sector to gradually stop their production lines in order to lower costs of 
merchandise stock accumulation37. 
 The vehicles and transport equipments sector experienced sharp declined in both 
1997 and 1998, the production fell by 26.51 percent in 1997, and further reduced by 54.03 
percent in 1998. Although the decline in Baht had improved the competitiveness of this 
sector in the world market, and thus increased the export volume, they only account for 
                                                 
36 Bank of Thailand, (1999) 
37 Bank of Thailand, (1999) 
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about 20 percent of the total production, and were not sufficient to offset the impact of 
domestic demand contraction.  
  
Figure 4.5: Manufacturing Production Index 
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Figure 4.6: Manufacturing Production Index 
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Figure 4.7: Manufacturing Production Index 
Iron and steel products sector, being the intermediate products for the declining 
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industries (such as vehicles and transport equipments) and the declining sector (such as 
constructions) had inevitably experienced a decline in their production. The industry 
production contracted by 3.08 percent in 1997, and worsened to 31.02 in 1998. 
Traditionally, Thai steel producers relied heavily on loans to support their expensive 
investments. With the severe liquidity problem in 1997 and early 1998, many steel 
producers found themselves in a situation that is much more difficult to service their higher 
cost of loan repayments, hence resulting them to have no other option but to either cease 
their operation or to enter the debt restructuring process. 
  
The exp
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producers in these industries had also experienced difficulties resulting from the crisis (i.e. 
very tight liquidity situation, severe shortage of funds, and decreased in inter-firm domestic 
trade credits), the depreciation in Baht had improved their competitiveness in the export 
markets, and hence had, to some extent, been able to weaken the negative effect of the 
crisis. Compared to the domestic oriented industries, industries in the export oriented sector 
experienced a much smaller declined in their productions. Also, many of these industries’ 
productions returned at least to (but mostly significantly exceeded) their long-term trend in 
just one year after 1998, when the problems of liquidity and non-performing loans were 
solved. Nevertheless, one common trend most of these industries shared was the rather 
sharp decline, except the jewellery productions, in the growth in production between 2000 
and 2001, as the result of world sluggish economic following the September 11th terrorist 
attacked38.  
   
 
Figure 4.8: Manufacturing Production Index            
Source: Bank of Thailand 
   
                                                
 
 
38 Bank of Thailand, (2003) 
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 Food productions (Figure 4.8) had experienced a slight growth of 1.77 percent in 
1997, before a moderate declined of 4.92 percent in 1998. However, this slump might be 
owing to the shortage and low quality of raw materials, following the unfavourable climate 
condition in the country during that period, particularly, in the canned fruit and sugar 
industries, which are the major export products of Thailand. For 1999, the production 
reverted back to its long-term growth trend, before facing another slowdown in 2001 
following the September 11th event.    
 The electronic sector (Figure 4.9) had experienced two consecutive years of 
moderate decline growth. The productions contract by 5.78 and 13.77 percent in 1997 and 
1998, respectively. Although the devaluation of the Baht had improved Thailand’s 
 the problems of non-performing loans were still severe among 
 cease their productions until the debt restructuring 
competitiveness, however
the producers in this sector. During the early 1990s, Thailand had become an important 
exporter of the electronic products in the world market, due to the cheaper labour costs. In 
addition, the liberalization of the capital account in the early 1990s had encourage many 
investors to borrow from aboard and invested in the fast growing electronic sector. Thus, 
resulting in a huge number of producers in this sector engaged in foreign currency debts. 
During the financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, these producers found it more difficult to 
service their loans, and were forced to
program had been negotiated. Therefore, resulting in the contraction of production stated 
earlier. By the last quarter of 1998, many businesses were able to resume their operation, 
thus a significant improvement in the production could be seen. The manufacturing 
production index grew by a respectable level of 12.04 percent in 1999 and a remarkable 
level of 31.54 percent in 2000, placing the production level back to the level envisaged by 
long-term trend. Unfortunately, this growth was greatly disrupted again by the effect of the 
terrorist attacked in September 2001. 
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Figure 4.9: Manufacturing Production Index                                        
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Figure 4.10: Manufacturing Production Index 
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 The integrated circuits industry (figure 4.10) had been hit briefly by the economic 
crisis in 1998, where the production shrivelled slightly by 2.04 percent. Similar to the 
electronic sector, this industry had benefited from the devaluation of the Baht, but at the 
same time suffered from the credit crunch problems. After the non-performing loan issues 
had been solved in the last quarter of 1998, the industry experienced the full benefit of 
devaluation, and thus enjoyed the impressive growth of 31.92 percent in 1999 and 36.39 
percent in 2000, before being affected by the world economic recession in 2001 as a result 
of the terrorist attacked. 
  
 
Figure 4.11: Manufacturin roduction Index 
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attacked in the United States, Thailand’s biggest export market. However, exports to other 
important markets such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Japan were still 
expanded favourably, as a result of the government export promotion package in exemption 
of import duty on 11 items of jewellery and ornament raw materials. 
 
Industry that export between 30 to 60 percent of total production 
 
Industries in this group experienced similar growth pattern during the 1990s. The majority 
of them enjoyed production expansion during 1990 to 1993, then a significant boom during 
1994 and 1995, with the exception of textile industry that enjoyed the boom earlier in 1992 
ustries experienced less severe impacts from the economic crisis in 
compared to the domestic oriented industries, as the devaluation of the Baht 
increase Thailand’s competitiveness. Also, when compared to the export oriented industries, 
these industries experienced less negative impact during the world economic slowdown in 
2001.   
  
and 1993. These ind
1997, when 
Figure 4.12: Manufacturing Production Index 
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 Textiles and textile products sector (Figure 4.12) were fortunate enough not to 
experience the declined in their productions during the two most difficult years following the 
economic crisis. The productions in this sector continued to expand, following its long-term 
trend, by 1.79 and 2.83 percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The important of the 
increase in Thai competitiveness could be seen very clearly in this sector. Since 1993, Thai 
extiles producers had started to lose their competitiveness of the low-end products to 
 and China, which had much cheaper labour 
costs. The devaluation of the Baht in 1997 had resulted in the improvement of the 
competitiveness in this low-end market, thus improved the overall performance of the 
industry which could be much worsen attributed to the significantly lower domestic demand 
in line with the economic contraction. However, by 1999, the effects of Baht devaluation 
had started to fade away as many countries in the East Asian region had also devalued their 
currencies. As a result, Thailand, once more, faced eroded competitiveness in mid- and low-
end textile products. The productions declined by 1.14 percent in 1999, and stay rather 
stagnant at that level until 2003. Therefore, improvements in design and production, as well 
as the shift of productions toward the mid- to high-end products are necessary if Thailand 
wishes to maintain its share in the world market. 
T
newly developing countries such as Vietnam,
 The production of glass sheets (Figure 4.13) and electric motors (Figure 4.14), like 
most of the industries, experienced negative effects from the tight liquidity problem in 1998. 
The production of the glass sheet industry contracted by 21.39 percent in 1998, while the 
production of the electric motor industry contracted by 27.47 percent, in the same year. 
Both industries started to experience recovery in 1999, and continued to grow until the 
world economic slowdown in 2001, when the glass sheet industry faced zero growth and 
the electric motor industry contracted by 5.45 percent. 
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Figure 4.13: Manufacturing Production Index 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
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4.3.2 Employment 
 
The population of Thailand was a little over 62 million in 2000 39 . The labour force, 
estimated at approximately 34 million (54.4% of the population) in the same year, was 
growing at declining rates of an annual average of 3.0 percent during 1980-1985, 2.9 
percent during 1986-1990, 1.5 percent during 1991-1995, and about 1 percent during 1995-
200040. It should also be emphasized here that employment in Thailand is highly seasonal. 
The size and pattern of employment and unemployment vary from season to season, and 
thus a single set of labour force data from one particular season would not necessarily 
represent the employment pattern in another season. In order to capture the seasonal 
variations, the labour force surveys (LFSs) carried out by the National Statistic Office (NSO) 
ted on a quarterly basis, which in February and May correspond to the dry or 
ack agricultural season, and in August and December are the wet (planting) and 
 the crisis on employment. The final factor is the 
ructure of the economy. Thai economy has relatively large agricultural and informal 
are conduc
sl
harvesting months, respectively. In most studies, for simplicity, two major seasons are used, 
the February round represents the dry or slack season, and the August round to represent 
the wet or the peak agricultural season.  
 Paitoonpong (2002) alleged that in general, the severity of the impact of a financial 
crisis on labour markets depends on three major factors. First is the flexibility of quantity 
adjustment by the groups and/or industries directly affected by the crisis. The flexibility of 
employment can cooperatively happen between employers and workers. Firms can adjust 
their production process to maintain the level of employment, while the workers can reduce 
their working hours to minimise the cost of production. The second is the flexibility of wage 
adjustment, which provides firms the option of reducing their operating costs, and 
consequently, minimising the impact of
st
                                                 
39 fice Thailand, (2002), Thai Labour Force Survey, 2001 
g, (2002) 
 National Statistical Of
40 Data from Paitoonpon
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sectors, which are more likely to be able to absorb workers from other sectors that are 
directly affected by the crisis. In addition, government policies, such as the unemployment 
benefits, can also reduce the impact of the crisis on labour.  
 In this study, the impact of the 1997 economic crisis on labour can be categorized 
into 4 parts. These are the impact of the crisis on employment, unemployment, 
underemployment, and real wages. The analysis will proceed by comparing the above four 
indicators in the years prior to and follow the crisis.  
 
4.3.2.1 Employment  
 
The majority of Thai labour force is engaged in the agricultural sector. In 2000, during the 
peak season, 48.5 percent of the total employment was engaged in this sector, while 15.2 
percent was in services sector, 14.8 percent in commerce, 13.7 percent in manufacturing, 
and 4 percent in construction. During the dry or slack season, the proportion of employment 
in agriculture decreased to 41.8 percent, while employment in the non-agricultural sector 
mostly increased, with the share of services at 16.3 percent, commerce at 16.1 percent, 
manufacturing at 16.2 percent, and construction at 5.2 percent. Since 1995, in spite of the 
economic crisis, employment in manufacturing was relatively stable, accounting for about 16 
to 17 percent of total employment during the slack season and around 13 percent during 
the peak season. Employment in services and construction was less stable during this period. 
In the slack season, employment in services increased from 14.3 percent in 1995 to 16.3 
percent in 1999, while in the peak season it increased from 12.7 percent in 1995 to 15.2 
percent in 1999. This phenomenon reflects the capacity of the service sector to absorb 
labour during economic hardships41. However, a totally different picture could be seen in 
the construction sector, the employment proportion declined from 10.4 percent and 6.7 
                                                 
41 Paitoonpong, (2002) 
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percent in 1996, during the slack season and the peak agricultural season, respectively, to 
5.2 and 4.0 percent in 1999. 
 The long-term employment trends of Thailand reflected the nature of the changes 
in economic activity during the past 2 decades, which were to be expected in the course of 
economic development, namely, a shift away from agricultural toward industrial and service 
sector. The share of agricultural employment significantly decreased from 74.4 percent in 
977 to 48.5 percent in 1999, while industrial employment increased from 8.3 percent to 
ice employment from 17.2 percent to 33.1 percent. During this period, 
efore the crisis, employment in industry showed a slowly-increasing trend, with an annual 
1
18.4 percent, and serv
b
growth rate of 6.2 percent, and with an annual growth rate of GDP per worker of 3.8 
percent. There was a small decline in the growth of manufacturing employment during the 
time of the economic crisis. Employment in services showed a consistently increasing trend 
both before and after crisis, with an average rate of 4.6 percent, but with a lower annual 
growth rate of GDP per worker of only 0.8 percent.42
  
Table 4.6: Employment, Percentage Change between 1996 and 1999 
ndustry % Changes in Round 2 % Changes in Round 3 % Changes in RoundI  4 
Agriculture 0.17 1.13 -1.60 
Mining -5.54 5.12 6.91 
Manufacturing -2.34 -2.29 -1.66 
Construction -35.57 -41.04 -39.10 
Electricity, Gas, Water 16.51 12.33 7.56 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 2.92 4.69 7.26 
Transportation -2.70 -0.18 -0.07 
Services and Others 9.44 12.30 13.92 
Total -1.52 -1.10 -1.21 
Source: Labour Force Surveys (Various Years) 
 
  
                                                 
apura (1998) 42 Paitoonpong and Than
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 Impact of the crisis on employment had a similar pattern to the impact on the GDP. 
On the GDP side, the construction sector, which was a major part of the real-estate-driven 
“bubble” economy, was the most severely hit sector. The percentage change of average 
sectoral GDP in eight quarters before and during the crisis indicates that GDP in the 
construction, commerce and service sectors declined by 53.1 percent, 12.4 percent, and 
10.1 percent, respectively. The industries that were less involved during the “bubble” period 
prior to the crisis (such as the agriculture, mining, and electricity, gas and water supply) 
had an increasing percentage of average sectoral GDP. Similarly, workers in the 
construction sector were the most seriously affected. The negative results of the bubble 
economy also affected employment in the manufacturing and transportation sectors, but 
not in the electric, gas and water, commerce and service sectors. As Table 4.6 indicates, the 
percentage changes of average employment in the construction sector between 1995 and 
sed by 35.6 percent, 41 percent, and 39 percent, according to data from 
ricultural sector, even though it’s 
GDP increased by h c
in this sector which normally employs around 40 to 50 percent of the total workforce. 
employment
1999 had decrea
rounds two, three, and four, respectively. For the ag
sectoral 1.3 percent, the crisis ad an ambiguous impa t on employment 
 
4.3.2.2 Un  
 
ent measurement in Th  is based on La Force Survey (LFS rtly 
re no unemployme surance and unemployment registration es, 
oyment in a country. The LFS defines 
oyed as “persons, 13 years of age and over who, during the survey week did not 
work even for one hour, had no jobs, business enterprises or farms of their own from which 
they were temporarily absent, but were available for work”. The unemployed also consist of 
those who were waiting to take up a new job or for the agricultural season to begin, as well  
Unemploym ailand bour ), pa
because there a nt in schem
which would normally give a fair estimate of unempl
the unempl
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Table 4.7: Labour Force Survey    
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* 1999* 2000* 
(Average (Round 1) and (Round 3)) (Thousand Persons) 
Population 58,442.0 59,239.5 59,281.9 59,897.9 60,499.8 61,173.8 61,778.7 62,404.7 
   Age  Under  13 15,466.0 15,300.0 14,216.0 14,141.6 13,932.8 13,966.8 13,866.4 13,759.9 
   Age  13  Up 42,976.0 43,939.5 45,065.9 45,756.3 46,567.0 47,207.1 47,912.4 48,644.8 
Labour  Force 32,240.0 31,816.1 32,174.9 32,324.2 32,780.5 32,595.5 32,910.8 33,393.9 
1.  Employment 30,679.0 30,164.3 30,815.1 31,166.0 31,714.3 30,270.2 30,835.4 31,446.7 
      of which underemployment 844.0 630.0 568.0 642.0 760.5 1,035.3 1,216.0 1,057.1 
   - Agriculture 16,269.0 15,180.0 14,389.1 14,136.7 14,314.6 13,571.3 13,997.3 13,999.9 
   - Non-Agriculture 14,410.4 14,983.8 16,426.0 17,029.0 17,399.7 16,698.9 16,838.1 17,446.7 
      Mining  and  quarrying 58.0 57.8 55.0 53.6 52.5 44.7 64.3 44.8 
      Manufacturing 4,179.0 4,190.8 4,608.2 4,650.8 4,644.2 4,577.3 4,611.3 5,004.8 
      Construction, repair and demolition 1,615.2 1,996.7 2,247.6 2,648.6 2,502.1 1,632.5 1,401.8 1,506.5 
      Electricity,gas,water&sanitary services 146.0 184.0 184.0 151.7 176.4 195.7 157.1 165.9 
      Commerce 3,806.7 3,766.0 4,184.5 4,396.6 4,601.9 4,632.8 4,784.2 4,911.2 
      Transport  storage & communication 909.1 894.9 1,006.2 995.2 1,039.4 989.5 1,008.5 969.4 
      Services 3,676.5 3,882.0 4,132.3 4,097.1 4,371.0 4,612.9 4,793.5 4,833.6 
      Activities not adequately described 19.5 12.0 11.1 35.2 12.0 13.3 17.1 10.4 
2.  Unemployed  Persons  843.8 833.0 550.0 497.6 495.2 1,423.3 1,382.6 1,204.3 
( rate  of  unemployment ) 2.6 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 4.4 4.2 3.6 
   - Looking  for  Work 139.2 169.3 134.2 114.9 138.0 457.6 389.5 318.7 
   - Not  Looking  for  Work 704.5 664.3 415.1 382.7 357.2 965.6 993.0 885.5 
3.  Seasonal  Inactive  Labour  Force 717.2 818.8 809.8 660.6 571.0 902.0 692.9 742.9 
 ( share of total labour force ) 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.0 1.7 2.8 2.1 2.2 
Source: The Labour Force Survey by the National Statistical Office 
Remark: * Average of 4 rounds of the survey.  
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as those who had been looking for work, and those who had not been looking for work due 
 illness or because they believe there was no suitable work available. 
Prior to the economic crisis in 1997, unemployment in Thailand had been generally 
w, with an average of 2.36 percent of total labour force during 1990 to 1996 (Table 4.7). 
owever, there are several reasons that could be related to this low ‘open’ unemployment 
te. Firstly, Thailand did not yet have an unemployment insurance system, which results in 
e lack of incentive for workers to report their unemployment. Secondly, similar to many 
eveloping countries, the informal sector played an important role in providing employment 
pportunities for Thai labour force. And finally, the definition of the ‘unemployed’ was in 
self problematic in many ways43. Firstly, a person works for more than one hour during the 
rvey week would be automatically considered employed. Secondly, the definition does not 
clude the “seasonally inactive labour force” which is defined as persons, 13 years of age 
nd over who were neither employed nor unemployed, but were waiting for the appropriate 
ason. Thirdly, the definition also does not include “unpaid family workers” - persons who 
sually worked without pay on farms or in business enterprises engaged in seasonal 
ctivities owned or operated by the head of the household or any other member of the 
ousehold.   In Thailand, a large proportion of the labour force comprises of this category, 
ainly in agriculture. According to the LFSs, this group accounted for 58.7 percent of the 
tal employment in 1999.  
The 1997 crisis caused unemployment to increase significantly. As can be seen from 
able 4.7, the rate of unemployment, as the percentage of the total labour force, jumped 
om 1.7 percent in 1995 to 4.4 percent in 1998. Similar to the case of GDP growth, the 
egative consequence of the crisis on unemployment was unevenly spread across sectors. 
espite its sectoral GDP growth, in the short and medium periods, the mining sector was hit 
, respectively, from 
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hardest by the crisis in terms of unemployment. Average unemployment in this industry 
increased by 546.4 percent and 323.7 percent in rounds two and three
 
43 Paitoonpong, (2002) 
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1996 to 1999. In average, unemployment in the agriculture sector increased the least, but 
was still as high as about 90-100 percent (Table 4.8).   
  
Table 4.8: Unemployment, Percentage Change between 1996 and 1999 
Industry % Changes in Round 2 % Changes in Round 3 % Changes in Round 4 
Agriculture 90.31 99.54 98.33 
Mining 546.38 323.71 137.51 
Manufacturing 260.49 239.66 242.84 
Construction 266.69 265.33 257.23 
Electricity, Gas, Water 294.38 64.82 90.52 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 276.74 274.62 268.68 
Transportation 295.55 306.51 214.41 
Services and Others 166.20 160.73 191.11 
Total 148.83 155.92 157.16 
Source: Labour Force Surveys (Various Years) 
  
4.3.2.3 Underemployment
  
 
 
As mentioned above, unemployment in Thailand has been generally low except after the 
1997 crisis. One of the major reasons is that a substantial number of those considered 
44
employed were underemployed, or in order word, worked less than they could or wished. 
Officially, underemployment is defined by the National Statistical Office (NSO) as those who 
work less than 35 hours per week during the week of the survey. However, in many studies, 
underemployment is arbitrarily defined as those persons who work less than 20 hours per 
week in order to include only those who were really in need of more work . Under this 
definition of 20 hours per week, the number of the underemployed (Round 3) had 
significantly increased after the economic crisis, from 580,700 persons (1.77% of the labour  
 
                                                 
44 Siamwalla (1998), for example, used this definition and classified this group as being “severely 
underemployed” and persons who work less than 35 hours per week as being “moderately 
underemployed”. 
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Table 4.9: Underemployment by Industry 1995-1998: Industry Working less than 20 hours per week  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
(thousands of people) Round 1 Round 3 Round 1 Round 3 Round 1 Round 3 Round 1 Round 3 Round 1 Round 3 
Total 490.0 644.4 638.8 580.7 543.9 721.4 1477.2 938.4 862.7 953.9 
Agriculture 299.2 473.0 437.4 436.3 353.7 531.4 585.6 713.3 580.4 750.1 
Mining and Quarrying 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.4 2.9 0.2 4.3 0.0 
Manufacturing 35.9 44.2 51.2 32.9 44.1 40.5 489.2 30.5 49.3 30.4 
Construction and Repair 8.3 3.6 20.7 8.5 13.7 7.7 31.0 12.4 13.0 18.8 
Electricity, Gas, Water, etc. 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.3 1.3 1.4 0.0 1.0 0.1 
Commerce 68.4 61.4 70.8 57.0 67.5 80.9 220.1 100.1 105.5 79.1 
Transport, Communications 10.7 10.8 12.9 3.8 11.3 12.7 31.3 10.1 11.3 11.9 
Service and Others 66.4 51.0 45.7 41.2 51.2 46.4 115.8 71.9 97.7 63.5 
Source: Report of the Labour Force Survey, National Statistics Office (various years) 
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force) in 1996 to 938,400 persons (2.81%) in 1998, 953,900 persons (2.87%) in 1999, and 
82,700 persons (2.89%) in 2000 (Table 4.9). 
Generally, underemployment did not show seasonality. There was no trend or 
irection of underemployment between 1995 and 1999. In 1995, 1997 and 1999 it was 
reater in the slack season than in the peak season, while in 1996 and 1998 it was the 
ther way around. The underemployment figures of 1998, in both dry and slack seasons, 
ere significantly higher than those in 1996. It increased from 638.8 and 580.7 in round 1 
nd round 3, respectively, to 1,477.2 and 938.4 in 1998.  
During the crisis, underemployment increased in every industry except the electric, 
as and water supply sector. Underemployment in the electric, gas and water supply sector 
eclined by 43.1 percent, 6.1 percent, and 2.6 percent during the crisis, for all rounds. 
nderemployment in the mining and manufacturing sector had the largest increment during 
e crisis, with the manufacturing sector increased by 574.62 percent, 343.78 percent, and 
47.65 percent, in round 2, round 3 and round 4 respectively. Underemployment grew the 
ast in the agriculture sector, where the percentage changes of underemployment during 
e crisis period were 64.4 percent, 53.1 percent, and 54.6 percent (Table 4.10). 
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T : Underemployment, Percentage Change between 1996 and 1999 
Industry % Changes in Round 2 % Changes in Round 3 % Changes in Round 4 
Agriculture 64.42 53.11 54.64 
Mining 230.75 695.72 440.46 
Manufacturing 574.62 343.78 247.65 
Construction 94.53 31.13 61.32 
Electricity, Gas, Water -43.10 -6.10 -2.56 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 157.12 118.00 96.69 
Transportation 174.35 88.04 66.44 
Services and Others 103.18 106.76 84.61 
Total 114.79 85.90 75.77 
Source: Labour Force Surveys (Various Years) 
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 It should be noted here that the increase in the underemployment level implied the 
reduction in the number of working hours, as a result of the economic crisis. Hence, it 
suggested that Thai labour markets were able to absorb the negative impacts of the 
economic crisis through the adjustment of quantity of working hours, as well as the quantity 
of head-count. Also, the increase in underemployment also partly explained the reason the 
level of employment in Thailand was steadier than one would have expected in the period 
following the crisis, as a large proportion of the labour quantity adjustment was in the form 
of reduction in working hours rather than reduction in the number of workers. Thus, when 
attempting to evaluate the impact of a crisis, it is important to examine a number of 
possible quantity adjustment channels. Examination only on the figures of employment and 
unemployment might miss important quantitative adjustments in hours worked, and thus 
leaded to the misleading conclusion. 
 
4.3.2.4 Labour Wage  
 
As suggested in the previous section, when one attempted to examine the impact of an 
economic crisis, a number of possible labour market quantity, price and earnings outcomes 
were all needed to be considered. W djustment is one most common a nt 
m  in many countries, especially in developing countries, where th he 
absenc overnment policies or labour unions to impose muc  wage rigidity.  
 
c  that the impact of t is occurred less in terms of price adjustment than 
in terms of quantity adjustment. age rates, as e d from the LFSs, did not 
 post-crisis period in relation to the immediate pre-
risis period. One factor contributing to this outcome was due to a combination of reduced 
age a  of the djustme
echanisms seen ere is t
e of g h
However, the study of Thai labour market adjustment after the 1997 economic 
risis indicated he cris
Real w stimate
decline significantly in the immediate
c
hours worked for workers paid hourly or daily, and the selective movements from wage to 
non-wage employment.  
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 The real monthly wage for all types of worker declined only by 0.8 percent, 0.2 
percent, and 1.6 percent during the crisis, for round 1, 2, and 3, respectively (Table 4.11). 
Real monthly wages in the electric, gas and water supply sector increased by 24.2 percent, 
25.2 percent, and 22.5 percent, and real monthly wages in the transportation industry rose 
by 12.9 percent, 13.1 percent, and 7.9 percent during the crisis. The largest reduction of 
real monthly wages occurred in the mining industry, where the real wages decreased by 
11.5 percent, 13.3 percent, and 18.9 percent in all rounds. Interestingly, the sector with the 
smallest reduction in real monthly wages was the construction industry, whose real wages 
declined by only 1.7 percent and 1.8 percent in the second and third round, respectively, 
given it had been the industry that faced the most severe negative impact in term of GDP 
rowth rate. One suggestion was that prior to the crisis, the construction sector was the 
age very close to the minimum rate, thus the flexibility of price 
djustment was somewhat limited. 
g
sector with average w
a
  
Table 4.11: Real Monthly Wage Rate, Percentage Change between 1996 and 1999 
Industry % Changes in Round 2 % Changes in Round 3 % Changes in Round 4 
Agriculture -5.49 -4.40 -3.08 
Mining -11.49 -13.29 -18.86 
Manufacturing -5.96 -5.46 -6.47 
Const tion -1.73 -1.75 -5.68 ruc
Electricity, Gas, Water 24.20 25.21 22.51 
Wholesale and Retail Trade -4.80 -6.99 -7.06 
Transportation 12.92 13.13 7.92 
Services and Others -4.22 -4.63 -4.26 
Total -0.82 -0.19 -1.64 
Source: Labour Force Surveys (Various Years) 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
The 1997 economic crisis had affected Thailand in a very profound and extensive scale. The 
majority of the sectors in the economy were affected by the crisis, although the effects 
might not be even. The economic growth recorded severe contraction, financial market 
collapsed, domestic demand slumped, industrial sectors were in severe excess capacity, 
employment deteriorated, personal and corporate income diminished, inflation and cost of 
living mounted, and finally, poverty surged. The crisis culminated from a complex set of 
causes. Radelet and Sachs (1998) expressed their opinions on such issue as:   
“To be sure, there were significant underlying problems besetting the Asian 
economies, at both a macroeconomic and microeconomic level (especially within the 
 sector). But these imbalances were not severe enough to warrant a 
second half of 1997….. A 
on of panic on the part of th
mistakes at the outset of the crisis, and poorly designed international rescue 
ams have led to a much deeper fall in (ot e viable) output  
The gman (1994) has pointed out, h
s e economy. The rapid growth in the early 1990s had built up on higher use of 
inputs from resource mobilization ra han technology progress and efficiency. However, 
ts and mobilizing resources was impossible to be 
Nevertheless, these problems were, yet, concealed at the time. 
The relative stable growth of more than two decades had convinced everyone into 
mplacency regarding the risks they might be running. Mistakes in investments had almost 
ways been rescued by high growth. But it was this high growth that led to the 
ructural problems. Institutions were inadequately prepared to deal with 
e consequences of mistakes, and no arrangement had ever been properly set up. One 
financial
financial crisis of the magnitude that took place in the 
combinati e international investment community, policy 
progr herwis than was
either necessary or inevitable.”   
Thai economy, as Kru ad deep-rooted problems in the 
tructure of th
ther t
such growth based on utilizing inpu
sustained in the long-run. 
co
al
accumulation of st
th
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obvious example was the financial market liberalization when the supervision and the 
regulation of financial institutions were not yet overhauled to take into account of the new 
environment that would be opened up by such liberalization. The result of it was devastated. 
The massive capital inflow had led firms to over-reliance on external debt as a mean of 
financing new investments, which made them, as well as the financial institutions, became 
extremely vulnerable to external factors. The attack of the currency, which later led to the 
devaluation of the Baht, had put many firms and financial institutes in the ravaged situation, 
hence, in
the reco
suspensi
fiscal an
of the cr
 
moving 
problem as to be built based on ‘efficiency-led sustainable 
tensifying the impacts of the crisis even further. More unfortunate, the mistake in 
vering programs by the IMF had pushed the situation even further down. The 
on of financial institutions had created panic across the economy. The stringent 
d monetary policies left no prospect for business to recover. As a result, the impacts 
isis were far greater than what it should have been.  
However, the worst of the crisis had already passed, and Thailand is on its route to 
forward, therefore, it is time to look back and address the root of the fundamental 
s. Firstly, the economic growth h
growth’ instead of the mobilizing of inputs and resources. Secondly, the country’s long-run 
productivity and competitiveness has to be well planed. And finally, institutions and 
arrangements to deal with mistakes and external shocks have to be established, so that 
Thailand will be better equipped in dealing with future difficulties.  
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Chapter 5 – Measuring Productivity 
 
“Productivity is never an accident. It is always the result of a commitment to excellence, 
intelligent planning, and focused effort.” 
 
Paul J. Meyer 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The principal objective of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the concept of 
productivity and its measurement. The concept of productivity has long been examined, and 
while there is neither a unique purpose for, nor a single measure of productivity, there is no 
argument that productivity is commonly defined as the economy’s ability to convert inputs 
into outputs. At the simplest level, the productivity concept can be expressed as a ratio of a 
volume measure of output to a volume measure of input use1, with the simple equation: 
    
Input
Outputyroductivit =Ρ  
The productivity concept is distinct from the simple production notion (which concerns only 
the total volume of goods and services produced), by its relating output to the quantity of 
resources or inputs used to produce them2. Its concern is with how efficiently a certain 
output of goods and services is produced3, or generally speaking, it aims at maximizing 
outputs produced, for a given set of inputs, or, for a given output, minimizing inputs used. 
The measurement of productivity can be made at various levels – economy, industry, 
company and operational; and comparisons can be made either across time or between 
different production units4. The term productivity is closely related to ‘efficiency’, and very 
often used interchangeably. However, they are different in that the term productivity refers 
                                                          
1 Measuring Productivity, OECD Manual, 2001, pp.11 
2 Lipsey and Carlaw, (2003) 
3 Productivity in the New Millennium, APO Video Text 
4 Green, (1993b) 
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to the ratio that evaluates relationship between inputs and outputs. It is a measurement of 
the level of production in an absolute term (e.g. how many units of outputs can be 
produced by a certain set of inputs). On the other hand, the term efficiency is a relative 
concept. It evaluates the degree of acheivement of productivity at a certain level (in the 
case for this thesis, technical efficiency refers to an index that relates the level of 
productivity to a maximum attainable production level defined by a frontier production 
function). 
 It is commonly believed (Griliches (1987), Green (1993b), Barro (1998), Harberger 
(1998), Diewert and Lawrence (1999), Hulten (2000), Carlaw and Lipsey (2003a, 2003b)) 
that along with increases in factor endowments and changes in the terms of trade, 
productivity improvement is a major determinant of economic growth and national welfare. 
Despite this belief, there is much less agreement on the area of the purpose of productivity 
measurement. The most frequently stated objective of measuring productivity growth is to 
trace technological change. Griliches (1987) described technology as ‘the currently known 
ways of converting resources into outputs desired by the economy’, which could appear 
either in embodied or disembodied form. Although many economists (Basu and Fernald 
(1997), Hulten (2000), Lipsey and Carlaw (2002), Carlaw and Lipsey (2003a)) argued that 
productivity measurement is an imperfect measure of technological change, it is still 
somehow related to the productivity, at least by measuring the supernormal gain associated 
with growth creating technological change. The next objective for measuring productivity is 
to locate efficiency adjustment, which conceptually is different from technological changes. 
Full efficiency implies that a production process has achieved the maximum amount of 
output that is physically achievable with current technology, given a certain amount of 
inputs 5 . Therefore, technical efficiency gain is the advance towards the ‘best possible 
practice’, or the elimination of technical and organizational inefficiency.  
                                                          
5 Diewert and Lawrence, (1999) 
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 The third objective for measuring productivity is to identify real cost savings in 
production. Productivity, in general, is measured residually, which captures not only the 
effect of efficiency changes, technical change and economies of scale, but also changes in 
capital utilization, learning-by-doing and measurement errors. Harberger (1998) referred to 
this as real cost savings. Productivity, in practice, could be used as a way to identify them in 
the production process. Moreover, productivity could also be used in benchmarking the 
production processes, where in many cases, comparisons of productivity measures for 
specific production processes can help to identify production inefficiencies among producers. 
And finally, productivity measurement is the key element in assessing the standard of living6. 
Labour productivity, using value added per hour of work, is a good measure of per capita 
income, while the long term trend in multifactor productivity (MFP) is a good indicator of the 
economy’s underlying productive capacity7, which is an important measure of inflationary 
pressure. 
 This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the different types of 
productivity measures. It compares and contrasts the single and the multi/total factor 
productivity measures. Also, the differences between the gross output and value-added 
productivity measures are considered. Section 5.3 then examines the four main approaches 
to measuring productivity, including the growth accounting approach, the index number 
approach, the conventional econometric approach, and the distance function based 
approach. However, an important point to be mentioned here is that, due to the extensive 
literatures in each approach, it is unrealistic to include very detailed discussion of every one 
of them. Therefore, only those approaches that fall within the scope of this thesis will be 
discussed in detail, both in their technical aspects and in the literature development, and 
these discussions will be made later in the relevant chapters. However, this chapter is only 
aimed at giving a broad overview of the subject of productivity, and no rigorous theoretical 
                                                          
6 Griliches, (1987) 
7 Carlaw and Lipsey, (2003a) 
 - 103 -
Measuring Productivity 
advancement or breakthrough is intended. Also, readers should be warned that there are 
some slight repetitions of key ideas in this chapter, to make the material more accessible, 
and to make sections more self-contained.    
 
 
5.2 Types of Productivity 
 
There are several approaches to measuring productivity. The choice between them depends 
on the purpose of the study and, in many cases, on the availability of data8. At the broadest 
level, productivity measurement can be classified as 1) single factor productivity measures 
(i.e. relating a measure of output to a single measure of input such as output per worker, 
output per hour worked, or output per unit of capital used). It can also take the form of 2) 
total factor productivity (TFP), where all the production inputs such as land, natural 
resources, and inventories are included in the calculation. Other methods of classifying 
productivity (of particular relevance at the industry or firm level) include productivity 
measures that relate gross output to one or several inputs (i.e. gross output based 
productivity), and those that use value-added concept to capture output movements (i.e. 
value-added based productivity).  
 
5.2.1 Single Factor Productivity  
 
Historically, productivity is often expressed as the ratio of output to the most limited or 
critical input, with all the other inputs held constant 9 . In industries that require skilled 
labour (which is often in relative shortage), output per worker is considered as the most 
appropriate measure of productivity. However, such partial productivity measures, that only 
relate to one class of input, suffer from many obvious limitations. Firstly, as output is, 
                                                          
8 Green, (1993) 
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mostly, a product resulting from a bundle of inputs, there may be several factors of 
production that are of almost equal importance. Deciding on a single input as the 
measurement could be very difficult, and could be rather subjective. Secondly, the relative 
importance of inputs may change over time, and thus, the chosen input at one particular 
period might no longer be appropriate in the following period. For instance, the relative 
importance of labour may be low in the initial stages of development when unemployment 
is high, but may become critical as the country becomes more developed, because of 
declining birth rates and aging labour force.  
 Finally, as the partial productivity measure reflects the combined effects of a 
number of factors (including the changes of other inputs, intermediate inputs, as well as, 
technical, organizational and efficiency change), relying on only a single factor input can 
often be misleading10. A simple substitution of capital for labour within the input mix of a 
firm or industry can raise labour productivity without, or with a much less, improvement in 
actual productivity. This implies that movements in the partial productivity statistics do not 
always represent true changes in the underlying productivity of the economy. Caution, thus, 
needs to be applied when examining this type of productivity measurement.  
 However, despite the above shortcomings, partial productivity measures, such as 
the labour productivity index, are still used commonly by the statistics institutes around the 
world as a key indicator for the productivity level. This is due to the reason that single 
productivity measures offer ease of comprehension and interpretation, thus, is suitable for a 
wide range of clients11. Also, the single productivity measures require much less extensive 
use of data, making it suitable for economies, in which the data are not profusely recorded.  
    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
9 Hulten, (2000) 
10 OECD Manual, (2001) 
11 OECD Manual, (2001) 
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5.2.2 Total Factor Productivity 
 
In order to avoid the problems faced by measures based on one input factor, as described 
above, the total factor productivity had been suggested as an alternative (Hulten (2000)). 
Total factor productivity (TFP) refers to the weighted average productivity of all inputs, 
where the weights to these inputs are their shares in the total cost of production12. Since 
every input in the production process is included, TFP provides a much more accurate 
measure of efficiency and the effectiveness of the production in question13. Also, as each 
input proportion is allowed to vary, TFP takes into account the possibility that the relative 
importance of factors may change over time.  
 However, TFP is also subject to some drawbacks 14 . First, the formation of it 
requires a significant amount of data, which is often lacked in developing economies. Hence, 
the use of TFP is currently limited, mostly, to only a number of developed countries. Second, 
the level of TFP is normally measured by dividing a measure of total output by a measure of 
total inputs; however, the total inputs are often an aggregation of only physical capital and 
labour, and may overlook many less obvious inputs. Consequently, many analysts (Ahmed 
and Patricia (2001), Duke and Torres (2005), Meyer and Harper (2005)) recognize the 
incompleteness of their input coverage, and thus prefer to refer to the resulting measures 
as multifactor productivity (MFP), rather than total factor productivity measures. However, 
the distinction between MFP and TFP is usually made only by those concerned greatly with 
the exact accuracy of terminology, and the term TFP continues to be used more widely. 
Hence, in this thesis, the term total factor productivity will be referred to in this looser sense.  
   
 
 
                                                          
12 Carlaw and Lipsey, (2003a) 
13 OECD Manual, (2001) 
14 Hulten, (2000) 
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5.2.3 Gross Output and Value-Added Based Productivity  
 
The measurement of productivity can also be classified by the nature of the output data 
being used. Goods and services that are produced by a production unit, and become 
available for use outside that unit are called gross output15. This is considered as a gross 
measure in the sense that it represents the value of sales and net additions to inventories, 
without allowing for purchases of intermediate inputs. The value-added measure is 
considered a net measure, as purchases of intermediate inputs are deducted from gross 
output16. The argument over which one of these measures should be preferred over the 
other has been the focus of considerable debate.  
 Theoretically, when technical progress affects all factors of production 
proportionally (i.e. under Hick-neutral technical progress) gross output total factor 
productivity would be a better measure of technical change. This is due to the fact that it is 
less sensitive to changes in the degree of outsourcing; therefore, it becomes a valid 
representation of disembodied technical change. However, this is not the case for the value-
added based total productivity measure, which varies with the degree of outsourcing and, 
instead, provides an indication of the importance of productivity improvement for the 
economy as a whole. Rather than technical change itself, the value-added based measure 
reflects an industry’s capacity to translate technical change into income and into a 
contribution to final demand. Nevertheless, the opposite is true for the labour productivity 
measures. The gross output based productivity measures are more sensitive to the degree 
of vertical integration and outsourcing than the value-added based labour productivity 
measure. A process of outsourcing, for example, implies substitution of primary inputs for 
intermediate inputs, thus, gross output based labour productivity may rise as a consequence 
of outsourcing rather than a shift in technology or efficiency. Value-added based labour 
                                                          
15 Economic A-Z, The Economist 
16 Economic A-Z, The Economist 
 - 107 -
Measuring Productivity 
productivity measures, on the other hand, are much less dependent on the processes of 
substitution between primary and intermediate inputs. When outsourcing takes place, 
primary inputs are replaced by intermediate inputs, which leads to a fall in value-added, as 
well as a fall in primary inputs. 
 However, practical aspects should, also, be considered when choosing the 
productivity measures to be used. At the industry level, measures of value-added are 
generally easier to use than measures of gross output, because of intra-industries 
transactions, such as the deliveries of intermediate inputs 17 . With gross output based 
productivity measures, when the output from one industry becomes the intermediate input 
for the other, the problem of double counting arises18. Therefore, an adjustment has to be 
made, and one way of doing so is by the exclusion of intra-industries deliveries, in a 
measure referred to as sectoral output. Conceptually, this refers to the adoption of a 
process of integration of different units or industries, in which as one moves up the 
hierarchy of the activity classification, more and more different units are formed and treated 
as a single larger unit. At each level of aggregation, only products that flow out of (or into) 
the sector will be accounted for. However, this method has one disadvantage: that the 
growth rates of components cannot be compared to their aggregate. The productivity 
measures for aggregates are built up as weighted sums, not single averagea, from their 
components; therefore, a one percent growth of total factor productivity in all individual 
industries may lead to a 1.5 percent growth in the integrated economy. Value-added based 
productivity measurement is a good way to avoid this difficulty in dealing with intermediate 
inputs in the process of aggregation. Current price values of value-added can simply be 
summed up across different units, without regard to any inter-industry flows of inputs. 
Quantity indices of value added can be aggregated by forming weighted average, with 
weights adding to unity. Therefore, the value-added based productivity measures of 
                                                          
17 OECD Manual, (2001) 
18 Lipsey and Carlaw, (2000) 
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aggregates are also weighted averages of their components, and can be compared across 
levels of aggregation.  
 Overall, the gross output and the value-added based productivity measures should 
be seen as useful complements, in which each of the two have their own advantages and 
drawbacks, depending on the nature of the research. Nevertheless, in many cases, the 
availability of data would become the ultimate determinant of the choice of measures used.  
 
 
5.3 Approaches in Measuring Productivity 
 
Productivity measurement has long been of interest to economists. Productivity analysts 
(Griliches (1987), Green (1993b), Barro (1998), Harberger (1998), Diewert and Lawrence 
(1999), Hulten (2000), Carlaw and Lipsey (2003a, 2003b)) claimed that along with increases 
in factor endowments and changes in the terms of trade, productivity improvement is a 
major determinant of economic growth, and therefore, of the national welfare. This, hence, 
has made productivity measurement a key concern for many policy makers around the 
world. Many approaches to productivity measurement have been developed over the years. 
At the most basic level, productivity change is often approximated by changes in labour 
productivity, as the required information is usually readily available and easy to access. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, labour productivity is a single factor 
measure, which could easily produce misleading results, when other inputs (such as capital) 
are substituted for labour. Therefore, a more complex measure (namely, the total/multi-
factor productivity measure) should generally be calculated and used collectively. There are 
several approaches that could be used in calculating the total/multi-factor productivity. The 
following section summarizes four prominent approaches to these measurements; including 
the growth accounting approach, the index number approach, the conventional econometric 
approach, and the distance function based approach. It should be called here again that 
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because of the scope of this thesis, the survey of these four measures is only aimed at 
providing a general overview, but not an in-depth discussion of either the literature 
development, or the technical elements of these approaches. However, a detailed 
development, of the parametric distance function based approach specially, will be found 
later in Chapter 7 of this thesis.     
 
5.3.1 Growth Accounting Approach 
 
The relationship between the aggregate production function and the productivity has long 
ago been explored by Jan Tinbergen (1942)19; however, it was the seminal contribution by 
Solow (1957) that  provides  a  useful  frame  of  reference  for  the  main  empirical  
approach to measuring productivity. Solow established a significant theoretical link between 
the production function and the index number approach. Where as earlier index number 
studies had interpreted their results in the light of a production function, Solow started with 
the production function, and deduced the consequences for (and restrictions on) the 
productivity index.20 Such estimates of productivity are computed using a method called the 
growth accounting approach, which examines how much of an observed rate of change of 
an industry’s output can be explained by the rate of change of combined inputs. This can be 
done by measuring a residual resulting from separately evaluated contributions of the 
specified input factors to output growth, and then subtracting these measured contributions 
from the total growth of output 21 . Thus, the growth accounting approach evaluates 
productivity growth residually, and is sometimes referred to as the residual approach. 
 
5.3.1.1 The Solow Residual
 
Solow  began his calculation  by specifying a production function that defined  what  level of 
                                                          
19 Griliches (1996) 
20 Hulten (2000), pp.8 
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output can be produced at a particular time, given the availability of a certain level of inputs. 
Specifically, he began with an aggregate production function with a Hicks-neutral shift 
parameter. Here, the technical change which occurred was neutral in the sense that any 
shifts in production left all marginal rates of substitution of inputs unchanged. Thus, the 
production function could be written as: 
       (5.1) ):,()( tLKftAQYt ==
where   is output at time t, represents total factor productivity at time t, is the 
capital stock at time t, and is a measure of the labour available at time t. The time 
variable is included in order to allow for technical change. The growth accounting approach 
is based on several important assumptions: 1) the technology or the total factor productivity 
term, , has to be separable, 2) the production function exhibits constant return to scale, 
3) the producers in the industries behave in a profit maximizing manners, and 4) the 
markets are perfectly competitive, with all participants being price-takers, who can only 
adjust quantities but have no impact on prices.  
tY )(tA tK
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     Solow then addressed the key question of measuring using a non-parametric 
index number approach, by differentiating (5.1) with respect to t, which gave: 
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where the dots indicated a first partial derivative with respect to time. Thus, dividing (5.2) 
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Equation (5.3) can be rewritten as  
                                                                                                                                                                   
21 Diewert and Lawrence, (1999) 
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where the elasticity of output with respect to labour and the elasticity of output with 
respect to capital are 
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Solving (5.4) for ( )AA&  gives 
  
L
Lw
K
Kw
Y
Y
A
A
LK
..,.
−−=      (5.6)  
which indicates that productivity change is equal to the rate of output growth less the rates 
of growth in capital and labour inputs weighted by their output elasticities, for small 
movements along the production function. In another word, ( )AA&  represents what we 
called the Solow residual growth, which is the shift in the production function, reflecting 
that part of the total growth of real output that cannot be explained by the growth in inputs.  
 In order to disentangle ( )AA& , we will need data on the growth rate of real output 
( )YY& , the growth rate of the capital stock ( )KK& , the growth rate of labour input ( )LL&  
and capital and labour’s share of income, which correspond to  and . However, 
the estimates of and are not directly observable. Therefore, some assumptions 
about the production function, the returns to scale, and the marginal cost of inputs have to 
be made. If each input is assumed to be paid the value of its marginal product, then 
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Hence, these relative prices can be substituted for the corresponding marginal products. 
This,  in turn, converts the  unobservable  output  elasticities into observable income shares, 
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These data can then be easily acquired from the national accounts, making growth 
accounting a very vital approach in productivity measurement, despite the fact that the 
choice of the set of data sometimes depends on making ad hoc assumptions.  
 
5.3.1.2 Criticisms of the Solow Residual
 
The growth accounting approach proposed by Solow was a very influential development in 
the productivity measurement sphere.  Nevertheless, it is still subject to several flaws. In 
theory, the Solow residual ( )AA&  is equal to the growth rate of the Hicksian efficiency 
parameter. However, in practice, it reflects not only technical change, but also the effects of 
our ignorance of many components, such as measurement errors, omitted variables, 
aggregation bias, and model misspecification. Solow, in his own words, defines this residual 
as follows: “I am using the phrase ‘technical change’ as a short hand expression for any 
kind of shift in the production function22 .” Hence, everything that shifts the production 
function (such as recessions, natural disasters, and improvements in the education of labour 
force) will appear in the model as technical change. Thus, caution should be exercised when 
employing this residual.   
 Second, the Solow model is inextricably linked to the assumption of constant 
returns to scale23, where it is needed in order to estimate the return to capital as a residual. 
This has its foundation in Euler’s Theorem, which implies that the value of output will equal 
to the sum of the input values, if the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, 
                                                          
22Solow (1957), pp.312 
23 Hulten, (2000) 
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and the inputs are paid the values of their marginal products. Therefore, the accounting 
equation will hold, and substitutions as stated earlier could then be made.  rKwLPQ +=
 Similarly, the third criticism against the Solow model is that the model is, in practise, 
wedded to the assumption of marginal cost pricing (i.e. to the marginal productivity 
conditions, shown earlier in equation (5.7)). The Solow method is by nature non-parametric, 
in that it uses prices in estimating the slopes of the production function at the observed 
input-output configurations, without having to estimate the shape of the function at all 
points. The estimate of the residual (A) is produced directly from prices and quantities, and 
could be seen as a parsimonious method for getting at the shift in the production function. 
However, this parsimony comes at the cost of needing to use prices as substitutes for 
marginal products24. When markets display the imperfect competition that categorize real-
world industrial structure (such as the mixture of monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic 
competition), this leads to price being greater than marginal cost, and the residual will yield 
a biased estimate of the Hicksian shift parameter25 , and there is unfortunately no way 
around this.  
 Moreover, the Solow residual is based on another strong assumption of Hicksian 
technical change, where the innovation is assumed to improve the marginal productivity of 
all inputs equally, and thus, shifts the production function by the same proportion at all 
combinations of labour and capital. However, in reality, Hicks-biased technical change, in 
which productivity growth depends on the input shares, as well as on the parameters of 
innovation, is a rather common occurrence, especially when the general purpose of 
technology is evolving through its many new uses26. Therefore, it is highly possible that this 
assumption would be violated, and thus leading to a bias of the Solow residual.  
 Finally, another line of criticism has been based on the fact that the Solow residual 
approach, although a non-parametric approach, still needs a specific functional form of the 
                                                          
24 Hulten, (2000 
25 Hall, (1988) 
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technology to be assumed, in order to obtain an exact estimate of the efficiency parameter. 
Therefore, since the assumption on the production function has to be made inevitably, why 
should it not be estimated with the econometric techniques, instead of with the non-
parametric techniques, so that the assumption about the marginal productivity conditions 
could be avoided? The additional advantages of the econometric techniques are that they 
can also accommodate a full representation of the technology, non-competitive pricing 
behaviour, non-constant returns, and non-Hicksian technical change.  
 
5.3.1.3 Further Development on Growth Accounting
  
Hulten (2000) praised the 1967 paper by Jorgensen and Griliches as a major milestone in 
the evolution of productivity theory and measurement. It advanced the hypothesis that 
careful measurement of the relevant variables and correct model specification should cause 
the Solow measure of total factor productivity to disappear, given this residual involved 
‘measurement of our ignorance’. They introduced a number of measurement innovations, 
based on a strict application of the neoclassical theory of production, into the Solow 
framework. They began by estimating the rate of growth of output, input, and total factor 
productivity, in which these initial estimates contain many of the errors made in attempts to 
measure total factor productivity without fully exploiting the economic theory underlying the 
social accounting concepts of real product and real factor input. Then, they started 
eliminating errors of aggregation, measurement, and assumptions. When all these 
processes were completed, they found that the residual had all but disappeared. Their result 
was in stark contrast to the prevailing results, in which the residual is believed to be the 
main reason behind economic growth. 
 However, Denison (1972) utilized the simpler concepts and statistical procedures 
that he considered appropriate for input measurement, and compared his results with those 
                                                                                                                                                                   
26 Lipsey and Carlaw (2003) 
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of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). He found a striking contrast between the results of the 
two studies, partly because of the difference in the time periods covered, and another part 
coming from the capacity utilization adjustment based on electricity used. After the 
appropriate adjustment had been done, Denison still found that the Jorgenson-Griliches 
residual was far from zero. According to Denison, a substantial part of the post-war growth 
of national output was due to an increase in productivity, while according to Jorgenson-
Griliches almost all of the increase had been due to an increase in factor inputs. This set off 
a major debate on the ‘bottom line’ of empirical growth analysis, concerning how much 
output growth can be explained by total factor productivity (the ‘Manna from Heaven’) and 
how much by long term capital formation.  
 The 1980s were the prime years in which the prestige of the residual approach was 
high, and indeed that of non-parametric productivity analysis as a whole was high. The 
United States Bureau of Labour Statistics began publishing their multi-factor productivity 
estimates in 1983. Outside of the government statistics field, articles by Denison (1979), 
Griliches (1980), Diewert (1980), Hulten (1981, 1986), and many other authors were 
published. Also, many books were printed including Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), 
and Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1989). Interest had become extended from the simple 
measurement of growth and productivity, to the applying of growth accounting to explain 
international growth dispersion (e.g. Dowrick and Nguyen (1989)). However, by the 1990s, 
interest in the non-parametric approaches to measuring productivity had started to decline. 
The arrival of the ‘New Growth Theory’ challenged the underlying assumptions of the 
growth accounting residual, namely constant returns and perfect competition. The New 
Growth theory offered a new view in which markets were non-perfectly competitive, the 
production function exhibited increasing returns to scale, externalities among micro-units 
were important, and finally, the innovation was an endogenous part of the economic 
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system27. Therefore, there was a growing preference for econometric modelling in which 
these characteristics could be accommodated. Also, with the great improvement in 
computing technology, and the resulting development of high-powered personal computers, 
researchers were able to assemble and analyze large sets of data, thus, enhanced their 
ability to estimate a complex set of models. 
 Nevertheless, despite the shift in interest among productivity economists, the non-
parametric growth accounting residual, together with the index number approach, were still 
widely used techniques, employed by the statistical agencies around the world, who 
published regular periodic productivity statistics reports (including the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, the OECD Productivity Database, the New Zealand Treasury, the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, and the Thailand Productivity Institute). Moreover, many recent works 
on productivity have still been conducted based on the growth accounting approach, with 
some of these works being as follows.  
 Sarel (1997) examined the nature of the growth process in the ASEAN countries in 
order to discover whether it had been generated primarily by the additional inputs used or 
by productivity gains. He used internationally comparable data and explored an alternative 
method, including the growth accounting method, for estimating the capital and labour 
factor shares. The results contradicted to some previous studies. They indicated that 
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia had very impressive productivity growth rates, as well as 
identifying a relatively strong growth rate for Indonesia, but a negative one for the 
Philippines.  
 Jones (2002) developed a model, based on the growth accounting approach, to 
estimate the recent growth of the U.S. economy. The rising educational attainment and 
research intensity were suggested to be the main forces behind U.S. economic growth. The 
results from the model revealed that these factors explained 80 percent of recent U.S. 
growth, while less than 20 percent came from world population growth.  
                                                          
27 Hulten , (2000) and Reid, (1989) 
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 Feinberg and Keane (2003) used confidential Bureau of Economic Analysis data on 
the activities of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) to examine the rapid growth of the 
U.S. MNC-based trade. They estimated a simple structural model of the production and 
trade decisions of U.S. MNCs with affiliates in Canada (which was the largest trading partner 
of the U.S.) using data from 1983-1996. They then used that model as a framework for 
decomposing the growth in intra-firm and arms-length trade flows into components due to 
tariff reductions, technological change, wages adjustments, and many other factors. They 
found that, although tariff reductions could account for a substantial part of the increase in 
arms-length MNC-based trade, most of the growth was attributed to technical change, with 
tariff reductions playing only a secondary role.  
  Kohli (2003) provided a decomposition of GDP growth of the United States for the 
period of 1948 to 1998, based on the translog national income function and the Törnqvist 
index of real GDP. The contributions of changes in output quantities, factor prices, and total 
factor productivity were identified, with special consideration were given to foreign trade, in 
which imports were treated as a negative output.  
 Crafts (2004) examined reasons for the slow productivity growth of the British 
industrial sector during the Industrial Revolution, despite the arrival of famous inventions. 
He used a growth accounting method based on an embodied innovation model. His results 
highlighted the relatively small (and long-delayed) impact of steam on productivity growth 
even when capital deepening was taken into account. Technological change (including 
embodied effects) accounted entirely for the acceleration in labour productivity growth that 
allowed the economy to achieve ‘modern’ economic growth. 
 Oulton (2004) argued that apart from using growth accounting to analyse the 
aggregate growth of a country, it was also possible to analyse the consequences of the 
changing economic structure of a country. In his paper, he analysed the changing of the 
economic structure of the UK, utilizing disaggregated industrial data from the national 
accounts. He suggested that for such a case, the theory of growth accounting provided an 
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important empirical framework, from which the contribution of each industry to the national 
economy could be measured and assessed. Also, it revealed how these contributions were 
evolving over time. He also identified several obstacles currently faced by analysts 
attempting to implement the growth accounting approach. These include: long runs of data 
series; variety of data sources; and inconsistencies between the levels of aggregation at 
which different data series are published.  
 Some works on measuring productivity utilizing the growth accounting approach 
have also been conducted using data on the Thai economy. Tinakorn and Sussangkarn 
(1996) analyzed the sources of output growth in Thailand using the Solow-Denison growth 
accounting framework. The total factor productivity of Thailand was found to be (on 
average) 2.6 percent per year during 1972 to 1990, without adjusting for improved quality 
of the factor inputs. From 1978 to 1990, the average adjusted total factor productivity 
growth for Thailand was 1.2 percent per annum, which translates into a 15.8 percent 
contribution to growth. The remaining part of growth was explained by changes in the 
factor inputs, with 37.2 percent coming from capital, 1.2 percent from land, and 45.8 
percent from labour.  
 Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1998) provided further estimates of Thai productivity 
growth. They examined the sources of Thailand’s growth from 1980, when the new series 
of GDP and its components were available based on 1988 prices, up to 1995. They found 
that the average total factor productivity growth for the whole economy was about 2.7 
percent, while the average growth of GDP was about 8.1 percent. The contribution of total 
factor productivity growth to the growth of the economy was around 33.6 percent. With the 
improved quality of labour being adjusted, the total factor productivity growth became 1.65 
percent, which implied a contribution of about 20 percent to the overall GDP growth rate. 
Therefore, another 80 percent of GDP growth came from the increased use of factor inputs.  
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5.3.2 The Index Number Approach 
 
Today, a significant number of statistic agencies that produce regular productivity statistics 
use the index number approach as the measure of productivity changes. A productivity 
index  is generally defined as the ratio of an index of output growth divided by an index of 
input growth, where the outputs refer to the total quantities of all outputs produced by the 
production sector and the inputs are the total quantities of all inputs utilized by the same 
production sector over two accounting periods.28 Therefore 
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where is the productivity, is an index of output quantities, is an index of input 
quantities, and the subscript t indicates the time period.  
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5.3.2.1 The Index Number Approach and Growth Accounting Approach  
 
The index number approach and the Solow growth accounting approach are very closely 
related. The link between these two methods can be seen by rearranging equation (5.6) 
from the previous section as follow 
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The index number approach can be viewed as an extension of, and complement to, growth 
accounting. 29  The two approaches are very similar. Both use indexes in computing 
productivity, and both suffer from similar problems. In the growth accounting approach, the 
estimation process starts by selecting a suitable production function, while in the index 
number approach, the process starts with the selection of the appropriate index. In theory, 
                                                          
28 Diewert and Lawrence, (1999) 
29 Carlaw and Lipsey , (2003) 
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the main difference between these two approaches is that the index number approach does 
not necessary require an aggregate production function to be specified, meaning that no 
assumptions about the underlying economic structure have to be made. Therefore, the 
productivity level measured by and the subsequent growth rates may not be the same 
as would result from using the growth accounting approach.  
)(tA
 However, in reality, in order to be able to select an appropriate index to be used for 
a set of data, some properties of the production function would have to be assumed. Each 
index is related to different underlying assumptions about the aggregate production function 
and therefore, calculation varies with the different indexes. For example, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function is explicitly related to the Divisia index when the model is specified in 
continuous time, and to the Törnqvist index when the model is in discrete time. Therefore, 
each one of these two approaches in measuring productivity implies the other, in the sense 
that in order to measure productivity from an aggregate production function, an appropriate 
index number would be needed, while if the index number approach is used and the 
estimation process is started with a specific index number, an aggregate production function 
is then implied30. Consequently, the difference between the index number approach and the 
growth accounting approach is, in reality, obscured.  
  
5.3.2.2 Selecting an Index Number Formula
 
The calculation of equation (5.9) is straightforward, but the difficulty lies in the 
determination of the type of index to be used. In order to construct an output (as well as 
input) quantity index, it is necessary to determine an appropriate way to aggregate the 
different outputs and inputs. Most economies have a diverse range of outputs and inputs to 
which consideration must be given in determining how to add up the various outputs into 
single scalars, while avoiding the ‘adding apples to oranges’ problem of output 
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heterogeneity. Therefore, calculating the indexes requires a means of adding together these 
diverse quantities. There are a number of different index number formulations that attempt 
to overcome this problem. The most common way is by using prices or output shares to 
weight the various types of outputs. The most commonly used indexes include the 
Laspeyres, Paasche, Fisher, and Törnqvist index, which can be defined, respectively, as 
follows:  
 The Laspeyres index is the index, which uses the value of period 1 output measured 
in period 0 prices, divided by the value of period 0 output measured by period 0 prices. 
Therefore, 
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The Paasche index measures the value of output in the two period using period 1 prices, 
 ( )
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
01
1
11
1010 ,,,
−
=
−
=
=
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∑∑
∑ m
i i
i
im
i
ii
m
i
ii
P y
ys
yp
yp
yyppY    (5.13) 
The Fisher index is the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]21101010101010 ,,,,,,,,, yyppYyyppYyyppY PLF ⋅=   (5.14) 
 
And finally, the Törnqvist index is the geometric weights of the output of the two periods 
using an average of the two period share weights. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
30 Hulten, (2000) 
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As stated earlier, one most critical issue for the index number approach is selecting 
the appropriate index for use in calculation. Two approaches are commonly used for making 
the decision regarding the ‘best’ type of index formulation to be used, namely, the economic 
and the axiomatic approaches31. The economic approach selects index number formulations 
on the basis of an assumed underlying production technology, which involves the 
production, cost, revenue, and profit functions. This approach, generally 32 , assumes 
competitive optimising behaviour by producers in which producers are assumed to maximise 
profit, or minimise costs, for a given production technology33. The axiomatic (test) approach 
involves comparing the properties of the different index number formulations with a number 
of desirable properties they should possess. Potential indexes are then evaluated against 
those specified properties, and the one that passes the most tests would become the 
‘preferred’ index formulation. Diewert and Lawrence (1999) defined these properties to 
include the following attributes: 
• The constant quantities test states that if quantities are identical in two periods, 
then the output index should be the same irrespective of the price of the goods in 
both periods. 
• The constant basket test indicates that if prices are constant over two periods, then 
the ratio of the quantity indexes between the two periods should be equal to the 
ratio of the values between the two periods.  
• The proportional increase in output test requires that if all quantities increase or 
decrease by a fixed proportion between two periods, then the index should increase 
or decrease by the same fixed proportion.  
                                                          
31 McLellan, (2004) 
32 A recent research by Diewert and Fox (2004) shows that an index of multifactor productivity can 
be derived using the economic approach without the need for the optimising behaviour assumption. 
33 McLellan, (2004) 
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• The time reversal test specifies if the prices and quantities in period 0 and t are 
interchanged, then the resulting output index should be the reciprocal of the 
original index. 
 Diewert and Lawrence note that of the four index formulations mentioned above, 
only the Fisher index had all four desirable properties. Both the Laspeyres and Paasche 
indexes were inconsistent with time reversal test, while the Törnqvist fails the constant 
basket test. Thus, Diewert and Lawrence chose a chained Fisher index as the preferred 
index for constructing output and input quantity indices. These results are summarized in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Index Axioms 
 Constant quantities Constant basket Proportionality Time reversal 
Laspeyres Yes Yes Yes No 
Paasche Yes Yes Yes No 
Törnqvist Yes No Yes Yes 
Fisher Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: McLellan (2004) 
 
 Nonetheless, in practice, it is rather common that both the economic and the 
axiomatic approaches will be used alongside one another when choosing an index number 
formula. Also, in reality, data availability will be another important factor that often 
influences the decision.  
 
5.3.2.3 Exact and Superlative Index Numbers 
 
Although it is widely accepted that the Solow growth residual provides a simple, yet elegant, 
framework for productivity measurement, in reality, the calculation of the Solow residual 
has one main difficulty. Solow’s derivative of the residual is based on a continuous-time 
formulation, but unfortunately, data do not normally come in this form. One solution to this 
difficulty is to find a reasonable discrete-time approximation to the continuous-time model. 
In this approach, the choice among competing approximation methods is based largely on 
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computational expediency, with the implication being that the discrete-time approximation 
is not derived as an organic part of the theory, thereby weakening the link between theory 
and measurement.34  
 Jorgenson and Griliches were the first to recognize the use of a discrete-time 
approximation to the Divisia index. In their 1967 work (in which they attempted to prove 
that careful measurement of the relevant variables would cause the Solow residual to 
disappear), the Divisia index35 framework was applied to their disaggregated capital and 
labour components in order to avoid the aggregation bias associated with internal shifts in 
the composition of the inputs. However, because the data available are not continuous over 
time, they, instead, introduced a discrete-time approximation to the Divisia index that was 
derived from the Törnqvist index, where the continuous-time income share were replaced 
by the average between-period shares.  
 Diewert (1976) later showed that the Törnqvist approximation to the Divisia index 
used by Jorgenson and Griliches was not an approximation, but an ‘exact’ index number 
under the right conditions about the production function. He defined the exact index as a 
particular index that corresponded directly to the theoretic index derived from the 
production technology. He claimed that since the Törnqvist index is the corresponding index 
for the translog functional form, therefore, the Törnqvist index is the exact index for the 
translog production technology. The degree of the exactness would then depend on how 
close the assumed translog production function was to the true production function. He also 
proceeded further to define the term ‘superlative’ index as an exact index that corresponded 
to a production technology that has a flexible functional form in which it is able to 
approximate to a range of other functional forms. Therefore, the Törnqvist index is a 
                                                          
34 Hulten , (2000) 
35 The Divisia index is a weighted sum of growth rates, where the weights are the components’ shares 
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superlative index because the translog functional form could approximate a range of other 
functional forms36, e.g. the Cobb-Douglas production function.  
 Hulten (2000) mentioned that what Diewert showed, in effect, was that the translog 
specification of the production function served as a potential function for the discrete 
Törnqvist index, in the same way that the continuous production function served as a 
potential function for the continuous Divisia index. One important by-product of this finding 
is that the index number approach of the Solow residual is not entirely non-parametric. 
There is a parametric production function underlying the method of approximation if the 
discrete-time index is to be an exact measure of Hicksian efficiency 
 
5.3.2.4 Other Issues on Index Number
 
Many other complex issues also need to be considered when dealing with the index number 
approach in measuring productivity. However, it is not with in the scope of this thesis to go 
further into the details of these issues. Therefore, a general overview of these issues will be 
provided in this section, and some literatures to be noted for further detailed study. 
 In addition to choosing an index number formula, a choice also needs to be made 
on whether it is more appropriate to construct a fixed-weight or a chained index. A fixed-
weight quantity index is an index that compares quantities in period t relative to some fixed 
base period. Information on price movements as well as on the weighting changes in the 
intervening periods are ignored. By contrast, a chained index compares quantities between 
two periods by taking into account the information on weighting changes in the intervening 
periods. McLellan (2004) has claimed that a chained index uses price information that is 
more representative of that faced by economic agents in each period than is a fixed-weight 
index. In general, when relative prices of goods change, relative quantities would change as 
well. Using a fixed-weight index in measuring quantity changes in such cases would, 
                                                          
36 McLellan N., 2004 
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undoubtedly, introduce substitution bias into the quantity index, since the information on 
relative price changes is not taken into account. Moreover, the fixed-weight index usually 
becomes less representative over time. Therefore, the substitution bias becomes larger, 
hence the need for the use of the chained index becomes more evident.  
 The chained output quantity index can be formed by linking the fixed weight 
quantity indices as follows 
 ttt DDDC ,12,01,0,0 .....1 −××××=      (5.16) 
where denotes the chained index between period 0 and t, and  denoted the direct 
index between period t-1 and t.       
tC ,0 ttD ,1−
 One other issue that needs careful consideration when measuring productivity is the 
measuring of physical capital inputs. Information on capital flow is needed when the 
measuring of productivity growth is the prime concern. However, as the flow of physical 
capital services is not directly observable, the flow of capital is usually assumed to be 
proportional to the capital stock. Moreover, the capital stock is also subjected to an age-
efficiency schedule in which the productive capacity of capital assets is discounted over time 
in order to take into account of the loss in its productive capacity. Three commonly used 
age-efficiency patterns are the linear, the ‘one-hoss-shay’, and the geometric age-efficiency 
schedules. The linear age-efficiency schedule assumes that the productive capacity of an 
asset depreciates linearly over the entire asset’s economic life. The one-hoss-shay efficiency 
schedule (sometimes refered to as the light bulb efficiency pattern) assumes that the 
productive capacity remains constant over its economic life, but then falls to zero when the 
asset’s economic life ends. The geometric age-efficiency pattern assumes that the 
productive capacity of an asset declines at a constant rate. Further details on this literature 
concerned with measuring physical capital stocks are Hulten (1990), Hulten and Wykoff 
(1995), Diewert and Lawrence (2000), the OECD Manual (2001), and McLellan (2004). 
 - 127 -
Measuring Productivity 
 The selection of labour inputs is another complex issue in measuring productivity. 
In general, the number of hours worked is usually the preferred labour input, as compared 
to the number of people employed. This is because the number of people employed could 
not reflect the changes in the number of hours worked by each worker or changes in the 
composition of part-time versus full-time workers. However, the labour input using the 
number of hours worked is still unable to capture differences in human capital. The hours 
worked by different types of workers are, essentially, treated as if they are identical. 
Therefore, the differences in human capital and the quality of workers are subsumed within 
the productivity measure. In order to separate the contribution to the changes in output 
that comes from the changes in human capital that coming from changes in the quality of 
labour inputs, adjustments for differences in the quality of hours worked by different types 
of workers arre needed. This could be done through the separate accounting of different 
types of labour inputs when forming productivity measures. From equation (5.1), in which 
the aggregate production function was presented, an alternative specification can be 
developed as follows 
     (5.17) ):,...,,,...,()( 11 tLLKKgtBQY NMt ==
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Equation (5.18) shows that the alternative productivity index B(t) is simply the original 
productivity index A(t) adjusted by the quality composition of the labour input. Literature 
that adopt a similar type of index includes Jorgenson, Gallop and Fraumeni (1987), and 
Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989, 1992).  
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5.3.2.5 Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience  
 
Of the extensive literature on measuring productivity growth utilizing the index number 
approach, the most cited is undoubtedly the work of Young (1995). He provided a careful 
analysis of the historical patterns of output growth, factor accumulation, and productivity 
growth in the newly industrializing countries (NICS) of East Asia, i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, between 1966 to early 1990s. He argued that the common 
premise stating that productivity growth in these economies, particularly in their 
manufacturing sectors, had been extraordinarily high, was largely incorrect.  Once one has 
taken into account an equally remarkable record of factor accumulation in these countries 
during that period, one finds a much less impressive growth in productivity.  
 He pointed out that, during that period, the East Asian NICs had experienced 
remarkable growth in factor accumulation in terms of labour inputs, capital inputs, and 
human capital. The rapid post-war decline in population birth rates (hence changing 
dependency ratios), the rising rates of female labour force participation, as well as the 
intersectoral transfer of labour (Notably from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing 
sector) have all led to a substantial growth in labour inputs. The expanding investment rates 
over time have led to growth in capital inputs. And finally, the improving levels of education 
have led to improvements in human capital.   
He then estimated the growth in productivity of these four countries using the 
translogarithmic value added production function 
  ( ) ( )( )LKKtLKY KLKKtLK lnlnlnlnlnexp[ 2210 Β+Β++++= ββββ  
          ( ) ]lnlnln 221221 ttLLtK ttLtLLKt Β+⋅Β+Β+⋅Β+   (5.19) 
where K, L, and t denote capital input, labour input, and time, under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. The parameters iβ and jkΒ satisfy the restriction: 
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        0,1 =Β+Β=Β+Β=Β+Β=+ LtKtKLLLKLKKLK ββ  (5.20) 
 He then differencing the logarithm of the production function, which provide a 
measure of the causes of growth across discrete time periods: 
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where  and [ ] 2/)1()( −Θ+Θ=Θ tt iii iΘ denotes the elasticity of output with respect to 
each input or, equivalently, assuming perfect competition, the share of each input in total 
factor payments. The translog index of TFP growth ( )ttTFP ,1−  provides a measure of the 
increase in output attributable to the time-related shift in the production function. 
 In order to allow for more accuracy of measurement, Young subdivided capital and 
labour inputs into finer sub-input categories. He divided the capital input into five categories 
consisting of residential buildings, non-residential buildings, other durable structures, 
transport equipment, and machinery. (This method had also been applied in this thesis in 
Chapter 9 where capital input was separated into 3 categories including land, machinery, 
and office appliances.) Labour was distinguished on the basis of sex, age, and education.  
 His results showed that over the period of concern, productivity growth in the 
aggregate non-agricultural economy of the NICs was 0.2 percent in Singapore, 1.7 percent 
in South Korea, 2.1 percent in Taiwan, and 2.3 percent in Hong Kong, while in the 
manufacturing sector, productivity growth was -1.0 percent in Singapore, 1.7 percent in 
Taiwan, and 3.0 percent in South Korea. When compared to productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector of other countries (e.g. 1.6 percent in Germany, 2.0 percent in Japan, 
1.3 percent in United Kingdom, 0.4 percent in United States, 1.2 percent in Mexico, and 2.6 
percent in Venezuela), it can be seen that productivity growth in the NICs is not particularly 
low, but at the same time, neither is it not extraordinarily high.  
 Young concluded that the remarkable post-war growth of East Asian economies was 
primarily the result of a one-shot increase in output, brought about by the rise in 
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participation rates, investment to GDP ratios, educational standards, as well as the 
intersectoral transfer of labour from agriculture to other sectors (e.g. manufacturing) with 
higher value added per worker, but not the growth in productivity.   
 
5.3.2.6 Recent Empirical Researches   
 
Many further developments have been accomplished within the scope of the index number 
approach, both theoretically and empirically. In this section, some of the most recent 
literature is considered in order to provide a guideline on the direction of current research. 
It should also be noted here that this section is not aimed at showing knowledge of the 
rigorous literature n this particular topic of index number, which is not the primary objective 
of this thesis.  
 Carlaw and Lipsey (2003a) briefly surveyed the literature on total factor productivity 
calculations, including the various techniques and problems associated with it. They argued 
that TFP was not a measure of technological change and only under ideal conditions did it 
measure the supernormal profits associated with technological change. The critical driving 
force of economic growth was not the super-normal profits that technological improvement 
generated, but the continuous creation of opportunities for further technological 
development. Six illustrations of cases in which TFP failed to correctly measure these super-
normal profits were provided. A version of the Carlaw and Lipsey (2003b) model of 
endogenous general purpose technology-driven growth is then utilized to make some 
progress towards answering Prescott's (1998) call for a theory of TFP. The model was then 
used to simulate artificial data and connect theoretical assumptions of returns to scale and 
resource costs to the conditions under which TFP miss-measured the actual growth of 
technological knowledge. 
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  Färe and Primont (2003) examined two ways of aggregating Luenberger 
productivity indicators across firms, in order to show that this is only possible under 
assumptions of allocative efficiency. The first approach imposed a rather implausible 
allocative efficiency assumption that employed every observed input-output vector with 
respect to the technologies in every time period. The second approach relied on more 
palatable assumptions, and only imposed allocative efficiency on the observed input-output 
vectors, with respect to their contemporaneous technologies. It utilized the superlative 
index number approach, which was then applied to a directional distance function approach 
by Balk (1998). The results indicated that for the first approach, aggregation is possible only 
if both observed quantities vectors are allocatively efficient with respect to both of the time-
adjacent technologies. For the second approach, aggregation is only possible if each 
observed quantity vector is allocatively efficient with respect to the current technology, and 
if the directional distance function has a quadratic functional form, with time-independent 
second order coefficients. They concluded that the superlative index number approach was 
the more promising approach of the two.  
 Diewert and Fox (2004) examined the sources of profit change for Australia’s 
largest telecommunications firm, Telstra. A new method allowed for changes in firm’s profits 
to be broken down into separate effects. Productivity change, price changes and growth in 
the firm’s size were the suggested effects. This method, therefore, allowed them to 
calculate the distribution of the benefits of productivity improvements between consumers, 
labour, and shareholders. The results showed that about half the benefits from Telstra’s 
productivity improvements from 1984 to 1994 were passes on to consumers in the form of 
real price reductions.  
 Griffith, Redding, and van Reenen (2004) argued that research and development 
(R&D), apart from its conventional role of stimulating innovation, had an additional role in 
enhancing technology transfer, or the so-called absorptive capacity. They examined this 
issue using a panel data of industries across twelve OECD countries. Their results showed 
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that R&D was both statistically and economically important in the process of catching up as 
well as stimulating innovation. They also found that human capital played a major role in 
productivity growth, while trade only had a minor effect. They claimed that the existing 
U.S.-based empirical studies might have underestimated the return to R&D, as they had 
failed to take account of the R&D-based absorptive capacity in their studies.   
 Färe, Grosskopf, Forsund, Hayes, and Heshmati (2006) attempted to model and 
compute the productivity of public education. This was in the service sector and did not 
have marketable outputs. They used data on the Swedish primary and secondary school 
system over the period from 1992 to 1995. They utilized a Malmquist productivity index in 
which multiple outputs such as test results were allowed, without the need of requiring 
price data with which to aggregate these outputs. Also, this index allowed inputs, such as 
teachers and facilities, and proxies for quality of inputs, such as experience of teachers, as 
well as outputs to be accounted for. The results indicated that productivity growth did 
change when the quality of inputs and outputs were taken into account.  
 
5.3.3 Econometric Approach 
 
The empirical estimation of production functions began as early as 1928, with the paper by 
Cobb and Douglas (1928). However, until the 1950s, production functions were still largely 
used only as devices for studying the functional distribution of income between capital and 
labour at the macroeconomic level. The origins of empirical analysis of microeconomic 
production structures can be more recently identified with the work of Johnston (1960), and 
Nerlove (1963). However, these papers focused mainly on costs rather than production per 
se, though Nerlove (following Samuelson (1938) and Shephard (1953)) has highlighted the 
relationship between the cost and the production37. The methodology employed in most of 
the recent studies has been developed from the seminal paper on the translog production 
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function by Bernt and Christensen (1973). The conventional econometric approach of 
productivity measurement involves estimating the parameters of a specified production 
function (or in some case, cost or profit function) in order to yield an estimate of the 
parameter that reflect the growth in technological progress. This is typically interpreted as a 
measure of productivity growth. This approach of productivity measurement is only based 
on observations of the volume outputs and inputs. Thus it avoids postulating a relationship 
between production elasticities and income shares, and therefore, leaves room for the 
possibility of testing these relationship. 
 A single output production function can be written as 
 ( ) εβ +== ;ixfQY        (5.22) 
where ε is a random statistical error term with zero mean. Producers are assumed to be 
price takers in their input markets, so input prices may be treated as exogenous. This 
function could be expressed in the log linear form as 
 εβα ++== ixQY lnln       (5.23) 
where this functional form does not restrict the model only to the Cobb-Douglas, as a 
number of other functions are also linear in the parameters (i.e. translog production 
function). The least squares method, or some variant of it, was routinely used to lit a 
function to a ‘cloud’ of data points. 
 
5.3.3.1 Econometric VS Non-Parametric Approach  
 
The conventional econometric approach has several major advantages when compared to 
the non-parametric approaches, i.e. index number and growth accounting approaches. 
Firstly, it allows other parameters of the production technology to be explored, in addition 
to merely estimating the efficiency term, as in the growth accounting and index number 
                                                                                                                                                                   
37 Greene, (1993) 
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approach. Embellishments like the cost-of-adjustment parameters can also be incorporated 
into the analysis to help explain the residual. Moreover, greater flexibility in specifying the 
production technology can also be accommodated. The econometric approach allows the 
investigation of technical change other than the Hicks-neutral formulation implied by the 
growth accounting and the index number approach. Furthermore, non-competitive pricing 
behaviour, non-constant returns, and factor-augmenting technical change can all be 
examined.  
 However, this increased flexibility, and the ability to test the validity of different 
assumptions of the econometric approach, do not come without costs. The fully-fledged 
models (i.e. the estimation of the translog and other flexible function) can raise complex 
econometric issues such as parameter estimates that imply oddly shaped isoquants. This 
requires practitioners to place priori restrictions on the values of these parameters. 
Therefore, the problem of robustness of the resulting parameter estimates against 
alternative ways of imposing restrictions could arise.  Additionally, with these complex 
functions, when data samples are not large enough, the profusion of parameters can press 
on the number of data observations, requiring further re-imposing a priori the restrictions in 
order to increase the degrees of freedom. Furthermore, the use of more flexible, but highly 
complicated, production function usually requires non-linear estimation techniques, which 
are valid only under special assumptions, and therefore, again, brings about further 
questions on the statistical properties of the resulting estimates.  
 Moreover, the use of the econometric approach is generally limited in the 
academically oriented, single studies of productivity growth, but not in the publication of 
regular productivity statistics, because of several reasons. Firstly, the updating of the 
econometric approach involves a full re-estimation of the complicated model and the 
hypothesis testing following it, therefore, such an approach could be very inconvenient and 
time-consuming. Secondly, the methodology of such an approach is often too complicated 
to communicate to a broad spectrum of users. And finally, the significant amount of data 
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required by complicated models tends to reduce the timeliness of the results. Therefore, the 
econometric approach undermines the main purposes of the regular publication of 
productivity statistics in delivering timely and easy-to-understand statistics to the broadest 
group of recipients. Hence it presents little attraction from the point of view of statistical 
agencies38. However, the potential richness, and the testable set-up of this approach make 
it a valuable complement to non-parametric, index number, approaches which are currently 
used as the standard tool for productivity statistics. Hulten (2000) pointed out that there is 
no reason why the econometric and the index number approach should be viewed as 
competitors. Both approaches should be implemented simultaneously, thereby exploiting 
the relative simplicity and transparency of non-parametric estimates to serve as a 
benchmark for interpreting the more complicated results of the econometric approach. At 
the same time, the econometric approach could further explain the productivity residual, 
thereby reducing our ignorance about the ‘measure of our ignorance’.  
 
5.3.3.2 Measuring Average Behaviour
 
One fundamental problem with the conventional econometric approach lies in the fact that 
it is very often estimated utilizing an ‘averaging’ estimators, such as the least squares 
estimators, which involves estimating the average rather than the ‘best practise’ technology 
upon which the production function concept is based on. This practise causes two major 
problems for the estimates of the conventional econometric approach. First, in the standard 
models of production function analysis, producers are assumed to be maximizing the 
quantity of their outputs given the available quantities of a set of inputs. However, when 
these production functions are estimated by the standard statistical techniques (i.e. 
regression of output on inputs), which is generally estimated based on the method that 
simply estimate a function that passes through the middle of a scatter of data points, and 
                                                          
38 OECD Manual, (2001) 
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therefore the mean output rather than the maximal output is estimated. Thus, this results in 
estimates that are inconsistent, with the above definitions.  
 Moreover, these analyses, which often employ simple least squares technique, will 
have error terms that are assumed to be symmetrically distributed, with zero means. This 
assumption, in turn, indicates that the only source of departure from the estimated function 
is due to the statistical error, e.g. measurement error, or random shocks beyond the control 
of producers, such as bad weather. Therefore, these models are subjected by a common, 
but rather untenable, assumption that producers are always operating on their production 
functions, and that technical inefficiencies in the production process do notr exist.  
 
5.3.3.3 Recent Developments 
 
Despite the above inconsistency of the average measurement technique, the conventional 
econometric approach is still a very useful method for decomposing growth because of its 
flexibility. The recent developments in this approach have concentrated on this issue and 
have been used greatly to complement the index and growth accounting approaches. Key 
such works are consider below. 
 Szeto (2001) used the capital stock series published by Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) 
in estimating the production function, and the elasticity of substitution. The primary 
purposes of this paper were to, firstly, test the validity of the Cobb-Douglas specification 
with New Zealand data. He argued that many researchers had used the Cobb-Douglas 
function for its linear property; however, the use of such a function implied that the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour was constant and always equal to one. 
He argued that in the long-run endogenous growth model with possibly multiple steady 
states, there was a possibility that the elasticity of factor substitution might not be equal to 
one. Secondly, he attempted to test the validity of the use of the value-added form in the 
production function, which implied that the marginal product of the intermediate-good 
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inputs was constant and equal to unity. He argued that the use of the value-added form 
was justifiable only under very restricted conditions such as functional seperability between 
intermediate-good inputs and capital/labour inputs. Therefore, he employed two approaches 
in estimating the production function.  
 In the first method, he employed the methodology proposed by Grimes (1983) in 
which the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function was estimated using 
value-added data. Since the CES technology had an elasticity of substitution that was 
constant and took values other than unity, he argued that it was possible to test the 
suitability of the Cobb-Douglas specification. Then, by allowing for gross output as the 
measure of output, he proceeded further by estimating a nested CES structure. The two 
approaches were then compared and tested to identify whether the use of the value-added 
form is justified or would cause the estimates of parameters to be biased.  
 He reported that the results from both approaches rejected the Cobb-Douglas 
specification, indicating that the elasticity of capital and labour substitution was not equal to 
one. Also, he found strong evidence that there was some substitutability between value-
added and imports, and therefore, that this could lead to a downward bias in labour 
productivity estimates. This paper by Szeto has raised an important issue concerning the 
importance of including imports as inputs in the production function in New Zealand. In 
particular, from the 1990s onward, the New Zealand economy had been marked by higher 
import penetration ratios and a changing composition of imports. Therefore, the gross 
output approach was more suitable in constructing models of growth for New Zealand for 
the post-1990 period. 
 Chun and Nadiri (2002) examined the sources of productivity growth in the U.S. 
computer industry from 1978 to 1999. They separated technical change in total factor 
productivity growth into two components: product innovation, associated with better quality 
and process innovation associated with added quantity. They argued that the traditional TFP 
approach focused mainly on the latter component, in which they concentrated on how much 
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productivity growth was commensurate to improvements in the technological efficiency of 
teh production process. However, productivity growth could also take place in the 
improvement of output quality. Therefore, the identification of both process and product 
innovations were crucial to exploring the sources of productivity growth. They constructed 
the variables of output quantity and quality utilizing both the hedonic (quality-adjusted) 
prices and the list (quality-unadjusted) prices. They then formulated a joint production 
model of output quantity and quality, and estimated the joint optimization conditions of 
quantity and quality together with a general cost structure that accounted for scale 
economies and mark-ups. Based on the estimation results, they decomposed TFP growth 
into three effects consisting of process innovation, product innovation, and economies of 
scale.  
 They found that, firstly, the technical change associated with process innovation 
was a major factor contributing to TFP growth in the computer industry. It accounted for 
almost half of the total TFP growth, while product-oriented technical change also explained 
about 30 percent of the total TFP, and the effect of economies of scale explained about 20 
percent. Hence, the technical changes contributed for almost 80 percent of the total TFP 
growth. Secondly, the found a substantial size of mark-ups in pricing of both output 
quantity and quality, while was larger for the quality compared to the quantity mark-up. 
This suggested that the computer market was more competitive in quantity rather than in 
quality. Thirdly, they found that the TFP contribution from product innovation rose rapidly in 
the late 1990s, while the contribution from process innovation and economies of scale 
changed very little. They claimed that this increasing trend in product innovation challenged 
the predictions of the industry life-cycle theory, which stated that new industries should 
experienced product innovation in the earlier period, and then face process innovation later 
on.  
 Crafts and Mills (2005) considered traditional TFP growth estimates and thier 
accuracy in revealing the underlying ‘pure’ technological change, by taking into account of 
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scale economies, fixed factors of production, and adjustment costs. They claimed that in a 
pure Solow model with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the TFP growth 
was equal to the contribution of technological progress. However, this is not always the 
case. The TFP growth would understate the impact of technological progress when 
endogenous innovation is embodied in the new types of capital, in which case these better 
technologies would transmit their impact indirectly through the capital contribution. Also, 
even when technological change was exogenous and disembodied, the TFP growth would 
only measure its contribution to growth correctly when there were constant return to scale, 
when factor shares reflect marginal products, and when there were no fixed factors of 
production.  
 They argued that, following the Morrison (1992, 1993) methodology, these 
problems could be solved by the use of econometric techniques to filter out other effects in 
order to obtain the pure TFP growth. Therefore, they proposed using the Morrison 
methodology to reconsider the contribution of innovation to productivity growth in West 
Germany and the UK during the period of 1950 to 1996. Their finding suggest that the 
biases in the traditional estimates of TFP were not very substantial, and were on average 2 
percent per year in the early post-war period, and declining over time. Also, the size of bias 
was fairly similar in each period for both countries, but varied over time. They also claimed 
that in both countries, the early post-war years were marked by a larger bias, as the 
adjustment costs from a rising supply price of capital goods held down the TFP growth 
below the level which should have arisen from pure technological progress. However, as 
might be expected, this problem has largely disappeared in the later globalisation period.  
 
5.3.4 Distance Function Based Approach 
 
The issue of technical inefficiency was first introduced in the pioneer work by Koopmans 
(1951) in which he implied that not all producers are technically efficient, and an increase in 
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output is sometime possible without the need to increase inputs. Since this introduction of 
the technical inefficiency concept by Koopmans, there has been an immense increase in the 
number of studies concerning the issue. Economists had since then have used the term 
productive efficiency to describe how well an organizational unit is performing in utilizing 
resources to generate outputs or outcomes. Farrell (1957) further demonstrated that overall 
efficiency can be decomposed into two components, allocative efficiency and technical 
efficiency. Allocative efficiency is the market condition in which resources are allocated in a 
way that maximises the net benefit attainable throughout their use. It could be measured 
by the reduction in cost that could potentially be achieved when firms use their optimal 
combinations of inputs. On the other hand, technical efficiency is the condition arising when 
the maximum amount of an output is produced, for a given set of inputs (output-oriented 
technical efficiency) or when the minimum amount of inputs are required to produced a 
given output level (input-oriented technical efficiency). A firm is considered to be technically 
efficient if it is producing the maximum quantity of output that is technologically feasible, 
given the quantities of the factor inputs it employs. Therefore, it could be measured by the 
amount of outputs that would be potentially increased by producing on the possible 
production frontier.  
 However, the traditional production functions estimate by the standard statistical 
techniques will have error terms that is assumed to be symmetrically distributed with zero 
means, which implies that the only source of departure from the estimated function is due 
to the statistical noise, hence, leaving no room for the inefficiency component. For this 
reason, production function estimates by the least squares estimations are no longer the 
appropriate choice for estimating models based on the Koopmans’ and Farrell’s concepts. An 
alternative estimation method for the production function and productive efficiency, based 
on the distance function was then suggested by many analysts such as Aigner and Chu 
(1968), Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Stevenson (1980), Pitt and Lee (1981), Schmidt 
and Sickles (1984), Battese and Coelli (1988), Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), and 
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Kumbhakar (1990). These approaches aimed to separate productivity into two components, 
namely the changes resulting from a movement towards the production frontier, and the 
shifts in the frontier as such. Simply speaking, the distance function approach estimates the 
productivity level by utilizing an output distance function that measures how close 
production of a particular output is, when compared to the maximum attainable level of 
output, given the current level of input, if production is technically efficient. In other word, it 
represents how close a particular output vector is to the production frontier, given a 
particular input vector. At the aggregate level, this simply involves measurement of the 
distance of an economy from its production function. 
 
5.3.4.1 Parametric VS Non-Parametric Distance Function
 
Among the many suggested measures of efficiency, based on the concepts of technical and 
allocative efficiency, two main approaches could be classified. The first, favoured by the 
majority of economists, is the parametric approach. Here, the form of the production 
function is either assumed to be known or is estimated statistically. The advantages of this 
approach are that any hypotheses can be tested with statistical rigour, and that 
relationships between inputs and outputs follow know functional forms. However, in many 
cases, there is no known functional form for the production function and, indeed, it may be 
inappropriate to talk in terms of such a ‘production’ function. This is most clearly the case in 
public sector organizations such as health and education, but is also evident in certain 
private sector organizational units that are not, for example, concerned with taking 
unfinished goods or raw materials, processing them and producing finished goods or sale or 
transfer. (However, a more detailed development and discussions of the parametric distance 
function approach will be presented later in chapter 7 of this thesis.)  
 Second, the non-parametric approach (which shall be examined in more details in 
the next section) is an approach that makes no assumptions about the form of the 
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production function. Instead, a best practice function is built empirically from observed 
inputs and outputs. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), the pioneers of this approach, had 
attempted to estimate production efficiency by utilizing the technique they called Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), in which a non-parametric technique is used in assessing the 
efficiency of a unit, in relation to the other units in its grouping39. They also introduced the 
generic term ‘decision making units (DMUs)’ to describe the collection of firms, departments, 
divisions, or administrative units which have common inputs and outputs and which are 
being assessed for efficiency. Finally, they described the technique used in the DEA as 
follows:  ‘The efficiency measure of a DMU is defined by its position relative to the frontier 
of best performance, established mathematically by the ratio of a weighted sum of outputs 
to a weighted sum of inputs’.  
 However, the original model introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) was 
applicable only to technologies characterized by constant returns to scale. Banker, Charnes, 
and Cooper (1984) later extended this model to accommodate technologies that exhibited 
variable returns to scale. In subsequent years, methodological contributions from a large 
number of researchers have accumulated into a significant volume of literature concerning 
these models, and the generic approach of DEA has merged as a valid alternative to 
regression analysis for efficiency measurement. However, unlike in management science, 
where DEA became virtually an instant success, in economics, its welcome has been far less 
enthusiastic 40 . This scepticism about DEA on the part of economists was due to three 
principal reasons: 
• First, DEA is a non-parametric method, and therefore, there is no production, cost, 
or profit function that could be estimated from the data. This, thus, precludes the 
possibility of evaluating the marginal products, partial elasticities, marginal costs, or 
elasticities of substitution from a fitted model. As a result, the usual conclusions 
                                                          
39 Norman and Stoker (1991) 
40 Ray , (2004) 
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about the technology, which are usually possible from a parametric functional form, 
could not be derived.  
• Second, and more importantly, DEA utilizes the linear programming techniques to 
estimate efficiency components. However, being non-statistical in nature, the linear 
programming solution of a DEA produces no standard errors, and therefore leaves 
no room for hypothesis testing.  
• Third, in DEA, with no standard errors, any deviation from the frontier will be 
treated as inefficiency, leaving no provision for random shocks of any types. This is 
in contrast to the more popular stochastic frontier model, which explicitly allows the 
frontier to shift as a result of random shocks.  
 The above problem of the DEA efficiency measures lacking standard errors was 
explained in Ray (2004), in that it stemmed from the fact that the stochastic properties of 
inequality-constrained estimators were not well established in the econometrics literature. 
Although there was new research underway to address this problem, a simple solution was 
still unlikely to be found in the near future. This research can be classified into several 
different lines including, first, the convex and monotonic non-parametric frontier with one-
sided disturbance term, suggested by Banker (1993). He showed that the DEA estimator of 
such a frontier would converge in distribution to the maximum likelihood estimators; hence, 
he was also able to specify F tests to be used for hypothesis testing. Subsequently, Banker 
and Maindiratta (1992) introduced an additional two-sided component in the composite 
error term, and proposed a new estimation procedure for the non-parametric frontier by 
DEA. Second, Park and Simar (1994) employed parametric and non-parametric estimation 
techniques in order to derive the statistical distribution of the efficiency estimates.   
 Third, a line of research was initiated by Simar (1992) and Simar and Wilson (1998, 
2000) in which a bootstrapping technique was combined with DEA to generate empirical 
distributions of the efficiency measures of individual firms. Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) 
proposed an alternative ways to make estimates of technical efficiency employing the 
 - 144 -
Measuring Productivity 
method of DEA more robust. The DEA approach is estimated non-parametrically from a set 
of n observed production units; therefore the efficiency is measured relative to an estimate 
of the true, but unobserved, production frontier. Since statistical estimators of the frontier 
are obtained from finite samples, the corresponding measures of efficiency are sensitive to 
the sampling variations of the obtained frontier. DEA estimators show consistency under 
very weak general conditions, but the obtained rates of convergence are, as with many 
nonparametric estimators, very slow. Simar and Wilson solved this problem by adopting a 
smoothed bootstrap method to obtain more reliable efficiency rankings.  
 Bootstrapping is based on the idea of repeatedly simulating the data-generating 
process (DGP), usually through resampling, and applying the original estimator to each 
simulated sample, so that resulting estimates mimic the sampling distribution of the original 
estimator. The primary difficulty in applying bootstrap methods in complex situations, such 
as the case of non-parametric frontier estimation, lies in simulating the DGP. In the case of 
nonparametric frontier estimation, a model of the DGP must be defined clearly, a priori, 
otherwise we cannot know whether the bootstrap mimics the sampling distribution of the 
estimates of interest, or some other distribution. 
 Simar and Wilson demonstrated that although nonparametric efficiency measures 
were often criticized for lacking a statistical basis, in fact, nonparametric efficiency measures 
do have a statistical basis. One of their chief differences from stochastic, parametric models 
is the implicit nature of the DGP. By focusing on the underlying nature of the DGP, they 
were able to use bootstrap methods to analyze the sensitivity of nonparametric efficiency 
scores to sampling variation. 
 The bootstrap estimates offered by their methodology offer several possible 
enhancements to typical DEA applications. Firstly, one can test for statistical significance 
among differences in firms’ efficiency scores, similar to the way in which t ratios are used in 
classical regression studies. Secondly, the bootstrap estimates can also be used to test 
hypotheses about the structure of the underlying technology. Thirdly, their approach 
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requires only minimal assumptions on the DGP, hence allowing one to avoid more restrictive 
assumptions usually imposed. Finally, their approach can be used with cross-sectional data, 
unlike other non-parametric approaches that require panel data.  
 Currently, this line of research has generated quite a lot of interest, and attempts 
are being made to developing the standard DEA software to incorporate the bootstrapping 
option.  
 
5.3.4.2 Data Envelopment Analysis
 
Followed the work by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes, and 
Cooper (1984), Färe, Grosskopf, Norries and Zhang (1994) have defined an output distance 
function at time t as  
  (5.24) 10 }),(:(sup{})/,(:inf{),(
−∈=∈= ttttttttt SyxSyxyxD θθθθ
where is a vector of input quantities at time t and is a vector of output quantities at 
time t. describes a production technology, or production possibility set, that is feasible 
using the technology available at time t. The term  indicated that 
given the set of real numbers θ, where θ is such that the input/output combination 
is part of the production possibility set that is technically feasible, given the 
technology at time t, the infimum or the greatest lowest bound of θ is needed. This infimum 
of θ is defined by the biggest real number that is less than or equal to every number in θ.  
tx ty
tS
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 The term is the output distance function based on the input and output 
vectors at time t. To calculate , it is necessary to find the largest factor by which 
all the outputs in the output vector could be increased when making production as 
technically efficient as possible, based on the input vector .  is then the 
reciprocal of this value. The closer the economy is to the production frontier, the smaller the 
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factor increase will be, and the larger the value of . If the economy is operating 
on the frontier, will take a value of 1. In contrast, when the economy is 
operating below the frontier, will be less than 1.    
),(0
ttt yxD
),(0
ttt yxD
),(0
ttt yxD
 Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982a, and b) developed Malmquist output and 
input productivity change indices for multiple-input and multiple-output technologies that 
are valid for any returns to scale. The output-oriented index is based on an output distance 
function and reflects changes in maximum output given a set of inputs. This index can be 
expressed as  
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which is the ratio of two output distance functions which both utilize technology at time t as 
a reference technology. The numerator is the output distance function at time t+1 based on 
technology at period t. The denominator is the output distance function at time t based on 
technology at period t. 
 Färe, Grosskopf, Norries and Zhang (1994) extended this index by avoiding the 
need to choose an arbitrary benchmark technology for a particular period, hence, the 
constructed output distance function based on period t+1 is:  
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They then computed the Malmquist index relative to a non-parametric specification of the 
production frontier by utilizing the non-parametric, linear programming techniques of data 
envelopment analysis to fit distance functions of data on input and output quantities. They 
directly calculated the productivity change as the geometric mean of the two Malmquist 
indices shown in equation (5.22) and (5.23), without price data and without specifying a 
functional form. This becomes  
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which can be rewritten as   
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Therefore, they decomposed this productivity index into technical change, (viz. the shift of 
frontiers) and efficiency change (viz. the movement toward the frontier). The two terms on 
the right hand side of equation (5.25) can be interpreted as 
 Efficiency change = 
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Hence the Malmquist productivity index they derived was simply the product of the change 
in relative efficiency that occurred between periods t and t+1, and the change in technology 
that occurred between periods t and t+1.  
 However, since this approach is non-parametric, it is still imposing a constant 
returns to scale restriction on the frontier technology.  
 
5.3.4.3 Further Development on DEA
 
Färe, Grosskopf, Norries and Zhang, in their 1994 paper, examined the productivity growth 
of seventeen OECD countries over the period from 1979 to 1988 and produced a world 
production frontier following their Malmquist productivity index that was derived from the 
non-parametric data envelopment analysis. They then compared the performance of these 
seventeen OECD countries to the computed world production frontier. Their results showed 
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that the United States has slightly higher than average productivity growth, which is due to 
the highest technical efficiency they had relative to the world frontier. However, Japan has 
the highest productivity growth among the total of seventeen countries in the sample. But, 
unlike the case of the United States, this growth was mainly the result of efficiency change.  
 Färe, Grosskopf, and Margaritis (1996) followed the approach by Färe, Grosskopf, 
Norries and Zhang (1994) in estimating the productivity growth, but used sectoral level 
input and output data for New Zealand to produce an aggregate production frontier for the 
New Zealand market sector. Individual sectors are then compared to this frontier in the 
assessment of their productiveness.  
 Atkinson, Cornwell, and Honerkamp (2003) proposed an alternative method of 
estimating productivity growth that combined the approach by Färe, Grosskopf, Norries and 
Zhang (1994) with the econometric approach. They first estimated a flexible, parametric, 
stochastic distance function accounting for the technical inefficiency in which this flexible 
nature of the stochastic distance function allowed them to compute productivity change 
without arbitrarily restricting returns to scale. Then, within this new framework, they 
obtained a decomposition for productivity change equivalent to that of Färe, Grosskopf, 
Norries and Zhang (1994). They used a panel data of US electric utilities comprised of forty 
three privately-owned US electric utilities operating during the period from 1961 to 1992. 
They then compared the results of the simple DEA approach with their new approach. They 
result of DEA, when compared to the new approach, exhibited a much higher average 
annual rate of productivity growth. Moreover, there was also significant difference between 
the relative importance assigned to the efficiency change and the technical change in the 
two methodologies. The new approach attributed all of the average productivity gain to 
technical change, whereas the DEA yielded more balance in the measured sources of 
productivity growth. Besides, the DEA results exhibited much higher volatility over time. 
Atkinson, Cornwell, and Honerkamp then argued that these disagreements were most likely 
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caused by the failure of DEA to account for noise, as well as the DEA’s assumption of 
constant returns to scale.   
 these approaches. The contents of this 
ction 
proach is a non-parametric approach, it still needs a specific functional form of 
5.4 Comparison between Alternative Approaches to Measuring Productivities 
 
As seen from the previous sections, each approach to productivity measurement has its own 
advantages and drawbacks. Therefore, it is not easy to reach a conclusion as to which 
approach is superior to the other. One approach might be more suitable for some particular 
purpose, but not the other. This section aims to consider and summarize the differences, 
including the advantages and drawbacks, between
se involve some necessary overlap with other sections, in order to emphasise 
differences between these alternative approaches. 
 The Growth Accounting Approach is a non-parametric approach that measures the 
residual resulting from separately evaluating the contribution of the specified input factors 
to output growth, and then subtracting these measured contributions from the total growth 
of output41. The major drawbacks of this approach are that 1) it is inextricably linked to the 
assumption of constant returns to scale, 2) it is, in practise, wedded to the assumption of 
marginal cost pricing, 3) it is based on the strong assumption of Hicksian technical change 
(see the more detailed discussions on p.113-114). Moreover, although the growth 
accounting ap
the technology to be assumed, in order to obtain an exact estimate of the efficiency 
parameter.  
 The Index Number Approach employs the same conceptual background as the 
growth accounting approach. They both measure the residual in output growth that could 
not be explained by the growth of factor inputs. It is noted that the index number approach 
suffers from the same drawbacks as in the growth accounting approach : more specifically, 
the strong assumptions of constant returns to scale, marginal cost pricing and Hicksian 
 - 150 -
Measuring Productivity 
technical change. However, in the growth accounting approach, the estimation process 
starts by selecting a production function, while in the index number approach, it starts with 
the selection of an index. In theory, the index number approach is superior to the growth 
accounting approach, in that it does not necessarily require an aggregate production 
function to be specified, meaning that no assumptions about the underlying economic 
structure have to be made. However, in reality, in order to select an appropriate index, 
some properties of the production function would have to be assumed. Hence, the 
istinction between the two approaches is somewhat obscured (more detailed discussion on d
this is elsewhere, see p.121).  
 
Table 5.2: Comparing the d t approaches easuring prod ity   
Growth 
Accounting 
I  
Number 
Conventional 
Econometric 
Data 
Envelopment  
Stochastic 
Frontier 
ifferen  to m uctiv
Assumption ndex
Constant Ret
Scale 
urns to Yes Yes No   Yes* No 
Marginal Cost Pricing Yes Yes No Yes No 
Hicksian Technical 
Change Yes Yes No Yes No 
Pre-Specific 
Functional Form of 
Technology 
Yes No Yes No Yes 
Parametric vs No
Parametric 
n- Non-Parametric Non-Parametric Parametric Non-Parametric Parametric 
Measuring Average 
Behaviour N/A N/A Yes N/A No 
Allows for 
iciencies in 
uction Process 
N/A N/A No Yes YeIneff
Prod
s 
Provision for Random 
Shocks No No Yes No Yes 
Note: * Recent developments have extended this approach to accommodate technologies that 
exhibited variable returns to scale.   
 
 The conventional econometric approach involves estimating the parameters of a specified 
production function to yield an estimate of the parameter that reflects the growth in technological 
progress. The advantage of this approach is that it is only based on observations of the volume of  
outputs and inputs, and thus avoids postulating a relationship between production elasticities and 
income shares. Hence, it leaves room for the possibility of testing these relationships. It is superior to 
                                                                                                                                                                   
41 Diewert and Lawrence (1999) 
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the non-parametric approach ( i.e. growth accounting and index approaches ) in that it allows other 
parameters of the production technology to be explored, in addition to merely estimating the 
efficiency term. It can also accommodate greater flexibility in specifying the production technology, in 
contrast to the growth accounting and index number approaches. Furthermore, non-competitive 
pricing behaviour and non-constant returns to scale can also be examined. However, this increase in 
flexibility comes with costs, both theoretically and practically. In practice, the use of the econometric 
approach is generally limited to the academically oriented, one-off studies of productivity growth, but 
it is not relevant to the publication of regular productivity statistics, because the updating of the 
econometric approach involves a full re-estimation of the complicated model and the hypothesis 
testing following it. Also, the methodology of such an approach is often too complicated to 
communicate to a broad spectrum of users. In theory, the fully-fledged models can raise complex 
econometric issues and, hence, requires practitioners to place priori restrictions on the 
values of these parameters. Therefore, the problem of robustness of the resulting 
arame
he production 
chnolo
p ter estimates against alternative ways of imposing restrictions could arise. For more 
detailed discussion in these issues, see p.133-139. 
 The distance function based approaches (i.e. Data Envelopment Analysis, Stochastic Frontier 
Estimation) is superior to other approached previously discussed in that they recognize that not all 
producers are technically efficient. These approaches estimate the productivity level by utilizing an 
output distance function that measures how close production of a particular output is, when compared 
to the maximum attainable level of output, given the current level of input if production is technically 
efficient. The Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric approach that makes no assumption 
about the form of the production function, Instead, a best practice function is built empirically from 
observed inputs and outputs. However, because DEA is a non-parametric method, it precludes the 
possibility of evaluating the marginal products and elasticities of substitution of t
te gy. Moreover, the DEA produces no standard errors and, therefore, any deviation from the 
frontier is treated as inefficiency, leaving no provision for random shocks of any types.  
 This is in contrast to the parametric Stochastic Production Frontier, for which the form of the 
production function is either assumed to be known, or is estimated statistically. The advantages of this 
approach are that any hypotheses can be tested with statistical rigour, and that relationships between 
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inputs and outputs follow known functional forms. When compared to the conventional econometric 
approach, the stochastic production frontier is superior in that it estimates the ‘best practice’ 
technology upon which the production function concept is based on, while in the former case it is 
based on ‘averaging’ estimators. Therefore, the conventional econometric model may generate results 
that are fundamentally inconsistent with the definition of the production function. Moreover, the 
conventional econometric models often employ simple least squares techniques, and hence, will have 
error terms that are assumed to be symmetrically distributed with zero means. This assumption, 
effectively, indicates that the only source of departure from the estimated function is due to statistical 
noise. Therefore, these models are predicated on a common, but rather untenable, assumption that 
roducers are always operating on their production functions, and technical inefficiencies in the 
roduction process do not exist.  
p
p
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the conceptual and methodological issues in the 
theory and measurement of productivity. Attention was focused on the concept of 
productivity, the different types of it, and its measurement approaches. Productivity was 
defined at the simplest level as being the ratio concerning how efficiency a certain output of 
goods and services is produced given a set of inputs. Although there is no argument in the 
general definition of the productivity concept, but the unique consent on the measurement 
of it had been reached, and it remains an intense topic of debate. The measurement of 
productivity could be classified in several forms – the single and multi/total factor 
productivity, or the gross output and the value-added productivity. Each of these has its 
own strength and weakness. Also, there are several approaches to the measurement of 
productivity, both parametric and non-parametric. They could be summarized into four main 
lines including the growth accounting, the index number, the conventional econometric, and 
the distance function based approaches. Unsurprisingly, each of them also has advantages 
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and drawbacks, with one approach being more suitable for some particular objectives, but 
not others. No conclusion can easily be reached on which approach or which type of 
productivity measurement is superior to the other. Therefore, the choices between the 
types of measurement, as well as between the different approaches in measuring the 
productivity are always dependent on the purpose of each particular case, and, in reality, 
are very often dependent on the availability of the data as well. Nevertheless, it should 
always be remembered that these options should not be viewed as rivals. There is no 
reason for an ‘either-or’ choice, when several approaches can be implemented 
imultaneously. If the availability of data allows it, one is thereby exploiting the advantages 
of all measures, while avoiding the drawbacks from each of them.   
 
s
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Chapter 6 – Exploratory Data Analysis 
 
“Economists often like startling theorems, results which seem to run counter to conventional 
wisdom.” 
  
Joseph E. Stiglitz
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to carry out a preliminary analysis that would help identify the 
underlying structure of the Thai manufacturing sector (in both pre- and post-crisis periods) 
in order to minimize the assumptions that need to be made when further, more detailed 
analyses are carried out. The effects of the 1997 economic crisis have already been 
examined earlier in Chapter 4. It is clear that the Thai economy has been hit in a very broad 
and profound scale. In the manufacturing sector, output of most industries declined 
immediately post-crisis, although the intensity was varied across industries. While a large 
number of studies have examined the effects of this crisis, however, almost none has 
attempted to compare the structural change between the pre- and post-crisis manufacturing 
sector. This thesis is aiming at examining the productivity of the Thai manufacturing sector, 
and the effects that the 1997 crisis have on it. However, in doing so, in particular when 
there is no reference to the structural change between the two periods, strong 
presumptions about the pattern of the shift would be inevitable. Unfortunately, such 
presumptions could be easily criticized for their lack of robustness, and therefore, the 
creditability of the findings is reduced. Hence, this chapter proposes the use of the 
exploratory data analysis techniques to reduce such problem.  
 According to the Engineering Statistics Handbook1, data analysis is the systematic 
study of data that enable the analysts to understand the meaning, organization, structure, 
and relationships taken place within that particular set of data. In the classical approach of 
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data analysis, a model is imposed a priori, according to the conjecture one has made about 
that set of data. However, this approach has been criticized. The reasoning is that although 
the statistical significance of the variables in a model could be easily achieved, the 
robustness of it could be in question, as such significance would only hold if the underlying 
assumptions were correct. Moreover, in the process of classical data analysis, nothing is 
done to ensure that the assumptions made are the right ones. Therefore, the creditability of 
the estimates from such model could easily be queried. For this reason, an alternative 
approach was introduced, namely, Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA). The EDA method is not 
a simple matter of employing a different technique for data analysis, but is rather a different 
‘philosophy’ in approaching the problems to be analyzed. In EDA, very few assumptions are 
made; instead, it is the analysis of the data that takes priority. The main goal of EDA is to 
gain insight into the process behind data, and this is achieved by utilizing methods that 
would let the data itself suggest the most appropriate model to be used.  
 Therefore, in this chapter, the EDA approach is adopted in order to examine the 
underlying structure of the Thai manufacturing sector. Very few presumptions would then 
need to be made, and thus, the findings could help avoid any criticisms regarding the 
assumptions that will be made later on in the more refined analyses. This chapter starts 
with section 6.2 that will explain the concept, as well as the objectives of the exploratory 
data analysis. Section 6.3 is concerned with the source of the data being used, as well as 
the methodology in conducting this exploratory data analysis (i.e. the models being used 
and the hypothesis being tested). Section 6.4 examines the structure of the manufacturing 
sector, utilizing the graphical EDA approach, based on an efficiency measuring approach 
suggested by Foo (1992, 1993). Section 6.5 further examines the issue raises by the 
findings in Section 6.4, utilizing the quantitative EDA approach, based on a two-factor inputs 
production function. And finally, section 6.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
1 The US. Department of Commerce, Engineering Statistics Handbook  
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6.2 Exploratory Data Analysis 
 
Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) is an approach to data analysis that is concerned with 
reviewing, communicating, and using data in which there is a low level of knowledge about 
its causal system. It was first introduced by John Tukey in his seminal work in 1977, and 
had been developed over the years by many other authors such as Mosteller and Tukey 
(1977), Hoaglin (1977), and Velleman and Hoaglin (1981). Tukey (1977) alleged that too 
much emphasis in statistics had been placed on evaluating and testing given hypotheses (in 
what is called the confirmatory data analysis), but not enough attention had been given to 
the use of data in suggesting the hypotheses that should be tested. Therefore, he 
suggested a new approach to data analysis that postponed the usual assumptions about the 
kind of model the data followed with the more direct approach of allowing the data itself to 
reveal its underlying structure and model. The objectives of the EDA are to2
• Suggest hypotheses about the causes of observed phenomena 
• Assess assumptions on which statistical inference will be based 
• Support the selection of appropriate statistical tools and techniques 
• Provide a basis for further data collection through surveys or experiments 
The EDA approach is different from classical data analysis in its sequence of procedures and 
the focus of the intermediate steps. For the classical analysis, after the research problem is 
identified, the data collection process is carried out. There then follows the imposition of a 
model, which reflects the assumptions behind on hypothesis. Later, the analysis, the 
estimation, and the testing are performed with the focus being put on the parameters of 
that model. And finally, the conclusions are drawn from the features that the data exhibits. 
However, for EDA, after the research question is identified and the data needed are 
collected, the next step (unlike the classical approach) is not followed by a model imposition, 
but rather it is followed immediately by an experimented analysis with the goal of inferring 
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an appropriate model for representing the data, and then the conclusion is drawn from such 
analysis. Therefore, it is possible to describe EDA in a simpler term as ‘EDA used the data as 
a ‘window’ to peer into the heart of the process that generated the data in the first place’3.  
 
 
6.3 Data and Methodology 
 
The data being used in this thesis comes from the published Manufacturing Industrial 
Survey conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand and cover the period 
between 1990 to 2002 (with some gap years, see below). There were 177 observations in 
total, 89 in the pre-crisis period and 88 in the post-crisis period. The establishments under 
the scope of this survey are those engaged primarily in manufacturing industry (category D 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities; ISIC: Rev.3) which 
have 10 or more persons engaged in the business. The coverage of this survey is nation-
wide. All information collected refers to the operation period of establishment during 
January and December. The methodology uses in the survey is Stratified Systematic 
Sampling, in which a larger population is divided into sub-groups (strata) by using 
systematic sampling, and then a random sample is taken from each sub-group. In this case, 
provinces are constituted strata while types of industrial activities and groups of industrial 
establishment are constituted sub-strata. The sampling units are the establishments. 
Establishment in each stratum (province, for this case) is also divided into industrial 
activities (sub-strata). The interviewing method is employed in data collection. These 
interviews are carried out by the enumerators who are permanent staffs of the National 
Statistical Office. The target interviewees are the owners or the entrepreneurs of the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2 Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey (1983) 
3 The US. Department of Commerce, Engineering Statistics Handbook 
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manufacturing establishments. The survey is carrying out between June and September of 
the subsequent year.  
 The Manufacturing Industrial Survey is published annually, with some gap years in 
which the NSO did not carried out the survey. The data set used by this thesis covers the 
period from 1990 to 2002. However, the data of 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997, and 2001 are not 
presented, as these were the years the NSO failed to publish the survey. The data selected 
are 24 major manufacturing industries of Thailand, with the list of these industries being 
presented in Appendix A at the end of this thesis. The data extracted were variables for 
value added (Y), headcount (L), book value of capital (K) and a decomposition of capital 
into three further variables, namely land (l), machinery (m), and office appliance (of).  
 Value added (Y) was measured as value of gross output minus intermediate 
consumption. Headcount (L) was measured by the number of persons who worked in or for 
the establishment, including working proprietors, active business partners, unpaid workers 
and workers permanently working outside the establishment. Book value of capital (K) was 
measured as the net value of capital after deducting the accumulated depreciation at the 
end of the year. Capital includes land, building, machinery and equipment, vehicles, and 
office appliances. Land (l) was defined as land and buildings that are used for the 
production of outputs. Machinery (m) was defined as machinery and equipments that are 
used for the production of outputs. And office appliances (of) were defined as appliances 
that are used in the office to facilitate the production of outputs.  
 As mentioned at the beginning of this section (6.3), all data are secondary source 
and based on statistic gathered by the official Thai government statistical agency, The 
National Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand. They conduct an annual survey (with 
occasional gaps, as in the crisis year of 1997) of manufacturing firms which are larger than 
micro-firms (i.e. headcount greater than 10). Government enumerators from the NSO 
gather these data ‘on-site’ at the plant or business. Approximately 100,000 firms are visited 
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for this purpose every year. Because data collection is ‘on-site’, and also because it is not 
self-reported but gathered by independent government personnel with expertise in this area, 
the quality of data is considered to be high. That is, it is comprehensive, detailed and 
accurate. Especially output data (because they come under the tax net) and headcount 
(because they are so easily verified on-site) are likely to be precise. Land is also easily 
verified. Book value of capital (which will typically include a significant component of land) 
will also tend to be quite accurate. Likely sources of minor inaccuracy could possibly arise 
from the machinery and office appliances component.  
 The aggregated industry level data are used in this thesis, rather than the firm level, 
despite the criticisms that aggregate production functions do not have a sound theoretical 
foundation, and that aggregating micro production functions into a macro production 
function is problematic4 . Nevertheless, the aggregate data is being used here for three 
reasons. Firstly, following Solow (1966)’s argument, that based on the methodological 
position known as instrumentalism, as long as aggregate production functions appear to 
give empirically reasonable results, there is no reason why should they not be employed. 
Solow, in his own word, stated that “I have never thought of the macroeconomic production 
function as a rigorously justifiable concept. In my mind it is either an illuminating parable, 
or else a mere device for handling data, to be used so long as it gives good empirical results, 
and to be abandoned as soon as it doesn’t, or as soon as something better comes along.”5  
 Secondly, following Samuelson (1961-1962), the aggregate production function is to 
be thought of as a parable. Temple (2006) argued that ‘the argument misunderstands the 
nature and purpose of economic theory and empirical research, and that critics ask too 
much of theory’. He further argued that ‘a useful paper may offer new insights or provide a 
new and more sophisticated way of thinking about a problem. Some of the assumptions will 
be questionable or false, but readers will come away with a modified view of the world.’  
                                                          
4 It is important to keep in mind that the aggregate production function is the result of two types of 
aggregation. One is aggregate over multiple inputs or outputs and the other is aggregation over firms.  
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 Finally, as argued by Ferguson (1968), in some certain cases, the use of an 
aggregate production function is the only option. In the case of this thesis, the goal of the 
research is to study the overall improvement in efficiency of the manufacturing sector as a 
whole, therefore an aggregate production function that relates aggregate output to 
aggregate inputs is fundamental, and unavoidable.  
 Following the EDA technique, it is important that before any in-depth analysis on 
the productivity and efficiency of the Thai manufacturing sector is conducted, a preliminary 
analysis aiming at the revelation of the underlying structure of this data set is carried out. 
According to the EDA, it is vital to allow the data itself to reveal its underlying structure 
without making too many presumptions, which could prejudice the results coming from it. 
In the case of this thesis, one of the main objectives is to examine the structural shift in the 
manufacturing sector between the pre- and post-crisis period. It is hypothesized that the 
1997 economic crisis had affected the structure of the sector and hence, the productivity 
level. Therefore, most of the analyses following are built according to that assumption. 
However, as this thesis is the first literature to tackle this issue. Therefore, in order to 
enhance the validity of this assumption and the analyses, it is very important that the EDA 
is carried out to verify that there is indeed a structural shift between the two periods, and 
that the structural shift does not exist merely because of the presumption made.  
 Data analysis procedures can broadly be classified into two parts: quantitative and 
graphical6. Quantitative techniques are the set of statistical procedures that yield numeric or 
tabular output. Examples of quantitative techniques include: least squares regression, 
hypothesis testing, analysis of variance, point estimates and confidence intervals. On the 
other hand, there is a large collection of statistical tools that are generally referred to as 
graphical techniques, such as scatter plots, histograms, probability plots, and residual plots. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
5 Solow 1966, p.1259-1260 
6 The US. Department of Commerce, Engineering Statistics Handbook 
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The EDA approach relies heavily on these and similar graphical techniques. It is alleged7 
that such graphical tools are the shortest path to gaining insight into a data set, in terms of 
assumption testing, model selection, model validation, relationship identification, outlier 
detection, and many more.  
 This chapter is intended to carry out the exploratory analysis utilizing both graphical 
and quantitative techniques. Section 6.4 adopts a simple efficiency measuring model 
developed by Foo (1992, 1993) for the graphical analysis purpose. Section 6.5 employs a 
simple two-factor input Cobb-Douglas production function for the quantitative analysis 
purpose. It should, again, be noted here that both models being used in this chapter are 
only intended for the purpose of exploratory data analysis, and the more refined method of 
productivity measurements will be developed in the later chapters (Chapter 8 and 9).  
 
 
6.4 Graphical Technique 
 
Oulton (2004) claims that the theory of growth accounting (Solow (1957), Domar (1961), 
Hulten (1978), Jorgensen et al (1987), OECD (2001)) provides a framework for measuring 
and assessing the contribution of each industry to the national economy. Moreover, it also 
allows the evolution of these contributions to be seen over time. However, one problem in 
implementing the growth accounting framework using official data is that a long time series 
of data (e.g. 20-30 years) is needed. However, in reality (especially for the developing 
countries or newly developed countries) some basic official series do not go back very far, 
hence making it very hard to utilize the growth accounting framework in practice. Foo (1992, 
1993), seeing this difficulty, suggests an efficiency measuring approach, based on the 
concept of growth accounting, but with the mathematical identity of the model being 
developed by taking into consideration the availability of the data in published sources, as 
                                                          
7 The US. Department of Commerce, Engineering Statistics Handbook 
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well as the structural components of the firm. The main purpose of such a model is to relate 
the contribution of each components of organization structure configuration to changes in 
productive efficiency. 
  According to Foo (1992, 1993), a manufacturing firm may be conceptualised as an 
‘organism’ that absorbs inputs from the external environment. Then, through the process of 
production, value is added and inputs are transformed and then re-channelled into the 
external environment as outputs. Such a firm can be seen to be comprised of three main 
structural components – the operating core, physical and support elements, and the 
technostructure. The operating core takes into account factors that are involved directly in 
the production process of value-adding. It is, in another word, where the core value-adding 
activities take place. In the manufacturing organism, this includes raw materials, fuel, 
electricity, water, and other factors used in the production line. The technostructure relates 
to the more structural aspects of the production process. It includes things such as 
machineries, computer software, automation technology, and core human skills. Relative to 
operating core and technostructure, the physical and support elements have a less direct, 
integrative relationship with the production process. Instead, they embrace the operating 
core and technostructure, ensuring the production process runs favourably. In doing so, the 
physical elements form the framework in which a firm needs in order to manufacture 
outputs, such as buildings, plant, land, offices, and furniture. The support elements are 
physically less obvious, such as expenditure on administration.  
 Apart from relating the contribution of each structural component of the firm to the 
productive efficiency, this model also places great emphasis on the availability of the data 
needed, in which it is constrained by the published sources, such as the national accounts. 
Thus, it is modeled by the following relation (where symbols are defined below):  
 
        (6.1) OCPVANVA −=
and   IWGOOVA −−=         (6.2) 
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Therefore,        
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with  , WElFRMI +++= OEDRtRmRoOCP ++++= , and NVA = net 
value added, VA = gross value added, OCP = other costs of production, O = output, WGO 
= work given out, E = employees, CE = capital expenditure, I = inputs to production, RM 
= raw material, F = fuel, El = electricity, W = water, Ro = rent for office/factory promises, 
Rm = rent for machinery, Rt = rent for transport equipment, D = depreciation, OE = other 
expenditure. 
 Therefore, the net value added per employee of a firm can be expressed with: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++++−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++−−=
O
OE
O
D
O
Rt
O
Rm
O
Ro
O
W
O
El
O
F
O
RM
O
WGO
E
NVA 1
   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ××
E
CE
CE
O
       (6.5) 
in which the component ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++
O
W
O
El
O
F
O
RM  reflects the operating cores,                
   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++++
O
OE
O
D
O
Rt
O
Rm
O
Ro  reflects the physical and support 
elements, and   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ×
E
CE
CE
O  reflects the technostructure. 
 This model implies that the net value added per employee 
E
NVA
is the gain in the 
value of output which cannot be justified by the inputs in the three main structural 
components of the firms (i.e. operating cores, physical/support elements, and 
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technostructure). Therefore, 
E
NVA
can be seen as an estimator of the productivity gain 
from a firm’s production process. It is similar to the Solow’s residual referred to commonly 
in the growth accounting approach, but is different in the sense that this model is static, 
with only one period of time being taken into consideration. Therefore, it avoids the 
problem of long time series needed (which very often comprise of gap years) as mentioned 
by Oulton (2004).     
 
 6.4.1 Model Specification 
 
Following the work by Foo (1992, 1993), a similar model based on the published data of 
Thai manufacturing sector is developed. The model is specified as the following: 
      )()( DOOEICGOOCPVANVA +−−=−=    (6.6) 
      ( ) ( )DOOECVSPGRRMCCElFMCGONVA +−−+++++−=  (6.7)      
    DOOECVSPGRRMCCElFMCGO −−+−−−−−−=  (6.8) 
With GO = gross output, IC = intermediate costs, MC = materials and components, CC = 
contract and commission works, RM = repair and maintenance works, PGR = purchase of 
goods for resale, CVS = changes in value of stock of materials and components, OOE = 
other expenses. 
 Therefore: 
     
E
DOOECVSPGRRMCCElFMCGO
E
NVA −−+−−−−−−=  (6.9) 
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The component ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++
GO
El
GO
F
GO
MC  reflects the operating cores, 
  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++−++
GO
D
GO
OOE
GO
CVS
GO
PGR
GO
RM
GO
CC reflects physical and support elements, 
            and ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ×
E
CE
CE
GO reflects technostructure. 
In this model, the net value added per employee 
E
NVA
 is also measuring the gain in the 
value of output that could not be explained by the use of inputs through the three 
components of the firms.    
 
6.4.2 Results and Implications 
 
The results from equation (6.10) for year 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002 are 
presented in the graphical format, shown in figure 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. Figure 6.1 
reveals that there is a slight upward trend on the use of operating cores as a ratio to the 
gross output in the post-crisis period when compares to the pre-crisis. This upward trend 
can also be seen, but with a much stronger effect, in the physical and support elements 
component, shown in Figure 6.2. The technostructure component also shows a general 
upward trend post-crisis, despite a slightly higher level in 1996 (see Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.1: Pre- and Post-Crisis Operating Cores Component 
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Figure 6.2: Pre- and Post-Crisis Physical and Support Elements Component 
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Figure 6.3: Pre- and Post-Crisis Technostructure Component 
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 Results for the net value added per employee 
E
NVA
are shown by figure 6.4, where 
it reveals that during the pre-crisis period, the net value added per employee in the 
manufacturing sector of Thailand was declining, from 307.61 thousand Baht per employee 
in 1993 to 141.27 thousand Baht in 1996.  However, the trend in the post crisis period is 
less clear. The net value added per employee exhibits and increasing trend between 1998 
and 1999, however it demonstrates a declining trend again between 2000 and 2002. One 
explanation for such declining trend between year 2000 and 2002 could have lied in the 
statistical artefact resulting from a substantial increase in the rate of depreciation over gross 
output in 2000 and 2002, increased two folds from 0.075 in 1999 to 0.151 in 2000, and 
further increased to 0.356 in 2002. Such increase in the rate of depreciation came as a 
result of a large number of firms were facing with severe debt problems as a consequence 
of the devaluation of the Baht, and was forced to re-capitalize. 
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Figure 6.4: Pre- and Post-Crisis Net Value Added per Employee 
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Figure 6.5: Pre- and Post-Crisis Depreciation  
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 Despite the indefinite finding for the net value added per employee 
E
NVA
, one 
very important finding this model reveals is that there is an increasing trend in the 
technostructure post-crisis. The technostructure component ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ×
E
CE
CE
GO is the combined 
effect between the ratio of gross output over capital expenditure ( )CEGO  and the ratio of 
capital expenditure over employee ( )ECE .  Therefore, the growth of the technostructure 
component implies either an increase in the usage of more productive capitals (i.e. an 
increase in the ( CEGO )  ratio), or an increase in the amount of capital usage per 
employee (i.e. an increase in the ( )ECE  ratio), or both. Hence, a further exploratory data 
analysis is proposed in the next section, employing the simple two-factor input (i.e. capital 
and labour) production function in order to examine (with a more refined method) whether 
or not the ratio between the amount of capital and labour used has changed pre- and post-
crisis. 
 
 
6.5 Quantitative Technique 
 
As suggested in the previous section, the growth of the technostructure component could 
come partly from the increase in the usage of capital in comparison to the usage of labour. 
Another way this finding could be verified is by the examination of the aggregate production 
function of the manufacturing sector, and observes whether or not there is a different in the 
elasticity of input factors used between the two time periods. This section proposes the use 
of a simple two-factor inputs production function to examine the structural change that may 
have occurred between the pre- and post-crisis periods. It should once again be mentioned 
here that the use of a simple two-factor inputs production function is entirely due to the 
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specification of the EDA technique stating that a very simple model should be used in order 
to allow the data itself to reveal its underlying structure without making too many 
presumptions that may prejudice the outcomes.  
 
6.5.1 Model Specification  
 
This preliminary analysis starts with the choice of an appropriate production function that 
will provisionally represent the structure of the sector. The model being analyzed here is the 
simple two-factor input Cobb-Douglas production function and the generalized form of it, i.e. 
the translog production function. The reason for the choice among these two models was 
owing to the fact that they are simply the two most accepted and extensively used models 
for the analysis of production function. These models could be expressed as follow: The 
two-factor input Cobb-Douglas production function, 
 ( ) ( ) itititit VLKY +++= lnlnln 210 βββ     (6.11) 
where Y represents the value-added, K denotes the net assets, L represents total 
employment in headcount, V is a disturbance term with zero mean. The subscription of i 
refers to industry, and t refers to year. β is a vector of unknown parameters, with β0 
representing the intercept term, β1 representing the coefficient estimate of capital input 
parameter, and β2 representing the coefficient estimate of labour input parameter to be 
estimated.  
 The two-factor input Translog production function takes the form as follow:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itititititititit VLKLKLKY ++++++= lnlnln2
1ln
2
1lnlnln 5
2
4
2
3210 ββββββ  
          (6.12) 
This model in equation (6.12) differs from the Cobb-Douglas model in that it relaxes the 
Cobb-Douglas’s assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution. The Cobb-Douglas model 
could then be obtained by the restriction that β3 = β4 = β5 = 0. 
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 The data set mentioned earlier is then separated into the pre-and post-crisis period, 
and estimated according to these models for both periods, utilizing the ordinary least square 
method (OLS). The simple OLS estimation is being used here following the procedure of the 
EDA, which emphasizes that the simplest analysis should be conducted so as to obtain the 
basic knowledge of the data set, without too much data manipulation. Therefore, in this 
chapter, the OLS estimation is used for the purpose of achieving an overview picture of the 
structural change, if any, that has taken place in the manufacturing sector between the pre- 
and post-crisis period. And therefore, a further, more refined analysis could then be 
conducted with more confident. 
 Once the appropriate model is chosen among the two models mentioned above (for 
which, in this case, the Cobb-Douglas production function is proved to be more suitable, in 
which the details will be given in the next section), a hypothesis test of the structural 
change can then be conducted. The F test using the dummy variable technique is chosen, 
for this purpose, over the Chow test, as it has the benefit of being able to identify the 
sources of the structural shift, if any (on which more details will be given in the next 
section). By pooling all the observations both in the pre- and post-crisis period, the 
restricted multiple regression is analysed, based on the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
with the following expression,  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εδβδβδβ +⋅++⋅+++= )ln(ln)ln(lnln 322110 LDLKDKDY  (6.13) 
where D = 0 for the pre-crisis data, and D = 1 for post-crisis. The hypothesis being tested 
is that  
 0,0,0: 321 === δδδoH     against 
 0:1 ≠ioneleastatH δ       (6.14) 
The null hypothesis suggests that , , and . Therefore, 
if the null hypothesis could not be rejected, it could be concluded that there is no structural 
postpre
00 ββ = postpre 11 ββ = postpre 22 ββ =
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shift taken place between the pre- and the post-crisis period, and equation (6.13) collapses 
into  
   ( ) ( ) εβββ +++= LKY lnlnln 210      (6.15) 
which is simply the Cobb-Douglas production function with pooled observations. Hence, 
there would be no need for the separation of the observations between these two periods, 
and further analysis of productivity measurement could be done assuming no structural shift.  
 
6.5.2 Results and Implications 
 
The results from the analysis of both Cobb-Douglas and Translog models indicated that the 
Cobb-Douglas production function is a better representation of this set of data in both pre- 
and post-crisis period. From the estimation of Translog equation (6.12), the coefficient 
estimates β3, β4, and β5 are all not significantly different from zero in both periods, therefore, 
these findings suggest that equation (6.12) collapses into equation (6.11), and that the 
Cobb-Douglas model is a sufficient representative for the data of Thai manufacturing sector 
in both periods of studies. The estimates from the Cobb-Douglas production function are 
presented in Table 6.1 below.   
 
Table 6.1: OLS Estimates of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Note: OLS estimates were computed using the exposition in equation (6.11) p.171, based on the 
Cobb-Douglas production function. 
OLS estimates Variable Parameter 
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Constant β0 5.6532 4.5200 
  (0.9189) (0.8872) 
ln Asset β1 0.3430 0.5101 
  (0.8156) (0.0607) 
ln Employ β2 0.5098 0.3181 
  (0.1171) (0.0739) 
 R2 0.638 0.698 
 Adjusted R2 0.630 0.691 
 n 89 88 
 Standard errors are in brackets.  
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 The coefficient estimate of the capital input parameter, β1, is 0.3430 in the pre-
crisis period, and increases to 0.5101 in the post-crisis period. On the other hand, the 
coefficient estimate of labour input parameter, β2, is 0.5098 in the pre-crisis, and reduces to 
0.3181 in the post-crisis period. These results (while confirming the previous finding of 
section 6.4 that there is indeed an increase in the capital use when compares to the number 
of employees) suggest that the manufacturing sector of Thailand exhibited a structural shift 
from labour intensive in the pre-crisis toward capital intensive in the post-crisis period. One 
possible explanation for such occurrence could have been the result of the post-crisis wage 
rigidity in the labour market as well as the sharp decline in the domestic interest rates, 
which therefore, causing a substantial adjustment in the relative price between labour and 
capital inputs. As a result, firms might have found it more efficient to substitute the use of 
labour with capital, and therefore, leading to this structural shift. However, this issue will be 
examined in more details later in Chapter 8.  
   
Table 6.2: Test for Pre- and Post-Crisis Structural Shift 
OLS estimates Variable Parameter 
Unrestricted Restricted 
Constant β0 5.647 5.653 
  (0.649) (0.771) 
D δ1 - -1.134 
  - (0.608) 
ln Asset β1 0.395 0.343 
  (0.052) (0.068) 
D x ln Asset δ2 - 0.167 
  - (0.086) 
ln Employ β2 0.413 0.510 
  (0.071) (0.098) 
D x ln Employ δ2 - -0.192 
  - (0.106) 
 R2 0.636 0.658 
 Adjusted R2 0.631 0.648 
 SSE 113.609 120.921 
 n 89 88 
Note:  The unrestricted OLS estimates were computed using the exposition in equation (6.15) p.173, 
based on the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 The restricted OLS estimates were computed using the exposition in equation (6.13) p.172, 
based on the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
         Standard errors are in brackets.  
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 The R2 and Adjusted R2 figures indicate an acceptable model fitting with the values 
having an approximate range from 0.63 to 0.70, implying that the two-factor input Cobb-
Douglas production functions fits the data set being used in this analysis relatively well. 
However, before any conclusion could be made from these estimates, it is important to 
make sure that the structural shift suggested by the results is, in fact, statistically 
significance. Therefore, a hypothesis test following the null and alternative hypothesis 
indicated by equation (6.14) is conducted using the restricted, pooled-observation model 
specified in equation (6.13). The results are shown in Table 6.2.    
 The results from this analysis show that for all δi in the restricted model, at 95 
percent significance level, their values are all significantly different from zero. Also, the null 
hypothesis 0,0,0: 321 === δδδoH  is rejected as the calculated F value is equal to 
3.64718, greater than the critical F, which is equals to 2.60, at 95 percent significance level. 
Moreover, since all δi are statistically different from zero, they imply 
that ,  and . Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
structural shift between the pre and post crisis did indeed existed, and this shift was a 
combined result of the shifts in the intercept ( ), the capital coefficient 
( ), as well as, the labour coefficient estimates ( ). Hence, for 
further analysis, this suggests that it is appropriated to divide the period of study from 1990 
to 2002 into 2 time frames: the pre- and post-crisis, and thus, examines each period 
separately.  
postpre
00 ββ ≠ postpre 11 ββ ≠ postpre 22 ββ ≠
postpre
00 ββ ≠
postpre
11 ββ ≠ postpre 22 ββ ≠
 Although the finding of this analysis is valuable in that it does confirm the finding 
from Section 6.4 that there was, indeed, an increase in the usage of capital per employee, 
as well as suggests that there is a structural shift between the two time periods, the use of 
the OLS estimated Cobb-Douglas production function does not allow for any possibility that 
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inefficiency might exist in the production process of any industry. This analysis, which 
employs the least squares technique, has error terms that are assumed to be symmetrically 
distributed with zero means. Therefore, it assumes that the only source of departure from 
the estimated production function is coming from the statistic noises. Such assumption, 
nonetheless, is a very strong one, in particular for the pre-crisis period in which the Thai 
manufacturing sector was rather renowned for being unproductive. Therefore, a more 
refined method of estimation should be conducted, based upon the findings obtained from 
the analysis in this chapter. The stochastic production frontier approach, which allows for 
inefficiency as well as statistical noise to be the source of departure from the estimated 
production function, is suggested as the appropriated estimation for such data. The details 
of this approach in productivity estimation are presented in the next chapter, chapter 7.  
  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the EDA approach to data analysis is used, in order to investigate the 
overall structure of the Thai manufacturing sector in both pre- and post-crisis period. The 
findings from the graphical approach provide the first glance into the underlying structure of 
the data set, and suggest that there is an increase in the technostructure component of the 
firms in this sector, This increase may have been a result of the increase in the usage of 
more productive capital, or the increase in the capital usage per employee, or both. 
Therefore, a further analysis employing a two-factor inputs production function is suggested. 
The findings from such analysis suggest that the Cobb-Douglas production function, with 
the assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution, is an adequate, but incomplete model 
for representing the structure of the sector. It is also suggested that the 1997 economic 
crisis, indeed, had significant effects on this sector, more specifically, by causing a structural 
shift in the manufacturing sector, from being labour intensive to capital intensive.  
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 Nevertheless, the simple OLS estimates Cobb-Douglas production function used in 
this analysis is subjected to a major drawback. The ordinary least squares techniques, due 
to its zero mean error component, does not permit any possibility of incorporating 
allowances for technical inefficiency into the model. Therefore, although it can verify that 
there is indeed an increase usage of capital compares to employee, it still cannot provide 
any answer to whether or not there is an increase in the usage of the more productive 
capital. However, according to the purpose of this chapter, this model had nevertheless 
served its intention sufficiently well. It had offered an overview picture of the effects that 
the crisis had on the Thai manufacturing sector, and therefore, provided an indicator of the 
further assumptions that would need to be made when more complex models are used in 
later analysis. Criticisms that the presumptions made could have affected the results of the 
analysis could largely be reduced. What is needed next is to include the inefficiency 
component into the model based on the findings in the chapter, so that in addition to the 
simple examination of structural change here, the changes in the technical efficiency could 
also be investigated. Chapter 7 utilizes the stochastic frontier estimation techniques in 
developing a stochastic production frontier, taking the two-factor input Cobb-Douglas model 
used here as its starting point.  
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Chapter 7 – The Stochastic Production Frontier 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter, following the more general literature reviews presented in Chapter 5, is aimed 
at examining literature concerning the technical development of the stochastic production 
frontier on estimating productivity. In the standard models of production function analysis, 
producers are assumed to be maximizing the quantity of their outputs given the available 
quantities of a set of inputs (OECD Manual (2001)). However, these production functions, 
estimated by the standard statistical techniques (i.e. regression of output on inputs), are 
generally estimated based on the mean output, rather than the maximal output. Therefore, 
such estimation will generate results that are fundamentally inconsistent with the definition 
of the production function above. Moreover, these analyses (which employ least squares 
technique) will have error terms that are assumed to be symmetrically distributed with zero 
means1. This assumption, effectively, indicates that the only source of departure from the 
estimated function is due to statistical noise2. Therefore, these models are subjected by a 
common, but rather untenable, assumption that producers are always operated on their 
production functions, and technical inefficiencies in production process do not exist3.  
The issue of technical inefficiency was first introduced in the pioneer work by 
Koopmans (1951), who, in his own word, provided a definition of technical efficiency by 
indicating that ‘a producer is technically efficient if, and only if, it is impossible to produce 
more of any output without producing less of some other output or using more of some 
input’. This, thus, implies that not all producers are technically efficient, and an increase in 
output is sometime possible without the need for increasing inputs4. Since this introduction 
                                                          
1 Green, (1993) 
2 Hulten, (2000) 
3 Green, (1993) 
4 Kumbhakar and Lovell, (2000) 
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of the technical efficiency concept by Koopmans, there has been an immense increase in 
the number of studies (Farrell (1957), Aigner and Chu (1968), Schmidt (1976), Aigner et al. 
(1976), Stevenson (1980), Pitt and Lee (1981), Battese and Coelli (1992)) concerning the 
development of the analysis in which the production functions are modelled with the 
assumption that not all producers are operating efficiently. For this reason, the production 
function estimates by the least squares estimation is no longer the appropriate choice of 
estimate, as its key assumption of non-inefficiency is violated. An alternative estimation of 
the production function and productive efficiency, based on the distance function was 
suggested by a number of key works in the literatures since then.  
This chapter is organized in the following way. Section 7.2 begins with the 
introduction of the pioneer work by Farrell (1957), in which the concept of technical and 
allocative efficiency was first introduced. Following this work, attempts have been made to 
develop a model in which the technical inefficiency component can be systematically 
included. Section 7.3 is concerned with the development of the deterministic production 
frontier. These models (Aigner and Chu (1968), Seitz (1971), Timmer (1971), Afriat (1972) 
and Richmond (1974)) can accommodate the technical inefficiency components, and all 
assumed that the deviations from the production frontier resulted from the inefficiency 
occurring in the production process. Section 7.4 examines the development from the 
deterministic frontier towards the ‘stochastic’ frontier (Meeusen and van de Broeck (1977), 
Aigner et al. (1977), Green (1980), Stevenson (1980), Jondrow et al. (1982)) in which the 
statistic error terms are introduced into the model, in order to allow for deviations that may 
have resulted from measurement errors and economic shocks. Section 7.5 studies the 
development from the cross sectional stochastic frontier to the panel data stochastic frontier. 
It also includes the development from the time-invariant panel data frontier (Pitt and Lee 
(1981), Sickles (1984)) to those with the time varying panel data (Cornwell, Schmidt and 
Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992)). Section 7.6 concludes the 
chapter.  
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7.2 Early Development of Production Frontier 
 
For the reasons mentioned above, the production function utilizing the frontier estimation is 
suggested as an alternative to the standard production function. The frontier production 
function is a production function that estimates the firms’ maximum level of output as a 
function of a given input quantities5. The initial works by Debreu (1951) and Shephard 
(1953) introduced the distance function as a way of modelling multiple-output technology. 
The radial distance of a producer from the frontier is measured in an output-expanding 
direction in the paper by Debreu, but is measured in an input-conserving direction by 
Shephard. These three studies, including Koopmans (1951), which associated the distance 
functions with technical efficiency measures, were tremendously important to the 
development of the efficiency measurement literature that followed.  
 The modern literature on efficiency measurement, as well as on the estimation of 
production frontier, both began with the same article, namely, Farrell (1957). Following the 
works by Koopmans (1951) and Debreu (1951), Farrell defined cost efficiency and then 
decomposed cost efficiency into its technical and allocative components. Farrell’s paper was 
the first work that attempted to measure productive efficiency empirically. However, in his 
paper, linear programming techniques, instead of econometric methods, were used. This 
has later influenced the development of the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), which has later become a well-established non-
parametric efficiency measurement technique, currently employed extensively in 
management science. 
Farrell’s analysis starts by assuming two inputs, x1 and x2, and one output Y, so that 
the production frontier is ( )21 , xxfY = . The further assumption of constant returns to 
scale is imposed, thus  ( )YxYxf 21 ,1 = , and the frontier is characterized by the efficient 
                                                          
5 OECD Manual (2001) 
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unit isoquant. This can be shown graphically by II’ in Figure 7.1.  
 
Suppose at an observed point A, a firm uses the combination of inputs (x1A, x2A) to 
produce output YA. Without reducing output, this firm can reduce the quantities of inputs 
used by moving to point B, holding the input ratio x1/x2 constant. This point B, as well as 
any point on the II’ (e.g. C and F) is technically efficient, and is represented by the ratio of 
OB/OA, which measures the proportion of (x1A, x2A) that is truly necessary to produce YA. 
The ratio 1-OB/OA represents the technical inefficiency of this firm, measuring the 
proportion by which inputs could be reduced. Suppose that PP’ represents the ratio of input 
prices; thus, the cost minimizing point of producing the output is point C, where the PP’ 
tangent with II’. Also, since point C and D are both on the PP’, they each represent an 
input mix with the same cost of production. Allocative efficiency is, therefore, achieved at 
point C, where the cost of production is minimized; and it is represented by the ratio of 
OD/OB. Thus, 1-OD/OB measures allocative efficiency, as it measures the possible 
reduction in cost from using the correct input proportions, which suggests that, although 
the firm may be technically efficient, it may still be able to improve its productivity. The total 
inefficiency could be decomposed as the sum of technical and allocative inefficiency, with 
O 
P 
P’
A
B
D
C
F
E
    I 
I’ 
x1/Y 
x2/Y 
Figure 7.1: Technical and allocative efficiency
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the ratio 1-OD/OA, which measures the possible reduction in cost from moving from the 
observed point A to the cost minimizing point C.  
 
 
7.3 Deterministic Production Frontier 
 
Of greater significance, was the influence Farrell’s work exerted on the later works by 
Aigner and Chu (1968), Seitz (1971), Timmer (1971), Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974). 
These works, although, are different in a number of respects (either by utilizing linear 
programming techniques, or by modifications to least squares techniques requiring all 
residuals to be non-positive). They all estimate a ‘deterministic’ production frontier, in which 
the error term is assumed not to be affected in any way, by either the measurement error 
or other statistical noise, leaving the only source of error as the technical inefficiency, which 
occurs in the production processes. Aigner and Chu (1968) considered the idea of this 
deterministic production frontier using a parametric frontier function  
( )β;ii xfY =      i = 1,2,3,…,N      (7.1) 
in the log-linear Cobb-Douglas form, which could be defined as   
 ni
j
ji xY lnln 0 ∑+= ββ       (7.2) 
where Yi is the maximum output obtainable from xi, xi is a vector of inputs, and β is a 
vector of unknown parameters of the intercept and the slope terms to be estimated. Since 
the production frontier represents the maximum output attainable from each input level, it 
reflects the current state of technology in producing that particular output. Firms operate 
either on the frontier (in which case they are technically efficient) or beneath the frontier (in 
which case they are technically inefficient).  
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Aigner and Chu (1968) suggested the estimation of β by the mathematical 
programming method based on a cross-section of N firms within a given industry 6 . 
Specifically, they suggested the minimization of a linear programming problem of the form 
( )β;
1 ii
N
i
xfY −Σ=     subject to  ( )β;ii xfY ≤        (7.3) 
Alternatively, the minimization is achieved by a quadratic programming problem of minimize 
 ( )[ ]2
1
;βii
N
i
xfY −Σ=    subject to ( )β;ii xfY ≤  (7.4) 
In order to characterize differences in output among firms with identical input vectors or to 
explain how a given firm’s output lies below the frontier, ( )β;ixf , a disturbance term has 
been implicitly, not explicitly, assumed. Although these procedures do indeed produce 
estimates of β, they are subjected to a notable problem. The deterministic production 
frontier is very sensitive to outliers as they do not produce standard errors for the estimates. 
Hence, all the measurement errors and unobservable shocks are precluded from the model. 
Therefore, with the absence of a more detailed specification of the errors, the effectiveness 
of these estimators becomes questionable. 
 The above problem has led to the development of the so-called ‘probabilistic’ 
frontiers by Timmer (1971) and Dugger (1974), who employed the same type of 
mathematic programming discussed above in obtaining estimators of β. However, in these 
models, some specified proportions of the observations are allowed to lie above the frontier, 
in order to solve the problem of outliers’ sensitivity. Nevertheless, these models are still 
subjected to several drawbacks. Firstly, the selection of this proportion is fundamentally 
random, lacking explicit economic or statistical justification. Secondly, the reconciliation of 
the observations above the frontier is achieved by appealing to measurement errors in the 
extreme observations, which is again very arbitrary. Finally, by employing the mathematic 
                                                          
6 Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, (1977), pp.24 
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programming techniques discussed previously, the problem of estimation without known 
statistical properties remains.  
 In an attempt to impose a statistical basis on the models proposed earlier, Schmidt 
(1976) explicitly added a one-side disturbance to the model suggested by Aigner and Chu 
(1968), as shown in equation (7.1), which yielded 
 ( ) { }iii xfY εβ exp;=     i = 1,2,3,…,N      (7.5) 
where εi ≤ 0. Given a distributional assumption for the disturbance term, this model can 
then be estimated, e.g. by maximum-likelihood techniques, specifically, if -εi is assumed to 
have an exponential distribution, this model can be estimated by the linear programming 
technique. On the other hand, if -εi is assumed to have a half-normal distribution, the model 
can be estimated by the quadratic programming. This, consequently, implies that if the 
error term associated with the technical inefficiency effects follows a one-sided distribution, 
then linear programming estimates proposed by Aigner and Chu (1968) are the maximum 
likelihood estimates of the deterministic frontier model. This finding of Schmidt (1976) has 
an immense significance for studies of frontier analysis, as it has later led to the wide use of 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques in the stochastic production frontier analysis. 
However, unfortunately, this observation was of little practical value for Schmidt’s own 
model, as the usual regularity conditions for the application of maximum likelihood are 
violated. Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) mentioned this issue stating that 
‘since ( )β;ii xfY ≤ , the range of the random variable Y depends on the parameters to be 
estimated. Therefore, the usual theorems cannot be invoked to determine the asymptotic 
distributions of parameter estimates. Under these circumstances it is not clear just how 
much we know about the frontier after having estimated it.’  
 Aigner, Amemiya and Poirier (1976) suggested a more realistic error component 
approach, as compared to the purely one-sided one suggested by Schmidt (1976). They 
assumed 
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( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤
=>−=
0
,,...,1,01
**
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ii
ii
i
if
Niif
εθε
εθεε   (7.6) 
where the error, *iε , are independent normally distributed random variables with N(0,σ2) 
for  0 < θ < 1, otherwise *iε has either the negative or positive truncated normal distribution, 
when   θ = 1, or θ = 0, respectively.  
 The justification for this error term is that firms differ in two respects: first, in their 
ability to utilize the best practice technology, which is the source of the one-sided error, and 
second, in the input quantity or measurement error in output, which leads to a symmetric 
error. The parameter θ is interpreted as the measure of relative variability in the two error 
sources. As θ is approaching 1, the positive error component has a large variance, and 
hence, a small influence on the likelihood function, and the negative error dominates. Thus, 
it gives rise to the full frontier as the limiting case, θ = 1. On the other hand, when θ = ½, 
the likelihood function has the form of a mixture of two half-normal, each with equal 
influence; thus it becomes the case of the ‘average’ function.  
 The most important contribution of this error structure proposed by Aigner, 
Amemiya and Poirier (1976) is that, through the parameter θ, it allows the placement of the 
fitted function to be estimated alongside with the other parameters of interest, β. Thus, this 
ameliorates the argument against the average function such as that of Aigner and Chu 
(1968), as well as the criticisms that accompany the strict use of the frontier or envelop 
function as the appropriate industry production function, c.f. Timmer (1971). Nevertheless, 
this interpretation of θ as a measure of the relative variability of error sources, although it is 
a more accommodating specification compared to the previous literatures, is still only 
implicit in this formulation.  
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7.4 Early Development of Stochastic Production Frontier  
 
The stochastic production frontier originated with two branches of literature published 
nearly simultaneously, i.e. Meeusen and van der Broeck in June 1977, and Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt in July 1977. Both studies were developed in the production frontier context, 
and had the composed error terms that include a traditional symmetric random noise 
component, as well as, a new one-sided inefficiency component. Thus, these models allow 
for technical inefficiency, and at the same time, acknowledge the fact that random shocks 
beyond the control of producers could affect the output. Hence, it overcomes the problems 
associated with the deterministic approaches described earlier. The model was developed 
directly from the model of Schmidt (1976) 
 ( ) { }iii xfY εβ exp;=     i = 1,2,3,…,N      (7.7) 
but under the error structure 
iii UV −=ε         (7.8) 
where Vi is the error component representing the symmetric disturbance, and is assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed as N(0, σv2)   
Ui is the non-negative error component that is intended to capture the effects of 
technical inefficiency, and is distributed independently of Vi, also, it is assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed (iid.).  
According to this model, producers operate on or beneath their stochastic production 
frontier, ( )β;ii xfY ≤ , following the specification of Ui ≥ 0. The only difference between 
models of Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) is 
that the error component is assumed to have an exponential distribution in the former, and 
either a half-normal or an exponential distribution in the later. However, either distributional 
assumption implies the same thing that the composed error, εi, is negatively skewed, and 
statistical efficiency requires that the model be estimated by maximum likelihood.  
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 Aigner et al. (1977) explained the logic behind this specification by which the 
production process was subjected to two economically distinguishable random disturbances 
with different characteristics. The non-negative disturbance, Ui, reflected the fact that each 
firm’s output must lie on or below its frontier, with any deviation from the frontier results 
from factors under firm’s control such as defect products, and inefficient management. At 
the same time, the frontier itself could also vary randomly across firms, or over time. This 
interpretation implies that the frontier is ‘stochastic’, with random disturbance Vi being 
either higher than, less than, or equals to zero resulting from external event (both 
favourable and unfavourable), such as errors in observation and measurement, luck, 
political disturbance, and climate change.  
 The output-oriented technical efficiency (TEi) of each producer can be measured by 
the ratio   
 ( ) { }ii
i
i Vxf
YTE
exp;β=       (7.9) 
Thus, the productive inefficiency can be distinguished from other stochastic sources of 
disturbance. Yi achieves its maximum feasible value of ( )β;ixf  if and only if TEi = 1. 
Otherwise TEi < 1 provides a measure of the shortfall of observed output from maximum 
feasible output in an environment characterizes by exp{Vi}, which is allowed to vary across 
producers.  
 Given the assumption of a half-normally distributed technical inefficient error 
component, the density function of V is 
 ( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧−= 2
2
2
exp
2
1
VV
VVf σσπ        (7.10) 
and the density function of U is   
( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧−= 2
2
2
exp
2
2
UU
UUf σσπ      (7.11) 
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Thus, the joint density function of U and V becomes 
( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−= 2
2
2
2
22
exp
2
2,
VUVU
VUVUf σσσπσ     (7.12) 
Since ε = V - U, the joint density function of U and ε is 
( ) ( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−−= 2
2
2
2
22
exp
2
2,
VUVU
UUUf σ
ε
σσπσε     (7.13) 
The marginal density function of ε is obtained by integrating U out of f(U, ε), which yields 
( ) ( )
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−Φ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
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⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Φ−=
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εφσ
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ε
σ
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2
exp1
2
2
,
2
0
dUUff
      (7.14) 
where ( ) 2122 VU σσσ += , VU σσλ = , and ( )⋅Φ  and ( )⋅φ  are the standard normal and 
cumulative distribution and density functions, respectively. This density f(ε) is asymmetric 
around zero, with its mean and variance given by 
( ) ( )
( ) 222
2
VU
U
V
UEE
σσπ
πε
πσε
+−=
−=−=
      (7.15) 
As 0→λ , then either +∞→2Vσ  or 02 →Uσ , thus, the symmetric error dominates in 
the determination of ε . The model reverts back to an average production function model 
with no technical inefficiency. Whereas, when +∞→λ , then either 02 →Vσ  or 
+∞→2Uσ , the one-sided error component dominates the symmetric error component in 
the determination of ε. The model thus, reverts back to the deterministic production frontier 
model, with no statistical noise.   
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 In the early period of the frontier production analysis, this area of the literature 
suffered from a major drawback which limited its usage. Individual observation’s technical 
inefficiency could not be estimated, as it was not possible to decompose individual residuals 
into their two components. It was not until Jondrow et al (1982) provided a solution to this 
problem that the appeal of the stochastic frontier production function became greatly 
enhanced. Jondrow et al (1982) estimated the technical inefficiency of each producer, Ui, 
using either the mean or the mode of the conditional distribution of Ui given εi, [ ]iii UVU − , 
which contained whatever information εi contained concerning Ui. They showed that if Ui 
was distributed as N+(0, σ2U), the conditional distribution of U given ε would become 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
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        (7.16) 
where 22* σεσµ U−=  and 2222* σσσσ VU= . And since ( )εUf  is distributed as    
N+(µ*, σ2*), thus, either the mean or the mode of this distribution can serve as a point 
estimator for Ui. This can be written by 
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and ( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ≤⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=
otherwise
if
UM i
U
i
ii
0
02
2
εσ
σεε     (7.18) 
where ( )iiUE ε  represents the mean, and ( )iiUM ε  represents the mode. Once the point 
estimates of Ui are obtained, estimates of the technical inefficiency of each producer can be 
obtained from  
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{ }ii UTE ˆexp −=        (7.19) 
where iUˆ  can be either ( )iiUE ε  or ( )iiUM ε   
Battese and Coelli (1988) have proposed the alternative point estimator of 
individual producer’s technical inefficiency as 
{ }( ) ( )( ) ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ +−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −Φ− −Φ−=−= 2**** *** 21exp11ˆexp σµσµ σµσε ii iiii UETE  (7.20) 
However, regardless of which estimator is used, the estimates of technical efficiency are 
inconsistent since the variation associated with the distribution of ( )iiU ε  is independent of 
i. This problem is, unfortunately, hard to solve, and these estimates are the best possible 
estimates that can be achieved with the cross-sectional data7.  
 The half-normal and exponential distribution assumptions of the one-sided 
inefficiency error component models discussed up until now assume single-parameter 
distributions. In order to allow for more flexibility, the assumption concerning the 
distribution of the one-sided inefficiency error components has been relaxed in many works. 
Two-parameter distributions such as the Gamma distribution have been proposed by 
Greene (1980), as well as the Gamma and truncated normal distributions proposed by 
Stevenson (1980). The literature has extended even to include the calculation of the four-
parameter Pearson family of distributions by Lee (1983).  
 In Stevenson (1980), the half normal distribution of the inefficiency error 
component has been generalized by allowing U to follow a truncated normal distribution, 
with Ui followed N+(µ, σU2). In contrast to the normal and the half-normal distribution, the 
truncated normal distribution is a two-parameter distribution, with one parameter 
characterizing the placement and the other characterizing the spread of its mode, µ, and σU. 
It generalizes the half-normal distribution by allowing the normal distribution, which is 
truncated below zero, to have a non-zero mode. Thus, the truncated normal distribution 
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contains an additional parameter µ to be estimated, and so provides a more flexible 
representation of the pattern of efficiency in the data. The truncated normal density 
function for non-negative U is given by 
 ( ) ( )
( )
⎭⎬
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⎩⎨
⎧ −−Φ= 2
2
2
exp
2
1
UUU
UUf σ
µ
σµσπ      (7.21) 
where µ is the mode of the normal distribution, which is truncated from below at zero. If µ 
= 0, the density function would collapse back to the half normal density function given 
earlier. The joint density function of U and V is 
 ( ) ( )
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and the joint density of U and ε is  
 ( ) ( )
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The conditional distribution of ( )εUf  is  
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where ( )εUf  is distributed as ( )2*,~ σµ iN + , with ( ) 222~ σµσεσµ ViUi +−= and 
2222
* σσσσ VU= . Thus, as in the case of the half-normal distribution, either the mean or 
the mode of ( )εUf  can be used to estimate the technical efficiency of each producer, with 
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7 Kumbhakar and Lovell, (2000) 
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and ( )
⎩⎨
⎧ ≥=
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UM iiii 0
0~~ µµε     (7.26) 
Point estimates of the technical efficiency of each producer can be obtained by substituting 
either ( )iiUE ε  or ( )iiUM ε  into { }( )iii UETE εˆexp −= , giving 
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 Unfortunately, the estimates of technical efficiency under the truncated normal 
distribution are, as in the case of half-normal distribution, still inconsistent8. 
 
 
7.5 Stochastic Production Frontier with Panel Data 
 
Cross-sectional data used in the early development of the stochastic frontier production 
estimation provides merely a snapshot of producers and their efficiency. Panel data, on the 
other hand, provides more reliable evidences about the behaviour of firms as it observes the 
performance of each producer through a sequence of time periods. Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984) identify three difficulties with cross-sectional stochastic production frontier models 
including, firstly, the maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic production frontier 
model, as well as the subsequent separation of its technical inefficiency, requiring strong 
distributional assumptions on each error component. However, having access to panel data 
and its repeated observations on sampled producers would permit the use of conventional 
panel data estimation techniques in the estimation of the technical efficiency, for which 
some of these techniques do not require strong distributional assumptions. Thus, it enables 
the relaxation of some of the strong distributional assumptions normally associated with 
                                                          
8 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
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cross-sectional data, and as a result, produces estimates of technical efficiency with more 
desirable statistical properties. 
 Secondly, maximum likelihood estimation also requires an assumption that the 
technical inefficiency error component is independent of the regressors, whist in reality, it is 
not uncommon that technical inefficiency is correlated with the input vectors selected by the 
producers. Again, this problem can be avoided by the use of panel data, as not all panel 
data estimation techniques require the assumption of independence of the technical 
efficiency error component from the regressors. 
 Finally, as mentioned earlier, although the technical efficiency of producers could be 
estimated using either the Jondrow et al (1982) or the Battese and Coelli (1988) technique, 
the estimates are inconsistent, given that the variance of the conditional mean or the 
conditional mode of ( )iiU ε  for each individual producer does not go to zero as the size of 
the cross section increases. This is due to the fact that the variation associated with the 
distribution of ( )iiU ε  is independent of i. This problem could be solved by the use of a 
sufficiently long panel data, since it involves adding more observations on each producer, 
and as T → +∞, the estimation of the technical efficiency became consistent, a condition 
that could not typically be achieved with cross sectional data.  
 The early literatures of panel data stochastic production frontier (Pitt and Lee 
(1981), Schmidt and Sickles (1984)) were based on the assumption of time-invariant 
efficiency, in which, although technical efficiency was allowed to vary across producers, it 
was assumed to be constant through time for each producer. Technology used in the 
production process was assumed in these models to be fixed, with no allowance for any 
improvement in technical efficiency that might occur in the production process. Thus, this 
assumption of time invariance of technical efficiency might be considered tenuous in long 
panels, particularly, in the highly competitive environments. Later developments led to the 
relaxation of this assumption, and hence, enabled the technical efficiency to vary across 
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producers as well as through time for each producer. A time indicator could be included 
among the regressors in these models (Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar 
(1990), and Battese and Coelli (1992)), enabling one to disentangle the effect of technical 
change from that of technical efficiency change.        
 
7.5.1 Time-Invariant Models 
 
Pitt and Lee (1981) were the first to extend the cross-sectional maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques to panel data. In their paper, frontier production function models 
were proposed and estimated with panel data on Indonesia weaving establishments. The 
production function is assumed takes the form of  
( ) { }ititit xfY εβ exp;=  
where   iitit UV −=ε    i = 1, 2, 3,…., N,    t = 1, 2, 3,…., T, (7.28) 
t represents the tth time period. The technical inefficiency term, Ui, is assumed to be time-
invariant, so that technical inefficiency remains with firm throughout the period of study. 
The distribution of Vit is assumed to be independently and identically distributed at N(0, σv2), 
while for Ui is independently and identically distributed at N+(0, σU2). These distributional 
assumptions parallel those employed in the normal-half normal model proposed by Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977), except that in Pitt and Lee model I (1981) the noise component, 
Vit , varies through time as well as across producers. The density function of U is 
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and the density function of V, which becomes time dependent, is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ′−= 22 2exp2
1
V
T
V
T
VVVf σσπ       (7.30) 
Given the independence assumption, the joint density function of U and V is  
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and the joint density function of  and U and ε is 
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Thus, the marginal density function of ε is 
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The estimates of producer-specific time-invariant technical efficiency can be obtained from  
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which is the density function of a variable distributed as N+(µ*, σ*2). And the point estimator 
of technical efficiency can be estimated by either the mean or the mode of this distribution. 
Thus,  
 ( ) ( )( )⎥⎦
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⎡
−Φ−
−+=
**
**
** 1 σµ
σµφσµε
i
i
iiiUE     (7.36) 
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and ( )
⎩⎨
⎧ ≤=
otherwise
if
UM iiii 0
0* εµε     (7.37) 
An alternative point estimator using the minimum squared error predictor suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1988) can be written as 
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The estimators of the technical inefficiency term, Ui, are then, unlike in the case of cross 
section data, consistent as T → +∞.       
 The above maximum likelihood technique used by Pitt and Lee (1981) in obtaining 
the estimates of producer-specific time-invariant technical efficiency is based on the normal-
half normal distribution assumption suggested by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). This 
assumption has later been generalized to the normal-truncated normal distribution for use 
with panel data context by Kumbhakar (1987) and Battese and Coelli (1989). The 
distribution of Vit is assumed to be independently and identically distributed at N(0, σv2), 
while Ui is independently and identically distributed at N+( µ, σU2). The truncated normal 
density function for U ≥ 0 is given by        
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and for time-independent V is  
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the joint density function of U and V is 
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The conditional distribution ( )εU  is given by 
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which is distributed as ),~( 2*σµ+N . And again, either the mean or the mode of this 
distribution could serve as the basis for a point estimate of producer-specific time-invariant 
technical efficiency, which are given by 
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and  ( )
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UM iiii 0
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An alternative estimator is provided by the minimum squared error predictor as 
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The estimators obtained from these methods are also consistent as T → +∞.       
 The assumption made for these time-invariant models that technical efficiency is 
constant through time is a very strong one. This leads to a major drawback of this type of 
models as they do not make any allowance for technical change since the structure of 
production technology is assumed to be constant through time. Particularly, if the operating 
environment is competitive, it is hard to accept the notion that a firm will permit technical 
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inefficiency to remain within their production through very many time periods9 . Thus,  
although the estimators obtained become consistent as T approaching infinity, however, in 
reality, the longer the panel is, the less tenable this assumption becomes.  
 
7.5.2 Time Varying Models 
 
Eventually, the assumption of constant technical efficiency through time was relaxed in a 
series of papers by Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), and Battese 
and Coelli (1992). Cornwell et al. (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990) are the first to propose a 
stochastic production frontier with time varying panel data technical efficiency. The model  
 ( ) { }ititit xfY εβ exp;=       (7.47) 
is specified to take the form of Cobb-Douglas production function, thus, it becomes  
 ∑ −++=
n
ititnitnotit UVXY lnln ββ      (7.48) 
where otβ  is the production frontier intercept common to all producers in period t.   
Cornwell et al. (1990) employed the fixed-effects and the random-effects approach 
in estimating the frontier production function. Equation (7.48) becomes 
 ∑ ++=
n
itnitnitit VXY lnln ββ      (7.49) 
where itotit U−= ββ  is the intercept for producer i in period t. However, with an I x T 
panel, it becomes very difficult to obtain all the estimates of I · T  intercepts βit, the N slope 
parameters βn,  
and σV2. Thus, they address this problem by specifying  
 232 tt iiitit Ω+Ω+Ω=β       (7.50) 
                                                          
9 Kumbhakar and Lovell, (2000) 
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which reduces the number of intercept parameters to I · 3. Nevertheless, it still leaves quite 
a number of parameters to be estimated, in particular if the ratio of I/T is large.  
 Alternatively, Kumbhakar (1990) employs the maximum likelihood method in 
estimating the production frontier by assuming equation (7.48) with ( )tβ as the parametric 
function of time, 
 ( ) { }[ ] 12exp1 −++= ttt ωηβ       (7.51) 
This model contains two additional parameters to be estimated, η and ω. The function of 
( )tβ  satisfies the properties which, firstly, 0 ≤ ( )tβ  ≤ 1, and secondly, ( )tβ  can be both 
monotonically increasing or decreasing, and both concave and convex, depending on the 
signs and magnitudes of the two parameters η and ω. The distributional assumptions on Vit 
assumed it to be distributed independently and identically with N(0, σv2), and Ui is assumed 
to be distributed independently and identically with N+(0, σU2). The error terms are specified 
as  
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The marginal density function of εi = (εi1,…, εiT)’,  becomes 
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The estimator for Ui can be obtained from the mean and mode of iiU ε , which are given 
by 
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which iiU ε is distributed as ),( 2** σµ iN+ . 
Alternatively, the minimum squared error predictor of technical efficiency is 
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 An alternative time-varying stochastic production frontier model is proposed by 
Battese and Coelli (1992), using data on Indian paddy farmers, relaxing the half normal 
distribution assumption of the technical inefficiency error term, by assuming it to be 
truncated normal. It incorporates unbalanced panel data associated with observations on a 
sample of N firms over T time periods. Similar to the model proposed by Kumbhakar (1990), 
the model is defined by equation (7.48), but with the technical inefficiency term Uit of 
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whereη  is an unknown scalar parameter to be estimated, which determines whether 
inefficiencies are time varying or time invariant, and )(iτ represents the set of Ti time 
periods among the T periods involved for which observations for the ith firm are obtained. 
The function itη  satisfies the properties that firstly, itη  ≥ 0, and secondly, itη  decreases at 
an increasing rate if η  > 0, increases at an increasing rate if η  < 0, or remains constant if 
η  = 0. The distributional assumption is made that itV  is assumed to be an independently 
and identically distributed random error N(0, σv2), while itU  is assumed to be distributed as 
an independently and identically distributed as non-negative truncation of the N+(µ, σU2) 
distribution. 
 Based on these distributional assumptions, Battese and Coelli showed that iiU ε is 
independently and identically distributed with ),( 2*** σµ iN+ . Thus, the minimum mean 
squared error predictor of technical efficiency )exp( itit UTE −= is  
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and iη  represents the (Ti x 1) vector of itη  associated with the time periods observes for 
the ith firm. Notice that in this model, if technical efficiency is time invariant, η  = 0 and 
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thus itη  = 1 and  iiηη′  =  T,  and the expressions for  i**µ   and  2*σ  collapse  to  their 
time-invariant  version proposed by Battese and Coelli (1988), as discussed earlier.       
 This model by Battese and Coelli (1992) is by far the most commonly used model in 
the literature concerning the stochastic production frontier estimation, as it provides the 
consistent estimates of the technical inefficiency term with only one additional parameter, 
η , to be estimated. Nevertheless, this model has the one drawback that the technical 
efficiency is forced to be a monotonic function of time, as the exponential nature of the 
behaviour of the firm effects over time (shown in equation (7.59)) is a rigid 
parameterization10. Hence, in the period when there occurs both upward and downward 
movement of technical efficiency, this model will not be able to capture that movement, and 
thus, could not represent the true adjustment of the efficiency.  
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on presenting, and commenting on, the technical development of the 
stochastic production frontier. It started with the pioneer work of Farrell (1957) in which the 
concept of allocative and technical efficiency was first introduced. It then progressed further 
into the development of the deterministic production frontier (Aigner and Chu (1968), Seitz 
(1971), Timmer (1971), Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974)), which is subjected to a 
notable problem as it does not allow for a disturbance term. Therefore, it becomes very 
sensitive to outliers such as measurement errors and unobservable shocks. This problem 
was solved later on by the development of the stochastic production frontier (Meeusen and 
van de Broeck (1977), Aigner et al. (1977)) in the 1970s by which the traditional symmetric 
random noise component was included into the model.  
                                                          
10 Uğur, (2003) 
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 However, these early stochastic production frontier models are still subject to one 
very serious problem, resulting from the use of cross sectional data. The estimates of 
technical efficiency from these models are inconsistent. This problem can be solved by the 
use of a sufficiently long panel data, since it involves adding more observations on each 
producer. Therefore, the later generation of stochastic production frontier was developed in 
order to accommodate the use of panel data. Pitt and Lee (1981) were the first to extend 
the cross-sectional maximum likelihood estimation techniques to panel data. However, their 
model was still subjected to one important criticism. In their model, they assumed that 
technical inefficiency was constant through time, i.e. no technical improvement existed 
through out the entire period of study. Nonetheless, when the panel is involving a very long 
period of time and the operating environment is competitive, such an assumption becomes 
less tenable. The notion that any firm will permit technical inefficiency to remain with their 
production process for a long period of time becomes more difficult to accept.  
 Therefore, this led to the development of the time varying stochastic production 
frontier (Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli 
(1992)), in which the structure of the production technology was allowed to change through 
time. Firms were assumed to upgrade their technologies if technical inefficiencies existed in 
their production processes. However, although such development has eliminated the 
problem of the unattainable assumption of a constant production technology, it is still 
subject to a drawback, as technical efficiency is forced to be a monotonic function of time in 
this type of models11. Hence, such models would only be suitable in estimating efficiency for 
periods in which there are no major shifts of technical efficiency. Such a limitation is rather 
inconsistent with the need for a lengthy panel in order to guarantee a consistent estimate of 
efficiency. Therefore, further development is necessary to include a non-rigid 
parameterization of the technology progress over time, so that it will be possible to capture 
                                                          
11 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), and Uğur (2003) 
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the real movements of technical efficiency, without imposing too many untenable 
assumptions.    
Thai Productivity and the Crisis 
Chapter 8 – Thai Productivity and the Crisis 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the association between the effects of the 1997 economic crisis and the 
productivity level of Thai manufacturing sector is examined. The parametric distance 
function approach (Stevenson (1980), Pitt and Lee (1981), Battese, Coelli, and Colby (1989), 
Cornwell et al (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992)) in measuring 
productivity (namely, the stochastic production frontier approach) is being employed. The 
treatment is extensive, but its focus is very specific. The concern of this chapter is to 
provide answers to the key research questions posed by the thesis (see details in Chapter 1). 
In sum, the main interests of this thesis are twofold. Firstly, the thesis provides an answer 
to what happened to the Thai manufacturing sector in the post-crisis period compared to 
pre-crisis? And secondly, it asks what were the factors leading to the differences in the 
productivity level of the two periods?    
 In order to resolve these concerns, the chapter is organized in the following practice. 
Section 8.2 provides a review of the computer software that can be used for estimating a 
stochastic production frontier. The two most widely used types of software, i.e. LIMDEP and 
FRONTIER 4.1, are introduced, evaluated and compared. Section 8.3 presents the particular 
stochastic frontier models (Pitt and Lee (1981), Battese, Coelli, and Colby (1989), and 
Battese and Coelli (1992)) that will be employed in the analysis. Section 8.4 involves further 
preliminary analysis (to Chapter 6 above). This section follows the method of explanatory 
data analysis (EDA), in which a simple analysis, with few assumptions, is carried out in 
order to allow the data to reveal its own structure, and therefore, preventing mistakes and 
biases that could arise from making unsuitable assumptions 1 . In Section 8.5, the main 
analysis will be conducted. A suitable model for representing the pre- and post-crisis will be 
                                                 
1 Engineering Statistics Handbook, The US Department of Commerce 
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selected here. Also, the results from the analysis will be given. And most importantly, the 
answer to the first research concern of ‘what happened to the Thai manufacturing sector’ 
will also be answered here. Finally, these results will be discussed and explained in Section 
8.6. The answer to the last research concern will also be given. And finally, a concise 
conclusion for the chapter is provided.  
 
 
8.2 Review of the Stochastic Frontier Software 
 
A stochastic frontier (Meeusen and van de Broeck (1977), Aigner et al (1977), Green (1980), 
Stevenson (1980), Pitt and Lee (1981), Jondrow et al (1982), Battese, Coelli, and Colby 
(1989), Cornwell et al (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992)) can be 
estimated using a different range of multi-purpose econometric software of which most can 
be adapted for the desired estimation. These include well-known statistical packages such 
as LIMDEP, Shazam, GUASS, SAS, STATA, etc. However, the most commonly used packages 
for estimating stochastic production frontiers and inefficiency are FRONTIER 4.1 and 
LIMDEP. LIMDEP 7.0 is a general-purpose econometric package developed by William H. 
Green, and is released in the Window version in 1998 (LIMDEP 7.0 Manual, (1995)). It is 
designed primarily for the non-standard econometric estimation of cross-section and panel 
data models. By contrast, FRONTIER 4.1 is a single purpose program, created by Tim Coelli, 
especially designed for the estimation of stochastic production frontiers. It utilizes the 
method of maximum likelihood to compute a wide variety of stochastic frontier models, for 
both cross-sections and panel data, in both balanced and unbalanced forms. FRONTIER 4.1 
is employed in this thesis for carrying out the stochastic frontier estimations of the Thai 
productivity. 
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 FRONTIER 4.1 follows a three-step procedure in estimating the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the parameters of a stochastic frontier production function2. In the first step, 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the function are obtained. This provides 
unbiased estimators for all coefficients, except for the intercept term. These OLS estimates, 
excepting that of the intercept term, are then used as starting values in a two-phrase grid 
search across the parameter space of γ. The values of γ are considered from 0.1 to 0.9 in 
increments of size 0.1. The coefficient of the intercept term and the variance estimate are 
adjusted according to the corrected ordinary least squares presented in Coelli (1995), while 
other parameters μ and η are set to zero. Finally, the values selected in the grid search are 
used as the starting values in an iterative procedure, utilizing the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell 
Quasi-Newton method, to obtain the final maximum likelihood estimates.  
 FRONTIER 4.1 solves two general models: the error components model and the 
technical efficiency effects model. The error components model is formulated following the 
Battese and Coelli (1992) model  
 ( ) )exp(; itititit UVXfY −= β  
where  ))(exp( TtUU iit −−= η       (8.1) 
The imposition of one or more restrictions upon this model can provide a number of special 
cases, reflecting the main models proposed in the literature. These include the five models 
that will be tested in this thesis (details on these models are presented in the next section). 
Setting η to zero provides the time-invariant model set out in Battese, Coelli and Colby 
(1989). Furthermore, restricting the formulation of the previous model to a balanced panel 
data will result in the model suggested by Battese and Coelli (1998). The additional 
restriction of μ equals to zero will reduce the model to that in Pitt and Lee (1981) – their 
Model 1.  
                                                 
2 Coelli, (1996) 
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 The technical efficiency effects model (TE), suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995), 
estimates stochastic frontiers, as well as predicted efficiencies of firm-specific variables. The 
latter may influence the firms’ efficiency, by influences such as managerial experience, 
ownership characteristics, and time trends. This procedure attempts to identify the factors 
that affect differences in efficiencies between firms in an industry. FRONTIER 4.1 calculates 
this model by a single-stage estimation procedure, employing the formulation 
 ( ) )exp(; itititit UVXfY −= β  
where ititit wzU +′= δ        (8.2) 
and zit is a vector of explanatory variables that influence the structure of the production 
process by which inputs x are converted to output Y . Similar to the error components 
model, this model specification can also encompass a number of other model specifications 
as special cases. If we set T=1 and zit contains the value one and no other variables, then 
the model reduces to the truncated normal specification in Stevenson (1980), where δ0, the 
only element in δ, will have the same interpretation as the μ parameter in Stevenson (1980).  
  
Table 8.1: Distributional assumptions allowed by the two programs 
Distribution LIMDEP 7.0 FRONTIER 4.1 
Cross-sectional production (cost) function   
Half-normal distribution Yes Yes 
Truncated normal distribution Yes Yes 
Exponential distribution Yes No 
Panel Data production (cost) function   
Time-invariant firm-specific inefficiency   
Half-normal Yes Yes 
Truncated normal Yes Yes 
Time-variant firm-specific inefficiency   
Half-normal No Yes 
Truncated normal No Yes 
Effect-specific panel data production (cost) function No Yes 
Source: Sena V., (1999)  
  
 - 208 -
Thai Productivity and the Crisis 
 When compared to LIMDEP 7.0, FRONTIER 4.1 is superior in many aspects3. The 
most distinctive advantage of FRONTIER 4.1 is that it is able to accommodate a wider range 
of assumptions about the error distribution term, as shown in Table 8.1. When the panel 
data are estimated, the inefficiency component can be specified as time-variant, or as a 
function of a vector of firm-specific variables, while the option of the inefficiency term is 
only limited to the simple time-invariant model in LIMDEP. 
 The second advantage of FRONTIER 4.1 is also very significant. FRONTIER 4.1 is 
the only program that can estimate an inefficiency model (Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin 
(1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Huang and Liu (1994), Battese and Coelli 
(1995) in a one-step process. The inefficiency models may be estimated by two approaches: 
a one-step process and a two-step process. With the two-step procedure, the production 
frontier is first estimated and the technical efficiency of each firm is derived. These are 
subsequently regressed against a set of variables, zit, which are hypothesized to influence 
the firms’ efficiency. A problem with this method is the inconsistency arising from the 
assumptions about the distribution of the variates denoting inefficiencies (which will be 
discussed in more details in the next chapter). In the first stage, the variates representing 
inefficiencies (or, briefly, ‘inefficiency’) are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed (iid) in the estimation procedure. However, in the second stage, the estimated 
inefficiencies are assumed to be a function of a number of firm specific factors, and hence, 
are not identically distributed unless all the coefficients of the factors are simultaneously 
equal to zero. FRONTIER solves this problem by incorporating the firm specific factors 
directly into the maximum likelihood estimate, and estimating all the parameters in one step.  
 Third, with FRONTIER 4.1, it is possible to test whether any form of stochastic 
frontier function at all is required, by testing for the significance of the γ parameter. The 
output file in FRONTIER 4.1 contains the likelihood ratio statistics of the one-sided error 
between the frontier model estimated, and the restricted OLS model. If we cannot reject 
                                                 
3 Herrero and Pascoe, (2002) 
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the null hypothesis that γ is equals to zero, this would imply accepting the hypothesis that 
σU2 is not significantly different from zero, and hence that the  term should be removed 
from the model, leaving a specification with parameters that can be consistently estimated 
using ordinary least squares. In contrast, LIMDEP 7.0 does not provide any suitable 
statistics for such hypothesis testing.   
itU
 Nevertheless, FRONTIER 4.1 does not come without drawbacks. One minor problem 
with this program is that the variables in the function are labelled by Greek letters, not by 
their original names, making variable identification a little troublesome in the cases where 
the list of regressors is very extensive4. Secondly, apart from the test of significance of the γ 
parameter, FRONTIER 4.1 does not provide any other diagnostic tests on the chosen 
functional form, nor on the properties of the stochastic noise. Therefore, in order to perform 
these tests, users have to implement them by running the program for each specification, 
and then calculating the likelihood ratio tests by hand, using the log likelihood values 
provided by the software.  
 Another point worth mentioning here is the choice of gradient method used by 
FRONTIER 4.1. It is generally accepted that nonlinear optimization is an intricate practical 
problem. It often cannot be solved explicitly, and an iterative algorithm is needed. The most 
commonly used algorithms are gradient methods. Those can take many forms, such as 
Newton’s method, quadratic hill-climbing method, and the Newton-Raphson method. 
However, most of these methods require the calculation of the matrix of second partial 
derivatives, which can be troublesome (e.g. computationally burdensome, slow convergence, 
or even divergence). Hence, the developer of FRONTIER 4.1 decided that this task was 
probably best avoided, and turned their attention to Quasi-Newton methods5. This is a very 
effective class of algorithms that has been developed in order to eliminate the problem of 
deriving second derivatives altogether, and still retains excellent convergence properties. 
                                                 
4 Herrero and Pascoe, (2002) 
5 Coelli, (1996) 
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The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell Quasi-Newton method was selected by the author of 
FRONTIER 4.1 because it was a respected tool in econometric applications, and had also 
been recommended by Pitt and Lee (1981) for the estimation of stochastic frontier 
production function model.6 Thus, the chosen DFP algorithm is extremely effective it being 
amongst the most widely used gradient methods.  
 
 
8.3 Model Specifications 
 
Using data from the Manufacturing Production Survey, published by the National Statistical 
Office of Thailand (available in year 1990, 1991, 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002), 
the frontier Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated and compared between two 
time periods, the pre-crisis period consists of year 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1996, and the 
post-crisis period consists of 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002. The model is defined as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ititititit UVLKY −+++= lnlnln 210 βββ    (8.3)  
This frontier function is then estimated for five basic models, using the computer software 
FRONTIER 4.1, developed by Coelli in 1996. 
Model 8.1: the traditional OLS estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function, in which 
an assumption is being made that no technical efficiency exists, and thus the 
term is assumed to be zero. Thus, the model reduces to  itU
( ) ( ) itititit VLKY +++= lnlnln 210 βββ    (8.4) 
Model 8.2: following Battese and Coelli (1992), a technical inefficiency term is defined by  itU
( )( )TtUU iit −−= ηexp       (8.5) 
where  the  technical inefficiency term  is  assumed  to be time-variant,  with the 
                                                 
6 Coelli, (1996), pp.12 
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non-negative truncation distribution, N+(μ, σU2). This model can accommodate 
unbalanced panel data. Hence, the missing years are treated as the missing data. 
They arise in the pre-crisis period for i = 1, 2, 4, and 7; and in the post-crisis 
period for i = 1, 2, 3, and 5.  
Model 8.3: the time-variant production frontier with a half normal distribution of the 
stochastic technical inefficiency component. This is a special case of the Battese 
and Coelli model (1992). Thus, 
   ( )( )TtUU iit −−= ηexp         
      where  is iid, and has the distribution NitU +(0, σU2) 
Model 8.4: the time-invariant model presented by Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989), in which 
the technical inefficiency component term is assumed to have a non-negative 
truncated distribution. Hence, 
iit UU =   
  where  is iid, and has the distribution NiU +(μ, σU2) 
Model 8.5: the model involves a time-invariant and half normal distributed inefficiency 
component, as suggested by Pitt and Lee (1981).  This is commonly known as 
Pitt and Lee’s Model 1. 
             iit UU =
      where  is iid, and has the distribution NiU
+(0, σU2)  
 
 Before proceeding any further, it is important to make a clarification here. Because 
of the limitations of the data, and the short time-series involved, the main focal point in 
estimating and comparing pre- and post-crisis productivity is not on technical change, but 
rather on technical efficiency, i.e. the distance from the production frontier. Figure 8.1a and 
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8.1b illustrate the distinction between the two concepts, using the conventional isoquants 
(like II’) and factor price lines (like PP’)  
O 
P 
P’
C 
F
   I 
I’
K/Y 
L/Y 
Figure 8.1a: Technical Progress
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I2’
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Figure 8.1b: Efficiency Improvement
S 
S’
 
 Figure 8.1a illustrates two states of equilibrium (C and G), where point C represents 
the equilibrium with lower technical advancement (and G with higher), and point F 
represents a disequilibrium (being then off the expansion path). Over time, with technical 
 - 213 -
Thai Productivity and the Crisis 
progress, the industry may move from point C to point G, representing an equilibrium with 
better technical advancement. This will result in the upward shift of the production frontier. 
  Figure 8.1b illustrates the movement from initial equilibrium point C to new 
equilibrium point F. In period 1, point C represent the equilibrium point where the relative 
factor price line  PP’ is tangent with II’. Overtime, the capital-labour composition changes, 
and results in the shift from PP’ to SS’. Hence point C becomes a disequilibrium from the 
standpoint of prices given by SS’ and factor proportions shift to new values, as implied by 
the new equilibrium position in period 2 at point F. This will result in movements of  
observations below the frontier towards the frontier, representing improvement in the 
efficiency of production.  
 This thesis focuses on the latter case, in which the distance from the frontier is the 
main concern. The limitation in the data availability and the length of the time-series only 
permit the comparison between the pre- and post-crisis efficiency level, i.e. the distance 
from the frontiers, given the frontier representing the best technology available at the time.  
 
 
8.4 Further Exploratory Data Analysis 
 
Before attempting to fit a complicated model on a set of data, it is common for an analyst to 
first conduct an explanatory data analysis (EDA) in order to identify the overall pattern of 
the data set. In this thesis, an explanatory data analysis has already been conducted (in 
Chapter 6), using the simple ordinary least square estimates of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function in order to obtain a statistical summary of the structural change that 
happened post-crisis. However, the ordinary least square estimates could not provide any 
indication of the technical inefficiency component. Therefore, another set of explanatory 
data analysis should be conducted focusing on the technical inefficiency components. The 
results from these analyses should then provide a better overall understanding of the 
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inefficiency issue in the Thai manufacturing sector, and therefore, improve the basis of the 
further analysis in this thesis. 
 Simple frontier estimation of the pre- and post-crisis period has been carried out 
using the half-normal, time-invariant inefficiency model proposed by Pitt and Lee’s Model I 
(1981). This choice of model owes something to the explanatory data analysis (EDA) of 
Chapter 6. Therefore, a simple model with the following specification is chosen 
 ( ) ( ) ( )iitititit UVLKY −+++= lnlnln 210 βββ    (8.6) 
which  is independently and identically distributed at  NiU
+(0, σU2)  
  
 Table 8.2a: maximum likelihood estimates of the pre- and post-crisis period 
  MLE Estimates for Period 
Variable Parameter Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Constant β0 7.0777 4.9410 
  (1.1791) (0.9972) 
Ln Asset β1 0.2891 0.5084 
  (0.0821) (0.0666) 
Ln Employ β2 0.5266 0.3123 
  (0.1301) (0.0829) 
 σ2 1.4181 0.4792 
  (0.4835) (0.1365) 
 γ 0.5069 0.3447 
  (0.2097) (0.2204) 
 n  89 88 
 Log Likelihood -119.9576 -79.4732 
Note: Model used is Pitt and Lee’s Model I (1981), or referred to as Model 8.5 above 
(p.212) in this chapter. Numbers of observation for pre- and post crisis period are 
also included. 
            Standard errors are in  brackets.  
 
  
 The results of the coefficient estimates of capital and labour in both periods 
continue to confirm the findings by the OLS Cobb-Douglas production function carried out in 
Chapter 6. The capital coefficient, β1, is 0.2891 in the pre-crisis period, and 0.5084 in the 
post crisis period. On the other hand, the coefficient estimates of labour, β2, is 0.5266 in the 
pre-crisis, and 0.3123 in the post-crisis. These results (see Table 8.2a) suggest that there 
was a structural shift from labour intensive production in the pre-crisis period to capital 
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intensive production in the post-crisis period. However, the primary interest here is not on 
the coefficient estimates of inputs, but on the estimates of the efficiency level for each 
industry. The results are listed in Table 8.2b.  
 This table shows that the mean efficiency improves in the post-crisis period, when 
compared to the pre-crisis period. It rises from 0.5478 in the pre-crisis period to 0.7362 in 
the post crisis. A paired samples test confirms that these pre- and post-crisis mean 
efficiencies are statistically significantly different from each other. Twenty industries, out of 
the total 24, exhibit an improvement in their efficiency level; however, four industries 
exhibit a decline in efficiency. These four industries are: industry 9 – the publishing and 
printing industry; industry 10 – the coke, petroleum and nuclear industry; industry 14 – the 
basic metals; and industry 16 – the machinery and equipment industry. 
 
 Table 8.2b: Technical Efficiency Estimates 
Industry Pre-Crisis (n = 89) Post-Crisis (n = 88) 
Food  0.6686 0.8190 
Tobacco  0.8587 0.9351 
Textiles 0.5169 0.7030 
Wearing Apparel 0.4520 0.8095 
Leather Products  0.4620 0.6834 
Footwear 0.3063 0.7217 
Wood  0.3382 0.6020 
Paper  0.5172 0.6720 
Publishing 0.8296 0.7486 
Petroleum  0.8360 0.7967 
Chemical  0.5328 0.7296 
Rubber & Plastic  0.5489 0.7832 
Non-Metallic Mineral  0.6279 0.7141 
Basic Metals 0.5647 0.5230 
Fabricated Metal  0.4187 0.7378 
Machinery  0.7741 0.7623 
Computing  0.4682 0.9071 
Electrical  0.5671 0.7297 
Communication  0.7186 0.8244 
Medical 0.3385 0.6267 
Vehicles 0.7453 0.8387 
Transport Equipment 0.3077 0.6514 
Furniture 0.3636 0.6102 
Jewellery  0.3854 0.7394 
Mean               0.5478 (0.0307)               0.7362 (0.0093) 
   Note: Technical efficiencies were computed using the expression in equation (7.60) p. 201, based 
on the method derived by Pitt and Lee’s Model I.  
 Standard errors are in brackets. 
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 One characteristic that these four industries have in common is that they are all 
very domestically oriented. This is by the standard of the National Statistical Office, who 
define an industry to be domestically oriented if it exports less than 30 percent of its total 
production. These domestic oriented industries, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, were the 
segments of the manufacturing sector that have been most heavily hit by the crisis. This is 
due to the fact that they had to face a sharp decline in domestic demand resulting from the 
economic crisis; but, unlike the more export oriented segment, could not enjoy the benefits 
of higher export which came as a result of the cheaper Baht. Moreover, three out of these 
four industries, namely, the basic metals, the machinery and equipment, and the coke, 
petroleum and nuclear industry, are all heavy industries, which are known to be the 
industries that, generally, mostly affected during the timing of the economic.  
 This finding suggests that it is sensible to re-estimate the post-crisis data by 
dividing these industries into two segments, the domestic oriented and the non-domestic 
oriented industries. Also, time varying effect should be included, in order to examine the 
adjustment of these industries, in term of efficiency, in the post-crisis period.  Therefore, 
the time-varying inefficiency model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) is selected for 
this analysis. For this model, the time varying parameter η could take the value less than 0 
(implying that technical efficiency is deteriorating), equal to 0 (technical efficiency is 
constant), or higher than 0 (technical efficiency is improving). Therefore, this makes it very 
suitable for use in analyzing the pattern of efficiency adjustment in the post-crisis period. If 
the efficiency component of the post-crisis domestic and the non-domestic segments exhibit 
the same trend, either increasing or decreasing, there might not be a need for the sectoral 
analysis. If both segments exhibit increasing trends, then this would suggest that the 
domestic segment had been more heavily hit by the crisis. Hence a low efficiency level 
provided at the beginning of the post-crisis period, but over time, the efficiency level began 
to pick up. Therefore, the next important thing to examine is whether or not the difference 
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between the mean efficiency of these two segments is significant. If they are not significant, 
then there will be no need for sectoral analysis.  
  
 Table 8.3a: maximum likelihood estimates of the post-crisis period 
  MLE Estimates for Models 
Variable Parameter Domestic* Non-Domestic#
Constant β0 5.6689 6.5306 
  (1.4651) (1.0303) 
Ln Asset β1 0.5506 0.5584 
  (0.0619) (0.1133) 
Ln Employ β2 0.1856 0.1151 
  (0.1271) (0.1387) 
 σ2 0.0735 0.2921 
  (0.0614) (0.0750) 
 γ 0.3260 0.0516 
  (0.1930) (0.0820) 
 μ 0.3095 0.2457 
  (0.2232) (0.1199) 
 η 0.2633 0.2919 
  (0.0980) (0.0913) 
 n  15 73 
 Log Likelihood -5.2319 -63.1143 
Note:  * Domestic oriented industry is the industry that exports less than 30 percent of its 
total production 
# Non-domestic oriented industry is the industry that exports more than or equal to 
30 percent of its total production 
Model used is Battese and Coelli (1992), see equations (8.3) and (8.5) above (p.212). 
Numbers of observation for domestic (n1) and non-domestic (n2) firms are also 
included. 
          Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
 
 The results from the domestic and non-domestic analyses indicate that the post-
crisis efficiency level exhibit an increasing trend, and this holds true for both domestic 
oriented and non-domestic oriented industries. The value of the time-variant parameter η is 
slightly, but insignificantly, higher in the non-domestic oriented industry, when compared to 
the domestic oriented industry, with ηdomes = 0.2633 and ηnon-domes = 0.2919 (see Table 8.3a). 
This indicates that the non-domestic segment has a slightly, but insignificantly, higher rate 
of technical improvement. One possible explanation for the higher rate of technical 
improvement in the non-domestic segment could lie in the fact that industries that are 
competing in the world market would be forced to become more efficient in order to survive, 
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while those in the domestic market are faced with a less fierce competitive environment, 
and hence, can afford to be less efficient. However, in the case of the Thai manufacturing 
industry, such phenomenon doesn’t seem to have very strong effect.  
 Table 8.3b shows the mean technical efficiency estimates for both segments. The 
paired samples tests for each post-crisis year suggest that there is no significant difference 
between the mean technical efficiency estimates of the domestic and the non-domestic 
segment, for any year in the study. Hence, with neither a significant different between the 
mean efficiency estimates, nor the rate of technical improvement, it is possible to conclude 
from this exploratory data analysis that there is no real difference in the structure of these 
two segments in the Thai manufacturing sector, as well as no difference in their adjustment 
patterns post-crisis. Therefore, it is sensible to analyze all these industries in one aggregate 
model, rather than several sub-segment models.   
 
 Table 8.3b: Mean Technical Efficiency Estimates 
Year Domestic* (n1 = 15) Non-Domestic# (n2 = 73) 
1998 0.4106 
(0.0659) 
0.4697 
(0.287) 
1999 0.4988 
(0.0612) 
0.5565 
(0.554) 
2000 0.5819 
(0.0515) 
0.6448 
(0.173) 
2002 0.7661 
(0.0062) 
0.7843 
(0.0671) 
Note:  * Domestic oriented industry is the industry that exports less than 30 percent of its total 
production 
# Non-domestic oriented industry is the industry that exports more than or equal to 30 percent 
of its total production 
Technical efficiencies were computed using the expression in equation (7.60) p.201, based on 
the method derived by Battese and Coelli (1992), see equations (8.3) and (8.5) above (p.212). 
          Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
   
 
8.5 Principal Empirical Results 
 
Empirical results for the five models specified earlier in Section 8.3 are presented in Table 
8.4, with Table 8.4a and Table 8.4b presenting the pre-crisis and the post-crisis results, 
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respectively. For the pre-crisis period, all five models provide similar results for the output 
elasticity of inputs. In all models, the output elasticity of capital, β1, has a value ranging 
between 0.28 and 0.38, with β1 of Model 8.1 equals to 0.3430, of Model 8.2 equals to 
0.3785, of Model 8.3 equals to 0.3496, of Model 8.4 equals to 0.2813, and of Model 8.5 
equals to 0.2891. The paired samples tests indicate that these results are significantly lower 
than the output elasticity of labour, β2, which has a range of between 0.50 and 0.56, with β2 
of Model 8.1, Model 8.2, Model 8.3, Model 8.4, and Model 8.5 equals to 0.5098, 0.5505, 
0.5199, 0.5625, and 0.5266, respectively. These figures suggest, in unison, that in the pre-
crisis period, the Thai manufacturing sector is rather labour intensive, and thus, confirming 
the finding from the OLS estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function presented in 
Chapter 6.  
 The t-statistics show that parameter β0, β1, and β2from all five models are 
significantly different from zero, and hence, should all be included in the models. Estimated 
values of the test parameter of the stochastic production function (γ) are somewhat diverse. 
They are 0.4235, 0.5712, 0.3464, and 0.5069 for Model 8.2, Model 8.3, Model 8.4, and 
Model 8.5, respectively. The value of γ has an important implication for the validity of the 
technical inefficiency term, and therefore, for the validity of the frontier production function. 
The parameter ( )22
2
UV
U
σσ
σγ +=  must have a value between 0 and 1 for use in an iterative 
maximization process. If the value of γ is equal to zero, it implies that σU2 = 0, therefore 
indicating that no technical inefficiency existed in the production process, and thus, that the 
traditional average production function (where producers are assumed to always work on 
their production function) is the superior model. On the other hand, if γ has the value of 
one, it implies that  σV2 = 0, and that therefore the production function takes the form of a 
full deterministic frontier without the statistic noise, Vit, with all deviations from the 
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production frontier being explained by technical inefficiency. Otherwise, the greater the 
value of γ, the higher the inefficiency that occurs in the production process. 
 
Table 8.4a: maximum likelihood estimates of the pre-crisis period  
  MLE Estimates for Models 
Variable Parameter Model 8.1 Model 8.2 Model 8.3 Model 8.4 Model 8.5 
Constant β0 5.6532 5.7608 6.0695 7.3335 7.0777 
  (0.9189) (0.9962) (1.3185) (1.1877) (1.1791) 
Ln Asset β1 0.3430 0.3785 0.3496 0.2813 0.2891 
  (0.8156) (0.0956) (0.0996) (0.0832) (0.0821) 
Ln Employ β2 0.5098 0.5505 0.5199 0.5625 0.5266 
  (0.1171) (0.1235) (0.1285) (0.1270) (0.1301) 
 σ2 0.9447 1.0755 1.6781 0.9738 1.4181 
   (0.3156) (0.6668) (0.2014) (0.4835) 
 γ - 0.4235 0.5712 0.3464 0.5069 
   (0.1749) (0.2090) (0.1614) (0.2097) 
 μ - 1.3350 - 1.1615 - 
   (0.4080)  (0.3228)  
 η - -0.0775 -0.0803 - - 
   (0.0428) (0.0861)   
 n  89 89 89 89 89 
 Log Likelihood -122.2279 -116.5374 -119.30346 -117.9199 -119.9576 
Note: Models used are described above in p.211-212. Numbers of observation for the pre-crisis period 
is 89.  
         Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
 
Table 8.4b: maximum likelihood estimates of the post-crisis period  
  MLE Estimates for Models 
Variable Parameter Model 8.1 Model 8.2 Model 8.3 Model 8.4 Model 8.5 
Constant β0 4.5200 6.4825 6.5214 5.1586 4.9410 
  (0.8872) (0.9987) (1.2427) (0.9533) (0.9972) 
Ln Asset β1 0.5101 0.5022 0.5131 0.5130 0.5084 
  (0.0607) (0.0654) (0.0687) (0.0765) (0.0666) 
Ln Employ β2 0.3181 0.2064 0.1783 0.3151 0.3123 
  (0.0739) (0.1019) (0.1135) (0.1030) (0.0829) 
 σ2 0.3808 0.2555 0.3255 0.3651 0.4792 
   (0.0356) (0.0841) (0.1442) (0.1365) 
 γ - 0.0809 0.2611 0.2737 0.3447 
   (0.0803) (0.2357) (0.2019) (0.2204) 
 μ - 0.2875 - 0.6322 - 
   (0.0834)  (0.3111)  
 η - 0.2649 0.2767 - - 
   (0.0851) (0.1026)   
 n 88 88 88 88 88 
 Log Likelihood -80.8550 -71.4005 -74.0212 -77.6189 -79.4732 
Note: Models used are described above in p.211-212. Numbers of observation for the post-crisis 
period is 88. 
         Standard errors are in brackets.  
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Notably, the results in the post crisis period indicate a totally different situation for 
the Thai economy. The t-statistics indicate that all parameters β0, β1, and β2 are significantly 
differed from zero and should be included in the model, except the output elasticity of 
labour, β2, in Model 8.3. However, in the post-crisis period, for all five models, the paired 
samples tests indicate that the output elasticity of capital is significantly higher than that of 
labour. The β1s vary slightly from 0.50 to 0.52. More specifically β1 has the value of 0.5101, 
0.5022, 0.5131, 0.5130, and 0.5084 in Model 8.1, Model 8.2, Model 8.3, Model 8.4, and 
Model 8.5, respectively. The β2s vary over the range of 0.18 and 0.32, with those of Model 
8.1, Model 8.2, Model 8.3, Model 8.4, and Model 8.5 taking on the values of 0.3181, 0.2064, 
0.1783, 0.3151, and 0.3123 respectively. These figures suggest a structural shift in the 
manufacturing sector from labour intensive, in the pre-crisis period, to capital intensive, in 
the post-crisis period. This is, again, consistent with the results from the standard OLS 
estimated production function discussed earlier in Chapter 6.   
In addition, the value of the time-variant parameter, η, which determines whether 
the efficiency is declining or improving over-time, indicates an opposite trend for the pre- 
and post-crisis period. In both time-variant models (namely, in Model 8.2 and Model 8.3), 
the pre-crisis η has a negative value, which suggests that the technical efficiency in this 
period is declining over-time. On the other hand, the post-crisis η shows a positive value in 
both models, implying that efficiency is actually improving throughout this period. These 
figures of η, again, suggest some kind of technological shift in the manufacturing sector 
between the pre- and post-crisis period.     
However, before any further interpretation of the results can be undertaken, 
various specification tests of the production frontier have to be conducted, in order to select 
the most suitable model for the analysis. First, the validity of the technical inefficiency term 
has to be tested, so as to confirm whether a stochastic production function is a superior 
measure to the traditional average production function. Specifically, this test can be done 
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through the checking of the γ value. The hypothesis for such a test is specified with the null 
hypothesis : γ = 0. The value of γ = 0 implies that σ0H U2 = 0, and thus, the technical 
inefficiency term Uit = 0, suggesting that technical inefficiency did not exist in the 
production process. Therefore, the model reverts (from the production frontier) back to the 
traditional production function, which is estimated by mean output, having only one 
statistical error term, Vit.   
The second hypothesis that needs to be tested concerns the distribution parameter, 
μ, which determines the distributional assumption of the technical inefficiency term, Uit. The 
technical inefficiency component is generally assumed to be a non-negative truncation of 
the   N+(μ, σU2) distribution. However, if the null hypothesis : μ =0 cannot be rejected, 
U
0H
it would, instead, have a non-negative half-normal distribution, N+(0, σU2), and the model 
reverts to the Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989) model.  
 The final hypothesis is concerned with the time-variant parameter, η, which 
determines the time-varying effects of the production frontier. Given the specification that 
(( TtUU iit −−= ))ηexp , if the parameter η has a value equal to zero, the inefficiency 
term, Uit, will reduce to Ui, indicating that technical inefficiency is time-invariant. This 
suggests that any inefficiency in the production process remains there for the entire period 
of concern, and no technical improvement had been made available in such period. Thus, in 
order to test for the time-varying effects of the production frontier, the hypothesis test 
should be specified with the null hypothesis : η = 0, which if it cannot be rejected, 
implies that
0H
iit UU = , and the inefficiency is time-invariant.  
 These hypothesis tests involving the parameters in the frontier function can be 
performed using the generalized likelihood ratio test statistic, defined by 
         (8.6) ( ) ( )[ 10 lnln2 HH −−=Λ ]
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where    is the log likelihood value of a restricted frontier model,  specified by a null 
hypotheses , and  is the log likelihood value of the general frontier model under 
the alternative hypothesis . This test statistic has approximately a chi-square distribution 
(or a mixed chi-square in the case that involves testing : γ = 0), with degrees of 
freedom equal to the difference between the parameters involved in the null and alternative 
hypotheses. The test statistics are presented in Table 8.5. 
( 0ln H )
)0H ( 1ln H
1H
0H
 Before proceed any further, a point should be noted here concerning the 
distribution of γ. The parameter γ does not have a regular χ2 distribution, but a mixture of  
χ2 distribution ( ) ( )1
2
10
2
1 22
cχχ +  where the distribution ( )02χ  is degenerate with a unit 
mass at zero, and the distribution ( )12cχ  of the square of a positively truncated standard 
normal variable N(0,1) is a chi-square with one degree of freedom7. This is due to the fact 
that an irregularity of the likelihood function occurs at the point where all firms are 
technically efficient (γ = 0). Thus  σ = 0, and as σ is non-negative, σ is on the boundary of 
the parameter space. The first and second order derivatives of the log likelihood function 
become zero, which implies that the information matrix at σ = 0 is singular. However, these 
irregularities can be simplified by the reparameterization of the likelihood function, and then 
the maximized likelihood function, again, provides a valid likelihood ratio test statistic, as in 
the standard case, except it would have the mixed chi-square distribution, as stated earlier. 
 From Table 8.5a, the pre-crisis period, given the specifications of the stochastic 
frontier production function with time-varying and non-negative truncated distribution 
inefficiency component, i.e. Model 8.2, it is evident that the traditional average production 
function is not an adequate representation of the data, as the null hypothesis of               
H0: γ = μ = η = 0 is rejected. The significance of the variance parameter γ suggests that the 
technical inefficiency effects make a significant contribution to the production function. 
                                                 
7 Lee (1993), pp.424 
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Hence, a production function with the technical inefficiency component, Uit, should be 
employed. Further, the hypotheses involve the assumptions that the half-normal distribution 
is an adequate representation of the inefficiency term. That is H0: μ = η = 0, as well as, H0: 
μ = 0 are also rejected, suggesting that the technical inefficiency component has the non-
negative truncated normal distribution, N+(μ, σU2). However, the hypothesis that the 
technical inefficiency has the time-invariant structure, specifically H0: η = 0, could not be 
rejected. This suggests that Uit is in fact equal to Ui, and inefficiency does indeed stay with 
the production process overtime. Hence, it could be concluded that Model 8.2 (the Battese 
and Coelli (1992) model) does not apply to the data set of the pre-crisis period. 
 
Table 8.5a: Tests of hypotheses for parameters of the technical inefficiency component in the pre-
crisis period 
Assumptions Null Hypothesis  χ2-statistic χ20.95 -value Decision 
Model 8.2 γ = μ = η = 0 11.3809 7.045∗ Reject H0
Model 8.2 μ = η = 0 6.8403 5.99 Reject H0
Model 8.2 μ = 0 5.5321 3.84 Reject H0
Model 8.2 η = 0 2.7649 3.84 Cannot Reject H0
Model 8.4 γ = μ = 0 8.6160 5.138* Reject H0
Model 8.4 μ = 0 4.0754 3.84 Reject H0
Note: Hypotheses are tested by the general likelihood ratio test ( ) ( )[ ]10 lnln2 HH− −=Λ  
 
Table 8.5b: Tests of hypotheses for parameters of the technical inefficiency component in the post-
crisis period 
Assumptions Null Hypothesis χ2-statistic χ20.95 -value Decision 
Model 8.2 γ = μ = η = 0 18.9090 7.045* Reject H0
Model 8.2 μ = η = 0 16.1453 5.99 Reject H0
Model 8.2 μ = 0 5.2413 3.84 Reject H0
Model 8.2 η = 0 12.4368 3.84 Reject H0
Note: Hypotheses are tested by the general likelihood ratio test ( ) ( )[ ]Λ  10 lnln2 HH −−=
                                                
 
 A further set of hypothesis tests has been conducted, with the specification of a 
frontier production function with time-invariant and non-negatively truncated technical 
 
∗ Any likelihood ratio test statistic involving a null hypothesis which includes the restriction that γ is 
zero does not have a chi-square distribution because the restriction defines a point on the boundary of 
the parameter space. In this case the likelihood ratio statistic has been shown to have a mixed chi-
square distribution. In this case, critical values for the generalized likelihood ratio test are obtained 
from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986). A simplifies version of this table is also presented in 
Appendix B. 
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inefficiency error component (i.e. Model 8.4). The results indicate that this model, when 
compared to the traditional average production function, is still a superior one, as the null 
hypothesis of H0: γ = μ = 0 is rejected. Therefore Uit is not equal to zero, and should be 
included in the model. Also, the half-normal distribution assumption is not an adequate 
representation of the inefficiency term, since  H0: μ = 0 is also rejected. Hence, Uit should 
be distributed with N+(μ, σU2). Therefore, it could be concluded that the stochastic 
production frontier with time-invariant and non-negative truncated normal distribution 
technical inefficiency component , namely, the model suggested by Battese, Coelli and 
Colby (1989) is an appropriate model for the analysis of the data set in the pre-crisis period.  
itU
 For the post-crisis period, given the specifications of Model 8.2, which the technical 
inefficiency term is assumed to be time-variant, ( )( )TtUU iit −−= ηexp , and has non-
negative truncated normal distribution, N+(μ, σU2), the null hypothesis of H0: γ = μ = η = 0 
is tested in order to confirm whether or not the traditional average production function is an 
adequate representation of the data. The result presented in Table 8.5b indicates that this 
null hypothesis should be rejected, therefore, suggesting that there exist inefficiencies in 
the production process, and hence, the stochastic frontier production function is the 
appropriate model to be used.  
 Furthermore, it is evident, again, from results presented in Table 8.5b that the half-
normal distribution is not an adequate representation of the inefficiency term, as the 
assumptions that  H0: μ = η = 0 as well as H0: μ = 0 are both rejected. The post-crisis 
production frontier should have the technical inefficiency component with normal, non-
negative truncated distribution.  Further, the hypothesis stating that the post-crisis period 
should be represented with the time-invariant technical inefficiency model, i.e. H0: η = 0, is 
also rejected, implying that there is enough evidence for the existence of technical 
improvement in the post-crisis period. Therefore, Model 8.2, the stochastic frontier 
production function with time-varying and non-negative truncated distribution inefficiency 
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component suggested by Battese and Coelli (1992) is the appropriate model for the post-
crisis productivity analysis.  
  
Table 8.6: Technical Efficiency Estimates 
Post-Crisis Industry Pre-Crisis 
1998 1999 2000 2002 
Food  0.3827 0.6509 0.7159 0.7717 0.8565 
Tobacco  0.7159 0.7210 0.7752 0.8207 0.8886 
Textiles 0.2767 0.4639 0.5513 0.6310 0.7604 
Wearing Apparel 0.2412 0.5751 0.6506 0.7167 0.8198 
Leather Products  0.2617 0.3706 0.4640 0.5527 n/a#
Footwear 0.1770 0.4292 0.5193 0.6026 n/a#
Wood  0.1944 0.3056 0.4002 0.4935 0.6580 
Paper  0.2909 0.3292 0.4238 0.5157 0.6752 
Publishing 0.6432 0.4076 0.4992 0.5847 0.7270 
Petroleum  0.7157 0.3583 0.4522 0.5420 0.6953 
Chemical  0.2967 0.4173 0.5083 0.5929 0.7330 
Rubber & Plastic  0.3023 0.5316 0.6123 0.6840 0.7975 
Non-Metallic Mineral  0.3572 0.4411 0.5304 0.6126 0.7473 
Basic Metals 0.3177 0.2591 0.3526 0.4477 n/a#
Fabricated Metal  0.2325 0.4250 0.5155 0.5992 0.7377 
Machinery  0.5257 0.4627 0.5503 0.6301 0.7598 
Computing  0.2745 0.7181 0.7728 0.8187 0.8873 
Electrical  0.3189 0.4347 n/a# n/a# 0.7415 
Communication  0.4488 0.5958 0.6685 0.7318 n/a#
Medical 0.1982 0.3159 0.4104 0.5031 n/a#
Vehicles 0.4824 0.5751 0.6506 0.7167 0.8198 
Transport Equipment 0.1846 0.2764 0.3705 0.4652 0.6355 
Furniture 0.2071 0.3177 0.4123 0.5049 0.6669 
Jewellery  0.2191 0.4225 0.5130 0.5970 n/a#
Mean 0.3444 0.4502 0.5356 0.6146 0.7559 
 (n = 89) (n = 88) (n = 88) (n = 88) (n = 88) 
Note: Technical efficiencies were computed using the expression in equation (7.60) p.201, based on the method 
derived by Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989) (referred to as Model 8.4 in this chapter (p.212)) for the pre-
crisis period and Battese and Coelli (1992) for the post crisis period (referred to as Model 8.2 in this chapter 
(p.211)). 
 
 Hence, given the specifications of Model 8.4 (Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989)) for 
the pre-crisis period, and Model 8.2 (Battese and Coelli (1992)) for the post-crisis period, 
the technical efficiencies of the industries together with the estimated mean technical 
efficiencies are calculated according to equation (7.60). The values obtained are presented 
in Table 8.6. The mean efficiency in the pre-crisis period is 0.3444. It increased significantly 
in the post-crisis period to 0.4502 in 1998, 0.5356 in 1999, 0.6146 in 2000, and 0.7559 in 
                                                 
# Data is not available for that period, thus, no values of technical efficiencies are calculated 
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2002. Twenty industries, out of the total 24 8 , showed an increase in efficiency in the 
immediate year post crisis, which is in accordance to the preliminary results from the 
exploratory data analysis reported in section 8.4. Only 4 industries, namely, industry 9 - the 
publishing and printing industry, industry 10 – the coke, petroleum and nuclear industry, 
industry 14 – the basic metals, and industry 16 – the machinery and equipment industry, 
displayed a decrease in efficiency in 1998 when compared to the pre-crisis period. 
Nevertheless, most of them, except industry 10, picked up in efficiency, and reached a 
higher level of efficiency in the later years (the reason for such performance of industry 10 
was already discussed in Chapter 6, and earlier in Section 8.4 of this chapter).  
 
 
8.6 Implication of the Results 
 
Comparing the results from this chapter to those from the OLS model in Chapter 6, it is 
obvious that there have been many improvements in the depth of the findings. The 
coefficient estimates of inputs β1 and β2 are still in accordance with those in Chapter 6, 
indicating the structural shift from labour-intensive in the pre-crisis period to the capital-
intensive in the post-crisis period. However, there are some additional, more ‘in depth’ 
findings that only become apparent when the assumption of full efficiency in the production 
process, made in the ordinary least square estimates, is relaxed. Firstly, since the stochastic 
frontier allowed the technical inefficiency to exist, the level of the technical inefficiency 
could then be estimated from such model. Secondly, the model could be tested for the time 
varying effects, which would indicate whether or not there are changes in the technical 
progress in those time periods of study. And thirdly, if technical progress does exist, then it 
would be possible to estimate its progress over time.  
                                                 
8 A list of industry names is provided in the Appendix A. 
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 The results from Model 8.4, the stochastic production frontier with time-invariant 
and non-negative truncated normal distribution technical inefficiency component suggested 
by Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989), indicate that during the seven years from 1990 to 1996 
in the pre-crisis period, the manufacturing sector of Thailand experienced no technical 
improvement as the null hypotheses that involved the time varying parameter η = 0 could 
not be rejected. Thus, the technical inefficiency was time-invariant. In addition, the sector 
was labour intensive as the estimate of the labour coefficient was 0.5625, much higher 
when compared to the estimate of the capital coefficient, which had the value of only 
0.2813. Moreover, the sectors mean efficiency level was considerably low, at only 0.3444, 
with many industries scoring less than 0.2, including industry 6, 7, 20 and 22.9  
 Prior to the crisis in July 1997, Thailand had enjoyed a sustained and high growth 
rate, with an average growth of 9.49 percent per annum. The investment level in the 
country had also been sizeable; the capital stock growth in the manufacturing sector during 
a decade from 1986 to 1996 was as high as an average of 14.0 percent per annum. The 
growth rate of domestic firms’ assets was 22.5 percent and 14.9 percent, between 1994 
and 1995 and between 1995 and 1996, respectively.10 With such an extensive investment in 
capitals and assets, one would expect to find empirical support for a model that involves a 
positive time varying parameter, η, which would suggest shifts in the production frontier, 
therefore indicating improvements in production technology. However, by considering the 
interest rate factor, the explanation for such a model becomes more apparent. During the 
early 1990s, Thai economy was growing at a favourably rate, hence, investors flooded the 
country with further investments. Consequently, the country’s national savings fell short of 
financing the countless investment projects, driving the domestic saving rate to a very high 
level11. Combined with the policy of the Bank of Thailand (BOT) of the time, in order to 
attract capital inflow into the country, the interest rates were kept at a very high level. 
                                                 
9 A list of industry names is provided in the Appendix A.  
10 National Development and Social Board, NESDB, Thailand 
11 Jitsuchon, (2002) 
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During 1994 and 1995, the domestic fixed saving rate was so high that it reached more 
than 14 per cent per annum. Therefore, it is certain that the majority of investment projects 
would not generate sufficient returns to service debt at such a high level of interest rate. 
Thus, many of these loans were channelled into risky projects in highly cyclical sectors 
(such as real estate and the stock market), rather than into the manufacturing sector. As a 
result, non-productive investment expanded dramatically. In Bangkok, the amount of new 
office space quadrupled between 1994 and 199712. To worsen the situation, many of the 
investments that did go into the manufacturing sector appeared to have been allocated 
inefficiently. Hence, despite the average capital stock growth of 14.0 per cent per annum 
during the 1986 to 1996, the contribution to the growth of economy was only 2.1 per cent 
per annum.13 It was also reported (Dollar et al. (2000)) that about two-thirds of the total 
investment made in the manufacturing sector during 1994 to 1997 was in machinery and 
equipment, and one-third was in plants and land. Thus, a large fraction of manufacturers in 
Thailand were reported to have owned unnecessary spacious plants and offices.  
 On the labour side, compared to the relatively high investment cost during the late 
1980s and the beginning of 1990s, unskilled labour was fairly abundant and inexpensive in 
Thailand14. However, with the rapid expansion the economy experienced the early 1990s, 
demand for goods and services increased considerably. However, without a sufficient level 
of investment in the manufacturing sector, the pressure from the increase in demand fell 
solely on the labour market. Wages were rising very rapidly between 1990 and 1997, at an 
annual rate of 4.6 percent for those with secondary school and lower education level, and at 
7.0 percent for those with university degrees15. This tight labour market situation played a 
significant role in the labour-intensive manufacturing sector of Thailand, and was blamed for 
contributing to the economic collapse of 1997.  
                                                 
12 Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, (2000) 
13 National Development and Social Board, NESDB, Thailand 
14 Laplamvanit, (1999) 
15 Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, (2000) 
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 The post-crisis results suggest that in the five immediate years after the crisis, the 
manufacturing sector of Thailand had shown signs of a structural shift from labour intensive 
to capital intensive production. The capital coefficient, β1, increased from 0.2813 in the pre-
crisis period to 0.5022, while the labour coefficient, β2, declined from 0.5625 to 0.2064. It is 
interesting to see that there is evidently a switch of the dominance between capital and 
labour in the pre- and post-crisis periods. In addition, the value of η in the post-crisis period 
is significantly differ from zero, and takes a positive value, suggesting that efficiency in this 
model is time varying, and that there was a general advance in the technology used in this 
sector over the post-crisis years. The mean efficiency levels were higher in the post-crisis 
period compared to the pre-crisis, and were increasing over the years, from 0.3444 in the 
pre-crisis period, to 0.4502, 0.5356, 0.6146, and 0.7559 in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002, 
respectively.  
 From these results, the adjustment in the structure of the manufacturing sector 
between the pre- and post-crisis period are seen to have been considerable in terms of its 
speed and intensity. One common explanation for such an improvement in performance of 
the post-crisis economy would have its root in the so-called ‘shakeout’ process16. Generally, 
immediately after an economic crisis, with its large and rapid reduction in demand, 
downward pressures would be placed greatly on the levels of prices. Thus firms would be 
forced to compete with each other in producing products (very often homogenous products) 
at the lowest possible cost17. Firms that are less able in doing so would be pushed out of 
the business, and this shakeout process would continue until all the less productive firms 
have been forced to exit the industry18. Many factors determine the firms’ ability to endure 
the shakeouts. These include the cost of production, advancement in R&D, brand loyalty, 
experience in the industry, progression in technology, and allocative as well as technical 
efficiency. Firms with higher cost of production would be less able to adjust to the 
                                                 
16 Low, (2000) 
17 Utterback and Suárez, (1993) 
18 Jovanovic and MacDonald, (1994) 
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downward pressures of price, as well as firms with low brand loyalty would have to rely 
solely on lowering price in competing. Poorer technology, lesser allocative and technical 
efficiency would result in higher production cost, with this affecting firms’ competitiveness. 
Hence, the overall performance of the crisis affected economy could tend to improve in the 
post-crisis period after the shakeouts. Therefore, this would explain the occurrences seen 
from the post crisis results shown earlier. In sum, the economic crisis in 1997 could have 
triggered shakeout in the manufacturing sector of Thai economy, and played an important 
role in the selection process, where only firms with a better foundation would survive, 
resulting in a positive reformation of the economy as a whole. This, therefore, created the 
sound foundation for the next phrase of growth of the economy that could be expected to 
be healthier and more sustainable.  
 Unfortunately, there has not been any direct collection of evidence on the shakeout 
of Thai manufacturers for the post-crisis period. However, the total number of 
establishments, as well as the number of establishments that ceased operation, could 
provide some general guide on this issue. The total number of establishments in the 
manufacturing sector of Thailand that involved more than 10 persons engaged in the 
operation had declined from 23,677 in 1996 to 20,807 in 1998; and then declined further to 
20,794 in 1999, and 20,608 in 2000, accounting for 12.12, 12.18 and 12.96 percent 
reductions, when compared to the 1996 pre-crisis level, respectively (see Table 8.7a). 
These figures imply that some establishments had been effected by the crisis and hence 
had been forced out of businesses. This can be explored further by looking at the figures for 
the entry and exit of establishments. Unfortunately, there is no such official data collected 
by the National Statistics Office. Fortunately, it has been possible to acquire unpublished 
data collected by the Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, on the number of firms in the 
manufacturing sector that ceased, as well as launched, operations in each year. The data, 
however, are not strictly comparable as they comprise a wider set of firms than the data of 
Table8.7a. Specifically the new data include micro-firms (i.e. firm with less than 10 persons 
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engaged in the business). An advantage of this set of data is that it is considered to be very 
reliable, as it is gathered for taxation purposes. The new data is presented in Table 8.7b 
below.        
 
 
Table 8.7a:  Number of establishment in the manufacturing sector of Thailand with more than 10 
persons engaged in the business. 
 
Period Number of Non-Micro Establishments 
1996 23,677 
1998 20,807 
1999 20,794 
2000 20,608 
2002 20,216 
Source: Annual Manufacturing Industrial Survey, National Statistic Office, Thailand 
Table 8.7b:  Number of establishments in the manufacturing sector that ceased and launched 
operations (including both micro- and non micro-firms) 
 
Period Establishments that ceased operation Establishments that launched operation 
1994 352 3,930 
1995 446 4,028 
1996 479 3,885 
1997 607 3,046 
1998 925 2,346 
1999 742 2,937 
2000 763 3,599 
2001 1,116 3,962 
2002 1,695 5,250 
Source: Ministry of Commerce (Thailand) 
 
 It can be seen from the figures in Table 8.7B that there was indeed an increasing 
trend in the number of firms that ceased operation in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. 
The number of firms that ceased operation in the pre-crisis period was 352 firms in 1994, 
increased to 446 firms in 1995, and to 479 firms in 1996. These figures shot up markedly in 
the post-crisis period. Thus, the number of firms that ceased operation in 1997 was 607 and 
this then rose drastically to 925 in 1998. The situation improved in 1999 and 2000, with 742 
and 763 firms ceasing their operations, respectively. Nevertheless, the crisis has proven to 
have a long-standing effect,  for the number of firms that ceased operation shot up once 
again in 2001 and 2002. The increase in the number of firms that ceased operation in the 
post-crisis period may well  have led to the observed improvement in post-crisis efficiency, 
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as firms with low efficiency were pushed out of the business, leaving the sector (an average) 
with better overall efficiency. 
 When looking at the figures on the number of establishments that launched 
operations, it can be seen that there was a drop in the number of firms launching 
operations in the immediate post-crisis period. The number of firms that launched 
operations in 1997 dropped from 3,885 in 1996 to 3,046, which implies that people were 
put off from investing in an economic situation of crisis. This figure declined further in 1998, 
as the Thai economy was facing a severe problem of ‘credit crunch’, with just 2,346 firms 
launching operation. The situation improved from 1999 onward as the economy started to 
show some improvement in performance and the government of Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra, 
who came into office in February 2000, imposed several effective economic stimulation 
packages. One thing that can be seen in the figures (on the number of establishments that 
launched operations) is that although there has been some drop in numbers, post-crisis, the 
overall level of establishments was fairly steady. One explanation may be that these figures 
include micro-firms, as well as non-micro firms. Micro-firms typically have low capital 
requirements for becoming established, and hence are not likely to have been much 
affected by the credit problem, post-crisis. This increase in the number of newly established 
firms could also have contributed to the efficiency improvements which occurred post-crisis. 
These newly established firms will tend to have higher efficiency than the existing ones, as 
a result of adjustments in financial markets (which will be discussed later in this section, see 
p.237), and hence they will have raised the hurdle of efficiency in the manufacturing sector. 
 The 1997 economic crisis had intensely affected the Thai economy. Severe 
adjustments had been experienced among most sectors during the initial post-crisis period. 
The economic growth data had recorded contractions, industrial sectors were left with 
excess capacity, employment declined, overall consumptions slumped, financial markets 
were faced with a liquidity crunch, and the currency drastically depreciated. However, 
among all these adjustments, one important point to notice was that the real wage rate 
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remained quite stable for the entire period, and this was especially so in the unskilled labour 
market 19 . Commonly, wage adjustment is one of the most important adjustment 
mechanisms at play during economic downturns. In particular, this applies when there is an 
absence of labour unions to impose wage rigidity. However, as revealed in the earlier 
section, the study of Thai labour market indicated that the impact of the crisis was less in 
terms of labour price adjustment, compared to quantity adjustment20. Unemployment in the 
manufacturing sector increased by more than 200 per cent in 1999, comparing to 1996, 
while the real monthly wage only decreased by 5.46 percent in the same period. Aside from 
the growth in unemployment, there was also a huge increase in underemployment, 
amounting to 343.78 per cent from 1996 to 1999. The possible explanation for this 
phenomenon lies in the existence of the minimum wage regulation imposed by Thai labour 
law. The minimum wage rate had not been altered during the adjustment period, and since 
the majority of labour in the manufacturing sector was unskilled and received wages very 
close to this minimum rate, the flexibility of labour price adjustment was somewhat limited21. 
Therefore, this left the labour market adjustments to come about through quantity 
adjustment, not price adjustment. This reduction in labour employment could have been 
one factor resulting in the shifting of the manufacturing sector from being labour intensive 
to being capital intensive.  
 Combined with the fact that after the IMF eased its monetary measures in August 
1998, domestic interest rates had declined radically. The one-year fixed saving rate dropped 
from 12 percent per annum in late 1996 to less than 2 per cent, while the interbank rate 
plunged below 5 percent for the first time in November 1998. Therefore, the post-crisis 
relative price between labour and capital changed considerably. Thus, the real wage rate 
remained rather stable, while interest rate declined to a great extend, and thus the relative 
price (and thus, cost) of labour became more expensive, creating a great incentive for 
                                                 
19 Behrman, Deolalikar, and Tinakorn, (2001) 
20 Behrman, Deolalikar, and Tinakorn, (2001) 
21 Paitoonpong, (2002) 
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manufacturers to substitute capital for labour. Hence, this explain, partly, the shifting of the 
manufacturing sector from labour intensive to capital intensive production, as seen from the 
results presented earlier. 
 The fourth factor affecting the reconstruction of the post-crisis Thai economy could 
have been the healthier investment behaviour within the private sector. As discussed earlier, 
in the pre-crisis period, the Thai economy was dominated by speculative behaviours, and 
this, contributed to creating bubbles in real estate and stock markets. Although the private 
investment level was extremely high, much of it was concentrated on the unproductive 
sectors 22 . Vines and Warr (2003) suggested that high interest rates had brought about 
investment in speculative sectors, since they were almost the only sectors that could create 
sufficient returns to cover such high costs of investment.  
 
Table 8.8: Private Investment Index (1995 based year, million baht or as stated) 
Source: Bank of Thailand (BOT)  
Year Private Investment Index Domestic Cement Sales Domestic Machinery Sales 
1995 100.0 33,034 162,946 
1996 95.0 37,082 192,712 
1997 66.4 36,002 239,164 
1998 31.8 20,633 262,866 
1999 34.0 18,700 276,334 
2000 41.7 18,020 319,447 
2001 41.4 19,048 343,653 
2002 50.2 23,020 331,142 
 
 Table 8.8 presents the private investment index, as well as, the level of investments 
in some sectors. It is clear from the figures that the overall investment level declined 
significantly in the post-crisis period. Using 1995 as the based year, private investment 
declined from 95.0 in 1996 to 66.4 in 1997, and declined further to just 31.8 and 34.0 in 
1998 and 1999, respectively. This reduction in investment comes without surprise 
considering the economic situation during that time. Immediately after the crisis in July 
1997, the IMF imposed tight fiscal and monetary policies for Thailand. In addition, 58 
financial institutions and 4 commercial banks were suspended. As a result, panic spread 
                                                 
22 Doner and Ramsay, (1999) 
 - 236 -
Thai Productivity and the Crisis 
across the financial sector, causing the interest rates to shoot up severely. To make matter 
worst, because of the crisis, Thailand faced a massive capital outflow within a very short 
period of time. Thus, severe cases of credit crunch and non-performing loans were 
experienced in all sectors, pushing the interest rates up even further. By December 1997, 
the interbank rate was at 21.73 per cent, and stayed at the two digits level until the IMF 
eased its policies in August 1998.  
 Nonetheless, one benefit that the Thai economy picked up from this financial crisis 
was the reformation of financial market structures. Before the crisis, financial institutions 
would make decision on loans based on collaterals (such as land) offered by borrowers23. As 
the price of real estate was growing at such a tremendous rate, this collateral served as a 
very secure guarantee for loans. However, after the crisis, real estate price declined 
immensely; and banks had to resort, instead, to investment project analysis for their 
decision making24 . Therefore, loans would then be made only to those most productive 
investments, for which the highest rates of return were expected. Hence, this improved the 
chance of good manufacturers in getting access to loans, compared to the pre-crisis period.  
 Also, in late 1998s, interest rates dropped to a very low level compared to the pre-
crisis period. This enhanced the ability of manufacturers to obtain loans, as now, unlike in 
the pre-crisis period, a reasonably good investment would be sufficient to attract a loan, 
which could be serviced by the interest reduction discussed above. Hence, it is not 
surprising to see that, despite the significant declined in the private investment index, there 
was a considerable increase in domestic machinery sales, from 192,712 millions Baht in 
1996 to 239,164 millions in 1997, 262,866 millions in 1998, and 276,334 millions in 1999.  
This growth in machinery sales was in accordance with the demand to increase productivity 
capacity in some industries, especially those related to exports (such as electronics, 
                                                 
23 Warr and Nidhiprabha, (1996) 
24 Vines and Warr, (2003) 
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integrated circuits, and televisions set), which grew considerably post-crisis25. Therefore, 
this, again, supports the increase in the output estimate of the capital coefficient seen from 
the post-crisis analyses. One other figure that is worth mentioning here is the reduction in 
investment projects in the real estate sector, which was reflected in the domestic cement 
sales (figures in Table 8.8).  The domestic cement sales index declined considerably in the 
post-crisis period, from 37,082 millions Baht in 1996 to only 20,633 millions in 1998, and 
declined further in 1999 and 2000. This reflected the sluggish condition in the real estate 
sector, as there were not yet many new building projects being invested in, due to the great 
excess supplies left in the economy from the pre-crisis period26.  
 Consequently, it is fair to argue (based on these figures) that one of the reasons 
leading to the improvement in post-crisis technical efficiency might have resulted from the 
increase in productive capital investments, such as machinery and equipment. Such 
argument is also supported by the finding in Chapter 6, Section 6.4, in which the finding 
from the graphical exploratory data analysis suggested that there was an increase in the 
usage of the more productive capital, hence, raised the gross output over capital 
expenditure, CEGO , ratio. On the other hand, the pre-crisis efficiency level suffered 
greatly from the unproductive investments, hence, leading to the declining competitiveness 
in Thai manufacturing sector, and consequently, building up the foundation for the 1997 
economic crisis. However, the issue concerning the productive investments will be examined 
in more details later in Chapter 9, where several forms of capital investment will be 
analysed in order to determine their effects on the sector’s efficiency.  
 The final explanation for the adjustment in the manufacturing sector lay in the 
effects of government policies during the post-crisis period. In the immediate post-crisis 
period, not many economic stimulus policies could be imposed, due to the IMF’s austere 
attitude toward the recovering of the economy. It was not until mid 1998 that the IMF 
                                                 
25 Bank of Thailand (2001) 
26 Bank of Thailand (2001) 
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started to realize the possible mistakes of the policies it had imposed27, and thus, relaxed its 
attitude on economic stimulus. The Thai government was then allowed to run budget 
deficits, and the looser monetary policies were then also becoming more acceptable. Taking 
this opportunity, the government of Thailand at the time quickly reacted to this change by 
implemented many industrial measures, focusing on solving problems of the production 
structure, and on enhancing competitiveness.  
 The first and foremost measure was to establish industry development institutes in 
order to enhance efficiency and competitiveness in the development of domestic industries 
in the long term 28 . These development institutes were considered as being of prime 
important to the development and improvement of the Thai economy, as the nature of the 
Thai manufacturing sector was comprised mainly of small and medium size enterprises 
(accounting for around 90 percent of the total number of establishments). Small and 
medium sized firms in Thailand were generally facing one common problems of lacking 
sufficient funds, and the ability to carry out useful research and development. Therefore, in 
July 1998, the Cabinet approved the establishment of two industry institutes, namely, the 
Automobile Institute and Electricity and Electronics Institute. Later in September of the 
same year, the Cabinet further approved the establishment of National Research and 
Development Institutes for Precious Stones and Ornaments, and then, for the Iron and 
Steel Institute of Thailand in December 1998. Later on 5th April 1999, the Cabinet approved 
the establishment of a Development Institute for Small and Medium Enterprises, as well as 
the establishment of the Microelectronics Technology Research and Development Centre, in 
April 2000.  
 Apart from these industry development institutes, two major economic stimulus 
packages were imposed, one in March 1999 and another in February 2000. In 1998, the 
Thai GDP contracted by 8 per cent, greatly affecting all segments of the society. Many 
                                                 
27 Stiglitz (2000) 
28 Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich, (2000) 
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businesses experienced severe difficulties as a result of the sharp contraction in demand, as 
well as the increase in their obligations (e.g. debt servicing). Non-performing loans (e.g. to 
stave off cash flow crises) increased sharply. This resulted in instability among financial 
institutions, which, in turn, affected credit intermediation to the real sector. Thus, private 
investment declined steadily, unemployment increased, incomes shrank, therefore, leading 
to widespread social ills. The Thai government carried out a substantial economic stimulus 
package by applying three externally sourced loans, with funds totalling of 1,450 million US 
dollar from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), the Japanese Export-Import 
Bank (J.EXIM Bank), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD)29. These loans were then used to support the expansion of public expenditures, as 
well as to fund the tax measures. The public expenditure measures were carried out, with 
one of the main objectives being stimulating the economy through productive investment30. 
Improvement in the competitiveness of manufacturing industries was the prime interest, 
and this was achieved through the assistance in the development of technology by the 
public sector through industry development institutes. As for the tax measures, they were 
directed at increasing the disposable incomes of individuals, thus stimulated private 
consumptions and in turn increased incentives for private investment. For this reason, the 
following tax measures were undertaken31: 1) the exemption of the first 50,000 Baht of net 
income from the personal income tax, 2) the reduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) rate 
from 10 to 7 per cent, and 3) the elimination of the VAT of 1.5 per cent on gross revenue 
for small enterprises with sales between 600,000 and 1,200,000 Baht. It was believed 
(Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich, (2000)) that these economic stimulus measures would 
turn around the economy, and at the same time, would build up a more productive 
manufacturing sector.  
                                                 
29 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
30 Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich, (2000) 
31 Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich, (2000) 
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 The new government led by Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra, came into office in February 
2000 and imposed a vast economic stimulus package covering all areas of society. 
Regarding the manufacturing sector, several policies were implemented, with the aim being 
to facilitate the restructuring, as well as the improvement, of the sector’s productivity. 
Firstly, fifty nine industrial development projects were approved under the phrase II 
Industrial Restructuring Plan (2000 – 2004). The plan focused on upgrading Thailand’s 
competitiveness through a set of strategies including allocating soft loans to 13 sectors, 
dispatching experts to provide technical assistance, and establishing funds and government 
organizations to support industrial development. Secondly, the master development plan of 
small and medium sized enterprises was introduced. The Ministry of Industry would act as 
the main coordinator, and would jointly devise the action plan with the involvement of both 
public and private sectors in order to promote SMEs. This included financial assistance given 
to SMEs through the SME promotion Fund, to provide soft loans to SMEs for business start-
ups and upgrading.  Independently of this bill, the Ministry of Finance initiated a package of 
financial support for SMEs, including an allocation of nearly 1 billion US dollar of credit for 
SMEs, through specialised financial institutions and the Bank of Thailand. Also, it established 
a 1 billion US dollar Venture Capital Fund, financed by structural adjustment loans from the 
World Bank, to invest in SMEs. Furthermore, the government also set up the Market for 
Alternative Investment (MAI), a special stock market with less stringent listing rules for 
SMEs32.  
 Finally, the Cabinet approved, in July 2000, a comprehensive reform of the tariff 
structure to enhance industrial competitiveness and to meet international commitments. 
This reform focused on cutting tariffs on capital goods (i.e. machinery, mechanical 
appliances and parts, and electrical machinery equipment and parts), and on raw materials. 
It was expected that these measures would directly benefit manufacturers in a wide range 
of industries. The reduction in tariffs on capital goods would lower production costs for all 
                                                 
32 Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich, (2000) 
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sectors. At the same time, the removal of the import duty surcharge would reduce the 
degree of protection, and encouraged more efficient resource allocation.  
 Therefore, considering all policies mentioned above, it is reasonable to conclude 
that, although some stimulus measures might not perform so well as the others, these 
policies had, by various means, contributed to the structural change, as well as to the 
improvement in efficiency in the post-crisis Thai manufacturing sector, as suggested earlier 
by evidence in this chapter.  
 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided answers to the main research questions posed in Chapter 1. These 
research questions were sharpened to just two major concerns in Section 8.1. The first 
concern was with what happened to Thai manufacturing sector in the post-crisis period 
compared to pre-crisis? The econometric analysis suggests that the 1997 economic crisis 
had affected the Thai manufacturing sector in several ways. Firstly, the results of the output 
coefficient estimates of inputs showed that there exists a structural change in the 
manufacturing sector of Thailand from labour intensive in the pre-crisis period to capital 
intensive in the post-crisis period. Secondly, the overall efficiency of the sector had been 
improved in the post-crisis period, comparing to the pre-crisis overall efficiency level. And 
thirdly, the post-crisis period exhibited some technical efficiency change from year to year, 
indicating that the sector was becoming more attentive in improving its productivity, as 
compared to the pre-crisis period, which shows no sign of technical efficiency change.  
 The second main concern was what factors led to the observed differences between 
the productivity of the two periods? One possible reason for such transformation could have 
come from the shakeout process, in which the economic crisis led to a sharp decline in 
demand and, thus, to a more stringent competitive environment. Firms with less efficiency 
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would not be able to compete in these surroundings, and would be driven out of the 
business. The post-crisis economy was, then, left with only those highly productive 
manufacturers, therefore resulting in an improvement of the overall efficiency level.  The 
second possible explanation might have come from real wage rigidity in the Thai labour 
market. In the post-crisis period, real wage level had not been reduced as much as one 
would expect, given the severity of the crisis. Adjustment in the labour market had been 
channelled through quantity (rather than price) adjustment. Thus, the number employed in 
the manufacturing sector declined rather significantly. Therefore, the shift towards higher 
capital intensity sector could partly be explained.  
 Another possible explanation for this structural shift could also be justified by the 
sharp decline in the post-crisis interest rates. After the ease of monetary measures in 
August 1998, domestic interest rate levels had declined radically. Combined with the rigid 
real wage, the relative price of capital, compared to labour, fell considerably, and, thus, 
capital was substituted for labours in many production processes.  Unsurprisingly, the 
manufacturing sector displayed this trend towards greater capital intensity in the sector.  
 Furthermore, as a result of the decline in domestic interest rates, as well as the 
forced restructuring in the financial market by the IMF, domestic private investments were 
guided toward the more productive sectors, including the manufacturing sector. Financial 
institutions were no longer issuing loans to speculative and non-productive investment 
projects. Thus, the productive manufacturers’ ability to access loans was enhanced. As a 
result, the overall productivity of the sector was improved.  
 Finally, the highly-favoured government policies (including the two economic 
stimulus packages) had played a major role in the improvement of the sector’s productivity 
level. The Thai government had expressed prime concern in improving research and 
development in small and medium size enterprises, which represent the majority of firms in 
the sector. Many industrial development institutes were established with public funding, in 
order to promote the productivity and efficiency of those particular industries. Moreover, 
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many other policies were also implemented. These included measures such as lowering 
import tariff for capital goods, cutting income, as well as, value added taxes, and more 
importantly, providing soft loans for SMEs, in order to stimulate business start ups and 
upgrading.  
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Chapter 9 – Technical Efficiency Effects Models 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose for this chapter is to examine one important issue raised in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 8 concerning the effects of the capital investments on efficiency level. The results 
from Chapter 8 suggested that one of the reasons leading to a significant improvement of 
the post-crisis efficiency level in Thai manufacturing sector was the higher level of post-
crisis investment in productive capital. The stochastic frontier production function, employed 
in Chapter 8, has also postulated the existence of technical inefficiency in the production 
process for producing a particular output; if inefficiencies indeed exist and vary across 
producers or over time, there must exist some specific variables that affect such variations. 
Therefore, the analysis of productive efficiency would not be completed without an 
examination on those variables that characterize the variation in producer performance.  
 These variables may influence technical efficiency in many ways; they could 
influence the structure of the technology by which conventional inputs are converted to 
outputs; or they may influence the efficiency with which inputs are converted into outputs1. 
Examples include the degree of competition, size of the firm, managerial experience, and 
ownership characteristics. There have been many attempts in incorporating these 
explanatory variables into the efficiency measurement models in a variety of ways, some 
more appropriate than the others, including Pitt and Lee (1981), Sickles, Good, and Johnson 
(1986), Deprins and Simar (1989a, 1989b), Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin (1991) and 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Bauer and Hancock (1993), Berger, Hancock, and 
Humphrey (1993), Huang and Liu (1994), Battese and Coelli (1995), and Berger and Mester 
(1997).  
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 In this chapter, the relationship between capital investments and technical 
efficiency will be carefully examined. Several renowned models, linking efficiency with 
explanatory variables will be discussed, including their innovations as well as their 
limitations. The development of these models is examined in section 9.2, starting from the 
early literatures, in which these variables are assumed to influence the performance of firms 
directly through the influence on the structure of the production frontier, through to the 
two-stage approach, in which the explanatory variables are incorporated into the efficiency 
model, but are assumed to have no direct influence on the structure of the production 
frontier; and finally, concluding with the development of the single-stage approach models, 
in which the inefficiency component is assumed to be distributed independently, but not 
identically, and the parameters of the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model are 
estimated simultaneously. Also, in Section 9.2.3 it surveys some recent empirical studies. 
Section 9.3 considers the specifications of the model that will be used later in the analysis of 
Thai manufacturing industry. The empirical results from this model are then presented in 
section 9.4. These results will then be discussed in details in section 9.5. And finally, 
conclusions will be reached in section 9.6.  
 
 
9.2 Technical Efficiency Effects 
 
In the early studies in which the issue of the explanatory variables were investigated, these 
variables are assumed to influence the performance of firms directly, through the influence 
on the structure of the production frontier. Pitt and Lee (1981), Sickles, Good, and Johnson 
(1986), and more recent studies, including Bauer and Hancock (1993), Berger, Hancock, 
and Humphrey (1993), and Berger and Mester (1997), are among those who follow this 
approach. The production frontier then takes the form of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
1 Kumbhakar and Lovell, (2002) 
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 ( ) iiiii UVzxfY −+= β;,lnln      (9.1) 
where z = (z1,…,zq) is a vector of explanatory variables that influence the structure of the 
production process by which inputs x are converted to output Y, and ( )β;,ln ii zxf is the 
deterministic kernel of the stochastic production frontier ( ) Vzxf ii +β;,ln . In such a 
model, the parameter vector β to be estimated now includes both technological parameters 
as well as environmental parameters.  
 This model here has exactly the same structure as a conventional stochastic 
production frontier, discussed in the previous chapter, and all the estimation techniques 
expand upon those in the conventional models. However, with the assumption of 
independently and identically distributed error terms, Ui and Vi, the elements of zi, as well 
as xi, are assumed to be uncorrelated with each of these disturbance terms. Thus, these 
explanatory variables influence the performance of firms, not by influencing their 
efficiencies (of which they are assumed to be uncorrelated), but by influencing the structure 
of the production frontier bounding the relationship between inputs and outputs. Therefore, 
what is accomplished by this formulation is merely a more accurate characterization of 
production possibilities, and consequently, entails more accurate estimates of producer 
efficiencies. 2  Even so, a main concern of this formulation, namely the source of the 
variation in efficiency, remains to be explained. 
 
9.2.1 Two-Stage Approach 
 
Another approach, attempting to incorporate the explanatory variables into the efficiency 
model, has been developed utilizing the two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, 
a stochastic frontier ( ) iiii UVxfY −+= β;lnln  is estimated, typically by the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique, under the usual distributional assumptions of identically and 
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independently distributed variates Vi, and Ui. The estimated efficiencies are then regressed 
against the explanatory variables in the second-stage regression of the general form  
 ( ) ( ) iiiii wzgUVUE +=− δ;       (9.2) 
where is distributed independently and identically with N(0, σiw w2), and δ is a parameter 
vector to be estimated.    
 In this two-stage approach, it is hypothesized that the explanatory variables, zi, 
influences the output, thus, the performance, of the firms indirectly through its effects on 
firms’ efficiency. Technically speaking, these explanatory variables do not influence the 
structure of the production frontier, but instead, influence the efficiency with which 
producers approach the production frontier. Therefore, the elements of zi are correlated 
with Ui if zi have, indeed, effects on firms’ efficiency. Unfortunately, this is obviously 
contradicted by the assumption of identically distributed Ui made in the first-stage in which 
 is a constant and is ( iUE ) ( ) Uσπ 212= , while in the second-stage, it becomes 
( iii UVUE − )
                                                                                                                                                                   
 which is varied with zi, as shown in equation (9.2).  
 Moreover, this approach also suffers from another econometric problem, namely 
that since it must be assumed that the elements of zi are uncorrelated with the elements of 
xi, the maximum likelihood estimates of β, σV2, and σU2 are biased due to the omission of 
the relevant variables zi in the first-stage estimation of the frontier. Consequently, the 
estimated efficiency obtained from the second-stage regression would also be biased, as it 
is estimated with a biased representation of the production frontier.  
 
9.2.2 Single-Stage Approach 
 
In order to overcome the drawbacks of the two-stage approach, Deprins and Simar  (1989a, 
2 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), pp.263 
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 1989b) suggest a production frontier with 
 ( ) iii UxfY −= β;lnln       (9.3) 
 ( ) { iii zzUE δ ′= exp }
}
       (9.4)  
where β and δ are the technological and environmental parameter vectors to be estimated, 
and { izδ ′exp expresses the systematic part of the relationship between technical 
inefficiency and the explanatory variables. Thus, the single-stage production frontier 
becomes 
   ( ) { } iiii wzxfY +′−= δβ exp;lnln      (9.5) 
where wi is assumed to have zero mean and a constant variance. Also, wi is not identically 
distributed since its support depends on zi. This frontier model is nonlinear in the 
parameters and can be estimated by either nonlinear least squares, or by maximum 
likelihood estimation, if a suitable one-sided distribution for Ui is specified.  
 This approach is a very important improvement compared to the first two 
approaches mentioned. Firstly, it has achieved an explanation of efficiency, which is not a 
characteristic of the first approach, and further it provides an adjustment to raw efficiency 
scores, which reflects the nature of the operating environments in which they were carried 
out. Secondly, it has solved a problem left by the second approach, since the omitted 
variables and independence problems are avoided by incorporating the explanatory 
variables in a single frontier estimation stage. However, the major drawback of this 
approach is that it is based on a deterministic frontier model, which contains no symmetric 
error component to capture the effects of random noise in the production process.  
 Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin (1991) propose that a production frontier with 
random noise in the production process is introduced, through the error component Vi, so 
that 
 ( ) iiii UVxfY −+= β;lnln       (9.6) 
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 iii wzU +′= δ         (9.7) 
where the technical inefficiency term, Ui, is associated with the systematic component izδ ′  
and a random component wi. This therefore yields a single-stage production frontier model 
 ( ) ( )iiiii wzVxfY +′−+= δβ;lnln      (9.8) 
However, because of the requirement that Ui has to be ≥ 0, wi is required to be ≥ - izδ ′ , 
which, in turn, should avoid imposing the condition that izδ ′ ≥ 0. Nevertheless, in order to 
be able to derive the likelihood function, the restriction of wi ≥ - izδ ′ , as well as a 
distributional assumption of wi and Vi, have to be imposed. To simplify this matter, they, 
however, impose the distributional assumptions on Ui and Vi instead. They assume that Vi 
is distributed with N(0, σV2) and that Ui has truncated normal structure, with variable mode 
depending on zi, N+( izδ ′ , σU2), which also do not require izδ ′ ≥ 0.        
 Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), have formulated a model that can eliminate 
the statistical problems that occur with this additive formulation in the Kumbhakar, Ghosh 
and McGuckin (1991) model. They proposed a hybrid model that combines features of the 
Deprins and Simar (1989a, b) model with features of the Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin 
(1991) model. The technical inefficiency term is now defined as 
 ( ) iii wzgU += δ;        (9.9) 
and the production frontier is, as equation (9.6), that: 
 ( ) iiii UVxfY −+= β;lnln  
The effects of random noise are captured by the error component Vi. The requirement that 
( ) iii wzgU += δ;  ≥ 0 is ensured by specifying a functional form for the systematic 
component of inefficiency satisfying ( )δ;izg ≥ 0, and also by assuming the distribution of 
the random component of inefficiency wi as N+(0, σw2). Hence, the single-stage production 
frontier becomes 
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 ( ) ( ) iiiii wVzgxfY −+−= δβ ;;lnln      (9.10) 
The assignment of a one-sided distribution to wi simplifies estimation of the model by 
eliminating the statistical problems with the additive formulation of Kumbhakar, Ghosh and 
McGuckin. However, this simplification does not come without cost, since the two conditions 
of ( )δ;izg ≥ 0, and that wi is iid N+(0, σw2) are sufficient, but not necessary for Ui ≥ 0. 
Also, the restriction of wi ≥ 0 has an interesting economic implication, for if wi ≥ 0, then Ui 
≥ ( )δ;izg , and thus inefficiency, Ui, is at least as great as the minimum possible 
inefficiency achievable in an environment characterized by the explanatory variables zi. 
Hence, the function ( )δ;izg  in equation (9.9) can be interpreted as a deterministic 
minimum inefficiency frontier.  
 Huang and Liu (1994) proposed a model very similar to the Kumbhakar, Ghosh and 
McGuckin (1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) models. With the same 
identification of the production frontier and the technical inefficiency relationship as those in 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), they rearrange equation (9.10), so that 
 ( ) ( )[ ]iiiii wzgVxfY +−+= δβ ;;lnln     (9.11) 
making it very similar to the model proposed by Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin (1991), 
(equation (9.8)), excepts that izδ ′ is replaced by ( )δ;izg . Therefore, the requirement that 
( )[ iii wzgU += ]δ;  ≥ 0 is met by truncating wi below such that wi ≥ - ( )δ;izg , and by 
assigning a distribution to wi such as N(0, σw2). Thus, instead of truncating a normal 
distribution with variable mode from below at zero as in Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin 
(1991), Huang and Liu (1994) truncated a normal distribution with zero mode from below at 
a variable truncation point ( )[ ]δ;izg− . This therefore allows wi ≤ 0, but enforces Ui ≥ 0.  
 The essential novelty of this model lies in the fact that with the function ( )δ;izg  it 
is possible to introduce interactions between elements of  zi  and elements of  xi. Thus, they 
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expand this function to  
 ( ) ∑∑∑ +=
q n
niqiqn
q
qiqii xzzxzg ln;, δδδ      (9.12) 
The condition that has set the Huang and Liu (1994) model apart from all the other 
stochastic frontier models mentioned above is that they show that when the exogenous 
variables interact with the inputs, they can have non-neutral effects on technical efficiency, 
whereas all other variables assume that technical inefficiency is neutral, with respect to its 
impact on input usage.  
 Later in 1995, Battese and Coelli proposed a model that is essentially the same as 
that of Huang and Liu (1994), but with two exceptions. Firstly, their model is formulated 
within the panel data, rather than cross-sectional context. And secondly, they do not include 
inputs in their specification of ( )δ;izg . Their model, similar to those of Kumbhakar, Ghosh 
and McGuckin (1991), consists of the following specification: 
 ( ) itititit UVxfY −+= β;lnln         
 ititit wzU +′= δ        (9.13) 
With the non-negativity requirement ititit wzU +′= δ  ≥ 0, the random variable wit is 
defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and variance σw2, N(0, 
σw2), such that the point of truncation is itzδ ′ , i.e.  ≥ -itw itzδ ′ . Thus, these assumptions 
are consistent with the distributional assumption that Uit is distributed as N+( itzδ ′ , σU2). 
This formulation differs from that of Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) in that the wit are 
not identically distributed, and nor are they required to be non-negative. Further, the 
mean itzδ ′  of the normal distribution is truncated at zero, to obtain the distribution of Uit 
where this variate is not required to be non-negative for every producer, so that wit ≤ 0 is 
possible in a relatively unfavourable environment. 
 The technical efficiency of the ith producer at the tth observation is, thus, given by 
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 { } { }itititti wzUTE −′−=−= δexpexp      (9.14) 
A predictor for this is provided by  
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This model by Battese and Coelli (1995) is one of the most commonly used models for 
evaluating the stochastic production frontier, when explanatory variables are being taken 
into consideration.  
 
9.2.3 Recent Empirical Studies 
 
Many recent empirical works have been conducted using the single-stage approach 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). This section reviews a number of recent key 
contributions in order to provide illustrative examples for this approach mentioned in the 
previous section. Works that have been conducted in the manufacturing sector include 
Driffield and Munday (2001), who used three-digit data from the UK Censes of Production 
for the period of 1984 to 1992 to examine the determinants of technical efficiency in the UK 
manufacturing industry, focusing particularly on the role of foreign investment and spatial 
agglomeration of similar industry activities. Their results show that foreign ownership is a 
determinant of technical efficiency in the UK manufacturing industry, although the effect 
was found to be varying according to industry characteristics. In sectors that were relatively 
more productive and regionally concentrated, the effect of foreign investment was found to 
be higher.  
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 As another example, consider the work of Battese et al. (2001) which used a 
stochastic frontier models in the study of technical efficiencies of firms in the Indonesian 
garment industry, in five different regions for the period from 1990 to 1995. The results 
showed that there were substantial efficiency differences among the firms across the five 
regions.  
 Uğur (2003) examined the technical efficiency levels in the Electrical and Optical 
Equipment industry in Irish manufacturing sector, and the factors that would affect these 
levels. They utilized the firm level panel data over the period from 1991 to 1999, and found 
that investment intensity and labour quality played an important role in explaining technical 
inefficiency levels. However, they found no significant relationship between export intensity 
and the technical inefficiency levels of individual firms in all but one sector.  
 Kneller and Stevens (2006) examined the two potential sources of inefficiency 
(namely, the differences in human capital and R&D) for nine industries in 12 OECD 
countries over the period of 1973 to 1991. They found that inefficiency in production does 
indeed exist and depends upon the level of human capital of the country’s workforce. 
However, the evidence that the amount of R&D would affect the efficiency was shown to be 
less robust.  
 Apart from the works concentrated in the manufacturing sector, many empirical 
studies had also been conducted on the agricultural sectors. Examples include the work on 
the technical inefficiency of the Swedish lobster fishery by Eggert (2000), in which the level 
of, and determinants of, technical efficiency of Swedish demersal trawlers are analysed 
using a translog stochastic production frontier that included a model for vessel-specific 
technical efficiencies. This technical inefficiency effect was found to be highly significant in 
explaining the level of, and variation in, vessel revenues. This indicates that fishermen 
become more efficient, the longer they have been fishing, but that their vessels became less 
efficient when they became older, and finally, that the size of the vessel does not influence 
efficiency.  
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 Coelli et al. (2003) applied a stochastic production frontier model to measure total 
factor productivity growth, technical efficiency change and technological change in 
Bangladesh crop agriculture for 31 observations from 1960/61 to 1991/92, using data for 16 
regions. Their results revealed that technical change followed a U-shaped pattern, rising 
from the early 1970s. However, technical efficiency declined throughout. The combined 
effect of slow technical progress, dominated by the fall in technical efficiency, resulted in 
total factor productivity declining, with an increasing rate of decline. TFP change was shown 
to depend on ‘green revolution’ technology, and agricultural research expenditures.  
 Belloumi and Matoussi (2005) compared estimates of technical efficiency, obtained 
from the stochastic frontier approach for two samples of private and GIC farmers in Tunisia, 
which were characterized by a severe scarcity of water and a high degree of salinity. The 
technical inefficiency effects were modelled as a function of farm-specific socioeconomic 
factors, and environmental factors. The results showed that both systems were technically 
inefficient, but that the GIC farmers were technically less efficient, compared to the private 
ones, as they were more severely affected by water salinity.  
 These empirical examples provided very valuable illustrative examples for such a 
single stage approach developed by Battese and Coelli (1995), therefore, leading to a more 
accurate model specification which will be carrying out in the next section.  
 
 
9.3 Model Specification 
 
As stated earlier, the objective of this chapter is to examine a key issue raised in Chapter 8, 
concerning the relationship between the level of productive capital investments and the 
efficiency level. Ideally, in order to explore this, the data on each category of capital 
investment should be used as an explanatory variable in the technical efficiency effects 
model. Then the results of stochastic frontier estimation, both pre- and post-crisis, should 
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be compared. Unfortunately, such disaggregated data on capital categories were not 
available in the pre-crisis period. Therefore, an alternative method needs to be adopted. 
One way in which this difficulty could be solved is by testing the increase in capital 
investments against the inefficiency level in the post-crisis period. A negative relationship 
between the increase in a particular type of capital investment and the inefficiency level 
would imply that the improvement in the post-crisis efficiency level was, at some level, 
affected by the increase in that particular capital investment. And if it is possible to show 
that the increase in productive capital investments (i.e. in machinery and office appliance) 
has indeed had a negative effect on the inefficiency term, then it would verify the claim 
made in Chapter 8 that the improvement in the efficiency level was partly a result from the 
increase in investment in the more productive capitals. 
 Therefore, following Battese and Coelli (1995), the production frontier is assumed 
to take the form of the Cobb-Douglas production function, which can be expressed as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ititititit UVLKY −+++= lnlnln 210 βββ    (9.18) 
where the technical inefficiency component is defined as 
 ititititit wzzzU +++= 332211 δδδ      (9.19) 
Here, the technical inefficiency, Uit, is assumed to be influenced by the increase in capital 
investments in three major areas, i.e. land, machinery, and office appliances (in which land 
is assumed to proxy the unproductive, speculative capital investment3, while machinery and 
office appliance are assumed to proxy the productive investment). This follows the method 
employed by Young (1995), in which capital input was divided into five categories, 
consisting of: residential buildings; non-residential buildings; other durable structures; 
transport equipment; and machinery. The addition to capital investment in land, z1it, is 
measured by the ratio of the change in value of gross additions of land to the number of 
                                                          
3 Land is used to proxy the unproductive and/or speculative investment in this case, since, in the pre-
crisis period, the Thai economy was characterized as being a ‘bubble’ economy, where many 
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employee. The addition to capital investment in machinery z2it is measured by the ratio of 
the change in value of gross additions of machinery and equipment to the number of 
employee. And the addition to capital investment in office appliances z3it is measured by the 
ratio of the change in value of gross additions of office appliances to the number of 
employees.  
 Therefore, the single-stage production frontier is estimated using the specification  
      ( ) ( ) itititititititit wVzzzLKY −+−−−++= 332211210 lnlnln δδδβββ     (9.20) 
and the technical efficiency of production for the ith industry at the tth observation is 
defined by  
 { } { }itititititti wzzzUTE −−−−=−= 332211expexp δδδ   (9.21) 
The prediction of the technical efficiencies is based on the conditional expectation given by 
the model assumptions. The technical efficiency will take the value of one if an industry has 
an inefficiency effect equal to zero, and will be less than one otherwise.  
 Several parameters need to be tested, including the γ, δL, δM, and δOF. The 
variance-ratio parameter γ, as in the previous chapter, is important in determining whether 
a stochastic production frontier is a superior model, compared to the traditional average 
production function. If the null hypothesis γ = 0 cannot be rejected, the average production 
function would be a better representation of the post-crisis manufacturing sector, 
suggesting that no technical inefficiency is presented. The parameters δL, δM, and δOF 
indicate the effects of capital investment on technical inefficiency. If the null hypothesis of δ 
= 0 cannot be rejected, then it suggests that particular capital does not have a significant 
effect on efficiency. Otherwise, the value of δ is expected to be negative if is it to improve 
the efficiency level of the production process, while on the other hand, a positive δ indicates 
                                                                                                                                                                   
manufacturers over-invested in the real estate sector, in order to benefit from the fast rate of price 
increase within it.  
 - 257 -
Technical Efficiency Effects Models 
a reduction in efficiency. Tests of hypotheses on parameters can be performed using the 
generalized likelihood ratio test statistic defined by 
  ( ) ( )[ ]10 lnln2 HH −−=Λ
This test statistic has approximately a χ2 distribution, or a mixed χ2 in the case that involves 
testing γ = 0, with degrees of freedom being equal to the difference between the numbers 
of parameters involved under the null and alternative hypotheses. 
 
 
9.4 Empirical Results 
 
The data set on the post-crisis manufacturing sector is estimated using the program 
FRONTIER 4.1, which uses equation (9.20) above based on the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model. Three explanatory variables, including the addition to capital investment in land, 
machinery, and office appliance, are assumed to be influencing the efficiency of the 
industry’s ability to convert inputs into outputs, and hence, affecting the production frontier 
indirectly. This model will, from here, be referred to as Model 9.6. The results from this 
estimation are presented in Table 9.1.  
 The estimation of the output elasticity of capital, β1, and the output elasticity of 
labour, β2, are in accordance to those estimated by the error components model in Chapter 
8. The coefficient estimate of capital, β1, is 0.5514, while it is 0.3003 for the coefficient 
estimate of labour, β2. This suggests that the structure of the post-crisis manufacturing 
sector is capital intensive, once again confirming the results from the traditional average 
function discussed in Chapter 6, as well as the error components model in Chapter 8.  The 
inefficiency coefficient estimate of the addition to land investment, δL, is 0.0017, indicating 
that the additional investment in land will result in a decline of efficiency, and hence to a 
deterioration in the sector’s productivity. On the other hand, the inefficiency coefficient 
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estimate of the addition to machinery, δM, and of the addition to office appliances, δOF, are 
equal to -0.0000712, and -0.0012, respectively. These indicate that the additional 
investment in machinery, as well as in office appliances, will improve technical efficiency, 
and hence, the overall productivity of the sector.  
 
Table 9.1: maximum likelihood estimates of the technical efficiency models for the post-crisis period 
MLE Estimates Variable Parameter 
Model 9.6 Model 9.7 
Constant β0 4.1578 4.0997 
  (1.0877) (0.9060) 
Ln Asset β1 0.5514 0.5447 
  (0.1466) (0.0911) 
Ln Employ β2 0.3003 0.3152 
  (0.1618) (0.1179) 
Land δL 0.0017 0.0013 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Machinery δM -0.7120E-04 -0.6379E-04 
  (0.2992E-04) (0.2804E-04) 
Office Appliance δOF -0.0012 - 
  (0.0017) - 
 σ2 0.3324 0.3380 
  (0.0552) (0.0549) 
 γ 0.1186E-06 0.1000E-07 
  (0.1166E-04) (0.0002) 
 n 88 88 
 Log Likelihood -76.4666 -76.8563 
Note: MLE estimates of model 9.6 (equation (9.20) p.257) were obtained using the method of Battese 
and Coelli (1995) for a Cobb-Douglas production function and a technical inefficiency term Uit 
influenced by 3 capital components: land, machinery, and office appliances.  
 MLE estimates of model 9.7 (equation (9.22) p.261) were obtained using the method of 
Battese and Coelli (1995) for a Cobb-Douglas production function and a technical inefficiency 
term Uit influenced by 2 capital components: land and machinery. 
   Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
 
 These estimates are then tested for their significance, using likelihood ratio tests. 
Table 9.2 presents the test statistics obtained from these hypothesis tests. Firstly, the 
variance-ratio parameter, γ, is tested for the superiority of the production frontier against 
the average function. The null hypothesis may be formulated as : γ = 0. If it cannot be 
rejected, this would suggest that the post-crisis manufacturing sector had no inefficiency in 
the production process, and hence that the traditional average production function (which 
assumes all the producers are producing efficiently) is a more appropriate choice of model. 
0H
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The results from the model estimation show that the estimated variance parameter (γ) 
presented in Table 9.1, has a value very close to zero, which suggests that the inefficiency 
effects could be of marginal significance. However, the result of the hypothesis test shown 
in Table 9.2 indicates that this null hypothesis should be rejected, as the calculated χ2 
statistic is equal to 8.7769. Therefore, it could be concluded that in the post-crisis period, 
although the efficiency level was rather high, some inefficiency in the production process 
still persisted. Therefore, the average production function is not an adequate representation 
of this period, hence, the frontier production function based on the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model is found to be a more appropriate representation.  
 
Table 9.2: Tests of hypotheses for parameters of the technical inefficiency component  
Assumptions Null Hypothesis  χ2-statistic χ20.95 -value Decision 
Model 9.6 γ = 0 8.7769 8.761∗ Reject H0
Model 9.6 δL  = 0 6.2336 3.84 Reject H0
Model 9.6 δM = 0 7.8351 3.84 Reject H0
Model 9.6 δOF = 0 0.7795 3.84 Cannot Reject H0
Model 9.7 γ = 0 7.9974 7.045* Reject H0
Model 9.7 δL  = 0 7.8487 3.84 Reject H0
Model 9.7 δM = 0 7.5070 3.84 Reject H0
Note: Hypotheses are tested by the general likelihood ratio test ( ) ( )[ ]10 lnln2 HH− −=Λ  
  
 Following this, the next set of hypothesis tests should be conducted in order to 
investigate whether or not each of the technical inefficiency explanatory variables δL, δM, 
and δOF are significant. If any of the null hypotheses : δ0H L = 0, or : δ0H M =0, or          
: δ0H OF = 0 cannot be rejected, then that particular explanatory variable should be 
dropped out of the model and another model specification would be needed. The results 
from these tests are also shown in Table 9.2. The null hypotheses : δ0H L = 0, as well 
                                                          
∗ Any likelihood ratio test statistic involving a null hypothesis which includes the restriction that γ is 
zero does not have a chi-square distribution because the restriction defines a point on the boundary of 
the parameter space. In this case the likelihood ratio statistic has been shown to have a mixed χ2 
distribution. In this case, critical values for the generalized likelihood ratio test are obtained from 
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as : δ0H M =0 are both rejected at the 95% significance level, indicating that the additions 
to the land investment and machinery investment, do indeed, have significant effects on the 
inefficiency level, and thus on the efficiency of the industry’s ability to convert inputs into 
outputs. However, the hypothesis : δ0H OF = 0 cannot be rejected, hence this implies that 
the effect of the addition to office appliance investment is not significant, and therefore, this 
variable should be dropped out of the model.  
 Consequently, a new specification for the Battese and Coelli (1995) single-stage 
production frontier becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ititMitMLitLititit wVzzLKY −+−−++= δδβββ lnlnln 210  (9.22) 
 and the technical efficiency of production for the ith industry at the tth observation is 
 { } { }itMitMLitLitti wzzUTE −−−=−= δδexpexp     (9.23) 
which from here, will be referred to as Model 9.7.  
 The coefficient estimates for Model 9.7 are also presented in Table 9.1. In 
accordance to the estimation in Model 9.6, the coefficient estimates of the output elasticity 
of capital β1, and the output elasticity of labour, β2, are equal to 0.5447 and 0.3152, 
respectively, suggesting that the structure of the manufacturing sector is capital intensive. 
Moreover, the inefficiency coefficient estimate of the addition to land investment is 0.0013, 
indicating a positive relationship between technical inefficiency and the additional 
investment in land. Therefore, this positive sign of the coefficient estimate is suggesting 
that the more investment in land the manufacturing sector undertakes, the less efficient it 
would become. This would lead to a decline in the sector’s productivity through the effect 
on the firms’ efficiency, due to their reduced ability to translate inputs into outputs. On the 
other hand, the inefficiency coefficient estimate of the addition to machinery is equal to -
                                                                                                                                                                   
Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986). The simplified version of this table is also presented in Appendix 
B.  
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0.00006379. This implies that additional investment in machinery will improve technical 
efficiency, and hence, the overall productivity of the sector. 
 Once again, significance tests are needed, and are conducted employing the 
likelihood ratio tests. The hypothesis test for the variance-ratio parameter, γ, rejects the null 
hypothesis : γ = 0 at 95% significant level thus, again, indicating that the inefficiency 
still exists, and confirming the superiority of the Battese and Coelli (1995) type of 
production frontier, against the traditional OLS average production function for the this set 
of data. Hypothesis tests on the significance  of  the  technical  inefficiency  explanatory 
variables δ
0H
L, and δM indicate that both : δ0H L = 0 and : δ0H M =0 are rejected. These 
results imply that the additions to both land and machinery investment, although relatively 
small, do indeed have significant effects on the inefficiency level, and thus, on the efficiency 
of the industry’s ability to convert inputs into outputs. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that 
the post-crisis manufacturing sector could be modelled by the production frontier of 
equation (9.22), in which the technical inefficiency exists in the production process, and is 
affected on some level by the two explanatory variables, i.e. the addition to land and 
machinery investment.   
 The technical efficiency estimates of the industries, together with the mean 
technical efficiency, are calculated according to the specification of equation (9.23) above. 
The values obtained are presented in Table 9.3. It should be noted here, once more, that 
data for 2001 are unavailable, as the National Statistical Office (NSO) failed to conduct the 
survey in that year. Therefore, observations for 2001 are treated as missing observations. 
The grand mean efficiency for the post-crisis period is considered relatively high at 0.8496, 
suggesting that in the post crisis period, most of the industries were operating rather close 
to the production frontier, with only industry 10 – the coke, petroleum and nuclear industry, 
and industry 13 – the non-metallic mineral products, that showed rather low efficiency, 
comparatively. The explanation for such a dramatic decline in the efficiency level for 
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industry 10 in 2002 (with the efficiency level calculated at only 0.1000) lies in the problem 
of a statistical artefact. Prior to 2001, this industry was dominated by one single stage-
owned company, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand PCL (PTT), which had been very 
inefficient and had been facing with a severe problem of debt. Therefore, in 2001, the 
company was restructured, and was ordered to increase its registered capital by 8,500 
million Baht (around 220.79 million US dollar). This has, therefore, led to a ‘pseudo-
increase’ in its input, and hence, has reduced its measured efficiency level as estimated by 
the Battese and Coelli (1995) model. For industry 13, the decline in its efficiency level in 
1999 was the result of decreasing demand for products in this category, such as cement, 
lignite, gypsum, and ballclay, following the declining in the construction and mining sector. 
However, the situation improved in 2000 owing to the assistance from the joint-venture 
partner4, which resulted in the higher export of these products, from being very domestic 
oriented to being rather export oriented, with more than 30 percent of its total production 
going overseas by 2000. 
 The annual mean efficiency is 0.8334, 0.8354, 0.8824, and 0.8447, for 1998, 1999, 
2000, and 2002, respectively. One interesting point here is that the annual mean efficiency 
is showing a small, but insignificant, increasing trend, except for 2002, in which it declined 
from the level of the year 2000. Such a decline has largely resulted from the sharp decline 
in the efficiency level of industry 10 (the coke, petroleum and nuclear industry) in 2002. 
Without industry 10, the mean efficiency is then 0.8381, 0.8511, 0.8873, and 0.8885 for 
1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002, respectively. This shows an increasing trend, as expected. 
However, once tested for statistical significances with null hypothesis H0: μ98 = μ99 =           
μ00  = μ02 , the null hypothesis could not be rejected at 5 percent level of significance. Hence, 
it could be concluded that this increasing trend is, unfortunately, insignificant. 
   
                                                          
4 Bank of Thailand, (1999, and 2000) 
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Table 9.3: Technical Efficiency Estimates of the TE Effects model 
Note: Technical Efficiency estimates were obtained using the method of Battese and Coelli (1995) for 
a Cobb-Douglas production function and a technical inefficiency tern Uit influenced by 3 capital 
components: land, machinery, and office appliances. Because office appliances were 
insignificant, computation used equation (9.22) which in this thesis is referred to as Model 9.7 
(see p.261)  
Industry 1998 1999 2000 2002 
Food  0.8445 0.8532 0.8674 0.8724 
Tobacco  0.9037 0.9201 0.9563 0.9939 
Textiles 0.8820 0.9351 0.9693 0.9242 
Wearing Apparel 0.9524 0.9689 0.9779 0.9408 
Leather Products  0.8374 0.8887 0.9339 n/a#
Footwear 0.9558 0.9809 0.9404 n/a#
Wood  0.8497 0.9045 0.9200 0.8761 
Paper  0.7891 0.8388 0.8545 0.8634 
Publishing 0.7886 0.7902 0.8125 0.8353 
Petroleum  0.7261 0.4893 0.7749 0.1000 
Chemical  0.8119 0.8442 0.7980 0.8593 
Rubber & Plastic  0.8370 0.9327 0.8880 0.9182 
Non-Metallic Mineral  0.5498 0.3258 0.6923 0.7270 
Basic Metals 0.7659 0.7780 0.7465 n/a#
Fabricated Metal  0.8133 0.8475 0.8976 0.8963 
Machinery  0.8827 0.8422 0.9063 0.8878 
Computing  0.9897 0.9467 0.9472 0.9933 
Electrical  0.9404 n/a# n/a# 0.9234 
Communication  0.8553 0.9409 0.9819 n/a#
Medical 0.8859 0.9586 0.9706 n/a#
Vehicles 0.6866 0.6658 0.7463 0.7535 
Transport Equipment 0.8163 0.8341 0.9284 0.8940 
Furniture 0.7556 0.7831 0.9300 0.9450 
Jewellery  0.8826 0.9442 0.8559 n/a#
Mean 0.8334 0.8354 0.8824 0.8447 
Mean  0.8496  (n = 88) 
   
  
9.5 Implication of the Results 
 
The results from Model 9.7, the stochastic production frontier with the technical inefficiency 
explanatory variables (i.e. the addition to land and machinery investment) suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1995), indicates that in the 5 post-crisis years, from 1998 to 2002, the 
manufacturing sector of Thailand experienced a structural shift from being labour intensive 
to being capital intensive. The coefficient estimates of the post-crisis output elasticity of 
                                                          
# Data is not available for that period, thus no values of technical efficiencies are calculated 
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capital and the output elasticity of labour are equal to 0.5447 and 0.3152, respectively. This 
finding is coincided with the conclusions in both the traditional average Cobb-Douglas 
production function in chapter 6, and the Battese and Coelli (1992) error components model 
in Chapter 8.  
 The factors behind such structural shift have already been explained in the previous 
chapter, which involves 5 main causes. First, the shakeouts of the firms with less efficiency 
and less technology advancement leading to the improvement in the overall efficiency level 
of the industries, and of the sector as a whole. Second, the reduction of the amount of 
labour used in the production processes as a result of the labour quantity adjustment to the 
crisis, leading to shifts in the output elasticity of inputs used. Third, the adjustment in 
relative price, due to the reduction in the interest rates as well as the rigidity in wage, 
results in the substitution of capital for labour in the production process, hence, shifting the 
structure from labour intensive to capital intensive. Furthermore, the government policies in 
facilitating capital investment including the soft loans provision for businesses that need 
capital upgrading or start-ups, and the tariffs reduction for import of capital goods, also 
bring about this structural shift. And finally, the post-crisis financial market reformation has 
resulted in a healthier investment environment in which the ability to access to loans for 
firms with good investment projects is greatly enhanced. Therefore, capital investment in 
the manufacturing sector increases, especially in the more productive investment area such 
as machinery.  
 In fact, this last argument, the factor concerning the investment behaviour in the 
manufacturing sector, is the main focal point of this chapter. The graphical exploratory data 
analysis in Chapter 6 has revealed the improvement in the gross output - capital 
expenditure ratio, CEGO , in the post-crisis period. Such finding implied that there might 
be an increase in the usage of the more productive capital, and hence, leading to the 
increase in the gross output produced. Later in Chapter 8, it was argued that although the 
level of total private investment declined significantly in the post-crisis period, the 
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manufacturing sector was benefited by the healthier investment behaviour resulting from 
the financial market reformation in form of the increase in efficiency level. Dollar and 
Hallward-Driemeier (2000) stated that because the pre-crisis interest rates were so high, 
the majority of the investments in that period were speculative investments, such as those 
in the stock market and the real estate sector, which was the only type of investments that 
could possibly generate sufficient returns. Therefore, the manufacturing sector suffered 
from such circumstances. It is also argued that even the pre-crisis investment projects 
within the manufacturing sector itself were also concentrated heavily on the unproductive 
areas5, such as investment in plants and land, since it generated higher returns compared 
to the returns from the production of outputs. Also, many domestic manufacturers preferred 
to invest their funds in real estate by building larger plants, as well as acquiring more land, 
as these increased the value of their company. Thus, by the time of the 1997 crisis, majority 
of manufacturers were reported to have excessive land and plant size. Fortunately, the 
post-crisis investment environment has turned favourable for the productive investments. 
Increase in productive investments could be seen as a result of the reduction in domestic 
interest rates and the financial institutes’ lending behaviour.  
 The analysis in this chapter is the verification for such arguments. The non-zero 
variance-ratio parameter, γ, indicates that although the efficiency level is rather high, there 
still exist inefficiency in the post-crisis production process. The positive value of δL, in which 
although small but significant, suggests that the higher the investment these industries 
made in land, the lower the efficiency in their production processes become, and therefore, 
leading to the decline in the sector productivity through the effects on the firms’ ability to 
translate inputs into outputs. This result is in accordance with the argument made earlier 
that many Thai manufacturers were already invested excessively in land and real estate 
prior to the crisis. Thus, further investment in this area would not generate much more 
efficiency, and in some cases might have even resulted in a decline in efficiency. Therefore, 
                                                          
5 Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, (2000) 
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it seems reasonable to argue that Thai manufacturing sector had suffered from the over-
investment in unproductive capital prior to the 1997 economic crisis, therefore, leading to 
low level of efficiency, and productivity. Consequently, the competitiveness of the country 
declined, and hence, brought about the decline of export growth, which was at that time 
the main driving force of the country’s economic growth. The declining export, the 
weakening economic growth, the bubble in real estate and stock market, as well as, the 
bulky external debt, had become an excellent motive for currency speculators to attack the 
Thai Baht, creating the starting point of the 1997 economic crisis.  
 Nevertheless, this crisis could still be seen as being beneficial for the Thai 
manufacturing sector. The post-crisis efficiency and productivity have improved significantly. 
One  of  the  reasons,  shown  in  this chapter,  might  have  been  partly  coming  from the  
post-crisis  financial restructuring,  which benefits this sector  by  allowing  more  productive 
investments (especially the capital investments) to take place. The negative value of δM, in 
which is used to proxy the productive types of investment, suggests that the increase in 
investments of machinery and equipment has improved the post-crisis efficiency of the 
manufacturers, and as a result, enhance their ability to convert inputs into outputs and thus, 
increase their productivity. As a result, post-crisis Thai manufacturing sector became better 
off in terms of productivity and competitiveness, and therefore, creating a stronger 
foundation for competing against other economies in the world market. Additionally, the 
negative sign of the technical inefficiency variable δM also implies that there is still room for 
Thai manufacturing sector to improve their efficiency further by the increase in investments 
in machinery and equipment. As once mentioned by Krugman (1994) that growth based 
only on the higher use of resource mobilization could not be sustained in the long-run, 
therefore, growth should be built up from technology progress and efficiency, or the so-
called ‘efficiency-led sustainable growth’.  
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9.6 Conclusion  
 
With the pre- and post-crisis structural shift in the manufacturing sector, as well as the 
significant improvement in the post-crisis efficiency, observed in the previous chapter, it is 
faired to allege that there existed some specific causes that affected such variations in the 
manufacturing sector. Therefore, this analysis of the productive efficiency would not be 
considered complete without the examination on at least one of the factors suggested 
previously to be causing such variations. Hence, in this chapter, the relationship between 
the capital investments and technical efficiency had been examined, based on the Battese 
and Coelli (1995) model. The estimation of the output elasticity of capital and the output 
elasticity of labour are in accordance to those estimated by the error components model in 
the previous chapters. Two explanatory variables, the addition to capital investment in land 
and the addition to capital investment in machinery and equipment, are concluded to be 
significantly related to efficiency. The positive value of the coefficient of additional 
investment in land suggests that the higher the investment these industries made in land, 
the lower their efficiencies become. While the negative value of the coefficient of additional 
investment in machinery and equipment suggest that the increase in investments of 
machinery and equipment will improve the efficiency of the manufacturers, and as a result, 
enhances their ability to convert production inputs into marketable outputs. These results 
verify the argument made in Chapter 8 stating that the post-crisis efficiency improvement is 
partly caused by the increase in productive capital improvement brought about by the post-
crisis financial market restructuring as well as the reduction in the domestic interest rates. 
Therefore, this implies that the pre-crisis Thai manufacturing sector had suffered from the 
insufficient productive capital investments, but this condition has improved since the 
aftermath of the crisis, and therefore, leading to the improvement of the efficiency and 
productivity level in the post-crisis period.  
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 Although the analysis in this chapter has fulfilled its objective in relating the capital 
investment with the efficiency level, however, this analysis is still somewhat limited due to 
the limitation from the data availability. Such an analysis could be greatly enhanced if more 
data could be collected in order that all the factors leading to such improvement in the 
productivity level previously discussed (including the shakeouts, the reduction in the labour 
used, the adjustment in the relative price, and the government’s post-crisis stimulus 
packages) could be included in the model and be tested. Therefore, further research is 
suggested to be conducted along this direction.  
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Chapter 10 – Conclusion 
 
10.1 Research Overview 
 
The main objective of this thesis (as suggested by its title) is to examine productivity trends 
in the Thai manufacturing sector using pre- and post-crisis evidence relating to the 1997 
economic crisis. The structure of this thesis has been built around the attempt to answer 
the three main set of research questions posed in Chapter 1. The first set of research 
questions concerned the measurement of the pre-crisis productivity level and, also, 
examined the efficiency trend within that period. The second set of questions involved the 
measurement of the post-crisis productivity, and its adjustment during the recovery period. 
Finally, the third set of questions were aimed at making a comparison between the two 
periods, and hence, drawing out the implications on the effects of the crisis and its effects, 
as well as the adjustments that led to the observed improvements seen in the post-crisis 
period.  
 The thesis started by providing an overview of the development of the Thai 
economy since the period of laying foundation in the 1950s, as it was believed that a good 
understanding of such a development process would create a better comprehension of the 
origins of the crisis. It then proceeded further to investigate the genesis of the 1997 
economic crisis, as well as examining the consequences that the crisis had for the Thai 
economy. Five main causes of the crisis have been identified including: the slowdown of 
export growth; mistakes in financial policies; the problem of asymmetric information and 
over-investment; attacks on the currency; and responses to the currency devaluation. The 
effects of the crisis were categorized into two areas: economic growth, and employment,. 
Nevertheless, the focal point of this thesis is not an aggregate economic effects, but rather 
on the effects of the crisis on the productivity level of the Thai manufacturing sector. 
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Therefore, much effort had been put into appropriate measurement of the productivity 
levels in both the pre- and post-crisis periods.  
 The outline of this chapter is as the following: Section 10.2 will summarize the key 
research findings concerning the productivity level of the manufacturing sector. Three sets 
of key hypotheses will be tested, aiming at the rejection of null hypotheses, and the 
acceptance of the alternative. Answers to the three main sets of research questions will be 
drawn from such hypothesis tests. Section 10.3 concludes other findings of this thesis. 
Section 10.3.1 reviews the genesis of the crisis by classifying the roots of it into 5 main 
causes. Section 10.3.2 considers other consequences of the 1997 crisis for the Thai 
economy, including the effects on GDP growth and employment. Section 10.4 identifies the 
research contributions, and also provides policy implications. And finally, section 10.5 offers 
future research suggestions.  
 
 
10.2 Answers to the Research Questions  
 
The organization of this thesis had been based on attempts to answer the three sets of 
research questions which were posed in Chapter 1. Much effort had been put into ensuring 
the results were reliable and robust. This effort was directed at the search for a trustworthy 
data source, a reliable method of measurement, and a rigorous and appropriate set of 
models. Moreover, in order to enrich the context of the results achieved, much exploratory 
analysis was conducted, and many alternative hypotheses were tested. The key findings are 
presented in the form of answers to the research questions. Thus:  
 
Question 1:  What was the productivity/efficiency level of the pre-crisis manufacturing 
industry? Is it true that the sector had low efficiency, and had not been improving its 
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productivity, despite the growing competition from the newly developing countries such as 
China and Vietnam? 
 
As mentioned above, in order to pursue for the answer to these two questions, a set of 
hypotheses had been set up, with the null hypothesis stating that ‘the productivity/efficiency 
level in the pre-crisis period was reasonably high, as the level of capital investment during 
that period was also high. Therefore, the deterioration of competitiveness, and hence the 
1997 economic crisis, were not caused by low productivity productivity/efficiency levels.’ In 
order to test such a hypothesis, the stochastic production frontier approach has been 
selected for the measurement of productivity in the Thai manufacturing sector. The findings 
(presented in Chapter 8) revealed that the pre-crisis efficiency level of the Thai 
manufacturing sector had been low, with the mean efficiency level of 0.3444, and with 
many sectors exhibiting efficiency levels as low as just 20 percent. Moreover, the findings 
also suggested that during the seven years from 1990 to 1996, the Thai manufacturing 
sector experienced no obvious technical improvement whatsoever. This finding might seem 
uncharacteristic at first, considering the period’s extraordinary growth rate, as well as the 
substantial rate of investment during the early 1990s. Prior to the crisis in July 1997, 
Thailand had enjoyed a long and considerable growth period, with an average GDP growth 
of 9.49 percent per annum. The investment level in the country had also been sizeable; the 
average capital stock growth in the manufacturing sector (between 1986 and 1996) was as 
high as 14.0 per cent per annum.  
 However, once one looks into the details of capital investments during the pre-crisis 
period, one would no longer be surprised by such findings. Dollar and Hallward-Driemeie 
(2000) claimed that the majority of that growth in capital was channelled into risky projects 
and highly cyclical investments (such as the real estate sector and the stock market), rather 
than into the more productive manufacturing sector. The soaring level of interest rates 
prevented entrepreneurs from investing in an ordinary investment projects, as they could 
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hardly yield sufficient returns1. Therefore, this had entailed the growth in the productivity of 
the manufacturing sector, and hence, had led to decline in the competitiveness of Thai 
manufacturing products. 
 Furthermore, findings from Chapter 9 also suggested that excessive investment in 
real estate had prevented manufacturers from investing sufficiently in technology 
advancement and efficiency upgrading of the production processes. Therefore, the 
productivity of Thai manufacturers was deteriorating even further.  Combined with the 
fierce competition from the newly developing countries such as China and Vietnam (where 
there resources were still abundant and the cost of labour were still very cheap), this 
became one of the main reasons behind the decline in Thailand’s export growth. 
 These findings, therefore, support the rejection of the null hypothesis discussed 
above. The alternative hypothesis stating that ‘the productivity/efficiency level in the pre-
crisis period was low, as investment made during that period were concentrated mainly in 
the unproductive areas. Therefore, the deterioration of competitiveness, and hence the 
1997 economic crisis, were indeed caused by low productivity/efficiency level’ is, instead, 
accepted. Consequently, this provides the answers to the first set of research questions. 
The productivity/efficiency level of the pre-crisis manufacturing industry was low, and did 
not show any sign of improvement during the seven-year period covered in this study, 
despite the growing competition from the newly developing countries.   
   
 
Question 2:  What was the productivity/efficiency level of the manufacturing sector in 
the post-crisis period? Did it improve, or did it deteriorate during the 5-year period of study? 
 
The structure of this thesis was built in such a way that it facilitated the pursuit of answers 
to the questions above. A second set of hypotheses was set up, with the null hypothesis 
                                                          
1 Jitsuchon, (2002) 
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(aiming to be rejected) hypothesizing that ‘the productivity/efficiency level in the post-crisis 
period was lower, when compared to the pre-crisis period.’ As in the case of pre-crisis 
productivity measurement, the stochastic production frontier approach was used in 
measuring the post-crisis productivity level in the manufacturing sector.  
 The findings in Chapter 8 implied that the appropriate model to represent the data 
set from the post-crisis period is the stochastic frontier estimation with time varying 
inefficiency component (i.e. the model suggested by Battese and Coelli (1992)). The results 
from such a model suggested that the mean efficiency levels were higher in the post-crisis 
period, comparing to the pre-crisis level, but most importantly, it demonstrated a rising 
trend in efficiency. The efficiency level in 1998 was 45.02 percent, which had increased to 
53.56 percent in 1999, 61.46 percent in 2000, and 75.59 percent in 2002. However, not all 
industries exhibited an immediate improvement in their efficiency levels post crisis. Twenty 
industries (out of the total of 24) showed an increase in efficiency in 1998, just a year after 
the crisis broke off. However, another four industries (namely, the publishing and printing 
industry, the coke, petroleum and nuclear industry, the machinery and equipment industry, 
and the basic metals industry) revealed a decline in efficiency level during 1998, when 
compared to the pre-crisis level. Nevertheless, most of them, except the coke, petroleum 
and nuclear industry, recovered and achieved a higher level of efficiency in later years. It is 
sensible to explain such finding in terms of the common characteristic all these four 
industries. Under the standard set by the National Statistical Office, these industries were 
considered to be domestic industries (which exported less than 30 percent of its total 
production), and they were the segments in the manufacturing sector that had been most 
heavily hit by the crisis, due to their inability to exploit the benefits of improved 
competitiveness, resulting from the cheaper Baht.  
 These results led to the rejection of the null hypothesis, which alleged that in the 5 
immediate years after the crisis, the manufacturing sector of Thailand had experienced 
deterioration in its efficiency level, when compared to the pre-crisis level. They, instead, 
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suggested the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis, claiming that ‘the 
productivity/efficiency level in the post-crisis period was higher, when compared to the pre-
crisis period.’ Therefore, the answers to the second set of research questions are that: the 
post-crisis productivity/efficiency level of the Thai manufacturing sector was higher when 
compared to the pre-crisis level, and that during the period of 5 post-crisis years examined 
in this thesis, the efficiency level of Thai manufacturing sector exhibited an increasing trend.  
 
 
Question 3:  What are the possible explanations for the difference in pre- and post-crisis 
productivity level? Did capital investment play a significant role in accounting for such 
difference? 
 
This set of questions is aimed at making a comparison between the structures of the pre- 
and post-crisis Thai manufacturing sector, and hence, drawing out the implications on the 
effects of the crisis, which have led to improvements in the post-crisis efficiency. In order to 
do so, a third set of hypotheses was set up, with the null hypothesis stating that ‘the 
deterioration in the post-crisis productivity/efficiency level was a result of the reduction in 
the amount of capital investment, due to the problem of the domestic credit crunch during 
1997 and 1998’.  
 The comparison between the structures of the Thai manufacturing sector in the 
pre- and post-crisis period were attempted in Chapter 6 and 8, in which it was 
demonstrated that there was a sign of a structural shift from a labour intensive 
manufacturing sector in the pre-crisis period to a capital intensive one in the post-crisis. The 
output elasticity of capital shifted from 0.2813 in the pre-crisis period to 0.5022 post-crisis. 
In contrast, the output elasticity of labour declined from 0.5625 pre-crisis to only 0.2064 
post-crisis. The justification for such a switch of dominance between capital and labour in 
the pre- and post-crisis periods, as well as the improvement in the post-crisis efficiency level, 
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can be sought in a complex set of explanations. The first possible explanation came from 
the shakeout process. In which it, the economic crisis had caused a sharp decline in 
demand, and hence had created a more stringent competitive environment in which firms 
had to compete. In these conditions, firms with less efficiency would not be able to survive, 
and would be expected to be driven out of business. Thus the post-crisis economy was left 
with only highly productive manufacturers, resulting in an improvement in the overall 
efficiency level.   
 The second explanation came from the effects of real wage rigidity on the Thai 
labour market. In the post-crisis period, the real wage level had not been reduced much, 
given the severity of the crisis. Adjustment in the labour market had been channelled, 
largely, through quantity, rather than price, adjustment. Thus, the number of working hours 
in the manufacturing sector declined significantly. Hence, the dominance of the capital 
inputs became more evident, resulting in the structural shift towards greater capital 
intensitivity. 
 The third explanation for such a structural shift could also be based on the observed 
sharp decline in post-crisis interest rates. After the easing of monetary measures in August 
1998, domestic interest rates had declined significantly2. Combined with the rigid nominal 
wage (resulting from unaffected minimum wage rates imposed by the Department of 
Labour), the relative price between capital and labour changed considerably, and in form of 
relatively cheaper capital, and thus, labour was substituted by the higher use of capital in 
many production processes (Behrman, Deolalikar, and Tinakorn (2001), Na Ranong (2000), 
Paitoonpong (2001, 2002)). Unsurprisingly, the manufacturing sector especially displayed 
this trend towards greater capital intensivity.  
  Furthermore, as a result of the decline in domestic interest rates, as well as the 
enforced restructuring of the financial market caused by the IMF intervention, domestic 
private investment was guided toward the more productive areas. Financial institutions no 
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longer issued loans to speculative and non-productive investment projects, thus, productive 
manufacturers’ ability in accessing to loans were enhanced 3 . As a result, the overall 
productivity of the sector was improved. This explanation had also been suggested by the 
analysis utilizing the technical efficiency effects model suggested by Battese and Coelli 
(1995) in Chapter 9. The findings there revealed that the Thai manufacturing sector was still 
experiencing the adverse effect of the pre-crisis excessive investment in unproductive 
sectors. Therefore, further improvement in the post-crisis productivity could yet be achieved 
through an increase in productive investment, and reduction in unproductive investment. 
    Finally, the highly-favoured government policies, including the two economic 
stimulation packages, have played a major role in the improvement of the manufacturing 
sector’s productivity level. The Thai government has placed prime emphasis on 
improvements in the research and development capabilities of the small and medium size 
enterprise (SME), as they dominated the manufacturing sector (Poapongsakorn and 
Tangkitvanich (2000)). Many industry development institutes were established with public 
funding, in order to promote the productivity and efficiency of small firms in those particular 
industries (Bank of Thailand (2000, 2001, and 2002)). Moreover, many other policies were 
also implemented. These include measures such as lowering the import tariff for capital 
goods, cutting income, as well as lowering value added taxes, and more importantly, 
providing soft loans to SMEs to be used in business starting ups and upgrading 
(Poapongsakorn and Tangkitvanich (2000)). 
  These findings, therefore, reject the above null hypothesis, and accept the 
alternative hypothesis stating that ‘the improvement in the post-crisis productivity/efficiency 
level was partly a result of the increase in the amount of productive capital investment, 
despite the decline in the total amount of capital investment.’ The answer to this final set of 
research questions is that there are five possible explanations for the difference in the pre- 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2 Laplamwanit, (1999) 
3 Vines and Warr, (2003) 
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and post-crisis productivity level, including the shakeout process, rigid real wages, changes 
in the relative prices between capital and labour, financial marker restructuring, and finally, 
the government’s economic restructuring policies. Also, an increase in the investment of 
more productive capital investment was shown (in Chapter 9) to be playing a significant role 
in the improvement of the post-crisis efficiency level. 
   
 
10.3 Further Findings 
 
The 1997 economic crisis affected Thailand in a very profound way and on an extensive 
scale. It is believed among the Asian economists (Phongpaichit and Baker (1998), Radelet 
and Sachs (1998), Sussangkarn (1998, 1999), Lane, Ghosh, Hamann, Phillips, Schulze-
Ghattas, and Tsikata (1999), Laplamwanit (1999), Vines and Warr (2003), Williams and 
Nguyen (2005)) that the origin of the crisis was prompted by a complex set of causes. This 
section concludes the findings of this thesis concerning the genesis and the consequences 
of such crisis. 
 
10.3.1 Genesis of the Crisis 
 
This thesis has shown that the answer to the question on the causes of the crisis was not a 
simple one, and there was not one single cause or explanation, but a multifaceted set of 
problems that precipitated the crisis of such intensity. The thesis has classified these 
problems into five main categories: the slowdown of export growth, the mistakes in 
financial policies, the problem of asymmetric information and over-investment, the attacks 
on the Baht, and the responses to the currency devaluation. 
  The Thai economy, as Krugman (1994, 2001) has pointed out, had deep-rooted 
structural problems. The rapid growth during the late 1980s and the early 1990s was built 
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up mainly by the strong export growth, which was driven largely by the two most important 
assets the Thai economy owned: cheap labours and extensive natural resources. However, 
such growth, based on the higher use of inputs and high resource mobilization, rather than 
the progress of technology and improvements in efficiency, was impossible to sustain in the 
long-run. This claim is substantiated in the case of Thailand. Unfortunately, by 1996, the 
two key assets Thailand processed, and had relied on most had seemed to reach their limits 
(Sussangkarn (1998), Phongpaichit and Baker (1998)). Between 1982 and 1994, real wages 
rose considerably, with an approximate 70 percent increase over these thirteen years. To 
worsen the situation, from the mid 1990s onward, the Thai export sector had experienced 
increased competition from other developing Asian countries, who had recently opened up 
their economies (also with abundant resources and much cheaper labours) to foreign direct 
investment. In this context, by employing the stochastic frontier estimation method 
presented in Chapter 8, it became possible to verify that the Thai manufacturing sector had 
not been experiencing any significant technical progress since 1990. Therefore, while other 
countries had been improving their technology, Thailand had been largely standing still, and 
was exhausting its natural resources and its supply of labour. Consequently, the country 
was inescapably losing its competitiveness, and was faced with severe reductions in its 
export growth.   
 Although the problems of poor productivity growth and declining competitiveness 
did take place long before the occurrence of the crisis (according to the results from 
Chapter 8, Thai manufacturing sector had not been improving its production technology 
since as early as 1990), nevertheless, these problems were concealed at the time. The 
relatively stable growth of more than two decades had lulled the polity into complacency 
regarding the risks they might be running. Mistakes in investment (e.g. the excessive 
investment in the real estate and other non-productive sectors, as suggested by the findings 
in Chapter 9) had almost always been rescued by high growth. But it was this high growth 
itself that led to the accumulation of structural problems. Related institutions were 
 - 279 -
Conclusion 
inadequately prepared to deal with the consequences of mistakes, and no arrangement had 
ever been properly set up to mitigate these affects. One obvious example was the financial 
market liberalization of the early 1990s. The Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) 
was initiated in 1993 in order to facilitate the flow of foreign currency account transactions, 
aiming to increase the amount of investment which could be used for upgrading the 
country4. However, as Chapter 4 had revealed, such liberalization was carried out before 
the supervision and the regulation of financial institutions had been overhauled to take into 
account the new environment that would be opened up by such a policy. Consequently, 
with a large number of private financial institutions directly involved in capital account 
transactions, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) had lost its ability to regulate the flow of capital in 
and out of the country, and hence, its ability into control the country’s money supply. 
Combined with the country’s fixed exchange rate regime, a massive wave of foreign capital 
rushed into the country, in pursuit of the virtually risk-free currency environment.  
 The result of this financial policy mistake was devastating. Although the amount of 
foreign capital inflow was high, the sum of foreign direct investment was minimal. The 
substantial amount of capital inflow, combined with the public belief that the BOT would bail 
out financial institutions in trouble, posed a serious problem of moral hazard in the banking 
sector. As a result, Thai financial institutions began to engage in risky lending behaviour. 
This situation was worsened by the problem of adverse selection, where firms generally had 
better information on risks involved in their investment projects than did banks. Alas, for the 
case of Thailand, loans were given to speculative and unproductive investments in the real 
estate sector and the stock market, as these were the investments which yielded the 
highest returns at that time (Vines and Warr (2003)). By 1995, the supply of real estate 
development projects was exceeding its demand severely, and yet real estate developers 
continued to borrow and build (Pongpaichit and Baker (1998)). This plethora of bad 
investment projects hurt the Thai economy severely. The results from Chapter 9 suggested 
                                                          
4 Nukul’s Commission Report, (1998) 
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that excessive investment in unproductive sectors had prevented any improvement in 
efficiency of the manufacturing sector. It also implied that without such investments, the 
Thai manufacturing sector would have been better off, and might be able to avoid losing its 
competitiveness to countries like China and Vietnam.  
 Worse still, the massive capital inflow generated by capital account liberalization 
had caused domestic firms to become over-reliant on external debt as a mean of financing 
their new investments. This had put them, as well as the financial institutions, in a position 
which was extremely vulnerable to external factors. After the second half of 1996, concerns 
about the sluggish export growth, the bubble economy, and the over-valued currency had 
become widespread. Currency speculators started some sporadic attacks on the Baht, as 
they expected the Thai authorities would soon devalue the exchange rate in order to deal 
with the economic difficulties. However, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) was forced to resist 
these depreciation pressures as the devaluation of the Baht would put many firms and 
financial institutions in a ravaged situation, concerning the amount of foreign debt they had. 
Unfortunately, the currency attacks did not stop, and the BOT was obligated to defend the 
Baht until, finally, Thailand had ran out of its foreign reserves, and was virtually bankrupted.  
 More unfortunate, it was alleged (Ghosh and Phillips (1999), Stiglitz (2000)) that the 
mistakes in the recovering program of the IMF had pushed the situation in Thailand even 
further downhill. The suspension of financial institutions had created panic across the 
economy. The stringent fiscal and monetary policies had left no prospect for business to 
recover. As a result, Thailand had to suffer a far greater impact of the crisis than it should 
have.  
 
10.3.2 Other Consequences of the Crisis 
 
Thai economy experienced severe adjustments in many ways. The crisis had resulted in a 
decline in domestic demand, both on consumption and investment. The failure of financial 
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institutions also led to tight liquidity conditions, which, combined with the decline in demand, 
resulted in widespread collapse and insolvency of domestic businesses. Measured economic 
growth had unprecedently become negative (viz. contraction, which was a condition that 
had not happened in Thailand for over fifteen years). The overall GDP growth declined 
dramatically, with the non-agricultural sectors experiencing much larger negative impact 
than the agricultural sector. The construction sector experienced the largest negative impact 
in the period following the crisis. The manufacturing sector had also been heavily hit, 
though the impact was uneven within the sector. Industries that experienced the most 
severe downturn were the domestic oriented industries (those that exported less than 30 
percent of total production), i.e. the petrochemical industry, the basic metal, and the 
construction materials industries. The export oriented industries were affected by the 
economic crisis to a much lesser extent. The majority of producers in these industries had, 
as in the other industries, experienced a very tight liquidity situation, severe shortage of 
funds, and decreased in inter-firm domestic trade credits. Nevertheless, the depreciation in 
the Baht had improved their competitiveness in the export markets, and thus, had, to a 
certain extent, been able to mitigate the negative effect of the crisis.  
 On the employment side, at the time of the crisis, Thailand still had relatively large 
agricultural and informal sectors; therefore, they were able to absorb labour laid off by 
other sectors that were directly hit by the crisis. Hence, the decline in the total number 
employed was somewhat moderate, with only a 2.87 percent decline in employment 
between the period from 1996 to 1998. On the other hand, the influence was much more 
severe in the construction sector (which was the main part of the real-estate-driven ‘bubble’ 
economy). The average employment in this sector declined by 41 percent between 1995 
and 1999. On the other hand, unemployment increased from 1.7 percent in 1995 to 4.4 
percent in 1998, which although a significant increase, was still considered moderate, given 
the severity of the crisis. One of the main reasons for this was that a substantial number of 
those considered employed were, in reality, underemployed. The number of the 
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underemployed increased significantly after the economic crisis, from 580,700 persons in 
1996 to 938,400 persons in 1998, 953,900 persons in 1999, and 982,700 persons in 2000. 
This increase in the underemployment level implied a reduction in the number of working 
hours, and thus, suggested that Thai labour market was able to absorb the negative 
impacts of the economic crisis through the adjustment of working hours, as well as the 
headcounts.  
  
 
10.4 Research Contributions and Policy Suggestions 
  
This thesis has pushed forward the research area concerning the productivity of Thailand, 
as well as the research on the effects of the 1997 economic crisis, to a significant extent. It 
has opened up a new area of empirical research on the productivity measurement that has 
never been adapted to the case of Thailand before, by using the frontier analysis approach 
(Pitt and Lee (1981), Battese, Coelli, and Colby (1989), Battese and Coelli (1992), Battese 
and Coelli (1995) in the measuring of productivity. Most of the works (World Bank Report 
(1993), Marti (1996), Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996 and 1998), Collins and Bosworth 
(1997), Sarel (1997), and Dollar et al. (1998)) on productivity measurement carried out 
concerning the Thai economy employed either the growth accounting approach (Tinakorn 
and Sussangkarn (1996, 1998), Sarel (1997)) or the econometric approach (Marti (1996), 
Sarel (1997). However, both approaches are subject to some major drawbacks. The 
stochastic production frontier used in this thesis is superior to those approaches in that it 
was not depend on the strong assumption of constant returns to scale as in the growth 
accounting case, and also is not subject to the neglect of the technical inefficiency 
component, as is the econometric approach.  
 Moreover, this thesis is the first literature which provides measurements of both the 
pre- and post-crisis productivity/efficiency levels of the Thai manufacturing sector by 
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utilizing the same source of data, and through the same model selection process. Therefore, 
it is the only empirical study that could compare the pre- and post-crisis efficiency level with 
minimal bias caused by the sensitivity of data and methodology. The findings from such 
comparison have revealed several interesting effects of the crisis, which had never been 
mentioned before in any literatures regarding the productivity of Thai economy. Firstly, this 
thesis discovered that there was a significant structural shift in the Thai manufacturing 
sector, from being labour intensive in the pre-crisis period to being capital-intensive post-
crisis. Secondly, it also identified that the post-crisis efficiency level as having improved 
significantly when compared to the pre-crisis level. Furthermore, there was also an 
increasing trend in the improvement of technology used by the industries in the 
manufacturing sector, therefore, indicating that the improvement in the efficiency level was 
to some extent a result of improvement in technology. 
 The technical efficiency effects model (Battese and Coelli (1995)) analyzed in 
Chapter 9 also verified such finding. The negative relationship between the technical 
inefficiency component and the improvement in the machinery variable implied that the 
higher the investment made in productive factor inputs (such as machinery), the higher the 
efficiency of the sector became. The positive relationship between the technical inefficiency 
component and the improvement in land variable also suggested that Thailand, even many 
years after the crisis, was still suffering from the negative effects of the over-investment in 
unproductive capital inputs (i.e. land and real estate) left by the bubble economy in the 
early 1990s. Therefore, improvement in the sector’s efficiency could still be achieved if the 
industries were able to transform this unproductive capital into more productive capital 
investments, such as investment in better production equipment.  
 In addition, the results from this thesis imply that one of the reasons Thailand 
started to lose its competitiveness during mid 1990s was due to the lack of productivity 
growth in the economy. The rapid economic growth during the late 1980s and the early 
1990s was mainly the result of the higher use of factor inputs and better resource 
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mobilization, such as the increasing use of labour in the industrial sectors resulting from the 
declining agricultural sector. Such growth was impossible to sustain in the long-run, as 
either the input resources would run out, or the economy would run into diminishing returns. 
Therefore, in other to generate future sustainable growth, as well as to avoid future crises 
similar to this one in 1997, it is very important that the relevant authority is focused on 
economic development, not just on the nominal growth rate, but also on the quality of the 
growth, i.e. the improvement of the productivity, technical progress, and also the efficiency 
level, which is referred by Krugman as ‘efficiency-led sustainable growth’.  
 Moreover, the country’s long-run productivity and competitiveness have to be well 
planed in advance. It is very important that the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB) puts more emphasis on the issue of productivity and competitiveness when 
the future National Development Plan is drawn up, so that it will help to guide the 
formulation of government budgets and policies at the national level. Finally, as one of the 
major factor leading to the crisis of 1997 stemmed from the failure of the public and the 
private sectors to deal with the aggregate economic mistakes and external shocks. 
Therefore, some new specific institutions and arrangements should be established in order 
to provide the necessary guidance and the control, should these unfavourable occasions 
occur again in the future.  
 
 
10.5 Further Research Suggestions 
 
Although the analyses in this thesis have enhanced the research on the area of productivity 
in Thailand to a great extent, due to the limitations of data as well as the scope of the 
thesis itself, there are still many areas of research that could be carried out. An appealing 
extension of this thesis would be to enrich the dataset with new inefficiency explanatory 
variables to include other causes of such inefficiency (e.g. interest rate, debt burden, 
 - 285 -
Conclusion 
advancement in R&D). Also, if possible, a technical efficiency effects model should also be 
analyzed using the pre-crisis data, so as to examine in more detail the causes of the crisis. 
Moreover, when longer post-crisis time-series data become available, a further analysis, 
similar to the one in this thesis, should be undertakes in order to examine the long-term 
effects of such a crisis.  
 A promising additional area of research might be to focus on the different segments 
of the economy, i.e. the service sector and the agricultural sector, which might provide 
some new insights into how different sectors would react to the same events, opening up 
the possibility of different detailed responses at the sectoral level.  
 Finally, it might also be constructive to compare the case of Thailand to other 
economies. Comparison between the adjustment of Thai manufacturing sector to those of 
other economies also affected by the 1997 crisis such as Indonesia, Malaysia, or South 
Korea should offer important insight into how difference in economic structure could affect 
the ability to recover and adjust after the event of the crisis. Also, a comparison between 
Thailand and Malaysia (which, unlike Thailand, refused any help from the IMF) should 
provide a new perspective on claims that mistakes were made in creating the IMF recovery 
package imposed on Thailand.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A - List of Thai Manufacturing Industry 
 
Industry 1 Food Products and Beverages 
Industry 2 Tobacco Products 
Industry 3 Textiles 
Industry 4 Wearing Apparel, except Footwear 
Industry 5 Leather and Products of Leather, Leather Substitutes and Fur, except Footwear 
and Wearing Apparel 
Industry 6 Footwear 
Industry 7 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork, except Furniture 
Industry 8 Paper and Paper Products 
Industry 9 Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 
Industry 10 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 
Industry 11 Chemical and Chemical Products 
Industry 12 Rubber and Plastic Products 
Industry 13 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Industry 14 Basic Metals 
Industry 15 Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery and Equipment 
Industry 16 Machinery and Equipment  
Industry 17 Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery 
Industry 18 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  
Industry 19 Radio, Television and Communication Equipment and Apparatus 
Industry 20 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 
Industry 21 Motor Vehicles 
Industry 22 Other Transport Equipment 
Industry 23 Furniture 
Industry 24 Jewellery and Related Articles 
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Appendix B - Mixed Chi-Square distribution 
 
df   \  α .25 .10 .05 .025 .01 .005 .001 
1 0.455 1.642 2.706 3.841 5.412 6.635 9.500 
2 2.090 3.808 5.138 6.483 8.273 9.634 12.810 
3 3.475 5.528 7.045 8.542 10.501 11.971 15.357 
4 4.776 7.094 8.761 10.384 12.483 14.045 17.612 
5 7.257 8.574 10.371 12.103 14.325 15.968 19.696 
6 8.461 9.998 11.911 13.742 16.074 17.791 21.666 
7 8.461 11.383 13.401 15.321 17.755 19.540 23.551 
8 9.648 12.737 14.853 16.856 19.384 21.232 25.370 
9 10.823 14.067 16.274 18.354 20.972 22.879 27.133 
10 11.987 15.377 17.670 19.824 22.525 24.488 28.856 
11 13.142 16.670 19.045 21.268 24.049 26.065 30.542 
12 14.289 17.949 20.410 22.691 25.549 27.616 32.196 
13 15.430 19.216 21.742 24.096 27.026 29.143 33.823 
14 16.566 20.472 23.069 25.484 28.485 30.649 35.425 
15 17.696 21.718 24.384 26.856 29.927 32.136 37.005 
16 18.824 22.956 25.689 28.219 31.353 33.607 38.566 
17 19.943 24.186 26.983 29.569 32.766 35.063 40.109 
18 21.060 25.409 28.268 30.908 34.167 36.505 41.636 
19 22.174 26.625 29.545 32.237 35.556 37.935 43.148 
20 23.285 27.835 30.814 33.557 36.935 39.353 44.646 
Source: Kodde D. and Palm F., (1986), pp.1246 
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Appendix C – Outputs from Pitt and Lee’s Model I (Further Preliminary Analysis) 
 
Appendix C-1: Pre-crisis Results 
 
 
 
 
Output from the program FRONTIER (Version 4.1c) 
 
 
instruction file = PreME.ins    
data file =        Pre.dta      
 
 
 Error Components Frontier (see B&C 1992) 
 The model is a production function 
 The dependent variable is logged 
 
 
the ols estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.56531947E+01  0.91888768E+00  0.61522151E+01 
  beta 1         0.34295852E+00  0.81557484E-01  0.42051140E+01 
  beta 2         0.50979795E+00  0.11706427E+00  0.43548551E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.94469411E+00 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.12222788E+03 
 
the estimates after the grid search were : 
 
  beta 0         0.62303932E+01 
  beta 1         0.34295852E+00 
  beta 2         0.50979795E+00 
  sigma-squared  0.12460087E+01 
  gamma          0.42000000E+00 
   mu is restricted to be zero 
   eta is restricted to be zero 
  
  
 iteration =     0  func evals =     19  llf = -0.12030866E+03 
     0.62303932E+01 0.34295852E+00 0.50979795E+00 0.12460087E+01 0.42000000E+00 
 gradient step 
 iteration =     5  func evals =     62  llf = -0.11996637E+03 
     0.69967355E+01 0.29006218E+00 0.53053946E+00 0.13658803E+01 0.49125890E+00 
 search failed. loc of min limited by rounding 
 iteration =    10  func evals =    147  llf = -0.11995756E+03 
     0.70776979E+01 0.28907392E+00 0.52662747E+00 0.14180628E+01 0.50685569E+00 
 
 
the final mle estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.70776979E+01  0.11790660E+01  0.60028003E+01 
  beta 1         0.28907392E+00  0.82131265E-01  0.35196575E+01 
  beta 2         0.52662747E+00  0.13012665E+00  0.40470378E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.14180628E+01  0.48351959E+00  0.29327930E+01 
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  gamma          0.50685569E+00  0.20967287E+00  0.24173642E+01 
   mu is restricted to be zero 
   eta is restricted to be zero 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.11995756E+03 
 
LR test of the one-sided error =   0.45406240E+01 
with number of restrictions = 1 
 [note that this statistic has a mixed chi-square distribution] 
 
number of iterations =     10 
 
(maximum number of iterations set at :   100) 
 
number of cross-sections =     24 
 
number of time periods =      7 
 
total number of observations =     89 
 
thus there are:     79  obsns not in the panel 
 
 
covariance matrix : 
 
  0.13901967E+01 -0.38684727E-01 -0.54719597E-01  0.25384273E+00  0.12360813E+00 
 -0.38684727E-01  0.67455446E-02 -0.74823052E-02 -0.96475825E-02 -0.48244897E-02 
 -0.54719597E-01 -0.74823052E-02  0.16932945E-01  0.14574635E-02  0.61943561E-03 
  0.25384273E+00 -0.96475825E-02  0.14574635E-02  0.23379119E+00  0.90998702E-01 
  0.12360813E+00 -0.48244897E-02  0.61943561E-03  0.90998702E-01  0.43962713E-01 
 
 
 
technical efficiency estimates : 
 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1           0.66861022E+00 
       2           0.85869480E+00 
       3           0.51692203E+00 
       4           0.45199161E+00 
       5           0.46204248E+00 
       6           0.30632259E+00 
       7           0.33817814E+00 
       8           0.51721575E+00 
       9           0.82961421E+00 
      10           0.83596564E+00 
      11           0.53284969E+00 
      12           0.54886345E+00 
      13           0.62786467E+00 
      14           0.56471842E+00 
      15           0.41871860E+00 
      16           0.77405296E+00 
      17           0.46816988E+00 
      18           0.56708604E+00 
      19           0.71861499E+00 
      20           0.33846383E+00 
      21           0.74534804E+00 
      22           0.30771676E+00 
      23           0.36360339E+00 
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      24           0.38544069E+00 
 
 
 mean efficiency =   0.54779454E+00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
summary of panel of observations: 
(1 = observed, 0 = not observed) 
 
  t:   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
   n 
   1   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   2   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   3   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   4   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   5   1   1   0   0   0   0   1   3 
   6   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   7   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   8   0   1   0   1   0   0   1   3 
   9   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  10   0   1   0   0   0   0   1   2 
  11   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  12   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  13   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  14   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  15   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  16   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  17   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  18   0   1   0   1   0   0   1   3 
  19   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  20   1   0   0   1   0   0   1   3 
  21   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  22   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  23   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  24   1   1   0   0   0   0   1   3 
 
      21  23   0  21   0   0  24  89 
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Appendix C – Outputs from Pitt and Lee’s Model I (Further Preliminary Analysis) 
 
Appendix C-2: Post-crisis Results 
 
 
 
 
Output from the program FRONTIER (Version 4.1c) 
 
 
instruction file = PostME.ins   
data file =        Post.dta     
 
 
 Error Components Frontier (see B&C 1992) 
 The model is a production function 
 The dependent variable is logged 
 
 
the ols estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.45196422E+01  0.88726413E+00  0.50939084E+01 
  beta 1         0.51014675E+00  0.60700774E-01  0.84042874E+01 
  beta 2         0.31814141E+00  0.73918569E-01  0.43039444E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.38076334E+00 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.80855025E+02 
 
the estimates after the grid search were : 
 
  beta 0         0.48323959E+01 
  beta 1         0.51014675E+00 
  beta 2         0.31814141E+00 
  sigma-squared  0.46559763E+00 
  gamma          0.33000000E+00 
   mu is restricted to be zero 
   eta is restricted to be zero 
  
  
 iteration =     0  func evals =     19  llf = -0.79485669E+02 
     0.48323959E+01 0.51014675E+00 0.31814141E+00 0.46559763E+00 0.33000000E+00 
 gradient step 
 iteration =     5  func evals =     44  llf = -0.79473181E+02 
     0.49408265E+01 0.50837069E+00 0.31236319E+00 0.47902716E+00 0.34453067E+00 
 iteration =     8  func evals =     87  llf = -0.79473178E+02 
     0.49409410E+01 0.50838051E+00 0.31234791E+00 0.47926260E+00 0.34465831E+00 
 
 
the final mle estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.49409410E+01  0.99718426E+00  0.49548927E+01 
  beta 1         0.50838051E+00  0.66586739E-01  0.76348612E+01 
  beta 2         0.31234791E+00  0.82923384E-01  0.37667049E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.47926260E+00  0.13654149E+00  0.35100144E+01 
  gamma          0.34465831E+00  0.22044906E+00  0.15634374E+01 
   mu is restricted to be zero 
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   eta is restricted to be zero 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.79473178E+02 
 
LR test of the one-sided error =   0.27636930E+01 
with number of restrictions = 1 
 [note that this statistic has a mixed chi-square distribution] 
 
number of iterations =      8 
 
(maximum number of iterations set at :   100) 
 
number of cross-sections =     24 
 
number of time periods =      5 
 
total number of observations =     88 
 
thus there are:     32  obsns not in the panel 
 
 
covariance matrix : 
 
  0.99437644E+00 -0.41822800E-01 -0.20892511E-01  0.28158992E-01  0.53899565E-01 
 -0.41822800E-01  0.44337939E-02 -0.32095063E-02 -0.17046003E-03 -0.40206578E-03 
 -0.20892511E-01 -0.32095063E-02  0.68762876E-02 -0.72873596E-03 -0.15048955E-02 
  0.28158992E-01 -0.17046003E-03 -0.72873596E-03  0.18643579E-01  0.25564473E-01 
  0.53899565E-01 -0.40206578E-03 -0.15048955E-02  0.25564473E-01  0.48597789E-01 
 
 
 
technical efficiency estimates : 
 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1           0.81898032E+00 
       2           0.93508104E+00 
       3           0.70295378E+00 
       4           0.80950666E+00 
       5           0.68342552E+00 
       6           0.72172206E+00 
       7           0.60202389E+00 
       8           0.67198106E+00 
       9           0.74857382E+00 
      10           0.79673521E+00 
      11           0.72958517E+00 
      12           0.78322121E+00 
      13           0.71408711E+00 
      14           0.52300900E+00 
      15           0.73778208E+00 
      16           0.76234736E+00 
      17           0.90709317E+00 
      18           0.72970955E+00 
      19           0.82438416E+00 
      20           0.62672567E+00 
      21           0.83873201E+00 
      22           0.65144628E+00 
      23           0.61026618E+00 
      24           0.73941322E+00 
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 mean efficiency =   0.73619940E+00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
summary of panel of observations: 
(1 = observed, 0 = not observed) 
 
  t:   1   2   3   4   5 
   n 
   1   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   2   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   3   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   4   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   5   1   1   1   0   0   3 
   6   1   1   1   0   0   3 
   7   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   8   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   9   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  10   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  11   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  12   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  13   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  14   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  15   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  16   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  17   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  18   1   0   0   0   1   2 
  19   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  20   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  21   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  22   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  23   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  24   1   1   1   0   0   3 
 
      24  23  23   0  18  88 
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Appendix D - Output from the Pre-Crisis Model 4 (Battese, Coelli, and Colby (1989)) 
 
 
Output from the program FRONTIER (Version 4.1c) 
 
instruction file = PreE.ins     
data file =        Pre.dta      
 
 Error Components Frontier (see B&C 1992) 
 The model is a production function 
 The dependent variable is logged 
 
the ols estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.56531947E+01  0.91888768E+00  0.61522151E+01 
  beta 1         0.34295852E+00  0.81557484E-01  0.42051140E+01 
  beta 2         0.50979795E+00  0.11706427E+00  0.43548551E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.94469411E+00 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.12222788E+03 
 
the estimates after the grid search were : 
 
  beta 0         0.62303932E+01 
  beta 1         0.34295852E+00 
  beta 2         0.50979795E+00 
  sigma-squared  0.12460087E+01 
  gamma          0.42000000E+00 
  mu             0.00000000E+00 
   eta is restricted to be zero 
  
  
 iteration =     0  func evals =     19  llf = -0.12030866E+03 
     0.62303932E+01 0.34295852E+00 0.50979795E+00 0.12460087E+01 0.42000000E+00 
     0.00000000E+00 
 gradient step 
 iteration =     5  func evals =     46  llf = -0.11948578E+03 
     0.67240125E+01 0.28083414E+00 0.59471217E+00 0.12799744E+01 0.49141177E+00 
     0.77736792E+00 
 iteration =    10  func evals =     86  llf = -0.11791988E+03 
     0.73334931E+01 0.28125972E+00 0.56250601E+00 0.97380733E+00 0.34636838E+00 
     0.11615439E+01 
 pt better than entering pt cannot be found 
 iteration =    11  func evals =     95  llf = -0.11791988E+03 
     0.73334931E+01 0.28125972E+00 0.56250601E+00 0.97380733E+00 0.34636838E+00 
     0.11615439E+01 
 
the final mle estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
  beta 0         0.73334931E+01  0.11877015E+01  0.61745255E+01 
  beta 1         0.28125972E+00  0.83177197E-01  0.33814523E+01 
  beta 2         0.56250601E+00  0.12700381E+00  0.44290481E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.97380733E+00  0.20144854E+00  0.48340253E+01 
  gamma          0.34636838E+00  0.16139926E+00  0.21460345E+01 
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  mu             0.11615439E+01  0.32283075E+00  0.35979965E+01 
   eta is restricted to be zero 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.11791988E+03 
 
LR test of the one-sided error =   0.86159889E+01 
with number of restrictions = 2 
 [note that this statistic has a mixed chi-square distribution] 
 
number of iterations =     11 
 
(maximum number of iterations set at :   100) 
 
number of cross-sections =     24 
 
number of time periods =      7 
 
total number of observations =     89 
 
thus there are:     79  obsns not in the panel 
 
 
covariance matrix : 
 
  0.14106348E+01 -0.43806267E-01 -0.64569113E-01  0.86722604E-01  0.88010819E-01 
 -0.80351869E-01 
 -0.43806267E-01  0.69184461E-02 -0.63348259E-02 -0.44221623E-02 -0.43591676E-02 
  0.75998400E-02 
 -0.64569113E-01 -0.63348259E-02  0.16129969E-01  0.59971393E-03 -0.63965798E-03 
  0.27062099E-02 
  0.86722604E-01 -0.44221623E-02  0.59971393E-03  0.40581514E-01  0.24126997E-01 
  0.80375819E-02 
  0.88010819E-01 -0.43591676E-02 -0.63965798E-03  0.24126997E-01  0.26049722E-01 
 -0.38070631E-02 
 -0.80351869E-01  0.75998400E-02  0.27062099E-02  0.80375819E-02 -0.38070631E-02 
  0.10421969E+00 
 
 
technical efficiency estimates : 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1           0.38267330E+00 
       2           0.71588217E+00 
       3           0.27666948E+00 
       4           0.24124861E+00 
       5           0.26173204E+00 
       6           0.17704686E+00 
       7           0.19439030E+00 
       8           0.29090070E+00 
       9           0.64315860E+00 
      10           0.71565743E+00 
      11           0.29673980E+00 
      12           0.30232863E+00 
      13           0.35722992E+00 
      14           0.31767256E+00 
      15           0.23252730E+00 
 - 311 -
Appendix D 
      16           0.52573475E+00 
      17           0.27449924E+00 
      18           0.31894090E+00 
      19           0.44879908E+00 
      20           0.19821586E+00 
      21           0.48239350E+00 
      22           0.18460789E+00 
      23           0.20713378E+00 
      24           0.21909572E+00 
 
 
 mean efficiency =   0.34438660E+00 
 
 
 
summary of panel of observations: 
(1 = observed, 0 = not observed) 
 
  t:   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
   n 
   1   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   2   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   3   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   4   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   5   1   1   0   0   0   0   1   3 
   6   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   7   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
   8   0   1   0   1   0   0   1   3 
   9   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  10   0   1   0   0   0   0   1   2 
  11   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  12   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  13   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  14   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  15   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  16   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  17   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  18   0   1   0   1   0   0   1   3 
  19   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  20   1   0   0   1   0   0   1   3 
  21   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  22   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  23   1   1   0   1   0   0   1   4 
  24   1   1   0   0   0   0   1   3 
 
      21  23   0  21   0   0  24  89 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 312 -
Appendix E 
 
Appendix E - Output from the Post-Crisis Model 2 (Battese and Coelli (1992)) 
 
 
 
Output from the program FRONTIER (Version 4.1c) 
 
 
instruction file = Post.ins     
data file =        Post.dta     
 
 
 Error Components Frontier (see B&C 1992) 
 The model is a production function 
 The dependent variable is logged 
 
 
the ols estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.45196422E+01  0.88726413E+00  0.50939084E+01 
  beta 1         0.51014675E+00  0.60700774E-01  0.84042874E+01 
  beta 2         0.31814141E+00  0.73918569E-01  0.43039444E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.38076334E+00 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.80855025E+02 
 
the estimates after the grid search were : 
 
  beta 0         0.48323959E+01 
  beta 1         0.51014675E+00 
  beta 2         0.31814141E+00 
  sigma-squared  0.46559763E+00 
  gamma          0.33000000E+00 
  mu             0.00000000E+00 
  eta            0.00000000E+00 
  
  
 iteration =     0  func evals =     19  llf = -0.79485669E+02 
     0.48323959E+01 0.51014675E+00 0.31814141E+00 0.46559763E+00 0.33000000E+00 
     0.00000000E+00 0.00000000E+00 
 gradient step 
 iteration =     5  func evals =     49  llf = -0.74919813E+02 
     0.48777400E+01 0.57566411E+00 0.22684648E+00 0.31431598E+00 0.19606425E+00 
     0.48548592E-01 0.26450633E+00 
 iteration =    10  func evals =    118  llf = -0.71401286E+02 
     0.64819247E+01 0.50222504E+00 0.20640626E+00 0.25539936E+00 0.81227679E-01 
     0.28806594E+00 0.26532005E+00 
 pt better than entering pt cannot be found 
 iteration =    12  func evals =    140  llf = -0.71400520E+02 
     0.64825369E+01 0.50223172E+00 0.20643327E+00 0.25552501E+00 0.80892216E-01 
     0.28754119E+00 0.26494515E+00 
 
 
the final mle estimates are : 
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                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.64825369E+01  0.99867376E+00  0.64911457E+01 
  beta 1         0.50223172E+00  0.65393424E-01  0.76801563E+01 
  beta 2         0.20643327E+00  0.10190892E+00  0.20256644E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.25552501E+00  0.35581196E-01  0.71814621E+01 
  gamma          0.80892216E-01  0.80279621E-01  0.10076308E+01 
  mu             0.28754119E+00  0.83448622E-01  0.34457273E+01 
  eta            0.26494515E+00  0.85155020E-01  0.31113275E+01 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.71400520E+02 
 
LR test of the one-sided error =   0.18909009E+02 
with number of restrictions = 3 
 [note that this statistic has a mixed chi-square distribution] 
 
number of iterations =     12 
 
(maximum number of iterations set at :   100) 
 
number of cross-sections =     24 
 
number of time periods =      5 
 
total number of observations =     88 
 
thus there are:     32  obsns not in the panel 
 
 
covariance matrix : 
 
  0.99734927E+00 -0.25721755E-01 -0.44201582E-01 -0.23354317E-02  0.49883623E-02 
  0.76432224E-02  0.24280398E-01 
 -0.25721755E-01  0.42762999E-02 -0.43631926E-02  0.27350684E-03 -0.88245918E-03 
 -0.83109111E-03  0.13887025E-02 
 -0.44201582E-01 -0.43631926E-02  0.10385428E-01 -0.19036248E-03  0.10771420E-02 
  0.86067390E-03 -0.42863484E-02 
 -0.23354317E-02  0.27350684E-03 -0.19036248E-03  0.12660215E-02  0.85701273E-03 
  0.12317418E-02 -0.14602774E-02 
  0.49883623E-02 -0.88245918E-03  0.10771420E-02  0.85701273E-03  0.64448176E-02 
  0.21125396E-02 -0.38307837E-02 
  0.76432224E-02 -0.83109111E-03  0.86067390E-03  0.12317418E-02  0.21125396E-02 
  0.69636725E-02 -0.51660890E-02 
  0.24280398E-01  0.13887025E-02 -0.42863484E-02 -0.14602774E-02 -0.38307837E-02 
 -0.51660890E-02  0.72513775E-02 
 
 
 
technical efficiency estimates : 
 
 
 
efficiency estimates for year      1 : 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1           0.65085499E+00 
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       2           0.72099438E+00 
       3           0.46385477E+00 
       4           0.57514448E+00 
       5           0.37059393E+00 
       6           0.42917342E+00 
       7           0.30556804E+00 
       8           0.32923494E+00 
       9           0.40753963E+00 
      10           0.35830181E+00 
      11           0.41730202E+00 
      12           0.53163311E+00 
      13           0.44109817E+00 
      14           0.25912143E+00 
      15           0.42495135E+00 
      16           0.46272951E+00 
      17           0.71815951E+00 
      18           0.43473938E+00 
      19           0.59584315E+00 
      20           0.31588410E+00 
      21           0.57514873E+00 
      22           0.27637816E+00 
      23           0.31770066E+00 
      24           0.42245784E+00 
 
 
 mean eff. in year   1 =  0.45018365E+00 
 
 
 
 
efficiency estimates for year      2 : 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1           0.71590682E+00 
       2           0.77515907E+00 
       3           0.55133478E+00 
       4           0.65059535E+00 
       5           0.46396206E+00 
       6           0.51928192E+00 
       7           0.40020924E+00 
       8           0.42378429E+00 
       9           0.49917373E+00 
      10           0.45220715E+00 
      11           0.50832694E+00 
      12           0.61230892E+00 
      13           0.53043818E+00 
      14           0.35257502E+00 
      15           0.51546496E+00 
      16           0.55030692E+00 
      17           0.77278536E+00 
      18    no observation in this period 
      19           0.66851304E+00 
      20           0.41044415E+00 
      21           0.65059907E+00 
      22           0.37053712E+00 
      23           0.41234582E+00 
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      24           0.51303154E+00 
 
 
 mean eff. in year   2 =  0.53562137E+00 
 
 
 
 
efficiency estimates for year      3 : 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1           0.77165496E+00 
       2           0.82067715E+00 
       3           0.63104233E+00 
       4           0.71672596E+00 
       5           0.55269669E+00 
       6           0.60260413E+00 
       7           0.49350091E+00 
       8           0.51565618E+00 
       9           0.58468564E+00 
      10           0.54199055E+00 
      11           0.59289665E+00 
      12           0.68402490E+00 
      13           0.61259503E+00 
      14           0.44771833E+00 
      15           0.59927657E+00 
      16           0.63013862E+00 
      17           0.81872694E+00 
      18    no observation in this period 
      19           0.73183582E+00 
      20           0.50308969E+00 
      21           0.71672912E+00 
      22           0.46517813E+00 
      23           0.50494339E+00 
      24           0.59702835E+00 
 
 
 mean eff. in year   3 =  0.61458331E+00 
 
 
 
 
efficiency estimates for year      4 : 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1    no observation in this period 
       2    no observation in this period 
       3    no observation in this period 
       4    no observation in this period 
       5    no observation in this period 
       6    no observation in this period 
       7    no observation in this period 
       8    no observation in this period 
       9    no observation in this period 
      10    no observation in this period 
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      11    no observation in this period 
      12    no observation in this period 
      13    no observation in this period 
      14    no observation in this period 
      15    no observation in this period 
      16    no observation in this period 
      17    no observation in this period 
      18    no observation in this period 
      19    no observation in this period 
      20    no observation in this period 
      21    no observation in this period 
      22    no observation in this period 
      23    no observation in this period 
      24    no observation in this period 
 
 
 mean eff. in year   4 =-NaN             
 
 
 
 
efficiency estimates for year      5 : 
 
     firm             eff.-est. 
 
       1           0.85653855E+00 
       2           0.88857409E+00 
       3           0.76044372E+00 
       4           0.81981814E+00 
       5    no observation in this period 
       6    no observation in this period 
       7           0.65795577E+00 
       8           0.67518707E+00 
       9           0.72702138E+00 
      10           0.69527796E+00 
      11           0.73301672E+00 
      12           0.79748794E+00 
      13           0.74726501E+00 
      14    no observation in this period 
      15           0.73765198E+00 
      16           0.75980169E+00 
      17           0.88731197E+00 
      18           0.74150689E+00 
      19    no observation in this period 
      20    no observation in this period 
      21           0.81982028E+00 
      22           0.63545716E+00 
      23           0.66689399E+00 
      24    no observation in this period 
 
 
 mean eff. in year   5 =  0.75594613E+00 
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summary of panel of observations: 
(1 = observed, 0 = not observed) 
 
  t:   1   2   3   4   5 
   n 
   1   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   2   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   3   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   4   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   5   1   1   1   0   0   3 
   6   1   1   1   0   0   3 
   7   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   8   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   9   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  10   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  11   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  12   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  13   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  14   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  15   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  16   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  17   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  18   1   0   0   0   1   2 
  19   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  20   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  21   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  22   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  23   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  24   1   1   1   0   0   3 
 
      24  23  23   0  18  88 
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Appendix F - Output from the Techinical Efficiency Effects Model 
 
 
Output from the program FRONTIER (Version 4.1c) 
 
instruction file = PostLM.ins   
data file =        PostLM.dta   
 
 
 Tech. Eff. Effects Frontier (see B&C 1993) 
 The model is a production function 
 The dependent variable is logged 
 
the ols estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.45196422E+01  0.88726413E+00  0.50939084E+01 
  beta 1         0.51014675E+00  0.60700774E-01  0.84042874E+01 
  beta 2         0.31814141E+00  0.73918569E-01  0.43039444E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.38076334E+00 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.80855025E+02 
 
the estimates after the grid search were : 
 
  beta 0         0.46296048E+01 
  beta 1         0.51014675E+00 
  beta 2         0.31814141E+00 
  delta 1        0.00000000E+00 
  delta 2        0.00000000E+00 
  sigma-squared  0.37987455E+00 
  gamma          0.50000000E-01 
  
  
 iteration =     0  func evals =     20  llf = -0.80905933E+02 
     0.46296048E+01 0.51014675E+00 0.31814141E+00 0.00000000E+00 0.00000000E+00 
     0.37987455E+00 0.50000000E-01 
 gradient step 
 iteration =     5  func evals =     46  llf = -0.79912416E+02 
     0.46277200E+01 0.52531190E+00 0.29434527E+00 0.82470024E-03-0.24234342E-04 
     0.38117308E+00 0.34006271E-01 
 iteration =    10  func evals =    101  llf = -0.76886393E+02 
     0.40497484E+01 0.56060460E+00 0.29504622E+00 0.13406546E-02-0.60831137E-04 
     0.34483863E+00 0.10000000E-07 
 pt better than entering pt cannot be found 
 iteration =    13  func evals =    143  llf = -0.76856334E+02 
     0.40996757E+01 0.54468589E+00 0.31524269E+00 0.13411299E-02-0.63786323E-04 
     0.33795805E+00 0.10000000E-07 
 
 
the final mle estimates are : 
 
                 coefficient     standard-error    t-ratio 
 
  beta 0         0.40996757E+01  0.90595449E+00  0.45252557E+01 
  beta 1         0.54468589E+00  0.91089543E-01  0.59796752E+01 
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  beta 2         0.31524269E+00  0.11790559E+00  0.26736875E+01 
  delta 1        0.13411299E-02  0.52233096E-03  0.25675864E+01 
  delta 2       -0.63786323E-04  0.28037510E-04 -0.22750352E+01 
  sigma-squared  0.33795805E+00  0.54855873E-01  0.61608361E+01 
  gamma          0.10000000E-07  0.18970842E-03  0.52712474E-04 
 
log likelihood function =  -0.76856334E+02 
 
LR test of the one-sided error =   0.79973823E+01 
with number of restrictions = 3 
 [note that this statistic has a mixed chi-square distribution] 
 
number of iterations =     13 
 
(maximum number of iterations set at :   100) 
 
number of cross-sections =     24 
 
number of time periods =      5 
 
total number of observations =     88 
 
thus there are:     32  obsns not in the panel 
 
 
covariance matrix : 
 
  0.82075353E+00 -0.44058218E-01 -0.47796445E-02 -0.60479420E-04  0.16315903E-05 
 -0.75755710E-03  0.10091891E-04 
 -0.44058218E-01  0.82973049E-02 -0.88016344E-02  0.19473984E-04  0.15157229E-06 
 -0.13540738E-03  0.50138588E-05 
 -0.47796445E-02 -0.88016344E-02  0.13901727E-01 -0.22710279E-04 -0.46435174E-06 
  0.31503301E-03 -0.85576572E-05 
 -0.60479420E-04  0.19473984E-04 -0.22710279E-04  0.27282963E-06 -0.11292729E-07 
  0.26384348E-05  0.28388403E-07 
  0.16315903E-05  0.15157229E-06 -0.46435174E-06 -0.11292729E-07  0.78610199E-09 
 -0.49773880E-07 -0.15083621E-08 
 -0.75755710E-03 -0.13540738E-03  0.31503301E-03  0.26384348E-05 -0.49773880E-07 
  0.30091668E-02 -0.52523433E-06 
  0.10091891E-04  0.50138588E-05 -0.85576572E-05  0.28388403E-07 -0.15083621E-08 
 -0.52523433E-06  0.35989284E-07 
 
 
technical efficiency estimates : 
 
     firm  year             eff.-est. 
 
       1     1           0.84454851E+00 
       2     1           0.90370665E+00 
       3     1           0.88204460E+00 
       4     1           0.95238019E+00 
       5     1           0.83743116E+00 
       6     1           0.95584826E+00 
       7     1           0.84973938E+00 
       8     1           0.78906547E+00 
       9     1           0.78864315E+00 
      10     1           0.72611480E+00 
 
 
- 320 -
Appendix F 
      11     1           0.81194524E+00 
      12     1           0.83704631E+00 
      13     1           0.54976922E+00 
      14     1           0.76594093E+00 
      15     1           0.81330547E+00 
      16     1           0.88268806E+00 
      17     1           0.98974613E+00 
      18     1           0.94044761E+00 
      19     1           0.85527070E+00 
      20     1           0.88592163E+00 
      21     1           0.68660782E+00 
      22     1           0.81628160E+00 
      23     1           0.75555152E+00 
      24     1           0.88264808E+00 
       1     2           0.85318641E+00 
       2     2           0.92008038E+00 
       3     2           0.93511157E+00 
       4     2           0.96891648E+00 
       5     2           0.88869728E+00 
       6     2           0.98093001E+00 
       7     2           0.90454530E+00 
       8     2           0.83882841E+00 
       9     2           0.79021996E+00 
      10     2           0.48931281E+00 
      11     2           0.84415813E+00 
      12     2           0.93270581E+00 
      13     2           0.32577951E+00 
      14     2           0.77800177E+00 
      15     2           0.84748952E+00 
      16     2           0.84225124E+00 
      17     2           0.94672487E+00 
      19     2           0.94085408E+00 
      20     2           0.95864040E+00 
      21     2           0.66576610E+00 
      22     2           0.83408638E+00 
      23     2           0.78305052E+00 
      24     2           0.94418795E+00 
       1     3           0.86743998E+00 
       2     3           0.95633168E+00 
       3     3           0.96933826E+00 
       4     3           0.97787214E+00 
       5     3           0.93386443E+00 
       6     3           0.94035678E+00 
       7     3           0.91998252E+00 
       8     3           0.85449549E+00 
       9     3           0.81248274E+00 
      10     3           0.77485500E+00 
      11     3           0.79802649E+00 
      12     3           0.88804472E+00 
      13     3           0.69228774E+00 
      14     3           0.74645747E+00 
      15     3           0.89757340E+00 
      16     3           0.90631768E+00 
      17     3           0.94719760E+00 
      19     3           0.98188176E+00 
      20     3           0.97059188E+00 
      21     3           0.74632372E+00 
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      22     3           0.92838263E+00 
      23     3           0.93001007E+00 
      24     3           0.85593195E+00 
       1     5           0.87244456E+00 
       2     5           0.99385199E+00 
       3     5           0.92416307E+00 
       4     5           0.94077943E+00 
       7     5           0.87608674E+00 
       8     5           0.86337316E+00 
       9     5           0.83533002E+00 
      10     5           0.10000000E+01 
      11     5           0.85930050E+00 
      12     5           0.91819325E+00 
      13     5           0.72704633E+00 
      15     5           0.89628431E+00 
      16     5           0.88782715E+00 
      17     5           0.99332597E+00 
      18     5           0.92340092E+00 
      21     5           0.75351400E+00 
      22     5           0.89398667E+00 
      23     5           0.94505478E+00 
 
 
 mean efficiency =   0.84963916E+00 
 
 
summary of panel of observations: 
(1 = observed, 0 = not observed) 
 
  t:   1   2   3   4   5 
   n 
   1   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   2   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   3   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   4   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   5   1   1   1   0   0   3 
   6   1   1   1   0   0   3 
   7   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   8   1   1   1   0   1   4 
   9   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  10   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  11   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  12   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  13   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  14   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  15   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  16   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  17   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  18   1   0   0   0   1   2 
  19   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  20   1   1   1   0   0   3 
  21   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  22   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  23   1   1   1   0   1   4 
  24   1   1   1   0   0   3 
 
      24  23  23   0  18  88 
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Appendix G – Data 
 
Table G-1: Value Added at the industrial level 
 
 
 Industry 1990 1991 1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 2002 
          
1 Food and Beverages 127086381 106635416 156192078 183232011.4 162391802.4 96320522.46 102159302.6 169319404.1 
2 Tobacco  41520767 47883097 25464954 30668864.5 688657.3 32190998.44 32917422.6 69751332.4 
3 Textiles 180754595 51372604 84085319 46467258.6 44714336.8 53942427.62 58318598.9 49913611.4 
4 Wearing Apparel 26857462 84141895 67127155 23666411.2 21418364.4 35779693.69 21588721.6 42236228.2 
5 Leather and Products of Leather,  1569557 15392265 3324653 5078839.1 6310771.5 3189609.9 3594362.2 8306880.8 
6 Footwear 1611955 7317173 7421903 8816797.1 8006977.9 6980110.75 11191752.1 10379216.3 
7 Wood Products  5959281 10439171 7545267 14983080 5495630.1 8813392.07 8906999.1 20001097.6 
8 Paper Products 194798 4097557 18932736 32120268.6 11700919 7528894.17 22476912.5 52563811.2 
9 Publishing  5196640 565470048 42073238 30087252 8234578.4 17705230.14 13666655.2 26141197.8 
10 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and 
Nuclear Fuel n/a 131471393 134764957 33038763.2 1157268.6 12843138.76 29131971.2 79538318.5 
11 Chemical Products 11324607 46314379 18371602 58880444.1 28616126.9 44678157.31 47002183.1 81680357.5 
12 Rubber and Plastic Products 34927076 31487210 33444891 63081690.7 43492217.9 53764236.94 46496489.6 71184017.2 
13 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 74703835 84477920 61361502 65018376 57346525.9 35222261.76 48687592.5 55767996.5 
14 Basic Metals 11266988 36888673 46455490 17821870.3 9966793.3 14805317.42 17572447.9 34981163 
15 Fabricated Metal Products 15472720 27714470 13759449 35207502.7 21291163.7 22825161.72 31910796.4 69280265.6 
16 Machinery and Equipment  49351053 172678466 71812692 38512619 34982976.8 23414663.99 28994265.3 66655764 
17 Office and Computing Machinery 8919 1563444 2915253 28023746.7 20339202.1 21209022.4 41925931.6 61038634.4 
18 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  24917531 25020389 15923318 40072948.1 18873188.6 21992089.85 38682872.1 29289664.4 
19 Communication Equipment  39634272 93417839 33267777 47977429.1 42345219.8 28945697.74 72898227.1 166763128.3 
20 
Medical, Precision and Optical 
Instruments  1491073 3218459 789662 11917626.9 4054296.7 4013718.74 5713098.7 8112617.7 
21 Motor Vehicles 21521740 97374615 29768662 139673043.4 72278363.7 40309249.98 49929964.2 151731395.3 
22 Other Transport Equipment 241471 3124704 15425366 6666653.7 3990628.8 2155589.95 4714112.2 22834994.7 
23 Furniture 15946122 7027309 3770973 14424684.7 9154099.9 7644800.5 11697332 19564625.6 
24 Jewellery  1361045 12303381 9814812 9183942.4 4473935.2 8229415.95 5817432.4 10761747.7 
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Table G-2: Book value of Capital at the industrial level 
 
 Industry 1990 1991 1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 2002 
          
1 Food and Beverages 77595791 75792933 110117088 417831531 215955891.4 163900780.7 270779114.1 242720681.7 
2 Tobacco  6240783 241667 3993945 9490772 1087067.3 5477158.32 4570816.6 8337219.3 
3 Textiles 51770169 59439108 77669033 286220320 93492362.8 74037646.86 280588060.9 98295289.5 
4 Wearing Apparel 13078867 23466028 43995219 41875311.2 20089665 25742831.53 10153378.7 45352135.6 
5 Leather and Products of Leather,  877507 23161789 n/a 8649309 5359736.9 5151581.7 3527633.5 -91508387.9 
6 Footwear 913294 2494667 2567877 16269173.2 9099820.2 3896821.51 9700195.3 -973559174.4 
7 Wood Products  24491533 6530644 6904152 38801386.8 13704595.2 13034508.46 16183704.8 31927933.1 
8 Paper Products n/a 4485961 26425696 108265807.4 37621695.4 39858527.82 48657144.3 106377917.6 
9 Publishing  5544875 5221123 4315452 49576582.4 13868844.9 35200536.43 24091706.2 22975674.9 
10 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and 
Nuclear Fuel n/a 14338040 n/a 322123549.8 1481916.6 120895114.8 265634931.4 216640567.4 
11 Chemical Products 8845343 58604340 32054619 293874557.6 150931877.5 145664781.6 127259608.6 247325677.2 
12 Rubber and Plastic Products 35896182 37460539 20645441 189758674 80160777.2 77274423.67 85192173.1 97571041.5 
13 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 56022513 90161021 153692381 300629715.4 185856562.9 181590256.7 59302496.9 195117780.9 
14 Basic Metals 7141772 35405193 72723726 64065445.6 84349380.3 90204728.28 103180076.1 -125025013.2 
15 Fabricated Metal Products 20172551 18920595 25152178 194666249.2 55698688.6 51874712 48718376.7 86012211.6 
16 Machinery and Equipment  25379662 18441900 18036709 159338110.8 83388692.2 51911426.65 55079731.9 107473858.1 
17 Office and Computing Machinery 1149 479141 829132 48247863.2 22125532.4 12398709.88 18391770.9 29540546.9 
18 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  n/a 16385869 16274801 113107614 39655700.1 -3770073.87 -106103454.9 51393951.1 
19 Communication Equipment  11223609 9665952 60779554 272308124 85749148 31516813.83 47830779.5 -7656664.8 
20 
Medical, Precision and Optical 
Instruments  512917 n/a 2970813 18550162.6 8053888.3 6286082.66 10634081.1 -90613135.7 
21 Motor Vehicles 4507867 28330337 22802186 259413944.2 114591156.4 172496262.7 154708833.7 117422513.5 
22 Other Transport Equipment 1303780 2835933 18092533 15300198.8 12354361.5 5476460.48 7319809.2 12267252.4 
23 Furniture 20385639 5095489 4480132 30467557.6 19408497.3 20076939.81 12316358.1 23613236.3 
24 Jewellery  815770 4355639 n/a 94707408.8 5555857.6 3546584.03 7297653.4 -202483229 
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Table G-3: Number of Employees at the industrial level 
 
 Industry 1990 1991 1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 2002 
          
1 Food and Beverages 299745 240137 333079 399195 376787 386021 388805 698158 
2 Tobacco  31708 22485 23863 17150 8344 13295 11883 14206 
3 Textiles 411204 276472 335330 224860 200519 225586 232594 309785 
4 Wearing Apparel 300134 227349 546636 173702 138851 178098 144450 302140 
5 Leather and Products of Leather,  12112 13400 16598 10107 21839 17754 21965 34566 
6 Footwear 17762 63262 55074 62118 55946 65553 83909 85660 
7 Wood Products  27659 44336 48187 58580 40741 56442 51965 110778 
8 Paper Products 784 17391 21495 43207 28493 36191 44093 55707 
9 Publishing  25526 32362 24021 47570 30923 48197 44221 55843 
10 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and 
Nuclear Fuel 0 2610 13965 7413 1579 3505 7986 6718 
11 Chemical Products 33666 52197 57901 93274 61158 74431 86013 119056 
12 Rubber and Plastic Products 58556 80953 100831 192242 174182 180362 189278 237329 
13 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 107262 115271 86894 153973 128200 109351 128442 169393 
14 Basic Metals 30701 47751 61387 43171 31369 38521 38177 55858 
15 Fabricated Metal Products 53364 64629 74081 129347 105852 98930 102915 175143 
16 Machinery and Equipment  65951 57707 62459 113280 94020 71559 82990 124969 
17 Office and Computing Machinery 112 1283 2105 78661 34951 42123 60686 27433 
18 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  49276 38223 39472 84860 85854 103371 112965 78927 
19 Communication Equipment  35657 35384 86174 113328 126503 102182 153417 275253 
20 
Medical, Precision and Optical 
Instruments  5472 10396 7076 25068 12643 18806 28180 33934 
21 Motor Vehicles 40870 72036 53340 107222 78142 96485 101617 105348 
22 Other Transport Equipment 3102 6072 30343 22296 16636 13496 24509 29110 
23 Furniture 32015 28578 30288 86636 72321 71732 73010 136592 
24 Jewellery  8043 33398 24040 30945 23254 33217 28479 49629 
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Appendix G – Data 
 
      Table G-4: Book value of Land at the industrial level 
 
 Industry 1998 1999 2000 2002 
      
1 Food and Beverages 37046372 48942637 49566397 77732992 
2 Tobacco  639853.9 994674.9 552365.4 383407.1 
3 Textiles 21467422 13962271 17081357 21368406 
4 Wearing Apparel 5507178 4914814 2573588 14287032 
5 Leather and Products of Leather,  1164814 1633406 1169663 5096772 
6 Footwear 2090927 1086586 4044809 3651702 
7 Wood Products  5160306 4436809 3633458 13252977 
8 Paper Products 3800274 6028758 7181979 10338176 
9 Publishing  3045590 9428560 7420480 8049962 
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 412283.7 6402891 10040493 6705845 
11 Chemical Products 9991806 14657450 19168110 23577648 
12 Rubber and Plastic Products 10740496 11985951 19117986 17750844 
13 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 53609545 94333837 40123379 45631671 
14 Basic Metals 8295307 9987567 12116655 11401758 
15 Fabricated Metal Products 8751608 13440397 9643859 23686718 
16 Machinery and Equipment  11259166 10544253 7789321 14579315 
17 Office and Computing Machinery 1164773 2078808 2964079 1340686 
18 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  5113802 5849001 7197734 6410311 
19 Communication Equipment  7345257 5677568 4993570 14039044 
20 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments  1410003 727184.9 855828.7 1726981 
21 Motor Vehicles 24998527 34227371 27241989 26585585 
22 Other Transport Equipment 2814419 1908494 1544175 2773735 
23 Furniture 8630142 13202252 4149481 6281328 
24 Jewellery  2200084 1506835 3345168 4086328 
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      Table G-5: Book value of Machinery and Equipments at the industrial level 
 
 Industry 1998 1999 2000 2002 
      
1 Food and Beverages 121317861 68150830.81 175326319 140814903 
2 Tobacco  222878 3552344.25 3295561.8 6687798.8 
3 Textiles 57154253.9 56293922.22 245584923 66253617 
4 Wearing Apparel 9581481.2 15169821.36 3437260.5 11227422.4 
5 Leather and Products of Leather,  2405470.6 1499718.34 1030570.4 6259297.1 
6 Footwear 4448520.6 3058401.46 4147468.8 3582762 
7 Wood Products  4498829.7 4513699.71 8450503.4 8793134 
8 Paper Products 27468216.1 27040459.54 42306932.8 89063236.1 
9 Publishing  6855023 20337146.04 12053803.4 11731406.1 
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 745795.1 95347989.37 179169144 210749786.2 
11 Chemical Products 121809128 110490499.3 98786562.8 212701407.4 
12 Rubber and Plastic Products 48323152.2 55023030.66 49636383.6 55666676.5 
13 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 99710988.1 60718480.22 103088767 112899190.3 
14 Basic Metals 55985584.9 58395490.4 79741521 112184083.4 
15 Fabricated Metal Products 33879428 25941266.19 28417283.6 39751662.7 
16 Machinery and Equipment  53133154 29100038.4 35793672.7 73435286.9 
17 Office and Computing Machinery 18847804.8 7554185.36 10709931.8 25308428.7 
18 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  24892591.8 23626998.71 31896029.5 36171175.9 
19 Communication Equipment  63890530.9 21706912.53 61014480.9 100601528.1 
20 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments  5637438.2 2836002.19 4807095.8 14545025.3 
21 Motor Vehicles 64990467 104279785.3 106642523 69497309.2 
22 Other Transport Equipment 6263086.1 1742020.27 3913735.4 7176200.4 
23 Furniture 4568645.8 2560035.57 4192073.3 11051550.8 
24 Jewellery  770525.5 1774804.15 877711.9 1536854.8 
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       Table G-6: Book value of Office Appliances at the industrial level  
 
 Industry 1998 1999 2000 2002 
      
1 Food and Beverages 3303215 3546433 4949362 5858375 
2 Tobacco  5675.2 75358.46 74656.1 85180.7 
3 Textiles 1489444 765958.8 1609499 1293920 
4 Wearing Apparel 1721153 2125797 1289827 1940660 
5 Leather and Products of Leather,  135259.4 91295.07 115708.9 245170.9 
6 Footwear 702017.3 659192.4 249554 372632 
7 Wood Products  290814.2 226364.3 261504.5 303623.9 
8 Paper Products 454346 867482.4 860445.7 1767618 
9 Publishing  674459 818942.3 788670 1286579 
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 26902.2 2028558 1789970 246398.9 
11 Chemical Products 2245841 2907675 4540424 3190010 
12 Rubber and Plastic Products 4855236 1764922 2219099 2592334 
13 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 5967916 1804387 1507459 2466865 
14 Basic Metals 980112.5 732343.3 1366359 2071466 
15 Fabricated Metal Products 1604216 861144.9 1022274 2361101 
16 Machinery and Equipment  2065362 1483121 3098511 4864354 
17 Office and Computing Machinery 290402 545298.2 706057.2 869513.8 
18 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  1944769 1748946 1466660 1981113 
19 Communication Equipment  4011885 1289503 3504601 3733799 
20 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments  418979 165747.8 805149.1 1436469 
21 Motor Vehicles 5597253 8496112 6059710 10172919 
22 Other Transport Equipment 246557.3 387677.4 296717.7 241726.3 
23 Furniture 510065.8 293195.1 366602 539072.9 
24 Jewellery  342836.7 159910.4 723428.3 807990.8 
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